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Henri Naus Bey: Retrieving the Biography of a Belgian Industrialist in Egypt

by

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In memory of Gabriel Baer

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As a fully-fledged book this study of Henri Naus was unforeseen. It started from mere curiosity, the beginning of which I can accurately date. My academic interest in the modern history of Egypt had taken me there, in January 1979, on the first of many regular visits. On my way from the airport to downtown Cairo I was struck by the bizarre view of a phantasy Bhuddist-baroque style palace, which — as I would soon find out — was the “Villa Hindoue” constructed by Baron Empain in 1910. Somewhat later I read two studies which further aroused my interest in Belgium’s economic involvement in Egypt. One was Robert Ilbert’s book on Heliopolis; the other one was an article on the activities of foreigners in Egypt by Robert Tignor, which laid much emphasis on the Belgians. In the background there was also my connection as a radio commentator for the Belgian Broadcasting Corporation BRTN (today VRT).

When I first started to look for relevant material on Empain, and the activities of his and other economic groups in archives in Brussels and London, I expected to find more than I did. I had encountered the name of Henri Naus Bey a few times and, gradually, I became more interested in his role in Egypt. It occurred to me that somebody by the name Naus had been a Belgian customs official in the service of the Shah of Iran. It was a logical move to read the study dedicated to him by Annette Destrée a few years earlier. Yet, there was still scant information on Henri Naus himself, reference to whom could almost solely be found in footnotes of scholarly works. Not surprisingly, his name crops up more frequently in the French, rather than in the English secondary literature, while he is almost completely absent from the Arabic sources: this is a consequence of his belonging to the Francophone élite of foreign residents. There is, moreover, a certain bias in the English language sources on Egypt, as they generally tend to emphasize political and military aspects, as well as cotton issues, which were Britain’s major economic concern. The sugar company, of which Henri Naus became the Director General, however, was one of the very large, but usually consciously focused, French interests in Egypt, along with the Suez Canal and the “Crédit Foncier”. These have been the object of a study by Samir Saul, which was published just before I completed my manuscript.

It was a series of trial and error telephone calls which put me on the right track in Brussels in 1992. I started to call the first of a number of Naus entries in the telephone directory, and I was almost immediately successful, being referred to Guy Naus, whom I would describe as the family historian, living near Antwerp. A few hours later, he received me most kindly in his home. I was made “familiar” with the basic life-story of Henri Naus, and referred to his

daughter Marie-Rose, who was kind enough in 1993 to receive me in Lausanne and answer my questions.

Since then I searched, besides my other interests in Egyptian history, for more material from which I was able to slowly retrieve Henri Naus Bey's biography. This project somehow provided a welcome distraction from the socio-Islamic topics, which I usually research. The more I read about Naus' activities and his ideas, the more I became convinced that a scholarly study was in place.

The result of my research, indeed, pertains to some important, at first sight, loosely connected, chapters in the social and economic history of Egypt: the role of the Belgian community, the sugar industry, and the Federation of Industries, all of which stand clearly related to Henri Naus. Though the term *retrieval* smacks of an outdated positivist approach to history, and though a narrative had to be constructed from a wide range of sources, my questions also pertained to aspects of historical discourse: why did Naus become a forgotten personality and, with him, the role of the Belgians in Egypt? Inevitably, this led me to consider, and re-consider, present-day Egyptian views on the above aspects of Egypt's modern history.

Still, I hesitated for some time whether and how to finalize this study. From the outset, it was not my intention to re-write the economic history of the foreign residential bourgeoisie in Egypt, or to produce a tract defending the nature of its economic involvement. But when I gradually discovered more and more unexpected traits — unexpected by me at least — in Naus' thoughts and activities, which somehow contradicted the usual image of an exploitative, selfish and isolated class of entrepreneurs, I concluded that some redressing of the balance was in place. Naus was too involved in the Egyptian economy, and even at different levels of Egyptian society, for me to simply discard his story as another example of Imperialist self-interest: not a few of his activities were directed at the well-being of Egypt, and some of his achievements were of lasting significance.

While comparatively many studies have focused on the economic history of the foreign residential community in Egypt, much less attention has been paid to the social and human aspects of their activities and environment, and to their perceptions on development in the country, which many of these foreigners considered to be their adopted fatherland. In order to fill this gap, at least as a primary, partial contribution, I have attempted to sketch and interpret Naus' biography as a social history. I wished I could have found more specific material from and on Naus himself, but his case differs little from so many of his contemporaries. Given the fast-evolving exodus of foreigners from Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s (including Naus' relatives), and its political circumstances, it is not surprising that the source materials are not as rich as could be expected. Much of the picture had to be pieced together from sources scattered over a host of libraries and archives. Even the posthumous *Recueil* of Naus' speeches, for instance, was available only from the Library of Congress in Washington. If the

final result of my research tilts towards economic issues, it proves that with regard to a topic like this, social and economic history remain inevitably intertwined.

Thus, the nucleus of this work is formed by the narrative of Naus' activities at the helm of the Egyptian sugar company as well as of the Federation of Industries. In addition, an attempt is made to discuss his world of ideas against the background of the shifting relationship between the foreign residential bourgeoisie and an economically self-asserting Egyptian élite. Around these two circles, a third one is constructed; it seeks to interpret the ways in which Naus' activities were and are being considered in Egypt itself.

My debts and thanks in writing this book are at least seven-tiered. Firstly, they are due to a number of archives and libraries and their personnel: the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade in Brussels, the Archives of the Royal Palace in Brussels, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, and the "Centre des Archives Diplomatiques" in Nantes, and the Public Record Office in London. Also to the "Koninklijke Bibliotheek" in Brussels, and the libraries of the "Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen" in Amsterdam and the "Koninklijke Nederlandse Vereniging voor Taal- en Volkenkunde" in Leiden, the library of the American University in Cairo, the National and Hebrew University Library in Jerusalem, and, of course, the library of the University of Haifa. I gratefully acknowledge receipt of some useful material from the Eridania Béghin-Say Company.

Secondly, I would like to thank Mr Guy Naus in Belgium, as well as Mrs Marie-Rose Naus, for patiently answering my questions on her father's and her own life, and both of them for putting some records at my disposal. Interviewing close relatives is not always easy for either side, and the historian's interpretation of the subject matter may differ at some points from views held by the family. I do wish to assure them that I have been solely guided by academic research interests — and hopefully by a correct professional methodology. I also would like to thank Dr Mekhitarian, erstwhile secretary to the "Fondation Elisabeth" in Brussels, for filling me in on the personality of Henri Bey.

Thirdly, I am very grateful to a number of colleagues who made valuable comments on an earlier draft of this study: the late Professor P. J. Vatikiotis, Professor Robert Tignor, and Professor Annette Donckier-Destrée. In addition, Samir Raafat in Cairo, as a journalist, writer and historian, probably unequalled in his knowledge of the period; he has my deep gratitude, not only for reading the first draft, but also for the insights he imparted on me over the past few years, as well as for constant encouragement. Dr Yoram Meital, too, made a number of useful comments on the first draft. Particular thanks are due to my *collega proximus*, Professor Gad Gilbar, who read both the first and later versions, and who saved me from at least some pitfalls in the interpretation of economic history. However, I immediately add the customary but sincere proviso, that for any errors and misconceptions which may remain, I am solely to blame.

Furthermore, I would like to thank the Braunstein family, who, as long as their tour of duty in Cairo lasted, hosted me during my research trips.

I was fortunate to be the recipient of an "Invitation en France" scholarship, which enabled me to complete my research in Paris and Nantes in the summer of 1997. For this I wish to express my special thanks to Mr Alexandre Defay, the Cultural Councillor at the Embassy of France in Tel-Aviv.

Thanks are due also to Mrs Marion Lupo for her usual punctilious and sensitive editing, and to Mr Ady Fischer for solving — at the last moment — some complicated computer problems. I am also grateful to the Royal Academy of Overseas Sciences in Brussels for awarding me their prize for 1998 and for making the publication of this work possible.

And, last but not least, though I have tried very hard not to let my research and writing interfere with the lives of Tamar, Zwi and Aran, I apologize for those moments when it could not be otherwise. They must know, however, that their patience and moral support have meant very much to me.

SUMMARY

Although he may not have been as well known in Belgium as his father Joseph Naus, who had attained cabinet rank in Iran at the turn of the century, Henri Naus played a prominent role in the Egyptian economy during the first four decades of the 20th century. Post-revolutionary writings in Egypt have, however, by and large, ignored him. This study, relying on a variety of sources, is an attempt to "retrieve" the story of his life in Egypt.

Born in Hasselt in 1875, Henri Naus started his professional career as a technician on a Java sugar plantation, and was engaged in 1902 by the "Société Générale des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie d'Egypte", a giant agro-industrial concern mainly in the hands of French shareholders, which enjoyed a virtual monopoly on sugar production in Egypt. He started his career as manager of a sugar factory in Upper Egypt.

Highly susceptible to world market fluctuations, for decades the sugar industry led a precarious economic existence. By importing a new variety of sugar cane from the Dutch East Indies (POJ 105), Naus achieved a breakthrough. Moreover, in 1905, he helped to stave off a crisis in the Sucreries of which he somewhat later became the Director General. The First World War saw large profits.

During the war he was a member of the "Commission du Commerce et de l'Industrie", which outlined Egypt's new economic course. The Commission was headed by Isma'il Sidqi, who was later to become a controversial Prime Minister (1930-1933).

Together with other foreign resident industrialists, and only a few Egyptians, Naus founded the Egyptian Federation of Industries in 1922. He served as its President until his death in 1938. Over the years more and more Egyptian industrialists joined the Federation. As an economic pressure group, the Federation successfully pressed for a protectionist customs tariff, which superseded Egypt's earlier Free Trade principles of British origin. The new tariff introduced in 1930 proved, in fact, to be a turning-point in Egypt's industrial history. In 1931 Naus was able to conclude a convention with the government. This stabilized the Sucreries' existence but also gave the government a larger share in its control.

Though reserved on progressive labour legislation, Naus proved himself to be an outspoken supporter of industrialization for the sake of Egypt's development. In a sense, he saw Egypt as his adopted fatherland. Naus never became directly involved in politics, but consistently supported Egypt's political emancipation.

Naus became involved as a director in a great number of foreign and mixed stock-companies, including some of the largest Belgian interests: Belgian investments in Egypt had ranked third after the French and British in 1900, and

remained considerable throughout the period. The Belgian “colony” in Egypt, however, never numbered more than a few hundred residents.

On the public level, Naus was active in favour of the Egyptian University, the Red Crescent, the “Association Internationale d’Assistance Publique” (a pioneering medical first-aid organization), the “Fondation Egyptologique Reine Elisabeth” and other charitable organizations.

At the time of his death in 1938, most of the shares of the Sucreries were already in the hands of Ahmad ‘Abbud Pasha, an Egyptian tycoon. One might say that Naus was overtaken by a process of “indigenation”. Though a street in Cairo was named after him, his memory as well as that of many others of the erstwhile foreign élite in Egypt, was deliberately glossed over by the Revolution of 1952.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

No one method of transliteration from Arabic is academically satisfying. All consistency leads to the devil, as my father used to say. I have adopted a simplified standard system, omitting diacritical marks and distinctions between long and short vowels, but maintaining the apostroph for the 'ayn. Well-known geographical names (e.g. Cairo) have been spelled the usual English way. This applies also to some names of persons. On the other hand, I have used the Arabic term *fallahin* for peasants, and *faddan* (0.4201 hectare) as the Egyptian surface measure. £E stands for the Egyptian Pound.

1. Introduction

While many aspects of 20th century Egyptian social history have become well-documented, properly researched and even vividly debated, some gaps in our literature persist. These are mostly caused by political vicissitudes in Egypt and by related alternating research perspectives. Much of the writing on the interwar period in Egypt itself and also in Western academia has, for a long time, been preoccupied with the transition from the “feudalist” *ancien régime* to the “radical” revolutionary change after 1952. For some decades, Western-Imperialist or capitalist interests, or even the participation of foreigners in the Egyptian economy, could hardly be depicted in a positive light. In this way lacunae were created, which we would define as “history deliberately ignored” [1]*.

The following sketch of the life of Henri Naus Bey is an attempt to retrieve the biography of an early “captain of industry” against the background of Egypt’s social and economic history. In some respects, it is the story of an enthusiastic industrialist overtaken by the political, economic, and ideological developments of his lifetime. It is also the story of a personality who has been largely ignored in post-1952 Egypt, and who remains virtually unknown in Belgium, his country of origin. Interestingly, the real achievements of both Henri Naus in Egypt and the controversial career of his father Joseph in Iran, are, each in their own way, linked to the modern history of the Middle East but have been played down, if not deliberately ignored, by local nationalist historiography in both Egypt and Iran.

Though Henri Naus belonged to the era of capitalist expansion outside Europe, and successfully worked himself up from the position of a foreign technician to a wealthy industrialist, resident in Egypt, it would be misleading to depict him as an archetypical Imperialist stalwart, or a representative of the exploitative “feudal class” [2]. True, the massive foreign involvement in Egypt’s early stages of industrialization was a mixed bag of blessings and curses — its ultimate weight depending on one’s vantage point. But as we will attempt to show, Henri Naus entertained, in addition to some conservative ideas, a strong, even idealistic, commitment to the economic advancement of Egypt. In any case, Naus, who closely cooperated with many local Egyptian industrialists and investors in what we would call today “joint ventures”, did not oppose the gradual Egyptianization or indigenation process which marked the interwar economic scene.

There is a relative lack of systematic research on the human exponents of foreign capitalist involvement in Egypt (and other Middle Eastern countries as well) for which one may adduce additional explanations [3]. One is the fact that the large “foreign resident” or “cosmopolitan” industrial and commercial élite

* The numbers in brackets [] refer to the notes at the end of each chapter.




Fig. 1. — Map of Egypt. Prepared by Daphna Stern, University of Haifa.

was forced to leave in the 1950s and the early 1960s, within a rather short span of time, often hastily, without taking too many belongings or papers. Their properties were sequestered and then nationalized, and they themselves were often slandered. Dispersed and trying to re-establish themselves in London, Paris or Geneva, only a few of them were able to write their memoirs, and then mostly in a family-biographic or literary vein. Possibly also because they did not wish to be identified with the abuses and corruption of the *ancien régime* and its dominant élites. Only fairly recently, in Egypt, have the various aspects of the period of the Monarchy become discussable again.

Another explanation lies in the scholarly attention which, until recent decades, was directed towards the political aspects of 19th and 20th century Egyptian history. Fortunately, an increasing number of studies in the field of economic history have significantly redressed the balance, and have also shifted focus from a "British" to an "international" era in Egypt [4]. With the previously heavy emphasis on dominant British involvement, and in particular on sources in the English language, it has often been forgotten that the non-Egyptian part of the population, or what has been called the foreign residential bourgeoisie, consisted of a motley of cosmopolitan communities, the main network of communication, press, and cultural orientation of which was Francophone [5]. Consequently, the writing of social and economic history cannot but heavily rely on French language sources [6].

The story of Henri Naus requires the preliminary discussion of three seemingly unconnected elements: the history of the sugar industry in Egypt, the presence of Belgians, and the family background of Henri Naus himself. Let us first elaborate on these.

1.1. THE MODERN SUGAR INDUSTRY IN EGYPT: A PRECARIOUS BUSINESS

While Egypt, at first sight, enjoyed a number of favourable circumstances for the cultivation of sugar cane, such as the right climatic conditions, a fertile soil, sufficient water for irrigation, and abundant manpower, it would not be erroneous to state that the branch remained precarious for many decades. Certain schools of economic thought could even question its *raison d'être* or need for survival. This is important to remember when discussing Naus' efforts and achievements.

The modern sugar industry in Egypt has been the object of an outstanding book by Jean Mazuel, as well as of a number of more recent scholarly studies [7]. While some basic elements from earlier studies are inevitably repeated here, we have been able to use additional sources, as well as archives, in order to reconstruct the conditions under which Henri Naus worked in Egypt.

One of the constant features in the struggle to keep the sugar industry alive is its need to cope with external market forces. Egypt was not alone in producing

sugar and, as long as Free Trade was the rule, foreign competition was an overwhelmingly important factor. As the Cuban War proved, a temporary shortage of sugar on the world market could create favourable economic conditions, but once the war was over, a dangerous slump was the result. Paradoxically, Egypt had earlier, after the American Civil War, experienced a similar economic swing with regard to cotton which had then encouraged Khedive Isma'il to turn to sugar cane cultivation. In fact, sugar and cotton would remain in a seesaw motion for many decades: high cotton prices generally reduced the acreage under sugar cane [8].

For modern sugar factories, an adequate supply is another condition for profitability. The cultivation of sugar cane is a seasonal affair, which is followed by a short production season of 3-4 months only: sowing takes place in February and March, harvesting from mid-December till mid-March, after which the cane has to be crushed and processed as soon as possible. In Isma'il's times factories worked for two periods of 50-55 days, interrupted by a 40-45 day crystallization break. A limited supply to the Upper Egyptian factories meant low profits or none at all. This was all the more true for the modern refining plant at Hawamdiyya, which was economically dependent on a constant supply of raw sugar [9].

Hence, the number of sugar mills fluctuated over the years: there were temporary closures for reasons of economy, but the construction of new factories in more prosperous times. During the crisis of 1905, which will be discussed below, only three factories were in operation, while there had been twelve before. However, the average number of modern sugar factories in operation appears to have hovered around nine [10].

Another essential condition required is a quick and efficient transport to nearby crushing-mills. Hence the importance of local railways. Due to its centre of gravity in Upper Egypt, no industry in Egypt was as dependent as that of sugar on the national railway system.

The sugar content of cane tends to decline within 24 hours after cutting it from the fields. Arriving at the factories, yields are not only assessed according to weight in tons, but have to be measured for sugar content too [11]. Generally, in Egypt this varied from 11-12 %. Hence the importance of the location of the sugar factory relatively close to the fields, as well as of the agricultural railway system which will be discussed below. A sugar refinery, which dissolves and reboils granulated sugar in order to arrive at a more purified, white sugar, has a more logical place near an urban centre, where larger quantities are consumed. A refinery also demands large quantities of fuel supply. This was the case of the Hawamdiyya factory in Badrashin, some 20 km south of Cairo, the founding of which will be discussed below [12].

In Egypt, during the period under consideration, there was every reason to look for possibilities to increase cultivation and production, and not only by a simple acquisition of technology from abroad. Also the location of the fields and

the factories, along the strip of hundreds of kilometres beside the Nile in Upper Egypt, were of utmost importance. The cultivation of the sugar cane demands an average temperature of 27-38 °C. Night temperatures should not fall below 13-11 °C, as "frost" may destroy the plant. In the Fayum, for instance, sugar cane had been tried and proven a failure [13]. Gradually, a preference developed for the hottest, *i.e.* the most southern districts of Egypt.

As sugar cane varieties tend to degenerate over times and become more prone to disease, agricultural research and development is called for. Research into sugar cane, along with the development of scientific and experimental agriculture in general, became practicably feasible and economically necessary towards the end of the 19th century. An important breakthrough, achieved almost simultaneously in Barbados and Java around 1888, pertained to the laboratory reproduction of sugar cane varieties from seeds [14]. From then onwards we see the emergence of experimental farms in the world's leading sugar cane areas. The first scientific articles on sugar cane cultivation in Egypt itself, by a French expert, Ventre Pasha, saw light in 1888 [15]. Research would become a regular activity of the Egyptian Sucreries ever since 1894, predating the experimental farms of the (then still) "Société Khédiviale d'Agriculture", which had started its activities around 1898-1900. The company had chemical laboratories attached to its factories in Upper Egypt. The main purpose was to locate the variety with the highest possible sugar content. Irrigation techniques, combatting plant diseases and parasites, and manure were other concerns. In fact, Naus himself published research articles on the effects of the feared Borer parasite [16].

Naus repeatedly proposed the establishment of a specialized experimental sugar cane station, assisted by botanists and chemists, and even hinted to the "Société Khédiviale d'Agriculture" that the Sucreries would be prepared to bear part of the costs [17]. Such a station would come into being in 1910 in Giza. Obviously Naus had reason to assume that sugar production could still be improved. In a communication to the British irrigation expert William Willcocks he proudly remarked that the Sucreries' own cultivation at Nag' Hammadi yielded "nearly double the natives' average" [18].

Remarkably enough, cane cultivation held its own in Egypt, never giving way to beet sugar, which had been crucial for the development of the continental European sugar industry. One might advance economic arguments in favour of beet, which occupies the field for a much shorter period than cane. But early experiments had created prejudices, not in the least at the Sucreries, and these were only reinforced by the outbreak of diseases and other mishaps [19]. However, only since about 1978 (!) beet has been grown and processed in the Delta areas of Egypt to comply with the increasing local demand for sugar.

From the foregoing paragraphs, it is evident that cane cultivation demands not only favourable climatic and economic conditions, but also a wide array of technologies and managerial skills. From sugar cane other products could also be derived, such as molasses, in a primitive form used as sweetener, especially for

drinks; at times molasses could equally be used as fuel, or even as fodder. And from molasses, in turn, in a more sophisticated process, different degrees of alcohol could be distilled. Another by-product is the bagasse, in fact the residue of sugar cane stalks after extraction of the juice, which could be used as industrial combustible [20]. Chemical know-how and constant experimentation were therefore a basic feature of the industry, as is also proven by a 121-page production compendium published by the Sucreries in 1918 [21]. In short, the sugar industry was a large and sophisticated agro-industrial complex.

Though economic studies generally pay little attention to the consumption of sugar and its history in Egypt, this is a factor to take into account as well. Sugar was used for the preparation of various sherbets, or to sweeten *kunafa* (the traditional pasta) and *fatira* pastries, but not coffee; in the 19th century honey and raisins still often substituted for it. We have to bring into discussion the differential patterns of consumption in rural and urban communities. Rural families could use honey, or crush their own cane in a primitive way. In early 19th century urban environments, however, families used, according to the estimate of the British scholar Edward Lane, about a *qantar* (45 kg) of sugar per annum, which amounted to a rather small percentage of their budget. Sugar imports in the early 19th century, however, were already considerable, which made the establishment of new local factories attractive. Some of the sugar produced domestically was red sugar, still unrefined, with a saccharine content of only 85 % - 98 %. Urban consumers, however, would increasingly buy refined, white crystal sugar, becoming available also in the form of cubes and so-called sugar breads, in their typical conic form [22]. Yet, for a long time, the “*mélasseries*” continued to exist. The term may be misleading, because these were in reality small sugar mills, with a very limited production of sugar syrup. These were generally owned by *fallahin* for their own consumption needs, and not factories working larger quantities of molasses (the dark syrup, which is a by-product of the refining process) [23].

Thus, sugar consumption went up from the 19th century onwards, and, especially in the cities, in the 20th century. This was a result of increasing urbanization and — with some interruptions — of a rising standard of living. A rising level of sugar consumption has sometimes been seen as an indicator of wealth. Though such a conclusion is arguable from an economic point of view, it was, at the time, shared by Henri Naus himself [24].

1.2. THE RISE OF A GIANT: THE “SOCIETE GENERALE DES SUCRERIES”

Like so much else, the modern sugar industry in Egypt is said to have started with Muhammad ‘Ali. We emphasize the word *modern*, as we should not forget that Egypt and the Levant in medieval times had a prosperous and high quality sugar-manufacturing industry which lasted until the discovery of the New World

and it being overtaken by European competitors. Some remnants of production methods and expertise survived, but the quality of the sugar produced fell much below the standard for which the region had once been so famous [25].

The modern sugar industry in Egypt, as embodied in the Société Générale des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie, and as come under the management of Henri Naus, was the outcome of combined local and foreign opportunities and initiatives, technological innovations, as well as a series of business mergers, which presented themselves during the second half of the 19th century. It was the “unique grande industrie du pays”, according to a recent extensive study on French interests in Egypt [26].

While Muhammad 'Ali initially built only three modern sugar factories and later added another four, Isma'il was at one time involved in twenty-two. It is generally assumed that, after a peak in world cotton prices due to the American Civil War (1861-1865), and the slump that followed, the Khedive sought to diversify his economic ventures. His sugar ventures included cane cultivation on the lands of his Da'ira Saniyya — private estates which belonged to his family —, as well as the founding of sugar factories in a number of Upper Egyptian locations, such as Biba, Maghagha, Matay, Minya, Abu Qurqas, Rawda, Dab'iyya, Armant, and Mata'ina, eleven altogether at the time he was deposed [27]. The Da'ira also owned the connecting cargo railway tracks in Upper Egypt, complete with rolling stock for the transport of sugar canes, and “droits de passage”. Isma'il lost his Da'ira Saniyya lands (some 400,000 *faddans*, 168,000 hectares, mostly in Upper Egypt) and his factories between 1865 and 1879, when they were pledged as collateral for the loans he was forced to contract, and to be administered by international creditors. Soon afterwards, they passed to the control of the Egyptian government, which lasted till about 1898. Unfortunately, the Da'ira Saniyya as an economic concern has not yet been systematically researched; the main emphasis of research has fallen on the scope of its landed property (which was sold between October 1905 and March 1906) [28].

Though for the growing of this “summer crop” there was in principle an abundance of water available, supplied by the Nile, it nevertheless called for a sophisticated irrigation network, by means of basin or perennial irrigation systems. The addition of pumps, canals, basins and dams were of vital importance. Though the building of the first Aswan Dam (1898-1901) might first come to mind here — with a British eye to the cotton economy —, an earlier large project, nowadays somewhat forgotten, had been connected to the production of sugar: the 267 kilometre-long Ibrahimiyya Canal, from Asyut to Ishmirit in the Bani Suwayf area, was dug from around 1867, and opened in 1873, especially for this purpose. Both the Da'ira Saniyya administration and the “Sucreries de la Haute Egypte”, from an early stage onwards, had powerful pumping stations, one even with 500 h.p., at their disposal near the sugar fields in Upper Egypt.

Some of Isma'il's sugar factories were described by 'Ali Mubarak in his unequalled topographic encyclopaedia *al-Khitat al-Tawfiqiyya al-Jadida*. He

meticulously surveyed the areas under sugar cane, the irrigation pumps, the transport by camels and barges (some tugged by steamboats) and increasingly by railways, the — then undoubtedly sensational — electric lighting in the factories enabling night shifts during the season, and the equipment (mostly imported from France) and production capacity in general. There are entries on such diverse small Upper Egyptian localities as Bahjura, Armant, Bani Mazar, Rawda, Shaykh Fadl, Dab'iyya, Samalut, Mata'ina, and Matay. Some produced white granulated sugar, others brown sugar of different grades; also molasses and some spirit were extracted. In Armant, Dab'iyya and Matay, Frenchmen were involved in the sugar factories, apparently as investors as well as engineers, and in Bani Mazar some Englishmen. What stands out is the agricultural supervision by the Da'ira Saniyya's *Diwan al-Taftish* [29]. However, by 1878, Isma'il's optimism had been dashed: only ten of these factories were still in operation, and the volume of production was disappointing. On the other hand, the white and brown sugar produced was said to be of superior quality and, therefore, much in demand among champagne manufacturers abroad [30].

Nevertheless, the 1880s and 1890s saw new business ventures. A temporary surge in the demand for sugar led to the founding of new sugar factories by local and French investors. In 1881 the sugar refinery in Hawamdiyya was established by a group led jointly by the Suares family and additional Jewish and Greek investors in Egypt, and a Frenchman named Baron Delort de Leon. The Suares brothers, Felix, Raphael and Joseph, Jews of Italian origin, were already cooperating with French interests in the "Crédit Foncier" mortgage bank, founded in 1880. It is difficult to determine whether their interest in the sugar branch was somehow related to an earlier tradition of Sefardic Jews in that field. 'Ali Mubarak, collecting his material in the early 1880s, mentions only in passing that a new sugar factory was established in Badrashin — as the place was known then —, a village where most inhabitants still lived from agriculture, but which also had an ammunition industry. The refinery, which produced white crystal sugar, would soon become the crown of the Egyptian sugar industry. Its production processes were considered to be most scientific and sophisticated. The refinery also had 14 km of a railway at its disposal [31]. Even in 1950 it was still considered to be the largest sugar factory in the world [32].

In any case, in 1891 the Suares group formed the "Société Générale des Sucreries de la Haute Egypte", which soon built the modern factories on Da'ira Saniyya plots at Shaykh Fadl (1892) and Nag' Hammadi (1895), the latter being officially opened by Prince Yusuf Kamal. These factories were technologically much more sophisticated than those of the Da'ira Saniyya, and were managed by French engineers. The Nag' Hammadi factory, where Henri Naus would start his Egyptian career a few years later, was called: "la plus importante, sans conredit, de toutes celles qui existent dans le monde". The business partner of the Suares family in this venture was the Henry Say company which, at that stage, held a third of the shares. The Say company was the leading French sugar pro-

ducer. It had been operating technologically advanced refineries in France from 1832, and also owned the largest such refinery in Paris. In about the same ownership proportion, initially one third, it also acquired a share of control in the "Société de la Sucrierie-Raffinerie d'Égypte". The latter had been set up in 1893 to enlarge the Hawamdiyya refinery, and to equip it with a short railway track from its Nile quay. Meanwhile, the local Say company placed its shares on the Paris stock exchange [33].

The board of the new company was presided over by the Suares brothers, but we find also other prominent Jewish names: Joseph Aslan Cattaoui and Moïse Cattaoui, Simon Rolo, as well as three French directors. Cattaoui, in time one of Egypt's ablest financiers and the only Jew ever to attain the position of government minister, was trained in France as a civil engineer. He may have met Ernest Cronier (whose role is to be discussed below) while studying at the famous "Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées". In any case, we find his name also among the directors of the mother company, Henry Say, in France. It would appear that the new company made handsome profits [34].

Here, a digression on the sugar industry in France is required. The Napoleonic wars, and in particular the Continental System, had given a boost to the cultivation of sugar beets. Indeed, from the mid-18th century onwards techniques had been developed to extract sugar from beets equal in substance to cane sugar. In 19th century Europe, sugar beet defeated sugar cane, decisively so from 1870 onwards. This was largely due to government subsidies. However, on a global scale, sugar cane recovered its predominance from 1900 onwards [35].

The 19th century had also seen new technological advances in the industrial production of sugar, especially in France. Steam engines and mills, new filtering and purification techniques, the introduction of vacuum boiling pans, centrifuges, as well as faster transport and more efficient mechanics were of great significance. But it was above all the use of scientific chemistry (e.g. the use of electrolysis, sulphuric acid), the large-scale application of which was enhanced by inventors such as Steffen and Drucker, which encouraged the industry towards the end of the century. New measuring devices, such as the refractrometer (1877), also led to a great qualitative improvement in the production of sugar. At the same time, larger and more specialized factories came into being in Europe, but also — with metropolitan capital investments — in the West Indies. Also a process of lowering costs, especially in Europe, took place [36].

This explains why from the outset of its modernization in the 19th century, French technology has played an important role in the Egyptian sugar industry. Innovations reached Egypt surprisingly quickly. Clot Bey, in his description of Egypt in 1840, hinted that at least one of Muhammad 'Ali's sugar factories, that at Rayramun near Minya, though managed by a British expert, was a copy of those in use in the Antilles. Under Ibrahim (1848), and even more so under Khedive Isma'il (1863-1879), up-to-date machinery was ordered from France [37].

Until about 1875 France was Europe's largest producer of sugar, but she was then overtaken by German and Austrian competition. This, in turn, led to protective measures by the French government which at the same time greatly stimulated local production, and caused tension with competing sugar-producing countries. This led to an unprecedented crisis on the world market, ultimately necessitating the Brussels convention of 1902 [38].

It would seem that the number of small refineries in France declined between 1850 and 1890 as the export of refined sugar became restricted. This caused French producers to look for investments abroad. One set up a refinery in Ancona in 1891, but the case of the Henry Say company, turning to Egypt, is more relevant to us. Say entered the sugar transformation business in Egypt in 1892 with a global business strategy: to increase its total production and, at the same time, to try and stave off competition from both southern French rivals (Marseilles, for instance, which used cane imported from the West Indies), and from Austria and Germany [39].

The Henry Say concern in France came to be dominated by a civil engineer — another professional trained at the “Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées” —, by the name of Ernest Cronier, who had entered into its employment in 1873. By 1877 he had already reached the position of “Administrateur Délégué” of the Say mother company and, in 1899, following the death of Henry Say himself, although being required to liquidate the company in favour of the heirs, he became in fact its sole director [40].

Upon becoming president also of the Egyptian company, the “Sucreries et Raffineries d’Egypte”, which he considered as an Egyptian daughter of the Say concern, Cronier sent a letter of thanks to the French Minister in Cairo — as the title of the French Diplomatic Agents and Consuls-General ran — for the latter’s support of French interests. Cronier hinted not only at the soil and climatic conditions in Egypt, but also explained that the new production methods applied in Shaykh Fadl enabled his company to produce raw sugar more cheaply than anywhere else, and to compete with Austrian exports. One may also understand that the factories in Egypt produced in seasons which alternated with those of the company’s factories in Paris and Marseilles [41].

After several internal changes in the company, Cronier became the president of the “Société Anonyme des Raffineries et Sucrerie Say” in 1898, and made a huge personal capital out of it, to the extent that he was nicknamed “le roi des sucres”. At the turn of the century, in France, he was said to rule over 240,000 hectares of land under sugar beets, and 292 manufacturers, and to have amassed a fortune of 25 million francs. By that time, we ought to remember the Cuban War and events in the Philippines had resulted in a global situation favourable for sugar cane.

In 1897 the “Société Générale des Sucreries de la Haute Egypte” and the “Société des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie d’Egypte” merged into the “Société Générale des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie d’Egypte”, which deal confirmed the

predominance of French capital. The merger was officially announced on 1 May 1897 following a shareholders meeting [42]. These were years of great optimism. The well-known British expert on irrigation W. Willcocks, writing in 1899 on the prospects of sugar cane, estimated that especially the "very large factory" at Nag' Hammadi would be able to produce 30,000 tons of sugar, double the volume of Shaykh Fadl, depending of course on sufficient supply [43].

But soon after, from about 1901 or 1902, when the Cuban and Philippines wars were being forgotten, world sugar prices began to fall again. A cane shortage ensued as cultivators turned to cotton, and five private sugar companies were forced out of business. In fact, the Da'ira Saniyya factories had been in trouble ever since 1895 owing to declining sugar prices; from about 1898 falling profits had been officially reported. It is not entirely clear whether all factories were in the red but, after more than two decades, their machinery was said to be in need of replacement. It turned out that, ever since the transfer of the factories and other property of the bankrupt Khedive Isma'il to the comprehensive Da'ira Saniyya corporation, their operations had remained in a precarious state. International competition weighed heavily on the sugar industry. The 8 % *ad valorem* tariff offered hardly any protection to the Egyptian industry. For the very same reason, large sugar exporters in Austria rejoiced at the open Egyptian market [44].

It seems that from 1894 onwards Cronier had been interested in the purchase of the Da'ira Saniyya properties. For this he even enjoyed the support of the French Minister in Cairo who viewed such a transaction as beneficial to French influence in Egypt. However, the Minister considered that the purchase could not materialize without the support of the "Crédit Foncier" [45]. By 1898, the powerful British Agent and Consul-General, Lord Cromer, had become convinced that the Da'ira Saniyya properties should be sold off. An additional factor, allegedly, was the refusal by the European powers of a loan to finance a new campaign in the Sudan. Under these circumstances several bankers stepped in, among them Suares and the British-Jewish financier Ernest Cassel. Cassel then founded the Daira Sanieh Company — in fact a British syndicate — in order to purchase the Da'ira Saniyya properties [46].

In what, in fact, became an intricate two-tiered hire-purchase agreement, the Daira Sanieh Sugar Corporation was formed in 1902. The express purpose of this procedure was to facilitate the sale of the nine remaining Da'ira sugar factories to the "Société Générale des Sucreries". The first lump sum amounted to £ 944,800, and the "Société des Sucreries" committed itself to pay £ 56,000 twice yearly for 25 years, after which it would become the proprietor. The Daira Sanieh Sugar Corporation was duly registered in London on 11 November 1902. While technical improvements had been implied in the agreement, the technical management remained, for the time being, in the hands of the Say refinery company. A new arrangement of the Sucreries capital and shares was worked out [47].

The 1902 take-over by a French dominated company and its subsequent reorganization make Naus' departure for Egypt more understandable [48]. The

“Société Générale des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie” had become a giant enterprise, not only by Egyptian standards. A brochure published in 1903 directed at potential European stockholders described the Société Générale’s economic prospects as promising due to three factors: firstly, the improved conditions for competition created by the recent Brussels International Sugar Convention of 1902. Secondly, in general, due to the prospects of increasing the cultivated area to come about with the new Aswan Dam and, thirdly, the above-mentioned sale of the Da’ira Saniyya factories and railways. The industry’s high level of technology, the quality of its products and its financial outlay were considered as important assets [49].

Regarding the first two assets, the brochure would prove to be too optimistic: as we will see below, Egypt did not become an adherent to the Brussels Convention because of its complex international legal status, while the Aswan Dam would enhance the cultivation of cotton rather than sugar. We will elaborate on the Sucreries’ economic difficulties below [50].

This further concentration of 1902 has commonly been referred to as the creation of a virtual monopoly on the local market held by the “Société Générale des Sucreries” in Egypt. This representation is not entirely correct, as many privately owned “mélasseries” continued to exist, catering for popular consumption of sweeteners. In fact, of those established by Muslim as well as Coptic Egyptians during the last decade of the 19th century, when prospects for the cultivation and processing of sugar cane had appeared to be favourable, some had soon been forced out of business owing to foreign competition, cheap imports, and more advanced technologies. The term *monopoly* therefore can only be applied, if we ignore the survival of 568 small “ateliers” (workshops) or “mélasseries”, focusing on the modern production methods of the “Société Générale des Sucreries” [51].

There was no doubt that the “Société Générale des Sucreries” had by any regional standards evolved into a giant industrial operation, engaging in the cultivation of sugar cane, its transport, storing, crushing, refining, as well as local marketing and import and export. Processing a mere 684,609 tons of cane in 1905-6, it reached a production of 1,578,405 tons in 1938-9. Sugar came in the form of sugar breads, cubes, powder, and candy. The trade in sugar was conducted directly with the merchants, not through the commodity exchange in Alexandria or other means. The company, however, never became a large landowner — possessing only a few small plots — but preferred to work through advance contracts with the cultivators. Renting land itself was, as a rule, also not practised, as this form of exploitation had contributed to the crisis of 1905, which will be discussed below [52].

The company owned, however, three daughter companies, the most important of which was the “Société Egyptienne d’Irrigation”, established in 1896 by Jewish entrepreneurs and purchased in 1900 with the interests of the Nag’ Hammadi factory in mind. It had installed exceptionally powerful irrigation pumps (up to

890 h.p. with a capacity of 40,000 m² per hour) at al-Darb, with additional government concessions at al-Khudayrat and Abu-'Ammar. It also possessed about 200 km of canals, all of which were of crucial importance towards the expansion of the sugar cane cultivation in the Nag' Hammadi area. Between 1901 and 1927 the sugar cane area there alone more than doubled from 4,600 to 9,731 *faddan* [53].

Two other daughter companies, however, the Keneh Company for the supply of coal, and the Ibrahimieh Ploughing Company for mechanized agriculture, did not survive for long [54]. The latter had been founded in 1904 with the purpose of giving cultivators along the Ibrahimiyya Canal certain economic incentives to grow more sugar cane, instead of cotton (e.g. by the subsidized use of steam ploughs) [55].

In 1902, the paid-up capital of the Sucreries amounted to £E 2,102,000 which turned it into, by far, the largest industrial stock company, the second-largest being the Alexandria Water Company with a capital of only £E 488,000, and the other 21 industrial companies together reaching jointly the amount of £E 3,313,000. In the following decades the Sucreries would remain the largest industrial company. For the sake of further comparison with other stock companies, the capital of the "Compagnie Universelle du Canal de Suez" amounted to £E 18,350,000 in 1902, that of the "Crédit Foncier" to £E 8,317,000, but all the other companies were less capitalized than the Sucreries [56].

The financial dimensions of the industry would remain gigantic also in later years [57]. In 1911, the "Société Générale des Sucreries", in terms of its total capital of £E 3.6 millions, was the fifth-largest company operating in Egypt, surpassed only by the "Crédit Foncier", the Suez Canal company, the Agricultural Bank of Egypt, and the Land Bank of Egypt. In 1926, its annual budget amounted to £E 2-4 millions and it was estimated that £E 5 millions had been invested in it [58]. A computation of the official statistical report on stock companies for 1939 suggests that it still held the seventh place in that year. It was then exceeded by the "Crédit Foncier", the Suez Canal Company, the National Bank, the Cairo Electric Railways, the Eastern Company, and the Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields [59].

1.3. THE BELGIANS IN EGYPT

Egypt saw a swelling influx of foreigners, which started in the last third of the 19th century, and lasted the first decades of the 20th. The régime of the Capitulations, as reinforced by its Mixed Court system, set up in 1875-6, promised legal protection and economic stability. From 1880 mortgage legislation under the aegis of the Mixed Courts seemed to add to the new investment opportunities. This was even enhanced by the forced abdication of Khedive Isma'il, and the British occupation a few years later, and all the more so after the "Entente

Cordiale" of 1904, which anchored the British presence in the rules of international law. Foreign stock companies, moreover, enjoyed even more beneficial conditions after 1908 [60].

The largest contingents of foreigners settling in the land of the Nile were Greeks, Italians and Jews (of different nationalities), but there were also French, British and others among them. Most of them came to seek economic opportunities, as entrepreneurs, investors, or as professional experts, advisors and technicians. Though any one generalization cannot give a true picture, it may be said that while French, British, and Belgian investors were important in supplying capital, Greeks and Italians, in majority, formed a sort of working middle class.

The Belgians in Egypt were one of the smallest Francophone, or for that matter, foreign communities in Egypt. While, according to 'Ali Mubarak, no more than 16,150 foreigners were living in Egypt in 1840 (out of an estimated 4,5 million or slightly less), the combined number of Swiss, Belgian, Dutch and Spanish subjects amounted to only a hundred. In 1860 there appears to have been about one hundred Belgians in Egypt; in 1879, too, their number was no more than 127. Thereafter the number of foreigners began to grow to about 90,000, out of a total population of 6.8 million, as the census of 1882 shows in broad but probably inaccurate terms. In 1897 there were already 112,000 foreigners vis-à-vis 9,622,000 Egyptians, and a high peak was reached in 1927 with at least, that is officially, 207,542 foreigners out of 14.2 million inhabitants. However, in 1896 still only 160 Belgians were said to live in Egypt, and subsequent census returns showed 256 Belgians for 1897, 340 for 1907, 400 for 1917, 481 for 1927, 471 for 1937, and 299 for 1947. As with the other foreign residents, most of these few hundred Belgians were concentrated in the main cities, Cairo and Alexandria [61].

Their small number, however, stands in stark contrast to the immense economic interests which Belgian companies had accumulated in Egypt. The scope of Belgian investments in Egypt amounted to 400 to 500 million francs in 1907, and to £E 14,294 in 1914. As a good third, they ranked below those only of France and Britain, in 1907 still in that order, and above those of Italy, Germany, Switzerland and others, which is remarkable for the relatively small *and* young state of Belgium [62]. While in 1907, 14 out of the 201 stock companies operating in Egypt were Belgian, this proportion gradually declined to a mere seven out of 243 in 1932, but even then their economic importance remained great [63].

Like so many others, the Belgians had been attracted by the sense of development élan engendered by Khedive Isma'il and the ensuing investment and business opportunities. They expected to make a profit from the rising value of land, and the protection of foreign interests by the legal, economic and fiscal advantages of the Capitulatory régime [64].

In this case too, relatively much has been written on Belgian economic interests, but almost nothing on the Belgian investors and residents themselves [65]. The main thrust of Belgian investments in Egypt was directed towards capitalist

expansion proper. The Belgians took an active part in what Roger Owen has called "the building boom of 1897 to 1907" [66]. In some Belgian minds there may have existed also a colonialist aspiration to link up their own empire in the Congo by means of a railway to the British network in Egypt and the Sudan, but there was no systematic policy on this matter and, in any event, it came to nothing [67].

With a very energetic Belgian consul in Cairo in the person of Léon Maskens, by 1907 thirty-two Belgian or Belgo-Egyptian companies were operating in Egypt. The heyday of Belgian involvement was amply documented in a report published in 1907 by Henry de Saint-Omer, a consular agent. The extensive survey details the activities and assets of these thirty odd companies, which embraced an impressive array of activities, ranging from agricultural and real-estate development companies, to railways, tramways, transport and navigation branches, construction firms, banking, breweries, hotels, and some trade ventures. His report also reveals some of the business relations and networks between various families. It is worth noting for our purpose, that the author conveniently added two companies to his survey, managed by a Belgian, namely Henri Naus, the "Société Générale des Sucreries" and the "Société Egyptienne d'Irrigation", both of which were in fact French [68]. The ambiguous relationships — and indeed rivalries — between tightly-controlled Belgian enterprises and French capital, as well as their performance on the Paris stock exchange, have recently been analysed by Samir Saul [69].

The name of Baron Empain, who built Heliopolis (and his Villa Hindoue, an eccentric pagoda-styled domicile, for himself, nowadays known as *qasr al-Barun*), and who found a last resting-place in its Cathedral, stands out. The creation of a grandiose development scheme, aptly named "Oasis" in what was then still a desert area north of Cairo, was in fact an expansion of the family's existing tramway and railway interests, of which the Paris metro was the best known. To the tramway concession, obtained in 1895, Empain added another in 1905, enabling him to construct the new suburb, connected to Cairo proper by an electric railway track. In fact, the Empains were a Belgian industrial dynasty, with similar interests even in Russia and China. But there is no doubt that in Egypt, owing to Heliopolis, Empain remains the best-known Belgian entrepreneur. Few, however, realize that President Mubarak's present working-place, the Ittihadiyya Palace, is in fact the former Heliopolis Palace Hotel [70].

But there were other important names as well: The Rolin family, for instance, who were active in the construction branch; the Lambert and Ralli families with interests in tramways, coal business and trade in general; or the Jacobs family, with roots in the "Crédit Anversois", members of which were involved in Egypt in banking, real-estate interests and agricultural development [71].

With regard to the development of Belgian interests in Egypt and the expansion of the Belgian community proper, some local families of protégés deserve special interest. Steering away from a dependence on French interests, Belgian

investors usually kept the management of their companies strictly under their own control, often maintaining their “sièges sociaux” in Brussels or Antwerp. Unlike the French, who cooperated with local Jewish entrepreneurs (as well as some other minorities), the Belgians sought out their own men of confidence. In the first place, the Eid family, of Syrian origin, ought to be mentioned. Ever since 1859 members of that family served as — the very energetic — consuls of Belgium; they obtained Belgian citizenship, developed trade, industrial and banking interests of their own, and finally settled in Belgium [72]. Though it is nowadays generally agreed that the Spanish or Portuguese term *comprador* (literally: purchaser) for local anti-nationalist forces does not apply to most of the early foreign industrialists in Egypt, the Eid family comes closest to it. Through their diligent reports to Brussels, the scope of trade between the two countries can be followed over many decades [73].

Another local family with a close Belgian connection was that of Boghos Nubar, descendants of the prominent Armenian Prime Minister Nubar of Khedive Isma'il. Boghos had been instrumental for Empain in his Heliopolis project, but there were other business connections as well. A Belgian ramification still exists, one of Arakil Boghos' children having married into Belgian nobility [74]. Also, at a lower level, the Belgian connections of the Shakur family, or the (Coptic) Bishara family, agents of Belgium and some other European powers in Luxor, ought to be mentioned [75].

Indeed, the Belgian community in Egypt, though less socially stratified than other foreign communities, was far from homogeneous. The sarcastic remark by an eminent British diplomat to the effect that “the Belgians, outside the *Parquet* offices, were apparently only interested in tramways” is clearly based on a misunderstanding [76]. It is probably correct to distinguish between at least two different categories of Belgians living in Egypt: firstly, the big investors and financiers, and later industrialists, such as Empain and Rolin, who were in control of the sort of large companies just mentioned, not only in the transport sector. But secondly, there was also a category, which we should like to characterize as mere professionals, some of whom had come in the wake of specific vested Belgian interests, or in the trail of Belgian relatives. This group included the engineers and mechanics of the Belgian-held tramway lines in Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said, or for a variety of other technical jobs in industry [77].

Some had been attracted by new employment opportunities in Egypt, or had been invited by the Egyptian authorities, mostly due to their expertise, still lacking in Egypt [78]. Henri Naus, in fact, belonged to the latter category. But after entering employment in the French-dominated sugar company, he gradually worked himself up to the status of a “captain of industry”.

This second category, over time, also comprised two dozen Belgian jurists, who held appointments in the different echelons of the Mixed Tribunals, which themselves were an expression of Belgian Capitulatory rights and economic interests [79]. Their professional prestige, and reputation for honesty, was very

great, and undoubtedly sprang from their belonging to a smaller Francophone nation, thought to be less threatening than France. The most prominent of these jurists was Baron Firmin van den Bosch, who reached the rank of Procureur Général, and whose name had also been associated with the formulation of the 1923 constitution and electoral law [80]. The list included also other well-known figures such as Emile Vercamer, (later Baron) Ernest Eeman, Constant van Ackere, Jacques Eeman, Maurice de Wee and Eugène Vroonen, as well as Jules Wathelet (Conseiller royal honoraire du Gouvernement égyptien). Some other — independent — Belgian lawyers, such as the well-connected Carton de Wiart and Merzbach, could also be found in Cairo.

Though deeper investigation is called for, at first sight at least, one gains the impression that some of these jurists had relatives in business in Egypt. This is maybe not an uncommon phenomenon in a bourgeois environment as Belgium was. In the case of the judges, however, it is intriguing in terms of professional aloofness, as well as in terms of who in the family had come first to Egypt, the jurist or the entrepreneur. Naus himself was related to the magistrate Eugène Vroonen, first appointed in Mansura in 1926; he was a cousin by marriage of Joseph Naus. Vroonen, in turn, was a distant relative of Firmin van den Bosch [81].

Similarly, about a dozen Belgian academics teaching at the young Egyptian University (later Fu'ad I University) ought to be mentioned, among them the well-known Henri Grégoire, who served as Dean, and Oscar Grosjean, who was the Librarian. Most of these were classicists; the renowned Egyptologist Jean Capart, though not teaching, also belonged to the small Belgian academic community [82].

1.4. NAUS' FAMILY BACKGROUND

Henri, or to be more precise, Henricus Jules Edgar Naus was born in 1875 in a Roman Catholic family in the town of Hasselt, the Flemish part of Belgium. The family can trace its ancestors as far back as the 17th century, when they were living in Roermond, which lies today in the adjacent Netherlands sister-province of Limburg. Most of their known forebears appear to have been merchants. Some drove business in what was called colonial produce. One of them, Henri's great-grandfather, is mentioned as a revenue official. The Naus family, who probably settled in Belgium after its independence, also afterwards maintained some Dutch connections. What strikes us is the relatively international orientation of the family: we hear about travels of their ancestors in the 19th century to countries such as Indonesia, Ethiopia and Algeria [83].

The Roman Catholic background of the family would not need special emphasis, were it not for some of the anti-Semitic allusions made in the campaign against Joseph Naus in Iran, about which later. Henri Naus' connections to

the Suares group and his close contacts with Harari and other members of the “haute juiverie” in Egypt could easily have led to the misunderstanding that the family was of Jewish descent.

The little we have heard from family sources about Naus’ adolescence confirms the impression that at that youthful stage he “ne manifestait le moindre goût pour les études”. This was probably the reason for his father sending him away with the help of a Dutch friend, possibly also a distant relative, named Hechtermans, to the Dutch East Indies to learn a proper trade [84]. One could legitimately ask why he did not go to Belgium’s own colony in the Congo. There were even family connections through his father Joseph’s second marriage. The answer probably lies in the fact that in the 1890s the Congo had not yet become a major point of gravitation and, in any event, the family had no financial resources of their own to invest in the Belgium’s Free State in Africa [85]. On the other hand, one may also speculate that with a formal, or more specific, vocational training Henri Naus could have joined one of the many Belgian railway and construction projects which, at the time, were underway in different parts of the world [86].

Thus, around 1893, the young Naus landed up in the coastal township of Kraksaan, near the port of Probolinggo (North-East Java). It was there that in 1898 he married Anne Etty, the daughter of a British family of planters, who ran one of the sugar factories for which the district was known [87]. In addition, his cousin Albert Ceysens, two years younger than himself, also worked there. Also born in Hasselt, he had arrived in Java in the autumn of 1899 and joined Naus in 1900. Ceysens’ career would henceforth evolve in his cousin’s shadow [88]. Henri first worked as a chemist for the Gending sugar factory — a Dutch company with its seat in Amsterdam —, subsequently became involved in the agricultural and the processing branches of the factory, and finally became its technical managing director [89].

In those years the young Naus had already made himself heard at the annual congresses of the Java sugar manufacturers, reporting on experiments he had undertaken [90]. The professional experience which he acquired on Java in the sugar branch, as well as the impact of the Dutch colonial emphasis on scientific agriculture, would later amply pay off in Egypt. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, in 1901 or thereabouts he returned to Belgium [91]. Family tradition has it that his father was much dismayed about his returning home.

It was during these years that Henri Naus realized that he would need a formal training or diploma, and decided to follow some courses in chemistry in Brussels. However, the nature of his professional training cannot be established with certainty. According to some sources, though not according to his daughter Marie-Rose, he may indeed have obtained the grade of practical engineer [92]. Whatever his formal qualifications, or despite the lack of them, he was later, in Egypt, as well as internationally, considered as a renowned expert on the subject of sugar refining. He published scientific articles and participated in several

international professional meetings [93]. In 1932, after ten failed experiments, he arrived at an innovative and economically profitable method for the heating of the sugar ovens, for which he used a mixture of molasses and bagasse (the residue stalks of extracted cane). The breakthrough in the use of bagasse, saving on the usually high fuel expenses, was duly reported to the World Sugar Congress in The Hague in 1936. In fact, throughout his career, Naus would put a strong emphasis on what we would call today Research and Development [94]. It was not an urge for making money, which moved Naus — the Francophone writer Marie Cavadia said after his death — but his “affection for this difficult plant, which demands so much care and attention [95]”.

Henri's father, Joseph, had been a top civil servant in the Belgian Ministry of Finance, when he and two of his colleagues, Priem and Theunis, were called upon in 1898 by the Persian government to reorganize the local customs and postal administration. They were the first of some tens of Belgians — higher and lower personnel — who would be hired as experts by Iran in the coming decades. Belgians were considered honest and economically competent, and, moreover, as to the Iranian situation, strictly neutral in the tense British-Russian situation. From a position as Director General of Customs, Joseph Naus was appointed as Minister of State in 1901, with added responsibilities for Posts and Telegraphs in 1903, as well as Chief Treasurer, Head of the Passport Department, and member of the Supreme Council of State.

Though achieving far-fetching centralizing reforms, and a measure of fiscal efficiency, as well as other, diplomatic, successes, all of which could be termed beneficial to the Iranian Treasury, his career aroused antagonism. There was criticism of his allegedly autocratic conduct, and the introduction of hitherto unknown bureaucratic measures. At least part of this, we tend to think, could have been the result of a cultural divide, in the sense of the imposition of Western modes of administration, and the strictly regulated remuneration of civil servants, on a society not yet ready for this. It was also a fact that the modern systems of fiscal management, which were proposed and in part introduced, deprived the big merchants of long-standing irregular practices (e.g. the *pishkash* money donated to the Shah in return for appointments) and certain traditional economic advantages. Moreover, the new measures raised the price of foodstuffs and other commodities. Gilbar, analysing in depth their mounting grievances, and their role in the outbreak of the Constitutional Revolution, has shown how crucial the issue of Naus' policies was. Several other historians also have argued that his behaviour was one of the immediate causes of the upheaval [96].

Opposition mounted not only in circles of the bazaar but also among the 'ulama (clergy), and the more conservative sectors of the urban population in general. Apart from misgivings about the holding of a cabinet rank by a foreigner, and Naus' preference for Armenian Christian personnel, their spokesmen seized upon his wearing a turban in the fashion of a *mulla* (a religious functionary or teacher) — apparently only once — at a social gathering, an act

which was felt as an affront by the clergy. Naus' personality became caught up in a general atmosphere of xenophobia which generated the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. This was probably also due to his involvement in negotiations for a controversial loan with the Russians, which had antagonized part of the Iranian public. The well-known British contemporary scholar Edgar Browne even accused the Belgians of being the "jackals of Russia", a strong accusation which has been mitigated by recent research [97].

Inevitably, Joseph Naus began to lose even the support of the Shah, particularly after Muhammad 'Ali Shah succeeded Muzaffar-u Din Shah. It has been suggested that court intrigues contributed to his ultimate downfall. He was summarily dismissed by the Iranian Majlis in 1907 and returned to Belgium in the same year, after writing an extensive report on his administration [98]. After his return to Belgium, Joseph withdrew to a castle in Limburg. He was called several times to St Petersburg to comment on Iranian affairs. It would seem that around 1910 he had also considered to go to Egypt, but nothing came of it. We know that he had been involved in some Belgian companies working there. During World War I, he was banished from Belgium due to fervent anti-German views. Thereafter, while engaged in some commercial ventures, he twice went bankrupt — a detail worth noting for somebody with his professional background. We cannot say whether there was any connection with his involvement in the faltering "Crédit Hypothécaire Agricole et Urbain d'Egypte", of which he was the third-largest shareholder. Joseph Naus died in 1920 [99].

Family sources relate that Joseph Naus exercised much influence over his son [100]. It would appear that Joseph's presence in Iran had created at least one opportunity there for Henri too [101]. According to one source, he was invited to Iran around 1898, the year his father was appointed there, to establish a modern sugar industry but, after several months, he reached the conclusion that such an enterprise would be hazardous, *inter alia*, owing to a totally inadequate transport system. Indeed, since the 1890s, not one of the Belgian projects, designed to establish a modern sugar industry in Iran, had proved lasting [102]. Opportunities in Egypt, in that respect, would turn out to be far more favourable.

Even so it is not exactly clear how Naus landed up, of all countries, in Egypt. The accelerated development in the land of the Nile certainly attracted many young professionals, as we have seen [103]. The family story goes that Henri Naus' new job with the sugar company in Egypt was arranged by his father Joseph while attending a dinner party in Paris, allegedly at the Boulevard Haussmann, where he met the Baron Rothschild; a different version, that it was the sugar-magnate Cronier, sounds more convincing [104].

It is therefore important to emphasize that Naus' upward career was not the result of Belgian metropolitan capital: the sugar company was predominantly French, not Belgian, and its interests were intertwined with those of local Egyptian élites, and would become even more so in the future. Naus' interaction with Belgian capital developed much later, when he had built up his reputation at the

sugar company, and even then to a secondary extent. It is amusing that one of the early detailed studies on the Belgian economic involvement in Egypt closes with an odd chapter on “Egyptian companies managed by a Belgian”. Under this heading come only two companies: the “Société Générale des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie en Egypte”, of which Naus was Director General, and the “Société Egyptienne d'Irrigation”, one of its daughter companies, which he served as Managing Director [105].

There was also no direct business connection linking Iran with Egypt. Moreover, hardly anybody in Egypt appears to have been aware of his father's career in Iran. Only one British High Commissioner, whom we assume was Sir Percy Lorraine who had earlier served in Iran, is reported to have once asked: “Are you the bloody son of that Naus who served in Persia?” [106]

NOTES

- [1] With another Middle Eastern variation on the theme of Bernard LEWIS' *History - Remembered, Recovered, Invented*, Princeton, 1975.
- [2] Cf. A. ABDEL-MALEK, *Egypte, Société militaire*, Paris, 1962, e.g. p. 22, who was one of the first scholars to label all early industrialists — foreigners, as well as the local “terrestrial” and “industrial” wings of the bourgeoisie — as “reactionary”. These definitions are debatable.
- [3] Relative lack, because I do not ignore the important contributions made by Tignor, Deeb, Owen, Vitalis, Saul and others, whose works are mentioned below.
- [4] Honorable mention must be made of J. BERQUE's *Egypt, Imperialism and Revolution*, London, trans., 1972, who was also one of the first to give due credit to Naus.
- [5] Cf. I. FENOGLIO-ABD EL AAL, “L'activité culturelle francophone au Caire durant l'entre-deux guerres: du paradoxe à la contradiction” in M.-C. BURGAT (ed.), *D'un Orient à l'autre*, Paris, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 457-496.
- [6] In addition to the archives in Egypt, further research by means of the manifold periodicals in the French vernacular (e.g. the important newspaper *La Bourse Egyptienne*) may still fill some gaps in our knowledge and understanding.
- [7] J. MAZUEL, *Le sucre en Egypte, étude de géographie historique et économique*, Cairo, 1937. It was a logical turn for Roger (E.J.R.) OWEN, after writing his *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914, A Study in Trade and Development*, Oxford, 1969, to add two partly overlapping articles on the sugar industry: “The Study of Middle Eastern Industrial History: Notes on the Interrelationship between Factories and Small-Scale Manufacturing with Special References to Lebanese Silk and Egyptian Sugar, 1900-1930”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 16 (1984), pp. 475-487, and “The Egyptian Sugar Industry, 1870-1914, from State to Private Ownership and from Export Orientation to Production for the Local Market”, in B. ALBERT and A. GRAVES (eds.), *Crisis and Change in the International Sugar Economy 1860-1914*, Norwich and Edinburgh 1984, pp. 217-225. Though Owen cautions against the use of the term “modern”, we nevertheless use it as this industry was distinguished by a larger scale of operation, European technology and various products including crystallized and refined sugar.
- [8] W. WILLCOCKS, *Egyptian Irrigation*, London, 2nd ed., 1899, p. 216, esp. on increasing cotton cultivation in 1899. He also drew attention to the ill-effects of a wrong system of crop rotation. On the Cuban War see MAZUEL, p. 43.
- [9] WILLCOCKS, 2nd ed., p. 375; MAZUEL, p. 37. In Egypt, contrary to Java which knew a new planting every year, this was spaced out over 2-3 years, *ibid.*, pp. 81-82.
- [10] C. ARTAUD, “L'industrie sucrière et la culture de la canne à sucre en Egypte”, *l'Egypte Contemporaine*, 1 (1910), pp. 211-212. Cf. *Sugar in Egypt and Elsewhere, the Daira Saniyya Sugar Corporation Limited, the Société Générale des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie de*

- l'Egypte, Presented to their Clients with the Compliments of Williams, DeBroere & Co*, London 1903, p. 76. For a concise historical survey, as well as general data for 1941, see *The Stock Exchange Year Book of Egypt, 1941* (ed. Clement Levy), Cairo, 1941, pp. 505-513.
- [11] On the same logistic-economic problem in our times, see R. CRITCHFIELD, *Shahhat, an Egyptian*, Syracuse, 1978, p. 171.
- [12] J.H. GALLOWAY, *The Sugar Cane Industry, an Historical Geography from its Origins to 1914*, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 16-17.
- [13] WILLCOCKS, 2nd ed., p. 221.
- [14] GALLOWAY, pp. 142 and 213.
- [15] See VENTRE's articles in the *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte*, 2nd series, no. 8 (1888) and no. 9 (1888). Ventre was the chief engineer of the Da'ira Saniyya factories. For experiments during the 1890s, see also W. TIEMANN, *The Sugar Cane in Egypt*, Altrincham, 1903, pp. 42-74.
- [16] GALLOWAY, pp. 14-16. Naus himself published articles on the effects of the Borer insect, see note 93 below, and Mazuel, pp. 95-98. On research, *ibid.*, p. 116. See also studies published by M.H. Pellet and Raoul Roche in 1907 and 1908 on the composition of the soil, and W. WILLCOCKS, and J.I. CRAIG, *Egyptian Irrigation*, London and New York, 3rd ed., 1913, vol. I. p. 35, whose work also contains elaborate details on the composition of the Nile water.
- [17] Report to (then still) Prince Husayn Kamil, begin 1909, and an undated note on the desiderata formulated by a commission appointed by the Société Khédiviale, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (hereafter: CAD), Le Caire, carton 232, dossier Documents sur l'Industrie Sucrière.
- [18] WILLCOCKS, 3rd ed., vol. I, p. 114.
- [19] MAZUEL, pp. 118-120. Only recently was beet re-introduced in Egypt, and on a larger scale than ever before. Interview with Eng. Muhammad 'Abd al-Mun'im, deputy manager Plant Wealth Collection at Agricultural Museum, Cairo (and ex-manager of the Nag' Hammadi factory), 28 February 1996. Unfortunately, the magnificent collections of the Museum (including some spectacular models of sugar factories) were in a rather poor state at that date.
- [20] The special issue on Egypt of *The Economist* of 4 December 1937 estimated that the sugar company produced 70,000 tons of molasses of which 20,000 tons were used for the manufacture of alcohol. Cf. MAZUEL, p. 80.
- [21] Société Générale des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie d'Egypte, *Recueil des renseignements pratiques sur divers articles et produits utilisés en sucrerie*, Cairo, 1918.
- [22] E. LANE, *The Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, London, repr. 1963, pp. 137, 140-141, 150-151, 154, and 581; A.B. CLOT BEY, *Aperçu de l'Egypte*, Paris 1840, vol. 2, pp. 5, 8-9. The latter states (p. 325) that in 1836 Egypt imported sugar to the amount of Fr. 666,000 out of a total of Fr. 50,786,000. Cf. G. Baer, *Egyptian Guilds*, Jerusalem, 1964, on the *sukariyya* guild, p. 123. On the history of production techniques, see Lucette CHABOUI, *Sucre, grandes et petites histoires*, Paris 1994; Centre d'Etudes et de Documentation du Sucre (CEDUS), *Le Sucre, documentation pédagogique* (Paris, n.d.).
- [23] WILLCOCKS, 2nd ed., p. 211; MAZUEL, p. 16n.
- [24] Cf. *Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt*, May 1937, p. 113. In 1935-6, sugar was still imported. See further MAZUEL, pp. 156-157, and N. KHOURI-DAGHER, "'La faillite' de l'Etat dans l'approvisionnement alimentaire des citoyens. Mythe ou réalité," *Egypte, recompositions, peuples méditerranéens*, 41-42 (October 1987-March 1988), p. 201.
- [25] On the early history of the sugar culture and industry in Egypt, see N. DEERR, *The History of Sugar*, London, 1949-1950, vol. I, pp. 87-95; E. ASHTOR, "Levantine Sugar Industry in the Late Middle Ages: a Case of Technological Decline", in A.L. UDOVITCH (ed.), *The Islamic Middle East, Studies in Economic and Social History*, Princeton, 1981, pp. 91-132; A. RAYMOND, "La fabrication et le commerce du sucre au Caire au XVIII^e siècle, l'effondrement d'une industrie traditionnelle", in CNRS, *Sucre, sucreries et douceurs en Méditerranée*, Paris 1991, pp. 213-225. On traditional sugar milling methods, see M.P.S. GIRARD, "Mémoire sur l'agriculture, l'industrie et le commerce de l'Egypte" in *Description de l'Egypte*, Paris, 2nd ed., 1821-1829, vol. XVII, pp. 238ff., as well as Planche VII in vol. XII, pp. 419-421.
- [26] S. SAUL, *La France et l'Egypte de 1882 à 1914, intérêts économiques et implications politiques*, Paris 1997, p. 375.

- [27] *The Egyptian Directory*, Cairo, 1903, pp. 317-318; MAZUEL, pp. 34-37; R. Roche in *Le Journal Sucrier Egyptien*, February 1940, p. 17; Saul, pp. 382ff.
- [28] G. BAER, *A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt 1800-1950*, London, 1962, pp. 41-42, 44, 69, 95-97, 103 and 124-127; G. BAER, "Da'ira Saniyya", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., Supplement (1981), p. 179. See also OWEN, *Cotton*, 387-388.
- [29] Cairo, 1886-9, vol. 8, pp. 56-57; vol. 9, pp. 98, 99; vol. 11, pp. 81-82; vol. 12, p. 45; vol. 13, p. 37; vol. 14, p. 77; vol. 15, p. 46 (here the equipment of the Matay factory is described; it is said to be a French factory, owned by the 'khawaga Kay' (which may be Say). Details for a slightly later period are also found in Willcocks' two editions, *passim*. Some elaborate articles analysing Isma'il's sugar policy, written by well-known figures such as Hafiz 'Afifi, Isma'il Sidqi and others are found in the Khedive Isma'il's memorial volume, al-Mamlaka al-Misriyya, Wizarat al-Ma'arif al-'Umumiyya, *Isma'il bi-Munasabat Murur Khamsin 'Amman 'ala Wafatihi*, Cairo, 1945.
- [30] OWEN, *Cotton*, pp. 153-154; CLOT BEY, vol. 2, p. 293; DEERR, p. 94n.
- [31] MUBARAK, *Khitat*, vol. 9, p. 14; P. ARMINJON, *La situation économique et financière de l'Egypte* (Paris 1911), pp. 249-251; SAINT-OMER, pp. 159-161; Husayn 'Ali AL-RIFA'I, *al-Sina'a fi Misr*, Cairo, 1935, pp. 265-266; SAUL, p. 382ff. On the Suares family, see G. KRAMER, *The Jews in Modern Egypt, 1914-1952*, London, 1989, pp. 39-41 and 84-89. On Jews in the sugar trade, see S.W. BARON *et al.*, *Economic History of the Jews*, Jerusalem, 1975, esp. pp. 58-59, 189-190, 273. The complex at Hawamdiyya still stands, but little has been done to describe the factories from a point of view of "industrial archeology": the exception is M. SCHARABI, *Industrie und Industriebau in Ägypten, Eine Einführung in die Geschichte der Industrie im Nahen Osten*, Tübingen, Berlin, 1992, who indeed mentions Hawamdiyya on p. 38.
- [32] République Française, Ministère des Finances et des Affaires Economiques, *Memento économique, l'Egypte* (Paris 1950), p. 16.
- [33] F. CHARLES ROUX, "Le capital français en Egypte", *l'Egypte Contemporaine*, vol. 2 (1911), pp. 484-490. See further WILLCOCKS, 2nd ed., p. 216; SAUL, pp. 379-381, and p. 386.
- [34] Statutes and subsequent *firman* of 13 July 1893, on CAD, Le Caire, file 232, sub-file Sucrerie 1893-1895. Initially the company registered a net profit of £E 13,882, but this would soon rise to £E 21,228 in 1894. See report to shareholders of 18 May 1893, and a note on the shareholders meeting of 28 February 1895, *Ibid.* On Cattaoui see Notice historique kindly sent by the Eridania Béghin-Say company, as well as KRAMER, pp. 89-103 et *passim*.
- [35] GALLOWAY, p. 5 and pp. 130-134.
- [36] See L. LINDET, "Les procédés techniques"; E. SAILLARD, "La diffusion" and E. SAILLARD, "Les méthodes analytiques en sucrerie" in *Histoire centennale du sucre de betterave*, Paris 1912, repr. 1993, pp. 46-53, 54-59 and 116-121; GALLOWAY, pp. 135-141; on the innovative Steffen process, introduced in 1889-90, see also Notice historique, mentioned above. Cf. E.J. HOBBSBAWM, *Industry and Empire*, London, 1968, p. 142.
- [37] CLOT BEY, vol. 2, p. 294; MAZUEL, pp. 30, 32-33; FAHMY, *La révolution de l'industrie en Egypte et ses conséquences sociales au 19^e siècle (1800-1850)*, Leiden, 1954, pp. 43-44. and 85.
- [38] J. HITIER, "Influences des législations nationales et des conventions internationales" in *Histoire centennale*, pp. 34-38.
- [39] A. GILBERT, "Raffineries et sucreries-raffineries" in *Histoire Centennale*, pp. 96-98; SAUL, pp. 379-389.
- [40] *Le Recueil Financier, Annuaire des valeurs cotées aux bourses de Paris et de Bruxelles*, 12th year, 1905, Paris, 1905, pp. 267-268 and 934-5; *ibid.* for 1906 (1906), pp. 279-280 and 958-959. Both include details on the Egyptian daughter-company as well. See further SAUL, pp. 391-392.
- [41] Letter Cronier, 13 May 1893, CAD, Le Caire, carton 231, sub-dossier Sucrerie 1893-1895.
- [42] CAD, Le Caire, carton 231, sub-dossier Sucrerie 1893-1895. Cf. MAZUEL, p. 42.
- [43] WILLCOCKS, 2nd ed., 1899, p. 156. At the same time the Egyptian Sugar and Land Company was erecting a somewhat smaller factory at Balyana.
- [44] J. GRUNZEL, *Bericht über die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse des osmanischen Reiches*, Vienna, 1903, p. 159; J. GRUNZEL, *Bericht über die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse Ägyptens*, Vienna, 1905, p. 166. I thank Prof. M. Sauer in Vienna for kindly sending me this source.
- [45] CAD, Le Caire, carton 210, letter Cogordan, 12 December 1894.

- [46] MAZUEL, p. 41, who mentions an advance of £E 500,000 to the Egyptian Treasury. On Cassel, whose name is equally linked to the construction of the first Aswan Dam, the founding of the National Bank, and the Wadi Kom Ombo project, see K. GRUNWALD, "'Windsor-Cassel' - the last Court-Jew, Prolegomena to a Biography of Sir Ernest Cassel", in Leo Baeck Institution, *Yearbook XIV* (1969), pp. 119-161. See further KRAMER, pp. 40, 45; Saul, pp. 266 and 279.
- [47] The texts of the relevant memorandum and agreements, which comprise 57 pages, under the British Companies Act, are found in *The Daira Sanieh Sugar Corporation Limited*, London, 1902. The texts of the contracts (10 and 12 November 1902) are also on CAD, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1905-1906, and relevant press clippings from October 1902 on sub-file Sucrerie 1893-1895; see further *Reports by H.M.'s Agent and Consul General on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of Egypt and the Sudan in 1905*, London, 1906, pp. 26-27; ARMINJON, *Situation*, pp. 240-241; MAZUEL, pp. 43-44; OWEN, *Cotton*, pp. 295-297; SAUL, pp. 395-401.
- [48] The actual date of constitution of the merged Société Générale was 26 April 1897, see Royaume d'Egypte, Ministère des Finances, *Statistique des Sociétés Anonymes par Actions travaillant principalement en Egypte, July 1939*, Cairo 1940, which also surveys the development of the company's capital from 1891. See pp. 174-175.
- [49] *Sugar in Egypt and Elsewhere*, pp. 3, 104, 107, 119. On the 1902 take-over, see further GRUNWALD, pp. 135-136.
- [50] SAUL, pp. 403-404.
- [51] ARMINJON, *Situation*, p. 247; WILLCOCKS, 2nd ed., p. 214; al-Rifa'i, p.266; MAZUEL, pp. 42 and 100, who mentions the existence of some hundred mélasseries under Muhammad 'Ali. For the end of the century, examples are mélasseries owned by e.g. Wissa Bey, a wealthy Coptic landowner in Bani Qurra; the Sultan Pasha family with a factory at Damaris, north of Minya; Prince Ahmad Kamil who owned one at Nag' Hammadi (till 1898), the Butrus brothers at Bardis, near Minya (for 2 years only), the Egyptian Sugar and Land Co. at Balyana, and Wissa Boktor at Bani Rafih (from 1898-1900 only); cf. OWEN, "The Study", p. 480; J.G. COLLINS, *The Egyptian Elite Under Cromer, 1882-1907*, Berlin, 1984, pp. 69-70.
- [52] OWEN, in "The Egyptian Sugar Industry", pp. 221-222, estimates that the Société Générale held an interest in about two thirds of the lands on which sugar cane was grown on the Company's own land, either by means of rents or contracts. Cf. Note on CAD, Le Caire, carton 232; *Memento économique, l'Egypte*, p. 106; A. EID, *La fortune immobilière de l'Egypte et sa dette hypothécaire, propriété rurale - propriété urbaine*, Paris, 1907, pp. 14-16; also MAZUEL, p. 128.
- [53] H. DE SAINT-OMER, *Les entreprises belges en Egypte*, Brussels, 1907, pp. 163-164. See also a report by Naus of 1913 on CAD, Le Caire, carton 223.
- [54] The "Société Egyptienne d'Irrigation" had been founded by members of the Cattauoi, Suares and Menasce families, Saul, p. 395. See further, CAD, Le Caire, carton 231, sub-dossier Divers. Technical details are found in WILLCOCKS, 2nd ed., p. 211, p. 213, p. 220. He also calculated the costs of irrigation, pp. 374-375. See also his 3rd ed., vol. I, p. 353. On additional pumping stations see also *ibid.* pp. 96-96, 338, and 341. On the "Ibrahimiyyeh Ploughing Company", see SAUL, p. 404.
- [55] GRUNZEL, *Bericht über die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse Ägyptens*, pp. 64-65.
- [56] A.E. CROUCHLEY, *The Investment of Foreign Capital in Egyptian Companies and Public Debt*, Cairo, 1936, repr. New York 1977, pp. 107-118. In 1906 the Sucreries' capital was estimated at Fr. 130,900,000 (87,000,000 "actions", 23,900,000 "traites", and 20,000,000 "obligations hypothécaires"). Note générale, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries (1905-1906).
- [57] R.L. TIGNOR, *State, Private Enterprise, and Economic Change in Egypt, 1918-1952*, Princeton, 1984, p. 33, calculated that the sugar company in 1914 had more than twice the capital (£E 1,341,534) than, for instance, the Greek cigarette manufacturer Gianaclis or the "Associated Cotton Ginners".
- [58] *L'Egypte Industrielle* (hereafter: *EgInd.*), January 1926; SAUL, p. 16.
- [59] *Statistique des Sociétés Anonymes, 1939*, pp. 174-176 and 340-353. In 1939 the Sucreries had a capital of Fr. 1,341,534. Most of the companies mentioned were still in foreign rather than in Egyptian hands.

- [60] M. BARAKA, *The Egyptian Upper Class Between Revolutions, 1919-1952*, Reading, 1998, p. 295, relying on the population census of 1917, counts 743 foreign industrial entrepreneurs among a total of 5,497 in Egypt in this category.
- [61] *Khitat*, vol. 7, p. 45. On 1860, see J.J. BRINTON, *The Mixed Courts of Egypt*, New Haven and London, 1968, p. 18. On 1879, P. VAN BEMMELEN [Un ancien Juge Mixte], *l'Egypte et l'Europe*, Leiden 1884, vol. I, p. 33. See further, R. OWEN, *The Middle East in the World Economy*, Cambridge, 1987, p. 216. On the Belgians, see Y. RAHIMLOU, "Aspects de l'expansion belge en Egypte sous le régime d'occupation britannique", *Civilisations*, 38 (1988), pp. 125-126; and Nabil 'Abd al-Hamid SID AHMAD, *Al-Nashat al-Iqtisadi li'l-Ajanib wa-Atharuhu fi al-Mujtama' al-Misri*, Cairo, 1982, pp. 38-43. A list of Belgian notables (only!) apparently dating from 1923 or thereabout, comprised 46 names, see archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, du Commerce Extérieur et de la Coopération au Développement, Brussels (hereafter: MAECE), file 2665bis; file AF10 (1930-1935) contains a detailed list of the Belgian colony dating from 1930, with some 110 names, excluding Alexandria.
- [62] J. DUCRUET, *Les capitaux européens au Proche-Orient*, Paris, 1964, pp. 298-299; Rahimlou, p. 150; R.L. TIGNOR, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914*, Princeton, 1966, p. 362, arrives at the following figures for 1914: French capital £E 46,267, British capital £E 30,250, and Belgian capital £E 14,292 out of a total of £E 92,039 paid-up (thus about 15 %). See also Chambre de commerce égyptienne d'Alexandrie, *La renaissance de l'Egypte*, Alexandria, 1940, pp. 219-221.
- [63] SAUL, p. 27.
- [64] On Belgian investments in the Ottoman Empire in general, see DUCRUET, pp. 287-288, 298-299, 302 *et passim*; J. THOBIE, "Intérêts belges et intérêts français dans l'Empire Ottoman (1880-1914)" in *Les relations franco-belges de 1830 à 1934*, Metz 1975, pp. 213-243; and S. PAMUK, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1923*, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 73-75. Belgian interests in Egypt had started as early as the 1850s, see B. EMERSON, *Leopold II of the Belgians, King of Colonialism*, London, 1979, pp. 18-19. On their development, see the classic book by DE SAINT-OMER, as well as CROUCHLEY, *The Investment*, pp. 47-48, 96-97, 107-113. Systematic data can be found in a report by the Belgian Minister in Cairo to Foreign Minister Jaspar, 5.9.1923, MAECE, file 2665bis, and in a similar survey for 1930 in file AF10 (1930-1935). On the contrast between the small number of Belgians and their "place de premier ordre au Caire", see further M. CLERGET, *Le Caire*, Cairo, 1934, vol. 1, p. 227.
- [65] A notable exception is R.L. TIGNOR, "The Economic Activities of Foreigners in Egypt, 1920-1950: From Millet to Haute Bourgeoisie", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 22 (1980), pp. 416-449. For a more recent, excellent appreciation, see Samir RAAAFAT, "The Belgians of Egypt", *the Egyptian Mail*, 13 May 1995.
- [66] Roger OWEN, "The Cairo Building Industry and the Building Boom of 1897 to 1907" in *Colloque International sur l'Histoire du Caire*, Cairo, 1972, pp. 337-350.
- [67] Public Record Office, London (hereafter:PRO), FO141/631/2287.
- [68] For the wide range of these investments and interests, see DE SAINT-OMER, and CROUCHLEY, *The Investment*, both *passim*; RAHIMLOU, pp. 159-161; SID AHMAD, *al-Nashat*, pp. 67, 209, 289ff.
- [69] SAUL, pp.129-162.
- [70] On the building of Heliopolis, see R. ILBERT, *Héliopolis, Le Caire 1905-1922, Genèse d'une Ville*, Paris, 1981. See also L. DE RYCK, "Tramways d'Alexandrie: een Belgische Onderneming in Egypte. Een politieke ingreep in de concurrentie", *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire*, 69 (1991): 925-995. Though the latter and Rahimlou's article are both solidly based on the series of files marked AE, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels, the social depth of the material is somewhat disappointing. See more recently also J.-L. LENTZ, "Héliopolis, l'antique cité qui renaît de ses cendres", *Wallonie/Bruxelles*, June 1995, pp.19-21; Yunan Labib Rizk in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 1-7 May 1997, and S.W. RAAAFAT, "The Baron's Palace", in *Cairo Times*, 1-14 May 1997. On the dynasty in general, see Y. TOUSSAINT, *Les Barons Empain*, Paris, 1996, with regard to Egypt, pp. 109-139, 148-149 and 187-189; and Kurganvan Hentenrijk, S. Jaumain and V. Montens (eds.), *Dictionnaire des Patrons en Belgique, Les Hommes, Les Entreprises, Les Réseaux*, Brussels, 1996, p. 266-268.

- [71] On Jacobs, see CAD, Le Caire, carton 223, sub-dossier 71 Banks. Also *Le Recueil Financier, Annuaire des valeurs cotées aux bourses de Belgique*, e.g. 35^e année (1928), tome III, or 57^e année (1950): Alfred, Emile, Frederic Jacobs. See further Kurgan, pp. 381-382.
- [72] The Eid family in itself justifies research. See MAECE files bis 564 en 1575; a list of 1923 mentions only Georges and Alfred Eid, file 2665bis, but the 1930 list mentioned in note 60 refers to eleven Eids in different trades. E.J. Blattner, *Who is Who in Egypt and the Middle East*, Cairo, 14th ed., 1948 mentions five Eids. Even today a Father Eid still serves as a Belgian clergyman in Cairo. The family settled in part in Belgium. Interestingly, Guy Eid, — a fourth generation Eid —, who became chancellor at the Belgian Embassy in Khartoum was the victim of an unsolved assassination attack in 1973, see MAECE, personnel file AO1, and D.A. Korn, *Assassination in Khartoum*, Bloomington, 1993.
- [73] See also the printed survey by G.-A. Eid, *Situation économique, commerciale et industrielle de l'Égypte*, Brussels, 1893. In fact, only in Alexandria between 1925 and 1927 did a Belgian Chamber of Commerce seem to have functioned. The term, invented by the French Marxist economist Paul A. Baran, is rejected by R. VITALIS, "On the Theory and Practice of Com-pradors: the Role of 'Abbud Pasha in the Egyptian Political Economy", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 22 (1990), pp. 291-315.
- [74] RAAFAT, "The Belgians", who also mentions a number of other families not relevant here.
- [75] J. D'AUMALE, *Voix de l'Orient, souvenirs d'un diplomate*, Paris, 1945, p. 120.
- [76] L. GRAFFTEY-SMITH, *Bright Levant*, London, 1970, p. 33.
- [77] One Belgian tramway employee, Henri van der Vecht, was assassinated in January 1922 against the background of one of the recurrent labour strikes in the branch, MAECE, file 2665bis.
- [78] In fact, Belgian specialists and technicians were sought after in Egypt from 1843 onwards, see applications and evaluations on possible employment on MAECE files AF10-4 (1843-1918), AF10/2, AF10/4 (1919-1943). The division according to professions, e.g. lawyers, physicians, engineers, as made by Belgian consular reports and by RAHIMLOU, p. 130, however interesting, is not very helpful. What matters in our view is the source of their employment or the motive for their presence in Egypt. An interesting point which deserves further research is the impact of family relationships on seeking or receiving employment in Egypt, e.g. between judges, diplomats and entrepreneurs. We found some family relationships with regard to the following: P. Van den Bosch (related to E. Vroonen), Van Ackere, Rolin (Léon, married to Van Ackere), Carton de Wiart, Eeman (one ambassador and his brother a judge), Van Damme, Van der Hecht, De Wee (Jean Albert and Maurice). On the other hand, we know nothing on Belgian missionaries, who were so active in other parts of Africa.
- [79] On Belgian judges connected to the Mixed Courts, see BRINTON, pp. 49-50, 57, 81, 91, 158, 228.
- [80] See his *Vingt années d'Égypte*, Paris, 1932. Though Firmin van den Bosch had clashed with Cromer, he understood that as a Belgian his position of Procureur Général largely depended on the British, see correspondence on PRO, FO141/ 439/12012. The Belgian consul Dange reported on 25 March 1922 to Brussels that van den Bosch had been officially requested to examine which parts of the Belgian electoral system could be adopted in Egypt, MAECE, AF10 (1921-1924). See further file AF10/2, also AF10 (1925-1929). Also 'Abd al-Rahman AL-RAFI'I, *Fi 'Aqab al-Thawra al-Misriyya*, Cairo, 2nd ed., 1959, vol. 1, p. 147. Upon the election of Constant van Ackere as President of the Mixed Court of Appeal, the Belgian Minister in Cairo, Guy de Schoutheete de Tervarent, proudly wrote: "la tradition des Eeman et des van den Bosch se poursuit", 23 May 1939, MAECE, AF10 (1936-1940).
- [81] The information concerning Vroonen is based on a communication by Guy Naus, 17 March 1996, who also put an unpublished autobiography by Vroonen at my disposal. Lists of Belgian judges are found in *Les juridictions mixtes d'Égypte 1876-1926, Livre d'Or*, Alexandria, 1926. A superficial glance at the business section of the *Livre d'adresses de la ville et de la province d'Anvers*, Antwerp, 1920, pp. XLIX-LIII, reveals the family names of Carton de Wiart, De Wee, Van den Bosch, who had relatives serving as judges or advocates in Egypt, as well as of Wouters, Philippart and Jacobs, who had investments there. In Egypt itself we find Alfred and André Eman who managed the "Société Industrielle des Fibres et Textiles", *Le Mondain Egyptien*, 1943, p. 127. Jean Albert de Wee was a physician in Heliopolis, *ibid.*, p. 121.

- [82] For some names, see MAECE, file AF10/2. According to the list of the Belgian colony in 1930 (see note 61), the following scholars were also attached to the university: Pierre Dopp, Oscar Grosjean, Georges Hostelet, and Marcel Kiven. In addition, a certain Joseph Servais held a teaching post at the French Lycée. Cf. CAD, Le Caire, carton 170, dossier 4 (1917-1934), mentions Grandor, Grégoire, Grosjean, Reignier, Pirote, Abel, Servais, Vander Burght, Youmain, and Dopp.
- [83] Communication by Guy Naus, 17 March 1996.
- [84] Interview with Henri's daughter Marie-Rose Naus, Lausanne, 3 July 1993.
- [85] Later he was, indeed, connected to some sugar projects in the Congo and paid several visits there, interview Marie-Rose Naus.
- [86] Belgians were at the time engaged in projects in China, Thailand, South America, as well as in Egypt. Empain's grandiose scheme for Heliopolis, however, was started only in 1905. See the catalogue for the exhibition *Belgen Overzee* [Belgians Overseas] in Brussels, 1985. It has been estimated that Belgian investments abroad in 1914 reached 7 milliard Belgian francs, H. PIRENNE, *Histoire de Belgique*, Brussels, 1932, vol. 7, pp. 367-368. Also, in the same era, not a few Belgian civil servants, jurists, and other specialists acted in advisory capacities in a number of countries, e.g. Macedonia, Persia (cf. the biography of Henri's father below).
- [87] Communication by Guy Naus, 17 March 1996.
- [88] Interview with Guy Naus, 2 February 1996, who showed me a letter to this effect, and communication of 16 December 1992.
- [89] Cf. *Nieuw adresboek van geheel Nederlandsch Indië, 1903*, Batavia, 1903, p. 425. Ceysens apparently worked for another sugar factory in Kraksaan, named Maron, p. 108. On the Gending company, see *Regeeringsalmanak voor Nederlandsch Indië*, Batavia, 1897, p. 795.
- [90] *Handelingen van het Eerste Congres van het Algemeen Syndicaat van Suikerfabrikanten op Java gehouden te Soerabaia van 21-24 Maart 1896*, Soerabaia, 1896, pp. 8 and 280-281; *Handelingen van het Vierde Congres van het Algemeen Syndicaat van Suikerfabrikanten op Java Gehouden te Samarang op 15, 16 en 17 Maart 1900* (Soerabaia 1900), p. 106; *Handelingen van het Vijfde Congres van Suikerfabrikanten op Java*, Soerabaia, 1901, vol. 1, pp. 253-254.
- [91] R. Roche, a leading expert of the Sugar Company, indicated that around 1900 Naus had already successfully experimented with a new process for making molasses extracts. For this reason he appears to conclude that Naus, becoming over-qualified, "miraculously escaped" professional "drowning" on Java. See his "In Memoriam" in the special commemorative issue of *Le Journal Sucrier Egyptien*, 8th year, Feb. 1940, pp. 14-15. In any case, Guy Naus is in possession of a series of postcards sent by Henri, the last of which is dated on 26 December 1900. This indicates that he was then still at Java.
- [92] Interview with Marie-Rose Naus. Our efforts to trace details on Naus' education have proved fruitless. His relative and contemporary Albert Ceysens, however, had a degree from the Ecole Polytechnique Glons in Liège, *Le Mondain Egyptien, the Egyptian Who's Who, l'Annuaire de l'Elite d'Egypte*, 1943, Cairo, 1943, p. 105.
- [93] His professional articles on Egypt include: H. Naus and H. Pellet, "Existence et ravage du Borer dans la canne à sucre, le maïs, le sorgho en Egypte", (Cairo 1902); H. Naus, "Moyen de régénération des cultures sucrières" and "Sur l'existence et les ravages du Borer dans la canne à sucre et le sorgho en Egypte" (Cairo 1906); "Sur l'existence et les ravages du Borer", (Cairo 1923), these four are mentioned by J. MAZUEL, p. viii, but could not be traced; H. NAUS, "De qualiteit van Java-suiker", *Archief voor de Java-Suikerindustrie*, 16 (1908), pp. 48-52; "Selectie van suikerrietstekken op specifiek gewicht door middel van verdunde melasse", *Archief voor de Java-Suikerindustrie, Bijblad van den 15den Jaargang* (Java 1908), pp. 978-983; "La canne à sucre", *Almanach de la Société Sultannie d'Agriculture*, 1916, pp. 181-185. On the breakthrough he achieved in the use of part of the sugar cane as fuel, see his "Emploi des mélasses comme combustible", *International Sugar Journal*, vol. 40 (1938), pp. 141-145. Two of his papers on the combustion of sugar molasses are summarized in the *Bulletin de l'Association des Chimistes*, 55 (1938), p. 253 and vol. 56 (1939), p. 670. We have not been able to see "a magistral study" on the use of bagasse in the *Sucrerie Belge*, published around 1936, mentioned in his obituary in *Bulletin de l'Association des Chimistes*, 55 (1938), p. 961.
- [94] Roche, pp. 14, and 23-24. To the same end Naus was also instrumental in founding, around 1932, the *Journal Sucrier Egyptien* (further issues of which could not be traced), and had

- suggested the establishment of a Division of Sugar Canes Investigations at the Ministry of Agriculture, which continued experiments with new varieties imported from abroad, cf. A. Rosenfeld in the commemorative issue of *Le Journal Sucrier Egyptien*, p. 35. Rosenfeld was an American expert, called in 1930.
- [95] *Journal Sucrier Egyptien*, vol. 8 (February 1940), p. 9.
- [96] Gad G. GILBAR, "The Big Merchants (*tujjar*) and the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906", *Asian and African Studies*, 11 (1976), pp. 275-303. See further H. ALGAR, *Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906, the Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 226-227 and 242; F.R.C. BAGLEY, "New Light on the Iranian Constitutional Movement" in E. BOSWORTH and C. HILLENBRAND (eds.), *Qajar Iran, Political, Social and Cultural Change, 1800-1925*, Edinburgh, 1983, pp. 48-64; V. MARTIN, *Islam and Modernism, the Iranian Revolution of 1906*, London, 1989, pp. 46-79, and 106-109.
- [97] Edward G. BROWNE, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*, London, 1910, repr. 1966, p. 99. Cf. F. Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914, A Study in Imperialism*, New Haven, London, 1968, pp. 372, 422-423, 448-449, 453, and 487.
- [98] A. DESTREE, *Les fonctionnaires belges au service de la Perse, 1898-1915*, Leiden, 1976, *passim*. For a more concise biography of Joseph Naus by the same author see the *Biographie Nationale*, vol. 40 (supplément), Brussels, 1978, pp. 653-657. The previous account is found in BROWNE, pp. 109-112, 136-138, 235. More details were collected in interviews with Guy Naus, 11 August 1992 and 2 February 1996.
- [99] SAUL, pp. 159-161. The *Recueil Financier* (27^e année, 1920), p. 2275, mentions Joseph as being the President of the Crédit Hypothécaire-Agraire et Urbaine en Egypte, and as "administrateur" of the Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris and the Crédit Foncier du Canada.
- [100] Also later correspondence between father and son, samples of which are in the possession of Guy Naus, proves that the relations between them, in terms of mutual advice, remained very close.
- [101] Cf. A. DESTREE, "Quelques tentatives belges d'implantation industrielle et commerciale en Perse, dans les Dernières Années du XIX^e Siècle", *Civilisations*, 38 (1988): 82-100, which does not mention the sugar industry at all, but analyses the relative failure of Belgian economic involvement in Iran (as compared to Egypt).
- [102] For the date of his stay, see obituary in *Bulletin de l'Association des Chimistes*, 55 (1938), p. 961. A later date, e.g. 1900 or after, in this biographical respect would make more sense. On Belgian investments and efforts in Iran, see E. LORINI, "La Persa Económica" in Ch. ISSAWI (ed.), *The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914*, Chicago and London, 1971, pp. 305 and 309, as well as other documents and ISSAWI's analysis, e.g. pp. 49, 251-252, 276, 292-293, 357, and 375.
- [103] OWEN, "The Cairo Building Industry", pp. 337-347; RAHIMLOU, pp. 101-177. By the time Naus reached Egypt, Leopold II had already given up plans for the unification of the Congo basin with the Nile valley, RAHIMLOU, p. 121.
- [104] Interview with Marie-Rose Naus, and with Guy Naus, 11 August 1992, who both suggested the name of Baron Rothschild. Indeed, the latter had been involved in a loan to Egypt. But Roche, "In Memoriam" p. 15, speaks about a chance meeting with Cronier. Incidentally, the Henry Say sugar company had its Paris office at 43 Boulevard Haussmann.
- [105] DE SAINT-OMER, pp. 157-164; DUCRUET, p. 295, mentions two daughter-companies liquidated around 1904-1905.
- [106] Interview with Marie-Rose Naus.

2. Naus' Early Career in Egypt

2.1. EARLY CRISES AND SUCCESSES

Henri Naus started his Egyptian career in 1902, the year of the take-over of the Da'ira factories by the Société Générale des Sucreries, with a five-year contract at the Nag' Hammadi factory. The family relates that he found conditions in Upper Egypt very difficult, owing to the climate and the rather undisciplined labour force, which mainly consisted of seasonal workers from among the local *fallahin* [1]. It would, however, appear that Naus owed his fast promotion to the position of Administrator and Director General at the Sugar company's main office in Cairo, not only to his personal abilities, but also to the combination of two strokes of luck.

The first of these was his successful importation of a new variety of sugar cane from the Dutch East Indies. Naus had realized that the Nag' Hammadi factory could not operate economically for more than two months per year without an increased supply of locally-grown, and more important, cheap sugar cane. Under these circumstances, the young manager requested his cousin Albert Ceysens to proceed from Java with some samples of new varieties of sugar canes. Ceysens, indeed, in 1902 brought with him thirteen such varieties, among which was one called POJ 105, which was later to become famous [2]. Ceysens would soon become the director of the sugar factory at Shaykh Fadl and rose later to the position of deputy director, and ultimately director, of the sugar company. The fact that both Naus and Ceysens could claim the success of POJ 105, or part of it, apparently led to some tension between the two families.

Naus started experiments with the POJ 105 sugar cane in 1903 at Shaykh Fadl, to resume them in Nag' Hammadi the next year. More than a hundred additional varieties were imported from Mauritius, Peru, Hawaii, Congo and other distant countries. Indeed, the POJ 105 did surprisingly well, first in Nag' Hammadi and Armant, later throughout Upper Egypt, increasing yields by 20-40 %, quite a sensational average of 30 %. According to reports by the company's chemist Raoul Roche, there could be little doubt any more about its success after 1907-8 [3]. The story is somewhat reminiscent of the introduction, around 1819-1822, of the Jumel, or the Mako-Jumel — as Owen insists —, a long-staple cotton variety, which at the time had given a boost to Muhammad 'Ali's agricultural enterprise [4]. By the end of the first decade of the century, the POJ 105 cane replaced all so-called *baladi* (local) varieties. In 1926 also POJ 2878 was tried, but then again abandoned. As late as 1946-7, when the introduction of a more profitable variety was considered, POJ 105 still held 65 % of the area under cane cultivation in Egypt. The POJ 105 variety was still holding 40 % even in 1955, but became

obsolete in 1960, when new varieties completely gained the upper hand [5]. Curiously enough, the POJ 105 variety did less well in Java itself [6].

The chemical substance of Java sugar cane also yielded good results for refining, but Naus indicated in one of his professional articles that some qualitative agricultural improvement was still desired and possible [7]. In fact, Naus' achievement went even further than the mere introduction of a new variety of sugar cane. With great perseverance, and the help of one of the most prominent and innovating sugar experts of the time, named H. Pellet, and Raoul Roche, he developed a technique to overcome the difficulties in the refining process of the more fibrous and more salty chemical substance of POJ 105, as compared to previous *baladi* varieties. It was the combination of an agricultural and chemical breakthrough which could be called "un véritable tournant dans les annales de cette industrie" [8]. The sugar company's ongoing scientific research was sympathetically accompanied by the "Société Khédiviale d'Agriculture" and by the active interest of the then still Prince Husayn Kamil [9].

In fact, in 1904 the sugar company was said to be in a deep crisis, owing to the fact that on most plots the more profitable cotton was cultivated. The surface under cane had shrunk to half what it had been at the turn of the century [10]. The modern factories owned by the Sucreries were working below their production capacity. None of the alternatives of enlarging the acreage under sugar cane, or of importing cane for the factory, or of growing sugar beets instead — experiments which had been going on since 1897 — proved practicable [11].

The second favourable circumstance for Naus was the 1905 management crisis which the "Société Générale des Sucreries" went through. It came out into the open with the bankruptcy of the mother company, Henry Say et Cie, in France and with the spectacular suicide of its director Ernest Cronier. The impact of the crisis on the Paris stock exchange was such that the term *krach* was used. Within two days, shares of the SA Henry Say fell by almost half their value, and those of the Egyptian daughter company by about one fourth [12]. Cronier, disliked by many, owing to his despotic character and his lavish lifestyle, with a sumptuous "palace" on the rue Jeanne d'Arc in Paris, may indeed personally have been to blame for "malversations" and unwarranted speculations in France. He certainly was heavily in debt, could not honour his obligations, and, according to one newspaper report, was about to face even criminal indictment [13].

It seems that the crisis was precipitated by an accumulation of factors such as poor management of the head office in Cairo, a shortage of capital, and heavy outstanding debts. Cultivators shifting from sugar to cotton, causing a scarcity of sugar cane, and the subsequent closure of some factories, played an important role in this process. Some rather vague factors mentioned were poor investments, unsuccessful imports, deficient technology, and insufficiently trained personnel. An official internal report also puts some blame on the choice of wrong areas of cultivation, as well as failed experiments with beet sugar. Among

French observers, not unexpectedly, considerable blame was also put on Cassel, who was seen as representing competitive British interests. However, an extensive report by experts, among whom the well-known British irrigation expert Willcocks, drawn up at the request of the Mixed Courts, went so far as to conclude that even without the direct causes of the Cronier krach, since 1899 there had been a growing local deficit, due to mismanagement, which had now reached £E 2,682,550 [14].

Cassel, and the prominent Belgian lawyer Carton de Wiart, who apparently represented the shareholders interests, travelled hurriedly to Cairo. In France, too, considerable commotion had arisen among shareholders, who organized themselves into a "Comité de Défense". Many feared a possible claim by the Daira Sugar Corporation on the outstanding debt which amounted to some £E 800,000. According to at least one report, opinions in France went against the reconstitution of the Egyptian sugar company, as this would work in favour of Cassel — or, in general, in favour of British interests. In fact, the very viability and the survival of the Sucreries were at stake. Three different reports on the situation of the Sucreries were drawn up. It appeared that foreign and local shareholders, creditors and directors were of different opinions as to the possibilities of total bankruptcy, liquidation or reorganization. While the sugar company in Egypt wavered on the verge of liquidation, and the Mixed Court of Appeal in Alexandria refused to endorse a proposed "Preventive Concordat" with the shareholders, which would have meant total bankruptcy, alternative solutions were being sought and, in the end, adopted [15].

A local supervising committee of financial experts was chosen which included (later Sir) Victor Harari Pasha, a former senior civil servant of the Ministry of Finance. We have reason to assume that he had somehow been involved in the negotiations with Cassel, and the setting-up of the Daira Sugar Corporation. It would thus seem that Harari, being well-versed in the financial operations of the sugar company, had become the representative of Cassel's interests. It may not have been insignificant that Harari was a British subject and, at the same time, served as a director of the French-dominated "Crédit Foncier" [16]. Other members were MacLoughlin of the "Banque Ottomane", Millet of the "Banque de l'Union Parisienne", and Roux de Vence, the Director of the Hawamdiyya refinery. Henri Naus was added as Technical Director [17].

The upshot was that the sugar company was nevertheless reconstituted at a meeting in March 1906 [18]. Total bankruptcy was averted by a definite "Concordat", which amounted to a total rescheduling of the company's financial debts, *inter alia*, exchanging shares for long-term obligations. The company's capital was, in fact, reduced by two thirds, and instead preferential shares were handed out to the creditors. Other arrangements were the issuing of a new loan, the payment of a fixed annual interest, some changes in the holding of the shares, and the fixation of the Daira Sugar Corporation's claim at £E 800,000. The deal, moreover, called for a reduction of management and production costs,

and the sale of the sugar company's railways [19]. In fact, Cronier's grand design of a globally competing company had to give way to a more realistic enterprise, mainly geared to the local and regional markets.

Meanwhile Naus was moved to the company's main office in Cairo to assume management of the entire company as its Director General [20]. His daughter speaks about a "carte blanche" which he received to reorganize the company. We know that many of the measures implemented had already been under consideration in the tense months preceding the solution of the crisis [21]. The Board of the company was reconstituted in such a way that it reflected French, British, as well as — once more — local entrepreneurial interests. Victor Harari Pasha became the most prominent member of it. From then onwards a very close and fruitful cooperation developed between Harari and Naus [22]. Soon, the French consul in Alexandria, André Ribot, who closely followed the financial operations of the company, commended the two for good management. Moreover, the local French press, part of which had been hostile to the deal, now changed its attitude [23].

From the studies available on the sugar company it would appear that the two acquitted themselves admirably of their new task [24]. Naus is reported to have reduced the company's administrative and production expenses which entailed, *inter alia*, closing a regional office in Minya. This measure, however, affected workers on social security payments. At the same time it meant seeking greater technological efficiency in the production process. Furthermore, in an effort to restore the company's profitability, six of the ten or twelve sugar mills previously operating in Upper Egypt were merged, or closed altogether. This meant, in fact, the survival of the factories built or transformed by the French company, and the demise of the more primitive plants once owned by the Da'ira Saniyya. Contracts with cultivators were revised in such a way that sugar cultivation would be able to withstand competition with cotton. The "Société Egyptienne d'Irrigation" was sold, while the Ibrahimiyeh Ploughing Company was dissolved [25]. The sugar company, which had never owned large tracts of land, only remained in possession of a small plot (20 *faddan*) in Mallawi, its head office in Cairo, as well as a storehouse (*shuna*) in the Bulaq quarter [26].

Even more spectacular was the sale of the 470 km of railway tracks, 65 locomotives and 2,092 wagons in the possession of the sugar company to the Egyptian Government against the impressive amount of £E 400,000 [27]. Possible reactions to the deal seem to have been sounded out, both in Egypt and in France, from the autumn of 1905 onwards.

Somehow, the idea began to emerge that the government had to play a more active role — aiding the Sucreries to overcome its crisis by indirect support and fiscal measures; this was an idea which would become stronger after World War I [28]. For the time being, however, the British Agent and Consul General, Lord Cromer, was still in control of the economy. It has often been repeated that his economic policies thwarted all industrial initiatives and development. Roger

Owen has argued that he was not so much against industrialization as he believed in Free Trade and Laissez-Faire. Upon closer analysis, it has been established that he sought to protect, before anything else, the British imperial interests in the cotton branch and in particular the metropolitan textile industry [29].

Cromer's economic policy was selective, *i.e.* against the development of the textile industry, but in favour of the sugar industry. Thus, H.M.'s Agent and Consul General's help in the deal with the Sucreries stands out as a remarkable exception to his reluctance to interfere in the domestic entrepreneurial scene. But then again we have to realize that the local sugar industry was no competitor to British vested interests. Yet, if having scruples about the rationale behind the sale, and undoubtedly with British public opinion and the repayment of the Sucreries' debts in mind, Lord Cromer wrote: "This measure is perfectly justifiable. I am assured, on competent authority, that the line, together with its material, is worth about that figure. It is in the interest of the tax-payers to obtain possession of the line, because, under Government auspices, it can be developed and used for general purposes of traffic" [30]. For the moment, the deal saved the financial viability of the Société Générale des Sucreries. As we shall see, the company, paradoxically or cynically, would later protest against high railway tariffs. Another concession by the government was the exemption, albeit for three years only, of sugar from the consumption tax [31].

A further financial crisis of the company, in 1908, was staved off by Naus. Though the Sucreries were making a profit again after 1906, and even exporting refined sugar, competition by foreign, in particular Austrian producers, was sharply felt. This was a consequence of the low 8 % *ad valorem* import tariff in force. Doubts on the company's future persisted.

As a matter of fact, Mazuel saw in 1908 a crucial year for the future of sugar cane cultivation in Egypt. Due to a shift, that year, by private cultivators to the more rewarding growing of cotton there was a temporary shortage of sugar cane which adversely affected the industry. Naus, himself, in a report to the then still Prince Husayn Kamil, deplored the fact that sugar cane had virtually disappeared from Middle Egypt, e.g. from the Bani Suwayf and Minya districts; he ascribed the phenomenon to the sale of Da'ira Saniyya lands to private owners, who could no longer be compelled to grow sugar. This, by the way, was true for large tracts sold to new owners in the Minya area, but some lands had also been sold to land development companies, such as the Wadi Kom Ombo company and the "Société Foncière du Cheikh Fadl" [32]. The Da'ira Saniyya, moreover, Naus further argued, had formerly conducted a policy of systematic crop rotation, rather than trying to achieve one cotton harvest after another, which tended to exhaust the soil. This certainly explains Naus' interest in the Wadi Kom Ombo project, which is discussed below.

Incidentally, we should like to draw attention to the interesting fact that Naus never in his public statements alluded to his experience in the Dutch East Indies: there, the controversial Culture System, which had compelled the Javanese to

grow coffee, sugar, spices and other products, had been gradually abolished from 1863 onwards. Naus must have realized that the Dutch sugar law of 1870 had initiated a new era in which large private plantations and sugar factories came to dominate the branch. He had worked in one of them. But contrary to the Dutch East Indies, most sugar in Egypt was not grown by the manufacturer itself [33]. Hence, the solution, in Naus' view, could be found in the adoption of a consistent cotton policy by the "Société Khédiviale d'Agriculture", and the allocation — at the same time — of a modest role to sugar cane too, in order that "la canne reprendra la place que lui avait consacrée un grand Prince", meaning Khedive Isma'il. One of Naus' additional suggestions was to develop new lands, wherever the hods (*haws*, or basins) along the Ibrahimiyya Canal would allow basin irrigation [34].

Indeed, the company was in great trouble; its results showed a serious decline. In the summer of 1908 Naus travelled to France in order to plead for diplomatic intervention in favour of the closure of the Egyptian market to Austrian sugar. This mission, however, did not lead to success [35].

It has been suggested that the solution was found in developing links with individual growers. This may well have been the case, but the wide-scale introduction of the POJ 105 cane can be offered as a more convincing explanation. Naus himself commented on Roche's trial report: "Toutes les analyses faites en octobre et novembre 1908 justifient complètement notre espoir d'une véritable rénovation des cultures sucrières dans un délai probablement rapproché" [36].

At the same time, intensive sugar cane experiments on the newly reclaimed desert lands owned by the Wadi Kom Ombo company — further south and under better climatic conditions, that is an average of 4 °C warmer even than Nag' Hammadi — was seen as a viable solution. This idea gained support from about 1907. The Kom Ombo land company had been established in 1903, but expectations as to its land development potential and profits had not yet materialized. On the company's board served figures with close connections to the sugar company: Soares, Cattaoui, Birch and, somewhat later, Harari, who held for some time a "double rôle" as president of both companies. Raphael Soares entertained good hopes that a new factory to be built close to the fields, could indeed save the company [37]. During 1909 the potential of this idea was also discussed in Paris, where strong, but unfounded, suspicions existed lest the project was, in fact, a cleverly disguised British attempt to take over the French Sucreries [38].

Naus was able to announce the signing of a contract between the Société Générale des Sucreries and the Wadi Kom Ombo company on 14 July 1910. The concession, initially for 20 years, later reduced to 15, included the exploitation of a large surface, with about a quarter, some 4,500 *faddan* under sugar cane, a railway (still to be completed), as well as the use of an existing hostel [39]. The project, at an estimated cost of Fr. 2.6 millions, took into account the transfer of technical equipment from the factories at Biba and Mata'ina which had been closed down [40].

The establishment of the Kom Ombo factory in 1910 was a memorable event unto itself, both in agricultural and in industrial terms. In our days we would speak of a development project. 'Ali Mubarak had dedicated no more than two superficial lines to the village. But now, it would in due course become the administrative centre of a powerful, and heavy-handed agricultural concern [41]. While the original concession of 1903 obtained by the Wadi Kom Ombo company had embraced 30,000 *faddan* (app. 12,600 hectare), at the time for a large part under sugar cane, the area was gradually enlarged to 70,000 *faddan* (appr. 29,400 hectares) [42]. The factory was inaugurated in January 1912 and proved, in the long run, to be a perfect "mariage de convenance" between the Sucreries and the Wadi Kom Ombo company [43]. While the other sugar factories received their cane supply from miscellaneous plots either rented by the Sucreries, or cultivated under contract by owners or sharecroppers, here only one source of supply was at work, the Wadi Kom Ombo company. The total sugar production of the company jumped from 472,344 tons in 1910-1911 to 537,235 tons in 1911-1912 — a success ascribed to the Kom Ombo project. In 1928, a further agreement was reached between the two companies, which regulated for the following 17 years the cropped area, sugar cane prices, as well as a basic 50 % share of the nett profits to accrue to the Wadi Kom Ombo company. In 1930 the sugar cane area was enlarged from 6,000 to 8,500 *faddan*, and the sugar factory was enlarged [44].

By the end of 1910, the company was out of this crisis and made a profit again, due also to a rise in sugar prices: the factories in Shaykh Fadl and Matay — though later closed again — were in the black, and the new factory in Kom Ombo was in full operation. The refinery in Hawamdiyya was once more enlarged and modernized, and additional raw sugar was imported from Java to maximize its refining capacity. The profitability of the Hawamdiyya refinery, however, would also in the future remain dependent on the freedom of the company to supplement its capacity with imported sugar. At about this time, some plots of new land seem to have been purchased from small companies [45]. In 1917 the Sucreries rented 1,455 hectares at Mata'ina to safeguard sufficient supplies to the Armant factory [46].

2.2. THE SINGULAR POSITION OF THE SUGAR COMPANY VIS-A-VIS THE GOVERNMENT

At one still precarious stage before World War I, Naus summed up the economic benefits which Egypt derived from its sugar industry: firstly, the Government enjoyed considerable income from railway fees (more than £E 50,000 p.a.), import duties and taxes; secondly, the sugar company employed a large labour force, mainly Egyptian, a small part of which underwent also professional training ("dans ce temps d'émancipation professionnelle et intel-

lectuelle”); thirdly, cultivators and peasants were assured of a good income; and lastly, sugar had an important nutritional role to play: in fact — Naus argued — mounting sugar consumption was a sign of well-being of the workers [47].

From the outset, the sugar industry in Egypt differed from other industries, e.g. the textile industry. This is, in the first place, because of its legacy dating back to the days of Khedive Isma'il and the Da'ira Saniyya, which created a lasting peculiar relationship with the government. Other early industries, such as those founded by Muhammad 'Ali, had undergone a totally different fate. The history of Egypt's textile industry stands in contrast, as it cannot be detached from the overwhelming British interests at stake. In addition, the “Société Générale des Sucreries”, as we have seen above, was still indebted to the Government. This may also explain why it came to exercise a virtual monopoly.

While cotton in Egypt is considered as the unchallenged monoculture, many comparisons have been drawn up between the significance of the cotton and sugar cultures. In terms of cultivation, this is a faulty analogy: while in the 1920-1940 decades cotton occupied 23 % of the cultivated area in Lower and Middle Egypt, sugar occupied only 4 % in Upper Egypt (or 12 % at the most in the Qina district). Calling sugar the “cotton of the south” is therefore something of an exaggeration [48]. Also the cotton-related industries were manifold and diverse, and therefore differed from the sugar industry.

The cotton economy depended heavily on exports and world market prices. Sugar, too, was extremely sensitive to global fluctuations, and often faced competition with cheaper imports. This interrelationship between cotton and sugar was not only reflected in terms of prices and profits, but also in terms of acreage. If we consider the history of the Egyptian sugar industry in the long run, from the 1860s until the early 1930s, there appears to be a long sequence of crises [49]. The economic balance between acreage under cultivation, annually varying yields, global and domestic prices, production costs and marketing, was extremely delicate, and it was often disturbed. It is to Naus' credit that, under his energetic management and with his inventiveness — in addition to Harari's devotion —, stabilization of the sugar branch for Egypt was achieved.

There had been a measure of understanding on fiscal arrangements and tariffs between the Egyptian government and the former sugar companies ever since 1881. The existing arrangements were carried over into the era of the Société Générale, to the economic benefit of both parties. But it was never more than a measure of understanding: in periods of hardship, the government lowered duties (e.g. between 1893 and 1896), or suspended taxes for one to three years. In spite of repeated requests by the Société Générale, it was never prepared to consider a thorough reform, let alone an abolition of taxes and duties. As a rule the 8 % *ad valorem* tariff on imported sugar, as well as an excise duty on locally-produced sugar, remained in force.

Fluctuation and insecurity remained overriding factors in the first decade of the 20th century. Egypt did not adhere to the Brussels Convention of 1902. This

international sugar convention had been the outcome of a period of unbridled, ruinous competition between the European producers. The Convention prohibited its adherents from giving any governmental subsidy to their sugar production and export, while allowing taxation on imported sugar. However, Egypt, being bound by the constraints of Ottoman suzerainty and restrictive interpretations of the famous *firman* of 1873 to Khedive Isma'il, had not even been officially invited to Brussels. The Convention could have been advantageous for Egypt, but joining it would have been considered a political rather than an economic act by the Ottomans. Naus, in 1908, regretting that "Egypt was not master of her own tariff", argued in vain in favour of such a move [50].

In practice this meant that the import of sugar remained subject to the 8 % *ad valorem* tariff, except where bilateral trade agreements applied a slightly higher tariff (e.g. in the case of Austria, Belgium and Germany). On the other hand, the existing situation on the world market seems to have enabled the company to raise prices and make larger profits locally, albeit temporarily.

When the sugar company in 1905 had lapsed into the major crisis described above, the government had granted a three-year remission of the excise duty on sugar. But a trade agreement in 1909 with Russia, and subsequently with other most-favoured nations, once again lowered the (import) tariff to 2 % and made the Sucreries in Egypt even more vulnerable to cheap global overproduction.

It is not difficult to understand the government's reluctance to enact a major reform. It was calculated that between 1896 and 1909 the Treasury derived the huge sum of £E 145,300 from the sugar company [51]. The income from the sugar company consisted not only of import and export duties, excise duties, but also of railway tariffs, and the repayment of debts. Though the *octroi* duty had been abolished for all other commodities, it was still maintained for sugar. Whatever concessions had been made by the government in the fiscal sphere, even once more in July 1909, an anonymous note — we suspect written by Naus — deemed them illusory and inefficient. Therefore, decreasing imports and growing local sugar cultivation hit hardest at the Sucreries, while the government derived large revenues from the situation. This is not Free Trade, concluded the same note, but "anti-protectionnisme" [52].

The proposition that — apart from raising the company's efficiency and lowering production costs — economic stability could ultimately only be found in fiscal and tariff reforms, was passionately put forward in 1910 by C. Artaud. He advanced in the very first issue of *L'Egypte Contemporaine* — published by the "Société Khédiviale d'Economie Politique, de Statistique et de Législation", of which Naus was one of the founders — the idea that government support for the sugar industry was needed. Owing to its large labour force and annual turnover of £E 1 million this was also said to be warranted: "... elle représente à elle seule l'industrie nationale ... elle constitue pour le pays un appréciable élément de prospérité et pour le Trésor une source importante de revenus" [53].

The singular relationship between the sugar company and the government would come to an even clearer expression during and after World War I [54]. The *de facto* monopoly situation with regard to the production of sugar was reaffirmed by import and (re)-export regulations and by price controls. On the other hand, it must be realized that Naus had to manoeuvre between partly French (and some British), and partly indigenous Egyptian interests. In practice, this meant, first and foremost, a constant struggle against British policies and principles, and particularly against the existing tariff system. This situation would be relaxed after the war. The war years, as we will see, were also particularly important for Naus' rising career.

2.3. THE SUGAR COMPANY AS A STEP UPWARDS: RELATIONS WITH FU'AD

It seems that Naus came to be firmly in charge of the management of the sugar company already in the years which preceded World War I. He developed useful personal alliances with the princes of the khedivial court, with (later Sultan) Husayn Kamil, and especially with (later King) Fu'ad. During the war he also worked with (the later Prime Minister) Isma'il Sidqi [55]. The latter two would be of avail in his subsequent rise as an Egyptian "captain of industry". Though his contacts with the British may have intensified, this relationship remained more ambivalent.

Little concrete evidence was found on the development of Naus' personal connection with Fu'ad, but we recognize that the prince was actively interested in the advancement of industrial enterprises [56]. We may further suppose that Fu'ad took a particular interest in the sugar industry, it having been established by his father, Khedive Isma'il. Moreover, Fu'ad's knowledge of the French language, his European orientation and his involvement in scientific societies, such as the "Société d'Economie Politique", are commonly known. Naus, in later speeches, from his part, would never fail to praise or hail the King, or the dynasty — e.g. Muhammad 'Ali's contribution —, possibly even more than was conventional at the time. On the other hand, as a Belgian, he was equally dedicated to the royal dynasty in his motherland.

One of the palpable results of the Fu'ad-Naus connection was the great expansion of the "Association Internationale d'Assistance Publique" (AIAP). *International*, in this and similar contexts, signified cosmopolitanism — the cooperation between members of different foreign communities and local Egyptians. Its title may also remind us of a first-aid organization which existed in Paris from 1849. But for Egypt a precedent could also be found in certain Italian initiatives; a similar voluntary first-aid organization was founded by an Italian typographer in Alexandria in 1902. In any case, this AIAP had been established in 1907 by Prince Fu'ad. Its objectives were to furnish first aid to any injured person, transport to hospital and, in general, assistance to victims of

domestic and public calamities and the provision of sanitary precautions in case of epidemics. Upon his becoming Sultan in 1917, Fu'ad requested Naus to assume the Presidency of the AIAP, as well as the position of Treasurer of the "Société Nationale du Croissant Rouge" (Red Crescent) [57].

In 1909 Naus joined the Board of the "Ligue de Prophylaxie Sanitaire et Contre la Traite des Blanches", to combat what was then referred to as White Slavery, which had just been established. Undoubtedly, this was another association typical of the Egyptian élite at the time. We know nothing of his activities in this "international" league, which had been founded to combat prostitution, but it is worth noting who his fellow members on the Board were: Prince Ibrahim Hasan (later Prime Minister), 'Abd al-Khalîq Tharwat, as well as members of the Nubar, Cattaoui, Mosseri, Carton de Wiart and Eid families [58].

Naus, indeed, was very interested in public health issues and in medical progress. We do not know how this interest evolved, but there might also have been some link with his father's experience in Iran. It is interesting to note here that Belgians in that country, for idealistic reasons, in 1904-5 had been involved in the struggle against cholera and helped to organize health services [59].

The Egyptian Red Crescent had been founded by Prince Muhammad 'Ali in 1912, under the impact of the Tripoli War, to extend help in the Balkan Wars, and was also led from the outbreak of the war by Prince Fu'ad. During the First World War, the Red Crescent Society ran, *inter alia*, with special British permission, a hospital for Turkish prisoners in Tura, south of Cairo. Naus was a member of the committee which had to advise on the hospital management [60]. This was, we may add, not the same organization as the (British) Red Cross, which had aroused the ire of the Egyptian population during the World War by soliciting more or less compulsory donations from the *fallahin* [61].

The AIAP considerably expanded its activities during the interwar period: new branches were established in a dozen provincial towns [62]. With ramifications throughout the country, in 1924, the "Fédération Royale des Associations Internationales d'Assistance Publique d'Egypte" was founded, with Naus as its President. He was instrumental in raising money by means of lotteries, and in requesting the voluntary involvement of many physicians, each for a few hours a week. The AIAP provided a public service hitherto not available in Egypt. With a clinic established in Bulaq in 1934, near the Mixed Tribunal, and motor ambulances, it played a pioneering role in providing first aid. Among those who were treated, one must mention particularly the victims of traffic and work accidents as well as of burns caused by cooking on primus stoves [63]. From periodic communiqués to the press, published *inter alia* in *La Bourse Egyptienne* and *The Egyptian Gazette*, one may learn that the organization in the 1930s treated about 800-1300 cases per week [64].

Naus was also, from an early stage onwards, a member of the Council of the Faculty of Letters of the Egyptian University, allegedly at the request of the then Prince Fu'ad. Egypt's first secular university had been founded in 1908 by pub-

lic subscriptions. Naus reportedly saw the intellectual development of Egypt as no less important than its material progress: he cooperated wholeheartedly, as one observer wrote, to ensure the success of an institution, which, he knew, “answered the most pressing needs of Egypt” [65]. His daughter told us that he “gave much protection” to the Francophone (and Belgian) staff. Indeed, French and Italian staff were much more dominant than British nationals. It is, however, not clear to what extent he was directly involved in the language struggle of 1925-1927 at the Faculty of Arts. The Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Henri Grégoire, together with a few other Belgians and the “Latin” (Francophone) staff of the University preferred teaching in French instead of in English — a feud which faded out somewhat later with the gradual Egyptianization of the staff and the change to Arabic [66].

From around 1914, Henri Naus bore the title of *bey*, probably of the second, lower rank. Jokingly, it was said that Naus “would never be raised to the rank of pasha, but would always remain ‘nus bay’” (in colloquial *nus bē*), that is half-a-bey, a pun on his name. No doubt, Naus had earned his reward, and possessed the right Khedivial connections. Apart from the Khedive’s appreciation for his contribution to the Egyptian economy, also a certain fiscal standing could have played a role. It would, however, be of interest to know the exact date of the awarding of the title: the Khedive ‘Abbas II spent the summer of 1914 in Istanbul, and was deposed by the British upon the proclamation of the Protectorate in December. Then Husayn Kamil succeeded him with the title of Sultan. Such successions were often accompanied with the awarding of new pasha and bey honorifics [67]. Before World War I there were altogether 760 persons with the title of bey in its various ranks. This title undoubtedly augmented Naus’ prestige in both Egypt and Belgium. It is said that he later declined a feeler from the Belgian government to be raised to the aristocratic stand of a Baron, the title acquired by his compatriots in Egypt, *i.e.* Empain, Rolin and Lambert [68].

2.4. WORLD WAR I COMMITTEES

In many respects can World War I be considered as a crucial turning-point in Egypt’s political and economic and, in particular, industrial history. It also saw an additional upward swing in Henri Naus’ public career.

In August 1914, Henri Naus was appointed by the Egyptian government as a member of the “Commission chargée d’établir les prix maxima des denrées et articles de première nécessité”. Most of the members of this body, under the jurisdiction of which fell twenty-one different basic products, were Egyptian entrepreneurs and merchants; the only other foreigner was the Italian cereals merchant Santantonio. What seems to be important for his later career, was the fact that he sat on the same body as a number of Egyptian notables who came to play an important role in the following years. Among them were Tal’at Harb,

then at the Cairo Chamber of Commerce, Yusuf (Joseph) Cattaoui, the energetic Jewish entrepreneur, and 'Abd al-Majid al-Rimali, a leading merchant in oat-meals and meat. Each of them would also play a prominent role in the Federation of Industries to be [69].

Naus also became a member of another war-time committee, the Supplies Control Board or "Commission d'approvisionnement", which was set up by the British in September 1915 and which was awarded "advisory capacity" with regard to the fixation of the price of essential consumer commodities, including sugar [70]. While "under the Imperial orders" of the British Financial Adviser, Sir William Brunyate, this body ordered a halt to all sugar exports, fixed maximum prices, and ordered the building-up of a local reserve stock of 4,000 tons (though the Sucreries were allowed to go on selling the bulk of their much larger stocks) [71]. In addition, a higher excise duty was levied on sugar, which augmented the Government's revenues, but which at the same time raised the consumer price of sugar. In fact, we know almost nothing of the deliberations of this body, let alone of the weight which Naus carried in it [72]. It probably did not amount to much more than "consultation". Clearly its decisions were bound to be favourable for the British, and their war interests. Considerable tension appears to have existed between the Board and the French-dominated "Société Générale des Sucreries", which remained after all a shareholders company.

The sugar industry went on producing, although at one point in 1917 Victor Harari complained to the British authorities that the recruiting of manpower for the so-called Labour Force had adversely affected production. In that year stricter export quota were applied, while an increased demand by the army and lower domestic sugar consumption also affected the Sucreries' profits. Moreover the sugar crop that year was poor [73]. Nevertheless, the Société Générale des Sucreries kept its commitment to supply the local market, and the armies of Egypt and the Sudan, as well as to maintain sufficient emergency stocks. The company's acrimony against the Supplies Control Board, no doubt, was in part justified. If Egypt in World War I had not produced the necessary amount of sugar for local consumption, it was calculated that an additional war expense of £E 6 millions would have been incurred. Later, even an amount of £E 13-14 millions was quoted [74].

On the other hand, several local Arabic newspapers strongly criticized the high consumer prices of sugar, as well as the privileges given to the sugar company [75]. The Sucreries itself haughtily maintained that wholesale prices of sugar in Egypt were lower, or even much lower, than in most Western countries, with the exception of the United States, and that this adversely affected its profits [76]. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that, in spite of the limitations imposed, and rising production costs, the Société Générale des Sucreries managed to derive considerable profits from the war.

After the war, the British intimated that the sugar company had sold its products at three to four times the pre-war price. Brunyate, moreover, hinted that Naus, in addition to a fixed salary, also had received a share in the profits [77].

There appears to have been at least some foundation to these allegations. A more recent scholarly calculation even came to the conclusion that between 1911 and 1917 production had doubled, profits had risen 34-fold, and dividends of 42.5 % had been paid [78]. A French sugar exporter, himself affected by war-time measures in France, complained to the British Government in 1917 that the Sucreries — speculating on the Paris stock exchange — had made “perfectly scandalous war-profits, 46 million francs, thus nearly two million sterling... and [as a company abroad] does not pay a penny war profits [79]”.

One reason for the large profits was the absence of competition by cheaper Austrian beet sugar; another, the rise in local demand due to supplies to the Sudan and to the army. As a rule, the war proved beneficial to Egyptian entrepreneurs, but it hit hard at the poorer strata of the population. Hence the complaints against the high sugar price from among the population, also.

Towards the end of the war, in July 1918, when conditions were deteriorating, and salaries and other production costs rising, these imposed arrangements inevitably led to an open clash between the British-dominated Supplies Control Board and the French-dominated directors of the sugar company. After some unsuccessful correspondence, the Société Générale in July 1918 even published a twelve-page memorandum, complaining about the price controls, and the heavy export limitations. The company felt discriminated against in comparison with other industries. It was even offended, as it claimed that it had loyally contributed its share to the war effort: “Elle proteste, au nom d'intérêts français qui représentent cent millions de francs, contre un régime dont le caractère exceptionnel accentue la défaveur”. The French Agency in Cairo, summoned to help, concurred, viewing the sugar company as an industry which had rendered an important war service to Egypt, and felt it had to intervene in order to defend its national interests. The French diplomats, however, failed to convince their British colleagues, calling them “trop zélés et mal informés” [80]. As a member of the Board, Victor Harari, being a British subject, took the liberty to voice a complaint to the British that profits of the sugar company had become so small as to “be unable to continue working [81]”.

Naus, too, argued that free imports and exports of different sorts of sugar were economically essential for his company, which was now losing £E 1,000 per day. Naus remonstrated to the British authorities that “any issues of sugar for the present must be regarded as made under compulsion”.

An additional point of friction appears to be related to the fuel consumption at the Hawamdiyya refinery, which the British deemed too high under the war conditions. As they felt a campaign against them was under way, Brunyate remarked on the minute sheet of the file: “I imagine that it should not be difficult to prepare a statement which would cause the Directors of the Company to reflect a long time before persisting in the exact attitude they have deemed it politic for the moment to adopt” [82]. Post-war political and economic conditions, however, would change the power games.

2.5. NAUS AND THE BRITISH

Naus apparently was a member of more war-time bodies, part of which were probably interlocking or succeeded each other. Thus we find him as a member of the “Cour Permanente d’Arbitrage” (Permanent Arbitration Board) [83]. This board was instituted under martial law in 1915, and lasted until well after the war in 1923. It was said to have saved the British government thousands of pounds, not only in terms of decisions in favour of Egypt’s war economy but also owing to the fact that its members were voluntary and not paid. Of the 80 meetings of the Board, 72 were attended by Naus, whose judgement was highly valued by the military authorities. His moral stand in the war, moreover, could not be in doubt, because his 17-year old son Joseph-Henri (nicknamed Noucky), had volunteered for the defense of Belgium and tragically fell in battle near the Yser in Flanders in 1917.

British recognition of Naus’ war-time services was therefore in place. In 1919 Naus was invited to dinner at the Residency to receive a decoration but, owing to the sudden recall of the High Commissioner Wingate, the ceremony was cancelled and temporarily “forgotten” [84].

The British, in particular Wingate’s successor Allenby, do not seem to have been in a hurry to recognize their debt. When the Permanent Arbitration Board was dissolved, as late as December 1923, five years after the war, the British military command strongly repeated its recommendation that the two British members of the Board, Judge McBarnet and Frank P. Watson, as well as Naus receive a decoration. But the honour destined for Naus appears to have hit on strong feelings at the Residency. Initially, it was argued that Naus’ allegedly negative reputation was such that a British decoration would upset the Zaghul government. In a more detailed letter to London, strong reservations were expressed owing to Naus’ rumoured association with Muhibb Pasha, who had served as Minister of Finance for some months in 1923. Muhibb’s term of office was supposed to have been financially beneficial to the former’s sugar interests and the latter’s cotton interests. The cynical addition was even more revealing: “It is difficult to substantiate stories of this kind but we are informed that the British Commercial Community’s [*sic*] feeling against Naus is very strong and in the circumstances we do not feel that he is the right man on whom to bestow a decoration” [85].

Yet not everybody at the British Residency in Cairo forgot the matter. McBarnet himself took the affront against Naus up again in 1924 and reminded the Foreign Office that “his work has been of the utmost value and we owe the perfect acquiescence of the foreign community in our decisions in over a hundred cases, dealing with anything between one and two millions of money [*sic*], to the confidence inspired by his presence on the Board”. The same letter, indeed, hints at the harbouring in British circles of some anti-foreign or even anti-Belgian prejudice. It equally reports Naus’ own sarcastic response, to the effect that

he “could only conclude that the British Government was dissatisfied with his services. He mentioned incidentally with a laugh which was far from pleasant for me to hear that he had seen a dragoman at Luxor who was wearing an O.B.E. [86]”. In fact, it was not until 1927 before Naus was made an Honorary Commander in the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire [87].

Maybe there was also another element at play, namely jealousy due to Naus’ being “a close intimate of the King of Egypt — he is commonly reputed to be almost a confidential adviser — and I know personally that he is on intimate terms with the Egyptian Royal Family”. The annual List of Personalities, which was drawn up by the Residency as a practical, internal guide, but which before anything else used to reflect current apprehensions and prejudices, mentions, *inter alia*, that Naus was *persona grata* at the Palace. Apart from an unflattering remark at the address of his wife Anne (“a lady of mixed extraction and some Javanese blood”), it lays bare an additional, even more convincing explanation: “His interests usually appear to be diametrically opposed to those of United Kingdom firms” [88]. The latter remark can be put in perspective with the recent publication of a pervasive study on the impact of the complex rival capitalist interests [89].

2.6. THE COMMISSION OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

The most important war-time appointment for Naus, in the long run, was his becoming one of the non-Egyptian members on the “Commission du Commerce et de l’Industrie”. This Commission, formed in 1916 by the Rushdi government, was asked to study the economic effects of the war and to advise on the options for future commercial and industrial development. The original decree of appointment of 8 March 1916 included Isma’il Sidqi, then a former minister, as President, and the following members: Sidney H. Wells (a British administrator in charge of the vocational education system), Yusuf (Joseph) Aslan Cattaoui (then mentioned as a member of the Legislative Assembly, but also one of the most active local investors in Egypt), J.I. Craig (a highly-placed government statistician, co-author of Willcock’s third edition of *Egyptian Irrigation*, and later Commissioner for Customs), Amin Yahya Bey (an Alexandrian notable and big industrialist-to-be), Tal’at Harb (then still, simply mentioned as a Cairo notable) and F. Murdoch (a British industrialist from Mansura). The names of M.F. Bourgeois (the French Director of the gas factory in Alexandria), C.W. Twelves (a British financial advisor) and of Naus himself, who were not on the original list of members, were added somewhat later.

The body, generally known as the Sidqi Committee, after its powerful chairman, became a landmark in Egypt’s economic history [90]. Robert Vitalis, moreover, sees the Commission as an expression of increasing cooperation between Egyptian and British officials, and local business groups, three of its

nine members representing the interests of the “powerful minority-Suares group” (Tal’at Harb, Cattaoui and Naus). However, we tend to attach less importance to the alleged existence of such a power group than to the fact that the Committee included prominent Egyptian businessmen and experts, with a clearly defined economic vision [91].

After 38 sessions, it published the very first systematic policy recommendations for the future expansion of industry in modern Egypt. “What fantastic prices would we not have to pay for our sugar, oil, cement, alcohol, fezzes, soap, furniture, etc., if the industries producing those goods had not existed in Egypt?” the report proudly asked. But it went much further as it recommended the enactment of a more flexible, that is a rather more protectionist, tariff policy, the founding of a Department of Trade and Industry, and a blueprint for vocational education. The report unmistakably signified a new departure, as compared to Cromer’s *Laissez-Faire* policy and the classic era of Free Trade liberalism in general, which was fading away. Her Majesty’s Agent and Consul General had always been afraid of a local industry, dominated by foreigners, but this was exactly what emerged after the war [92].

Naus too, in the course of time, considered the Sidqi Commission as an important turning-point, which occurred in his words “when economic independence became clear”. He even called its recommendations a “monumental program” [93]. Indeed, there is much in Naus’ later economic thinking and in his public speeches which harks back to this report. But it is probably not less important that Naus and Isma’il Sidqi would henceforward move on parallel tracks. Sidqi, who had initially joined the Wafd, and was then dispelled from it, became one of the most powerful but, at the same time, one of the most maligned and controversial Egyptian politicians of the entire era: an intriguing personality of “financial virtuosity”, and “a progressive in industrial matters”, but, as Prime Minister from 1930 to 1933 — replacing the 1923 Constitution by an even more restrictive and conservative one —, ... “a political reactionary” [94].

As we shall see, Naus’ greatest achievements as President of the Federation of Industries fell in the period Sidqi served as Prime Minister. Sidqi believed in strong, if not autocratic, leadership. Considering this relationship, it may have been significant that Sidqi was educated at the Alexandrian “*Collège des Frères*”, with its emphasis on the French language. In any case both men shared a zeal for industrialization and economic development, and possibly, unknown to us, also some views on politics. Instead of Cromer’s policies, the new tendencies were State regulation, protection and import substitution, albeit all of these to a limited degree.

From 1919 onwards, Naus would sit on the Economic Council, which was a consultative outgrowth, or sort of successor, to the Sidqi Committee, presided over by the Minister of Finance. Among his fellow members were prominent foreign resident personalities such as Michel Salvago, a Greek banker and entrepreneur from Alexandria, and Samuelle Sornaga, an Italian ceramics producer,

and Isaac G. Levi, born in Istanbul and educated in Naples, the erudite director of the Bureau of Statistics, and a remarkable publicist in later years — all of whom would soon become co-founders of the Association of Industries [95]. The body was once or twice suspended. In 1922, it was reconstituted “pour augmenter le rendement des revenus de l’Egypte et développer son industrie et son commerce”. At that time it had 23 members, of whom six were government officials, eight Egyptians, and nine foreigners. In February 1925, with Isma’il Sidqi as President (soon afterwards he would become Minister of the Interior) it had 17 members, both Egyptians, and, once more, a proportionally large number of foreigners — among them Naus. Its objective then was declared to be economic planning, the preparation of studies and research, as well as the development of financial and economic resources [96].

In addition, Naus was a member of the “Conseil consultatif supérieur d’Agriculture”. For some time he also occupied the position of honorary president of the “Union des Agriculteurs d’Egypte”.

NOTES

- [1] Even today many Cairenes consider the people of Upper Egypt to be hotheads, especially against the background of Islamic militancy. One of the assassins of Sadat, Khalid al-Islambuli, was born in Mallawi. An interesting detail is that his father was the juridical advisor of the sugar factory at Nag’ Hammadi. Cf. G. KEPEL, *Le Prophète et Pharaon, les mouvements islamiques dans l’Egypte Contemporaine*, Paris, 1984, p. 201.
- [2] P.O.J. is an abbreviation of Proefstation Oost-Java (Experimental Plant East Java). The variety appears to have come from Cheribon.
- [3] See Résumés on CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Documents de l’Industrie Sucrière. Also MAZUEL, pp. 65-69 and 72-75.
- [4] Regarding the significance of the cotton variety, see OWEN, *Cotton*, pp. 28-30, and OWEN, *The Middle East*, pp. 67-68. Jumel was a French textile engineer who had been engaged in 1917 by Muhammad ‘Ali to set up a spinning and weaving plant in Bulaq. He had accidentally discovered the advantages of the locally-grown long fibre variety. Where Owen calls this cotton variety Mako-Jumel, Crouchley speaks about Maho. The story of POJ 105 is told in MAZUEL, pp. 65-71.
- [5] Service Agronomique “Entreprises”, *La culture de la canne à sucre en Egypte*, Alexandria, Cairo, Brussels, 1952, pp. 38-39. The same source contains also details on the scope of sugar cultivation in Egypt in general; *The Stock Exchange Year Book for 1941*, pp. 506-507; C. VAN DILLEWUN, *Sugar Cane Culture in Egypt*, Istanbul, 1947, p. 29. Some of the *baladi* (local) varieties, contrary to their designation, had, in fact, been imported by Khedive Isma’il from the West Indies. The new varieties, introduced after the 1950s, included Co 45C9, Co.413, Co 310, etc., interview with Muhammad ‘Abd al-Mun’im. See further A.I. ALLAM, “Varietal Changes and their Impact on Yields of Canc and Sugar in Egypt”, in International Society of Sugar Technologists, Proceedings XVIth Congress, São Paulo, 1978, pp. 867-873. With thanks to the author who heads the Sugar Division of the Agricultural Research Center in Giza.
- [6] *Mededelingen van het Proefstation Oost-Java*, Vierde Serie no. 9, Jaarverslag over 1903 (Soerabaia 1904), pp. 236ff., MAZUEL, p. 69.
- [7] See his “De kwaliteit van Java-suiker”.
- [8] On Pellet, see F. DUPONT, “L’Association des chimistes de sucrerie et de distillerie”; and E. SAILLARD, “Composition de la betterave de sucrerie” in *Histoire centennale*. See further Muhammad Mahmud Khalil, “Henry Naus Bey” *Journal Sucrier Egyptien*, p. 5; Roche, “In Memoriam” *ibid.*, p. 18; and A. Rosenfeld, “Henri Naus Bey and P.O.J. 105” *ibid.*, p. 35.

- [9] Report to the shareholders, 22 January 1910, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Documents de l'industrie sucrière.
- [10] Note of 5 April 1904 on CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucrerie. Cf. OWEN, *Cotton*, p. 296.
- [11] Muhammad Mahmud Khalil, *Le Journal Sucrier Egyptien*, p. 3.
- [12] *The Times*, 30 August 1905. Other press clippings from several local French newspapers (*Journal de Roubaix*, *La Libre Parole*, *Le Réveil du Nord*) of the critical days at the end of August were kindly sent to me by the Eridania Béghin-Say company.
- [13] Press clipping from *L'Egypte*, 6 September 1905.
- [14] Report of 23 November 1905, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1905-1906. Cf. MAZUEL, pp. 44-45.
- [15] See correspondence on CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1905-1906. This file also contains a report (23 pp.) which may be one of the three. The episode has been described and analysed in much greater detail by SAUL, pp. 409-434.
- [16] Of Jewish origin, the latter's family had probably come to Egypt from Syria in the 1830s. He had received his academic education in both England and France, see KRAMER, pp. 41 and 45. On the acquisition of the British nationality, see PRO, FO141/813/14761. Also *Le Mondain Egyptien*, 1943, pp. 147-148. By that time Harari had long since become honorary president of the Sucreries.
- [17] Correspondence on CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1905-1906; see further SAUL, p. 434. The sources differ slightly as to the composition of the committee.
- [18] On the company's escape from liquidation, see *The Times* of 22 March 1906 and 4 June 1906.
- [19] For details on the Concordat, as proposed on 22 January 1906, and its adoption, see CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1905-1906. In particular an undated note (probably from 1906) on the composition of the company's capital consisting of 24,000,000 "actions", 54,500,000 "obligations chirographes", and 20,000,000 "obligations hypothécaires". A very detailed financial analysis is found in an undated article, probably from a 1929 issue of *La Bourse Egyptienne*, carton 233, dossier 72/1. From the records on file it would seem that agreement was reached over some opposition by Cassel. On the agreement in general, see also DUCRUET, pp. 294-295; and GRUNWALD, p. 136.
- [20] In 1903 the "Société Générale des Sucreries" had inaugurated its new head office in Cairo, formerly General Wingate's headquarters (Sharia Bulaq 6?), CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucrerie. In 1910 a plot was bought for the construction of a new building, apparently at Husni Gawwad Street where it is now. Shareholders meeting 22 January 1910, sub-dossier Documents de l'industrie sucrière.
- [21] Interview with Marie-Rose Naus.
- [22] BERQUE assumes that Naus' appointment was made on the advice of Harari Pasha, p. 244n. See also Roche, "In Memoriam" p. 17. Harari and Birch Pasha were then apparently the only British subjects on the Board of the sugar company. See SAUL, p. 437. From a personal letter of Joseph Naus to his son, dated 15 March 1909 (in the possession of Guy Naus), it would appear that Cassel also remained in close touch with the sugar company in the following years, or assisted Henri Naus with his personal advice.
- [23] Letter to the Chargé d'Affaires, 18 March 1910, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910. Cf. SAUL, p. 436.
- [24] It appears that, for some time, sugar was imported even from Belgium, RAHIMLOU, p. 137.
- [25] The Committee of experts of 1905 had assessed the value of the Shaykh Fadl factory (constructed in 1892) at £E 120,000, and that of the Nag' Hammadi factory (1897) at £E 180,000, and the Hawamdiyya refinery at £E 800,000, as against all the ex-Da'ira factories together at £E 600,000. The sugar mill in Mata'ina, for instance, was called primitive. The plot of the former factory in Minya was parcelled out, cf. Report to the shareholders, 22 January 1910, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Documents de l'industrie sucrière. See also MAZUEL, pp. 46-47; SAUL, 443-444. The government concession for the Khudayrat and Abu 'Ammar pumps was cancelled in 1935, CAD, Le Caire, carton 231, sub-dossier Divers.
- [26] Part of the storehouse was expropriated in 1911 and a new one — with a tunnel to the Nile — was constructed, see report for 1911-1912, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940, and report for 1911-12, *ibid*. The company at that time possessed another storehouse in Alexandria.

- [27] These are the figures mentioned in the contract, for a copy of which, dated 26 November 1905, see CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1905-1906. See also L. WIENER, *L'Egypte et ses chemins de fer*, Brussels, 1932, pp. 438-439. The railway deal stipulated conditions for the use of tracks on the lands of sugar factories, as well as a reduced state railways tariff for the transport of sugar canes. Further the brochure *Sugar in Egypt and Elsewhere* of 1903, p. 76, and ARMINJON, *Situation*, p. 242. Figures on the factories and the railway tracks slightly differ in other sources: some speak about 520 or even 595 km; there could have been some railway expansion later.
- [28] SAUL, p. 417.
- [29] The scholarly debate was sparked by E. R. J. OWEN, "Lord Cromer and the Development of Egyptian Industry, 1883-1907", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 2 (1966), pp. 282-301, and has more recently been discussed again by D. RACHOVICH, *Hitpathut Ta'asiyat ha-Tekstil be-Mitzrayim, Heybetim Kalkali'im, Hevratim'im, u-Medini'im, 1882-1952* (Development of the Textile Industry in Egypt, 1882-1952, Economic, Social, and Political Aspects), (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Tel Aviv University 1990), esp. pp. 292-302.
- [30] *Reports... in 1905*, p. 27. Cf. OWEN, *Cotton*, p. 343.
- [31] SAUL, p. 436.
- [32] MAZUEL, p. 47; BAER, *Landownership*, pp. 95-97 and 126-127.
- [33] On the Culture System (Cultuurstelsel), and its implications for the sugar branch, see e.g. B.H.M. VLEKKE, *Nusantara, A History of the East Indian Archipelago*, Cambridge, Mass., 1945, pp. 286-289 and 294; or even more incisively C. GEERTZ, *Agricultural Involution, the Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970, pp. 46-123. The Culture System, though formally abolished, dragged on till 1917 in the case of the compulsory growing of coffee.
- [34] Report by Naus to Prince Husayn Kamil (the Khedive Isma'il's son!), dating from early 1909, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Documents de l'industrie sucrière. See also the desiderata of a commission appointed by the "Société Khédiviale d'Agriculture" — of which Naus ostensibly was a member —, which specified five such small *hawds*, as well as the need for railways, *ibid.* A *hawd* is an arable plot, surrounded by a mud wall, with an inlet and an outlet for Nile water.
- [35] Report of 26 July 1908, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1908. Tariff reform was considered as a favourable though not yet essential act, cf. shareholders meeting of 22 January 1910, *ibid.*, sub-dossier Documents sur l'industrie sucrière.
- [36] CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries.
- [37] Confidential conversation with Soares, 11 May 1908, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1908. See further my article "Excavating the Modern History of Kom Ombo", in A. Kuijsten, H. de Gans, H. de Feijter (eds.), *The Joy of Demography... and Other Disciplines*, Amsterdam 1999, pp. 427-441.
- [38] Correspondence on CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1909.
- [39] CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910. Cf. BAER, pp. 92, 98, 116, 123, and 128-130.
- [40] French Consul Ribot (Alexandria) to Chargé d'Affaires, 18 March 1910, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910.
- [41] MUBARAK, *Khitat*, vol. 15, p. 12.
- [42] See financial study by the "Banque Belge et Internationale" for 1933-4, which claims a nett profit of £E 90,289 for that year, CAD, Le Caire, carton 223/1, sub-dossier 70/1 Banques.
- [43] WILLCOCKS, 3rd ed., vol. I, p. 352.
- [44] Report 1911-1912 to the shareholders, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940, and sub-dossier 70/1. See further *Bulletin de l'Association des Chimistes de Sucrierie et de Distillerie*, vol. 7 (January 1924), pp. 492-493; MAZUEL, p. 149. An overall evaluation of the Kom Ombo project is found in J. BESANÇON, "La mise en valeur du désert de Kom-Ombo", *Annales de Géographie*, vol. LXVII/361 (1958), pp. 319-334. For the overall history of the Kom Ombo project, see KUPFERSCHMIDT, U.M. "Excavating the Modern History of Kom Ombo".
- [45] OWEN, "The Egyptian Sugar Industry", pp. 221-223; RAHIMLOU, pp. 114ff., who, apparently, calls this the crisis of 1907.
- [46] Press clipping, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier 71/1.

- [47] Undated and unsigned note on the Sucreries' Economic Significance, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Documents de l'industrie sucrière. We have good reason to assume that its author was Naus. For an almost identical argument, dating from 1936, see MAZUEL, p. 218.
- [48] F. IRETON, "Des Agricultures égyptiennes, irrigation et système de cultures dans le Sa'id égyptien (1912-1940)", *Egypte, recompositions, peuples méditerranéens*, 41-42 (October 1987-March 1988), p. 231. Cf. C.M. CRAIG, *The Agriculture of Egypt* (Oxford 1993), p. 272.
- [49] AL-RIFA'I, pp. 263-264.
- [50] Letter by Naus, with appendix, to the French Chargé d'Affaires, 8 July 1908, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Documents de l'industrie sucrière.
- [51] MAZUEL, p. 172. For fiscal relations with the Government since 1881, see pp. 170-173.
- [52] Note (undated but probably from 1909), CAD, Le Caire, carton 232.
- [53] ARTAUD, pp. 215-217 and 222; MAZUEL, p. 172.
- [54] AL-RIFA'I, p. 267.
- [55] Interview with Marie-Rose Naus. See further RAAFAT, "The Belgians", on the Sultan's dinner party for some Belgian notables, quoting from the *Egyptian Gazette* of 27 January 1915.
- [56] Muhammad Fahmi LAHITA, *Ta'rikh Fu'ad al-Awwal al-Iqtisadi, Misr fi Tariq al-Tawjih al-Kamil*, vol. 1, Cairo, n.d., pp. 556, 574-576, and his *Ta'rikh Misr al-Iqtisadi fi al-Usur al-Haditha*, Cairo, 1944, pp. 562-564.
- [57] S. JAGAILLOUX, *La Médicalisation de l'Egypte au XIX^e siècle*, Paris 1986, p. 158, quotes the date 1906 from the Italian writer Sammarco. See further M. Tonin, "Provvedimenti Igienici e Problemi Sociali" in V. Arango-Ruiz *et al.*, *Egitto Moderno e Antico*, Rome, 1941, p. 207. Fu'ad's Italian inclination is well known. For a short summary of its history, see J. CATTAGUOI (ed.), "Sociétés savantes et institutions d'utilité publique", in his edited volume *L'Egypte, aperçu historique et géographique, gouvernement et institutions, vie économique et sociale*, Cairo, 1926, pp. 394-395 (here an earlier founding date is given); Fahmi QALINI Basha, *Mudhakkarat Qalini Basha*, Cairo, 1943, vol. II, pp. 65-66 on both the Red Crescent and the AIAP; and Sirdar Iqbal Ali SHAH, *Fuad, King of Egypt*, London, 1936, pp. 79-82.
- [58] CAD, Le Caire, carton 428, Police, Prostitution. Cf. E.J. BRISTOW, *Prostitution and Prejudice, The Jewish Fight Against White Slavery, 1870-1939*, Oxford, 1982, p. 192 and 244; and J.E. TUCKER, *Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*, Cambridge, 1985, p. 154.
- [59] DESTREE, p. 117.
- [60] It would seem that the hospital was resuscitated during the war at the request of the British General Maxwell, Shah, p. 102ff. Of the committee itself (headed by Prince Fu'ad, and of which Prince Yusuf Kamal, and Isma'il Sidqi were also members), Naus was the only foreigner. See also Egypte, Ministère des Finances, *Recueil des documents relatifs à la guerre*, 2^e année, Cairo, 1920, pp. 500-505. A fund established from public subscriptions amounted in 1925 to £E 20,000; with Naus involved, it may come as no surprise that in 1926 the Red Crescent made a donation to victims of flooding in Belgium, see "Sociétés savantes", pp. 394-395.
- [61] Such collections had been one of the causes of the 1919 uprising, see misc. memoranda on PRO, FO848/4. Cf. J. TERRY, *The Wafd 1919-1952, Cornerstone of Egyptian Political Power*, London, 1982, pp. 31-32.
- [62] King Fu'ad himself often opened many new branches, see for instance WIZARAT AL-MA'ARIF AL-'UMUMIYYA, *al-Ayam al-Malikiyya fi Sa'id Misr*, Cairo, 1931, pp. 23-24 (Luxor), p. 30 (Qina), p. 45 (Suhag), p. 50 (Asyut), p. 100 (Minya), p. 114 (Bani Suwayf).
- [63] Interview with Marie-Rose Naus. Her father even requested a permit from the French Mandatory government to sell lottery tickets in Syria, CAD, Le Caire, carton 449, Bienfaisance.
- [64] See periodic notices in both newspapers, and e.g. the photograph of 21 April 1937 in *La Bourse Egyptienne* which shows the military-style uniformed employees. Another photograph in the possession of Guy Naus shows some annual social event with the uniformed personnel.
- [65] CAD, Le Caire, carton 170, sub-dossier 4 (1917-1934), documents which indicate that Naus, with other foreigners, was a member around 1929. See further the obituary in *La Semaine financière et politique*, end 1938; R. Roche, "In Memoriam", *Le Journal Sucrier Egyptien* (vol 8, February 1940), p. 6.
- [66] See correspondence on MAECE, file AF10/2, and D. REID, *Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt*, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 87-99. Reid does not mention Naus at all. Marie-

Rose Naus (interview) relates that Naus personally befriended some of the Belgian staff, especially with Grégoire, Grosjean, and Dopp.

- [67] Surprisingly, little has been written on the awarding (or obtaining) of bey and pasha titles. Some information is found in 'Abd al-'Azim RAMADAN, *Sira' al-Tabaqat fi Misr, 1837-1952*, Cairo, 1978, pp. 81-82. Tens of foreign residents held these honorifics, especially the lower of the two ranks of bey. Relevant copies of the series *Tawqim Asma Dhawi al-Alqab wa'l-Rutub al-Madaniyya* could not be traced. Neither have I been able to see a complete set of the *Journal Officiel* of that year which must have carried the exact date of Naus being awarded the title. A comparison between the subsequent lists of members of the "Société Khédiviale d'Economie Politique" (of which Naus was a founding member and for some years the Treasurer) indicates that it was in late 1913 or early 1914, see *l'Egypte Contemporaine*, 5 (1914), p. i and p. xv. In any case, also the *Recueil des documents*, 1^{re} année, Cairo, 1920, p. 27, mentions Henri Naus as Bey already in August 1914. On the ranking system after World War I, see BLATTNER, *Who is Who*, e.g. 16th edition (1950), p. 15. The titles were abolished by the Revolution.
- [68] Another worthy Belgian in Egypt, Van den Bosch, lacked the financial means for baronetcy, interview with Marie-Rose Naus.
- [69] *Recueil des documents*, 1^{re} année, pp. 26-27. Tal'at Harb, and 'Abd al-Majid al-Rimali would both be honoured by Naus in the Federation of Industries. However, according to R.L. TIGNOR, "The Egyptian Revolution of 1919: New Directions in the Egyptian Economy" in E. KEDOURIE (ed.), *The Middle Eastern Economy*, London, 1977, p. 45, Tal'at Harb at the time published strongly critical articles against the high prices of the sugar company and the Belgian-owned tramways. The two of them must have known each other or even cooperated before, when Harb was still connected to the "Crédit Foncier" and the Wadi Kom Ombo company, see E. DAVIS, *Challenging Colonialism, Bank Misr and Egyptian Industrialization, 1920-1941*, Princeton, 1983, p. 93; and R. VITALIS, *When Capitalists Collide, Business Conflict and the End of Empire in Egypt*, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1995, p. 45.
- [70] *Recueil des documents*, 2^e année, pp. 338-339.
- [71] See Report to Financial Advisor on Supplies Control Board, March 1918-February 1919, pp. 8-12, PRO, FO 848/4. On the problem of not allowing sugar exports from Port-Said, see correspondence on CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940. In general it proved difficult, if not impossible, to control prices and to prevent hoarding and speculating on the black market, cf. TERRY, pp. 29-30.
- [72] For one complaint on insufficient supply, by a certain Rafiq Jabbur in Cairo, 20 May 1918, see CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.
- [73] PRO, FO 141/797/2689. See further PRO, FO 848/4 (Report to Financial Advisor).
- [74] Memorandum of the "Société Générale", July 1918, p. 1, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier 72/1; *EgInd.*, January 1926. See also Roche, p. 19.
- [75] Such articles were said to have been published by *al-Misri* and *al-Bashir* on 31 January, and by *al-Akhbar* on 1 February 1918, but we have not been able to see these. One of these allegedly appeared under the title "L'amertume du sucre", see press reports for end January, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940. Cf. TIGNOR, "The Egyptian Revolution", p. 25.
- [76] Memorandum "Société Générale", July 1918, p. 11, CAD, Le Caire, carton 76. See also carton 233, sub-dossier 72/1. Cf. *The Times* (trade supplement), 28 April 1923, which also claimed that prices were deliberately kept below those of world levels.
- [77] Brunyate, in his memorandum of 2 August 1918, calculated the following profits for 1915 £E 360,000, for 1916 £E 904,000 and for 1917 £E 1,149,000, as well a dividend of 42.5 %, PRO, FO141/485/7259.
- [78] TIGNOR, *State*, p. 51.
- [79] Letter Lingeman, 29 November 1917, PRO, FO 368/1723.
- [80] Letter Defrance, 16 July 1918, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, (MAE,QdO), Afrique 1918-1929, file K72 ("Sucreries et Raffineries d'Egypte").
- [81] Harari interview with Lloyd (12 July 1918) and protest letter of 16 July 1918, PRO, FO 141/485/7259, part I.
- [82] Minute 20 July 1918, correspondence on the same topic with French Minister in Cairo (who appears to have calmed down Naus somewhat), as well as a detailed memorandum by Brunyate on the sugar company are on PRO, FO 141/485/7259, part I.

- [83] It is not clear whether this was the same body mentioned as the Adjudications Committee, see *Recueil des documents*, 2^e année, *passim*.
- [84] McBarnet to Selby, 20 February 1924, PRO, FO 371/ 10056.
- [85] Kerr to Oliphant, 26 January 1924; Haking to War Office, 19 December 1923; Crowe to Creedy, 12 February 1924 and minutes on PRO, FO371/10056.
- [86] McBarnet to Selby, 20 February 1924, PRO, FO 371/10056.
- [87] Letter Lt. Col A. Mather, the Central Chancery of the Orders of Knighthood to this author, 9 August 1993, which states that the insignia were presented by the High Commissioner, then Lord Lloyd, to Naus on 19 April 1927.
- [88] For 1935 enclosed in Lampson to Eden, 16 April 1937, PRO, FO 371/20916. For 1935, see FO 371/ 19091. For 1937 see FO 141/660/353.
- [89] VITALIS, *Capitalists*, pp. 39-41, 49, 53 *et passim*. On further tension between the Federation of Industries and British commercial interests in the 1930s, see M. Deeb, "The Socio-economic Role of the Local Foreign Minorities in Modern Egypt, 1805-1961", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 9 (1978), p. 19.
- [90] See *Recueil des documents*, 2^e année, p. 511. Also 'Abd al-Salam 'Abd al-Halim 'AMIR Sub-ayh, *al-Ra'smaliyya al-Sina'iyya wa-Dawruha fi Misr fi Marhalat al-Mashru'at al-Hurra, 1916-1957*, Cairo, 1992, pp. 82-88. Note also the date 1957 in the title!
- [91] R. VITALIS, "Business Conflict, Collaboration and Privilege in Interwar Egypt" in J.S. MIGDAL, A. KOHLI and K. SHUE (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces, Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 179-180.
- [92] An extract in English from the report is to be found in C. ISSAWI, *The Economic History of the Middle East*, Chicago, London, 1966, pp. 453-460. See further TIGNOR, *State*, pp. 55-58; M.M. WAHBA, *The Role of the State in the Egyptian Economy*, Reading, 1994, pp. 28-30; M.M. ABDEL-MONEM ABUL FADL, *The Sidqi Regime in Egypt (1930-1935): New Perspectives*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, SOAS, London, 1975, pp. 30-32; and M. BADRAWI, *Isma'il Sidqi (1875-1950), Pragmatism and Vision in Twentieth Century Egypt*, London, 1996, pp. 7-11.
- [93] Speech 25 February 1925, *EgInd.*, March 1925; speech 14 March 1931, *ibid.*, Feb./March 1931. Naus' speeches were collected posthumously and published as: Henry [sic] Naus Bey, *Recueil des discours prononcés à la Fédération égyptienne des Industries* (Cairo 1939). Cf. in this case, pp. 2-3 and p. 17.
- [94] The quotes are from BERQUE, p. 448. See also P.J. VATIKIOTIS, *The Modern History of Egypt*, London, 1969, pp. 281-285, 338-340. Sidqi's second term as Prime Minister in 1946 saw the repression of Leftist forces.
- [95] On these personalities, see *Le Mondain Egyptien*, 1943, pp. 171, 226 and 238. See also ABUL-FADL, p. 47; and BADRAWI, p. 36.
- [96] BERQUE, p. 293; CAD, Le Caire, carton 41, Situation interne de l'Egypte; *Report on the Economic and Financial Conditions*, June 1925, p. 15; *EgInd.*, March 1925.

3. The Sugar Company after World War I

3.1. POST-WAR DIFFICULTIES

As war-time arrangements and restrictions had, on the whole, proven to be beneficial for both the government and the sugar company, they were, in essence, extended. A slightly more liberal agreement was drawn up by the end of the war. The idea was to remove some of the disadvantages of the war, e.g. the reopening, to some degree, of the possibility of sugar imports and exports, but to maintain, for the time being, the sugar company's obligation to supply primarily the British army as well as the populations of Egypt and the Sudan. To this end the capacity of the Hawamdiyya installations was somewhat enlarged, and a plot of land purchased at Mata'ina to increase supplies to the Armant factory [1].

Sugar control arrangements, and import restrictions, were extended several times after the war in order to dispose of the existing stocks, as well as to safeguard the profitability of the refinery. The government was interested in upholding the price control on sugar. Maximum prices for sugar were regularly announced in the *Journal Officiel* [2]. By providing certain logistic facilities the Egyptian government, moreover, felt entitled to a share in the "exaggerated profits" made by the sugar company [3]. The new agreement was signed on 29 January 1919, after some delay, due to the late Armistice, and declared valid until 31 October 1919 [4].

Although the sugar company had benefited by the relative protection of World War I, it entered a much more difficult economic episode soon after. This was no less true for other industries. It was one of the reasons for new initiatives in the economic field, such as the establishment of the Association of Industries, which is to be discussed below. The main impulse was the coming into full force again of the previous tariff system, that is the heritage of the combined Ottoman and Cromerian Free Trade philosophies: in practice it meant a renewal of the 8 % *ad valorem* import duties, a 1 % export tax and 8 % excise on most products.

The early 1920s turned out to be difficult years for the sugar industry, which claimed that it could survive economically only with an adequate supply of sugar cane. The harvest of 1920 fell short and, at the same time, the low sugar prices led to hoarding; this in turn caused a speculative shortage. As many cultivators preferred the more profitable cotton crop, worried sugar cane growers came to see the British High Commissioner in December 1921, somewhat dramatically claiming to represent the interests of 2 million people in Upper Egypt, who were dependent on the sugar branch. The British, on their part, rather than stating straightly their proper interests and trade philosophies, tried

to argue that the continuing restriction of sugar imports, as requested, was working against the interest of the consumers, precluding a cheaper consumer price of sugar [5].

In 1922, world and local sugar prices fell considerably, owing mainly to a worldwide selling-off of stocks. This had repercussions for the *Société Générale* too, which had to face rising production costs, and once more became worried about its future [6]. The cultivators too, pressed for a renewal of the existing agreement, and in any case an extension to the ban on the import of (cheaper) sugar. The General Agricultural Syndicate set up a committee under Cattaoui Pasha to mediate between sugar cultivators and merchants. Naus, for his part, pressed the government to sign a new agreement in order to safeguard the interests of both his company and the sugar cane cultivators. In 1922 sugar imports on the whole remained banned, but in response to local complaints, it was agreed to somewhat reduce the consumer price of sugar. This lasting price control — in itself an interesting feature under peace conditions — renewed the formal interrelationship with the government: the government would have to be completely in touch with the accounts of the sugar company and their fluctuations [7].

Such an agreement, amounting to a monopoly on the local market, was not, understandably, to the liking of foreign trade parties. In December 1922, for instance, the Belgian consul complained to Brussels that the Egyptian government intended to extend the annual agreement with the sugar company. He assumed correctly that only the *Sucreries* could import sugar, if at all, and that its price was controlled by the government. In short, the company's production and stocks were artificially protected, which meant that there would not be a "fair chance" for Belgian sugar [8].

Thus in 1922 a subsequent agreement between the Egyptian government and the sugar company was signed; the government justified this on political grounds, while the sugar company was allowed to work off large surplus stocks allegedly dating back to the war years, estimated by one source at no less than 60,000 tons. The sugar company's eternal fear from cheaper Austrian beet was again staved off by a ban on imports [9]. While this convention was to the advantage of the company and the planters in Upper Egypt alike, who saw the price of sugar cane slightly rise, it was attacked by local merchants [10]. The new agreement was even more to the dislike of the British. They claimed to be no longer interested in a further extension of the war-time import limitations, evidently fearing French and Belgian pressures [11].

As long as this virtual monopoly lasted, the *Sucreries* saw its profits increase. But the expiry of this agreement, and of the import prohibition, on 10 May 1923, rendered the sugar company as vulnerable as before [12]. True, sugar exports rose for about a year, but then fell again. But complaints resurfaced against the competition of cheaper sugar from abroad, to the extent even of "dumping", which could lead to the ruin of the company in Egypt. In fact,

while the company sought to make its plant at Nag' Hammadi more efficient, there were rumours about the imminent closure of sugar factories in Shaykh Fadl and Abu Qurqas.

Although it would seem that the actual production of sugar was developing satisfactorily, as shown by the fact that by 1929 no more sugar had to be imported, the company's financial position appears to have worsened. World prices were down, and the Sudan market was lost to a British "régie" arrangement in 1925. The export of refined sugar came to a halt, and in 1927 rented *waqf* lands had to be abandoned. Indeed, from 1926 the Sucreries' financial situation became even more precarious. The company had to pay dividends from its reserves, and ultimately, in 1929, no dividend was paid at all [13]. A crisis threatened the very survival of the Société Générale des Sucreries, and Egypt's sugar industry as a whole. Naus was again in the forefront to find a solution.

For understandable reasons Naus and Harari initially strove towards a return of the sugar price control, to which the British, for equally understandable reasons, remained opposed. Probably inspired by Naus, *l'Egypte Industrielle* complained that other governments protected their local sugar industries against dumping by drastically raised tariffs (e.g. Italy and Rumania); the United Kingdom subsidized its industry, and Sudan had its own sugar "régie" [14]. In its annual report for 1928-9 the French Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria warned that abandoning the sugar industry would result in disaster: it would affect the livelihood of numerous workers and peasants, as well as the prosperity of the railways and several secondary industries, and render all capital investments in buildings and installations idle. A return to World War I protectionist measures was recommended [15].

But as the government could not or would not force the sugar company to pay a higher price to cultivators, and the raising of import duties was, for the moment, unfeasible, the sugar company had to search for alternative solutions. This, in fact, forms the background to Naus' efforts to push for a tariff revision and lower railway transport rates. In 1929 Naus clearly stated at the shareholders meeting that a minimum import duty of £E 7 per ton sugar would be essential for the survival of the sugar industry [16]. In this effort Naus was strongly supported by the "Union des Agriculteurs", of which, at some time, he was a vice-president. A politician such as Qilini (Gallini) Pasha, who was concerned not only about his own agrarian interests, but also about the plight of the *fallahin*, came to see Naus. He pleaded for a protective customs tariff, as well as increased domestic production and consumption of sugar [17]. Ultimately, the tariff reform of 1930 and the agreement with the Government of 1931, which — for Naus at least — were one, took a large step towards the stabilization of the sugar industry. Both protection and a reduced railway tariff were achieved and are discussed below among the successes of the Federation of Industries.

3.2. THE SUGAR “REGIE” OF 1931

In 1929, the League of Nations, alarmed by a global crisis in sugar prices, pushed for a worldwide reduction of prices. Shares of most companies working in Egypt fell. The only exception was the Suez Canal company. Thus the Sucreries was also affected. The Egyptian Government, however, instead of allowing cheaper imports, now decided on a protectionist tariff (a general policy which will be discussed below) and embarked on protracted negotiations for a new convention, or what could be called a sugar “régie”. A government-appointed committee under the presidency of deputy-Minister of Finance ‘Abd al-Wahhab, with Naus as one of its members, was to study the problems in their totality. Naus proved a patient but, at the same time, tenacious negotiator, and we may assume that he was able to strike a good deal with Sidqi, who had become Prime Minister in June 1930. Thus it was Naus, probably, who saw an opportunity — however ingenious or astute — which guaranteed the sugar industry’s survival and, what is more, reaffirmed the government’s partial involvement in the industry. This was an industry which had, after all, been initiated by the erstwhile ruler, Khedive Isma‘il [18].

The resulting Convention, the only of its kind for any branch of the domestic economy, was signed on 5 February 1931 by Victor Harari as President of the Board of the Société Générale des Sucreries. The latter probably also played an important role in the negotiating process. Mazuel spoke about a “véritable charte” [19]. It has even more commonly been called a “régie”, in the sense of the tobacco and salt “régies” which existed in the Ottoman Empire, and the (envisaged) tobacco concession which had caused the 1890 upheaval in the Qajar Empire. This is not the place to consider similarities and differences, but suffice it to draw attention to the monopolistic character of all these. In fact, the sugar company committed itself to produce all the sugar needed in Egypt. The Convention’s unique advantages, which continued the “quasi-monopoly” of the Société Générale des Sucreries, once more reflected the singular position of sugar industry [20]. The Government was henceforward represented by two delegates on the Board of the sugar company, with their emoluments to be paid to the Government. Its power to audit the accounts was reaffirmed. It also obtained a series of rights enabling it to regulate sugar cane acreage and farm-gate prices, as well as the distribution of sugar which became subject to the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. The Sucreries engaged itself to increasing its production, while the Government committed itself to purchase a certain share of it. Hence production and import quota became subject to strict government control. After payment of a guaranteed annual dividend of 5 % to the Sucreries’ shareholders, the state would receive between 70 and 95 % of the remaining profits [21].

The agreement was thought to be favourable to producers and cultivators, as well as to the Treasury. Cultivators had already benefited by a price rise since

the new tariff of 1930, and saw a further stabilization of prices. Computing data from a table presented by Mazuel, the average annual amount in excise duties paid by the Sucreries to the Government between 1921 and 1929, can be shown to hover around £E 29,000, while payments dramatically rose to £E 42,000 for the years 1930-1935 [22]. Isma'il Sidqi justified the sugar convention of 1931 as "...assurant à la plus grande de nos industries une viabilité dont elle avait grand besoin", as well as safeguarding the interests of its 27,000 workers. He also referred to the help he had extended to the spinning and weaving industries when these were equally threatened by competition from abroad. Sidqi had, indeed, furnished credit guarantees also to several other industries in trouble, including some belonging to the Banque Misr group [23].

There is strong evidence that the terms of the convention spared the Société Générale from bankruptcy, and thus saved thousands of jobs. After many precarious years, the balance of the Sucreries for 1930-1937 showed a stabilization of profits and reserves [24]. Also, for three decades to come, the sugar industry was able to meet a full 100 % of the local consumer demand, an achievement matched only by the alcohol and cigarette industries. Sugar imports almost completely ceased, but also exports declined drastically: Egypt became a closed sugar market [25].

On the other hand, it could be argued that the state had been instrumental in keeping the sugar industry alive. Deriving surplus revenues from it, it had a vested interest in its survival, as had the sugar cane growing landowners. There can be little doubt that the Egyptian consumer paid a relatively high price for refined sugar, but this applies maybe more to the richer strata of society, which consumed larger quantities of this product [26]. We cannot but leave aside here as unprovable, a rumour to the effect that Isma'il Sidqi had personally benefited by the deal. Equally, there is some cryptic information to the effect that Naus had made a personal profit from unauthorized exports [27].

Thus, apart from the economic merits of the new convention, its signing reinforced the position of the sugar company. Its factories now worked continuously from December till May, the Hawamdiyya refinery even the year round, and soon total domestic demand could be covered. The company again reported a nett profit of £E 146,732 for 1931-2, and ascribed it to the absence of foreign competition. In these years, when the new tariff had gone into force, the Sucreries could be called "not perhaps prosperous [but] nevertheless healthy and profitable" [28].

The convention's meaning went even further. Following up the antecedents of the "étatiste" economic policies of the Nasirist period, a recent study has come to the following conclusion: "The example of the sugar *Régie* would seem to us to have been the earliest example of the state using its political power in order to gain control of an industry. In exchange for protection, the sugar monopoly was subjected to the control of the state in matters of economic policy, and the

state obtained a large part of the profits. Short of nationalization, this seems to be the most drastic measure the state could have taken with respect to the sugar monopoly" [29].

3.3. SHAREHOLDERS, MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

The Société Générale des Sucreries had its "siège social" in Cairo and thus fell, by and large, under the jurisdiction of the Capitulations. As most capital was French, one might say that it was, in fact, a French company operating in Egypt. What did this mean in practice, for its shareholders, managers and personnel?

It has been convincingly demonstrated that we have to be careful in distinguishing between the actual control of foreign companies working in Egypt, and their legal owners in the form of shareholders. In the sense of a distinction between unmediated and portfolio investment, the sugar company has been called "a loosely administered company", as opposed, for instance, to the Suez Canal company, which would be a "tightly controlled company" [30].

Unfortunately we have little concrete information when it comes to analysing the ever-changing composition of the shareholders body of the company. Shares were placed and traded on the Paris stock exchange, often with commercial banks as interfaces. Most shareholders lived in France, or elsewhere, but some resided also in Egypt.

An even more intriguing question is which proportion of the profits made by the Sucreries, over the years of fluctuation, went to shareholders abroad, and which proportion remained in Egypt. One may even argue that this is the crux of the matter of foreign involvement in Egypt. We have no answer to that question. However, in our discussion we cannot but draw attention to the supposedly increasing number of indigenous Egyptian shareholders, as well as to the skimming effect of the convention of 1931 on the Sucreries' profits.

As the company was a French enterprise, the composition of the shareholders body and especially of the Board ("Conseil d'Administration") was a topic of constant concern for the official French representatives in Egypt. The company's capital was composed of "obligations", "actions privilégiées" (while "porteurs de titres" and "porteurs de traites" merged after 1906), ordinary actions, and mortgage debts ("créances"). The first three categories were in majority in French hands. The last category was held by the — mainly British — representatives of the Daira Sugar Corporation. This, indeed, was mentioned as a source of tension. The French constantly feared, without justification, that the British were out to undermine the company's credibility, bring in more British personnel, and ultimately take it over [31]. Even more than the conduct of the Soares brothers, it was Harari's management which refuted the paranoid character of such apprehensions: a local resident and British subject, entertaining friendly

personal relations with all parties concerned, who remained before anything else interested in sound business.

The committee formed in response to the company's crisis of 1905 by the shareholders in Paris, clearly indicates that the centre of gravity was then still located in France. By the time of Naus' death in 1938, it was estimated that French investors still held only 30 % of the company's shares. However, fewer than one percent of them showed up at shareholder meetings; only once following Naus' death, after some persuasion by the "Crédit Lyonnais", did this proportion rise to 6 % [32].

In April 1919, according to one source, the capital of the company was still considered to be entirely French [33]. There was a French Inspector General, G. Schirmann, who appears to have dealt mostly with personnel matters [34]. But this was soon to change: in 1921 the French Minister in Cairo already warned his superiors in Paris against the danger of a take-over of French companies by "sujets locaux ou des Levantins". He reported that a majority of the shares of the sugar company had been purchased on the stock market in Paris by the alcohol and chemicals producer Theocharis Cozzika (Kotzikas) [35]. Already around 1912 we find the name of P. Cozzika — possibly his brother Polychrois — as "scrutateur", along with the names of Harari and Naus, who form the company's "bureau" [36].

The Cozzikas, rich Greek notables, were the owners of the alcohol distillery at Tura, south of Cairo. It had been established in 1879, but since then constantly enlarged and modernized. The distillery worked mainly on molasses purchased from the Sucreries. It has been suggested that the Da'ira Saniyya factories had not ventured into the production of alcohol owing to fears from foreign, especially British, competition. But the Cozzikas did, and even became suppliers to the British army.

In the early 1920s a question of principle arose in connection with the foreign or Egyptian status of the Société Générale des Sucreries. The company wished to pay dividends in Egyptian or French currency but, in a move to disengage himself from French interests, Cozzika demanded payment of dividends in gold francs instead of French francs [37]. After a protracted juridical struggle, the dispute was settled by the Mixed Court of Appeal, then still in Alexandria. Contradicting earlier judgements on the Suez Canal and Heliopolis companies — which show how complicated the matter was, and how much depended on the composition of the mixed courts at a given time — it was ruled in this particular case that dividends had, indeed, to be paid in gold francs. From a strictly theoretical point of view, the judgement could be understood to indicate that the Sucreries was not an Egyptian company. However, little practical meaning could be attached to this. The most far-reaching consequence of the judgement, was that it enabled Cozzika to increase his local fortune still further. By the end of the decade, it seems that he had become the largest single shareholder in the Sucreries [38].

From the Cozzika affair it would, moreover, appear that the transition to Egyptian capital, which was surmised to have occurred around the 1930s, took place somewhat earlier [39]. This certainly was not the end of the dynamics: by the end of the 1930s an industrial tycoon had appeared in Egypt's economic arena, Ahmad 'Abbud Pasha, a controversial figure, often accused of political opportunism — or was it mere business acumen? —, whose steep rise to economic power has recently been analysed in an innovative study by R. Vitalis. As his family originated from Armant, a sugar cane cultivation area, his interest in this branch is understandable. Though his exact career is difficult to trace, it appears to have started around 1924 in the construction business. At some early stage he also became involved in the Kom Ombo company. But he was equally interested in buying himself into a wide range of enterprises, creating a large industrial empire, a "groupe" of his own, like other giants such as Banque Misr, or the business concerns owned by Amin Yahya. His gradual take-over of the sugar company's control and directorship, which occurred, as we shall see, between 1938 and 1941, was only one of many such moves. The Jewish financial expert Elie Politi claims to have advised him to buy shares of the Sucreries, which he did, gradually and discreetly, till he surprised the General Assembly by becoming the largest shareholder, and subsequently entered the Board. Around the same time 'Abbud also took control of Cozzika's alcohol factory and of the Egyptian National Bank. To this could be added shipping and transport interests, hotels, textile and chemical factories as well. Ultimately, he would become the first Egyptian to sit on the Board of the Suez Canal Company [40].

We know next to nothing, however, about Naus' own shares: in 1942 the Belgian Ambassador reported that he had possessed "10 000 titres". Even if this is correct, we do not know how rewarding those 10,000 preference or founders shares were [41].

A full series of annual statements and, even more, the minutes of the annual shareholders meetings could have given us a clue as to the composition of the shareholders body. Such an in-depth investigation would enhance our understanding of the Sucreries' operations; this is undoubtedly true also for all the other large companies in Egypt. Unfortunately we have not been able to find such a series [42].

Though the sources, which we have seen, do not enable us to reconstruct an uninterrupted narrative of the composition of the Board of Directors of the Société Générale des Sucreries, it is nevertheless worthwhile to try and follow up those changes which could be traced. In 1897 the Board appears to have been essentially French, with Henry Say as its President and several other sugar magnates — living in France — as members. Under Cronier, obviously, French directors remained dominant. One of them was Emile Ternijnck, his son-in-law and director of a sugar factory in Chauny, Northern France [43]. But the directors of the sugar company soon emerged as a more diversified international group [44]. Even prior to the take-over of 1902 we find the names of a few

British directors, e.g. Richard Cavendish and Sir Arthur John Birch (Pasha), but also the well-known Armenian Egyptian Boghos Nubar Pasha. Rafael Soares, a local Jew who held French nationality, whose role has been discussed above, gained a dominant position on the Board.

In 1906, after the crisis and Cronier's suicide, the reorganized board of directors stabilized and included Boghos Nubar Pasha, Rafael Soares, Victor Harari Pasha, Birch Pasha and M.J.A. Cattaoui. Basically, this still represented what has recently been called the French-held "Soares group", a board which thus also reflected Egyptian-Jewish involvement [45]. However, in 1907 the French consul in Cairo lamented that a Belgian was designated to manage a French company ("alors que les capitaux belges n'ont rien à y voir"), and that "Malheureusement les Français ne sont représentés dans le conseil d'administration que par une seule personne sur quatre" — one being British and the two others Egyptian [46]. In any case, French representation was again reinforced by the election of a new board in 1910, presided over by Harari, and with at least four new French members [47]. The French felt reassured that at least one of them, S. Wellhoff, would look after their interests. These were specified as orders of equipment from French industry, and the employment of French personnel. To their regret, it seems that some of the former French mills had been replaced, during this decade, by British machinery [48]. French representation on the Administrative Council remained predominant in the following years. In 1922, five of its members were still French citizens, as against two "étrangers", Harari and Cattaoui.

In 1927 a law was enacted — over the opposition of European parties — with the objective of increasing direct, albeit moderate, Egyptian involvement in stock companies. It prescribed, *inter alia*, that at least two seats on the Board of any foreign company working in Egypt had to be reserved for Egyptians. Thus we find that in 1935, the above proportion had already been changed, being probably five against four, with Naus *ex officio* and Mazlum Pasha as additional members — a change which apparently worried the French shareholders [49]. This process of indigenation (or Egyptianization) would continue also in the following years.

Naus himself, as Director-General, showed himself always sensitive to the predominant French interests at stake. He may have remained mindful of some early advice offered to him by Ernest Cassel — to which his father Joseph agreed — to constantly "veiller au grain", and to entertain continuous contacts with them in order not to be surprised by them [50]. Naus would make it a point to invite French representatives frequently to the installations and social functions of the sugar company [51].

The management level of the sugar company's factories was for many years predominantly French. Scanning the lists of personnel for the 1890s shows between 18 and 21 French subjects at Shaykh Fadl, and 43 at Nag' Hammadi, mostly mechanics, some engineers, but also bookkeepers and surveyors (19 of

them being bachelors, a fact explained without any doubt by the conditions in Upper Egypt, which were generally deemed too harsh for foreign families). A certain French subject by the name of Joseph d'Argila was mentioned in 1913 as ex-director of the sugar companies installations in Minya [52]. This foreign contingent included some "aumôniers" (chaplains, if that is a correct translation) and physicians as well [53]. Some two dozen French clerks and administrators were employed in Cairo and Hawamdiyya [54]. The British High Commissioner, Sir Miles Lampson, after a visit to Hawamdiyya in 1935, noted in his diary: "This is an enormous place employing some 3,500 Egyptians and with a foreign staff of about 100, most of whom not unnaturally are French or Belgians seeing that the Company is a French one" [55].

The situation in those days, whether intended or not, was that few Egyptians had reached the management levels. In general, in this type of company, even graduates of the School of Commerce in Cairo faced prejudices [56]. Some vague French cultural connection could be an advantage when applying for a post, as is shown by the application for a position in Nag' Hammadi by a graduate of a "Frères" school [57].

Around 1912, some 267 Europeans were employed by the Sucreries, over sixty in Nag' Hammadi and Hawamdiyya (as compared with a total labour force of 5,580 there), and a mere 39 at the head office in Cairo. In Upper Egypt, the company put suitable accommodation in a special compound at their disposal. The foreign top-managers and technicians were certainly well-paid. As to Naus himself, it was rumoured in 1908 that he held an annual salary of Fr. 60,000, a sum which was considered to be disproportionate even in the eyes of the French consul [58].

In 1907, the capable French manager of the Hawamdiyya refinery since 1901, M.F.C. Roux de Vence, was dismissed while being away in France. Though it is difficult to unravel the exact reasons behind this move by the Administrative Council — reasons of economy being given — it would seem that the French consul, concerned about his country's interests, believed that it was Naus, seeing a potential rival in Roux, who had engineered the move. This was probably not the case. It was the French consul who had misread the affair as a British intrigue [59].

It was sometimes erroneously assumed that the Sucreries was a "Franco-Belgian company". Definitions such as a "société à participation belge", are more appropriate, though the exact proportion of the capital which was in Belgian hands is difficult to establish [60].

True, the number of Belgians in the service of the sugar company grew after Naus assumed the company's management, but this had no implications for its ownership. Yet Naus' dominant position probably created another specific Belgian interest in Egypt, which Belgian diplomats later also found worth defending. The French, on the other hand, followed personnel changes with some suspicion. It does not seem likely that French personnel was systematically

replaced by Belgians, but an element of nepotism cannot be denied. Some employees were, indeed, related to Naus: there was, first of all, Albert Ceysens, the deputy director of the company, who always remained in the former's shadow. The company employed two of the latter's sons-in-law: Falqui Cao, deputy chief of production in Armant by 1935, and Vladimir Peniakoff, both naturalized Belgians.

Peniakoff, a White Russian by descent, but born and raised in Belgium, held engineering degrees from Cambridge and Grenoble. In World War I he had served in the British army. He came to Egypt in 1924, where he felt very much at home among the indigenous population. He described himself as a "Belgian engineer. First generation in Egypt. Mixes more with the British than with his own Belgian community, yet practises no kind of sport". At first he was employed at the Nag' Hammadi factory. Disliking the French and, in general, the Levantine atmosphere among the élite, but admiring Lawrence of Arabia and other Arabian travellers, he developed a sincere friendship with a bedouin shaykh, the owner of a small sugar cane field. He thus acquired a perfect Arabic — a rare feature for a foreign expert working in Egypt. At the same time he explored the desert. This knowledge later enabled him to distinguish himself as a volunteer in World War II. After a short time at the Armant factory, he reached in 1930 a high management position at the Hawamdiyya refinery, and succeeded the French director Mathieu in 1935 following his death. In May 1940, Peniakoff was among the thirty odd Belgians in Egypt who requested permission to serve in the British army, in the framework of which he set up a desert commando group, Popski's Private Army, so called after his nickname [61].

Another relative, of Ceysens, we assume, was M. Renard, a director at the Shaykh Fadl factory [62]. By 1935, Hugues Naus, Henri's son, too served as deputy director at Armant. Four other Belgians held responsible positions at the company's factories [63]. It is noteworthy that a Belgian Embassy list of 1930 shows that out of twelve Belgian subjects living in provincial towns, ten were in the pay of the sugar company, including the two "aumôniers", attached to the factories in Armant and Nag' Hammadi [64].

The sugar company employed a huge labour force. However, when discussing the personnel of the sugar company, we have to distinguish between three different categories: the largest contingent were *fallahin*, day labourers, or rather seasonal workers, who made up 90 % of the unskilled factory workers [65]. According to our standards, some, maybe many of these, were children. The spectacle of their drudgery sometimes shocked foreign observers, one of whom described it in an understatement as "not attractive" [66]. But then again we have to remember that elsewhere in the world, sugar plantations often employed slave labour. Once this had been the case in Egypt as well, but only on a limited scale and for a very short time: when the large sugar plantations developed, slavery was already on its way out [67]. As a rule, even today, sugar cane cultivation in many parts of the world remains a largely unmechanized, labour intensive affair.

With the expansion of the industry in Egypt, and increasing production in the more sophisticated factories, seasonal labour increased from 100 to 300 days a year, and we have reason to assume that in Hawamdiyya, in particular, the nature of the work force also became more technologically advanced.

Then there were the skilled or semi-skilled Egyptian workers, on monthly salaries, whose number had been estimated at 390 in 1912, but which rose significantly over the following decades. A high-placed company source estimated in 1941 that about two thirds of the company's 5,000 skilled workers, e.g. copper and blacksmiths, carpenters, turners, technicians, electricians were Egyptians, some of whom were trained on the job. Vocational training, we should bear in mind, had been one of the desiderata of the Sidqi committee in 1916 [68].

Though in this type of agro-industry, the distinction between agricultural and manufacturing workers is difficult to make, the latter's proportion for Egypt at large, around 1930, could have been of the order of 400,000 to half a million [69]. Seen against this background, the statistics of the sugar company are impressive: while the different sources speak about 15,000 to 20,000 workers before the war, this number rose to 25,000-30,000 workers in the second half of the 1920s. For around 1912 we have precise data: of the 15,316 Egyptians in the pay of the company in or around that year, 5,511 worked in Nag' Hammadi, 2,856 in Shaykh Fadl, 2,325 in Armant, 1,768 in Abu Qurqas, 1,547 in Matay, and 1,020 in Hawamdiyya [70].

These figures, indeed, made the Sucreries the largest single employer in Egypt. For the sake of comparison, according to figures of the 1907 population census, 281,416 Egyptians were employed in manufacturing and another 94,925 in the construction branch. The textile industry, all factories taken together, employed some 45,000, the railways some 10,000, and the cigarette industry some 3,000 [71].

In any case, the composition of the Société Générale work force proved that any new nationalist rules on the employment of foreigners by companies operating in Egypt, as envisaged in 1936, which required that at least 25 % (and soon 50 %) of the employees, and 90 % of its workers, should be Egyptians, did not yet create unreasonable new pressures [72]. More than three quarters of the company's employees in 1947 held Egyptian citizenship [73]. Only from that year onwards, with the enactment of the Companies' Law, which laid down that 40 % of the directors of foreign companies, no fewer than 75 % of their employees (earning no less than 65 % of the salaries), as well as 51 % of the shareholders, should be Egyptians, did the pressures of a new era begin to be felt.

NOTES

[1] Report to the shareholders meeting of 22 March 1918, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1930.

[2] Cf. 1 February 1921, 12 February 1921, etc.

[3] Cheetham to Curzon, 10 February 1919, PRO, FO 141/485/7259, part I.

- [4] Regarding the agreement, see documents on PRO, FO 141/485/7259, part I. The text of agreement and relevant correspondence are also found in MAE, QdO, Afrique 1918-1929, K72.
- [5] *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation of Egypt*, March 1921, p. 9, where it is estimated that landlords had 57,000 acres under sugar cane, and that some 3,000 families (*sic*, only?) depended for their livelihood on the sugar industry; it appears that some reduction in price had been agreed upon. Cf. typescript for the *Report*, 31. March 1922, PRO, FO 141/814/10464.
- [6] Cf. shareholders meeting of 25 February 1922, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.
- [7] See several petitions by cultivators and note on an interview with Allenby (14 December 1921); a complaint by a sugar merchant to the effect that consumers were paying two and a half times the price of foreign sugar (1 December 1921); a newspaper report on the agreement for 1922 (16 January 1922), PRO, FO 141/485/7259, part I.
- [8] Dange to Foreign Minister Jaspar, 12 May 1922, MAECE, AF10 (1921-1924).
- [9] *The Times* (trade supplement), 28 April 1923. See also press clipping, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier 72/1.
- [10] Gaillard, 27 April 1922, MAE, QdO, Afrique, K72.
- [11] Letters, notes and memoranda of 1922 and 1923 are on PRO, FO 141/4857259, part II.
- [12] For this agreement, see *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation*, April 1922, pp. 13-14, where hope is expressed that cheap foreign sugar will become available soon. In 1923 the import duty on sugar was raised from 8 % to 10 %, while the excise duty was lowered to 2 %, cf. *Report*, April 1924, p. 21.
- [13] Press clipping, CAD, carton 232, sub-dossier 71/1; extensive survey, apparently by *La Bourse Egyptienne* on carton 233. See further AL-RIFA'I, pp. 267-268; TIGNOR, *State*, p. 99.
- [14] *EgInd.*, January 1926.
- [15] Chambre de Commerce Egyptienne d'Alexandrie, *Rapport Annuel 1928-1929*, Alexandria, 1909, p. 109.
- [16] Press clipping CAD, Le Caire 232, sub-dossier 71/2.
- [17] Minutes of 1 March 1926 and 12 April 1926, PRO, FO 141/485/7250, part II. See further, Qalini, vol. II, pp. 203-205.
- [18] *The Egyptian Gazette*, 4 January 1930; Roche, p. 23; AL-RIFA'I, pp. 268-273; also A.H. SIDKY, *L'Egypte Economique d'Aujourd'hui*, Paris, Thesis, 1931, pp. 84-85. It was the High Commissioner, Percy Lorraine, who concluded that Naus persuaded Sidqi, if we are to believe his report of 4 November 1933, PRO, FO 371 / 17101, as quoted by BADRAWI, p. 107n. This seems to contradict WAHBA, p. 32, who concludes that the agreement was reached "to Henri Naus's great surprise".
- [19] MAZUEL, p. 130, see also pp. 177-182.
- [20] The term "quasi-monopoly" is a British understatement. The *Report on the Economic Conditions in Egypt* for July 1931, pp. 85-86, also sees the convention as "what amounts to a monopoly".
- [21] The convention was to be extended after five years for three consecutive periods of three years each, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt*, May 1937, pp. 112-113; MAZUEL, p. 172; *The Stock Exchange Yearbook for Egypt*, 1941, pp. 505-506.
- [22] MAZUEL, see table on p. 173 (which also shows smaller payments to the French Treasury), and pp. 130-131.
- [23] *EgInd.*, February/March 1931; *ibid.*, April 1932. Sidqi, in 1932, had enacted laws to subsidize the textile industry then in trouble, see RACHOVICH, p. 340; ABDEL-MONEM ABUL-FADL, pp. 207, 211-212.
- [24] TIGNOR, *State*, pp. 130-132, and Tables A8, A9, A10 at the end.
- [25] SUBAYH, pp. 109-110, 141-142.
- [26] The first argument is put forward by R. TIGNOR, "Equity in Egypt's Recent Past: 1945-1952" in G. ABDEL-KHALEK & R. TIGNOR (eds.), *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt*, New York, 1982, p. 25. On sugar prices, see AL-RIFA'I, pp. 269-271, who argues that prices could not be lowered. For the opposite view, see Gritli's criticism below.
- [27] ABDEL-MONEM ABUL-FADL, p. 231n, and BADRAWI, p. 96, both quoting Grafftey-Smith (2 April 1931) on a rumoured pay-off to Sidqi to the amount of £E 100,000 from PRO, FO 371/15404. On Naus' alleged illegal profits, see MAECE, AF10/4, letter Decoigne to Spaak, 12 January 1942, and enclosure.

- [28] Report for 1931-1932, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940. See further an elaborate analysis of its results in *Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions*, May 1937, pp. 112-113; and *ibid.*, June 1939, pp. 50-51; MAZUEL, pp. 133 and 146.
- [29] WAHBA, p. 32. Cf. also ABDEL-MONEM conclusion, p. 250: "So Sidqi is the missing link between 1919 and 1952".
- [30] TIGNOR, "The Economic Activities", p. 431; R. TIGNOR, *Egyptian Textiles and British Capital*, Cairo, 1989, p. 84.
- [31] Letter Consul to Chargé d'Affaires, 28 January 1908, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1908. Back in 1907 it had been wrongly assumed that the "traités" were held mainly by Anglo-Egyptians parties, while "actions" and "obligations" — of a more deceptive ("illusoire") nature — were held by French parties. The former had mortgaged their properties and could therefore expect indemnification in case of liquidation of the company. See letter 5 December 1907, *ibid.*, sub-dossier Sucrerie 1907. Cassel's remaining influence was reluctantly tolerated, cf. letter Cambon (London) to the French Foreign Minister Michon, 13 January 1908, *ibid.*, sub-dossier Sucreries 1908. See further correspondence on sub-file Sucreries, 1904.
- [32] Tignor, *Egyptian Textiles*, p. 88.
- [33] MAE, QdO, Afrique, K72. See also DUCRUET, p. 295, who, however, thinks that the company's capital before World War I was "almost [*sic*] entirely French".
- [34] CAD, Le Caire, carton 223, sub-dossier 71, Banques, which mentions also another Frenchman, H. Hemart, as Director of Technical Services.
- [35] Gaillard to Paris, 14 February 1921, MAE, QdO, Afrique, K72. See also the report by F. Périer, the Administrator of the "Société des Sucreries", who blames "Egyptian speculators", who sought influence over the Board of the company as from 1919-1920. Tignor, *Egyptian Textiles*, p. 88, states that in the 1930s Cozzika held 75,000 out of 348,000 shares, which would thus amount to 21.5 %.
- [36] Report 1911-12 to the shareholders, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.
- [37] On the use of sugar for the production of alcohol, see "La culture de la canne à sucre", pp. 91-93. On the industry, see M.P. COZZIKA, "La distillerie de Toura", *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, 8 (1917): 44-49. On the Cozzika brothers, see A.G. POLITIS, *L'hellénisme et l'Egypte moderne*, vol. 2 (Paris 1930), pp. 353-355, and A. KITROEFF, *The Greeks in Egypt 1919-1937, Ethnicity and Class*, London, 1989, p. 117; A. ADOPOL (ed.), *L'Egypte Nouvelle, Livre d'Or - Golden Book 1938*, Cairo, 1938, no page numbering. See also OWEN, *Cotton*, p. 297. Curiously enough, while many names of streets were changed after 1952, the name of Cozzika was retained as a station of the Metro line to Helwan, south of Cairo.
- [38] Gaillard to MAE, 26 May 1924, MAE, QdO, Afrique, K72. The judgement had implications for a similar case involving the Suez Canal Company. For the wider juridical aspects, see BRINTON, p. 68, and M. HOYLE, *Mixed Courts of Egypt*, London, 1991, pp. 112-113.
- [39] TIGNOR, *Egyptian Textiles*, p. 88.
- [40] PRO, FO 371/20916, List of Personalities for 1937, pp. 2-3; E. POLITI, *L'Egypte de 1914 à "Suez"*, Paris, 1965, pp. 156-157; RIAD, pp. 52, 77, 79-80, 93, 96; VITALIS, *Capitalists*, pp. 49-55 et *passim*.
- [41] Delcoigne to Foreign Minister Spaak, 12 January 1942 (conf.), MAECE, AF10/4 (1919-1943). Cf. *Stock Exchange Yearbook, 1941*, p. 508, which speaks about 239,451 preferential shares and 38,600 founders shares.
- [42] Two early annual reports of the Sucreries were found at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, a few others in the Nantes Archives; the sugar company itself claims not to have them any more.
- [43] CAD, Le Caire, cartons 232/1 and 233, sub-dossier 72/1. On Ternijnck see also SAUL, p. 389.
- [44] Hence the view of the sugar company, and some other companies, as a "true multinational enterprise", Tignor, *Egyptian textiles*, pp. 89-90. This interesting statement needs further elaboration, depending on whether it refers to the company's capital and/ or its personnel, and in which period.
- [45] *Sugar in Egypt and Elsewhere*, p. 93; *The Times*, 22 March 1906 and 4 June 1906; *The Egyptian Directory*, Cairo, 1903, pp. 317-318, lists for that year the following: E. Cronier (President), Julien Barois, Allan Joseph, E. Ternijnck, S. Arbib, A. Leroux, A.J. Davey,

- M. de la Bouglise. The same source for 1918 (Cairo 1918), p. 183, mentions Harari Pasha, F. Perier, J. Cattaoui, S. Wellhoff, E. Miriel and some others. In the 1922 edition (Cairo 1922) also A. Pezas is mentioned. The same for 1931 (Cairo 1931), p. 215, shows little change. Some of the names, e.g. Cattaoui, Miriel (Crédit Foncier) and Pezas are interlocking with other industries. On the "Suarez Group", see also VITALIS, *Capitalists*, pp. 37-39.
- [46] Letter to Foreign Minister, 5 December 1907, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1907. The consul saw British interests as an extension of the Cassel group (e.g. Suares and Harari); he also explained that the French stockholders had more deceptive interests. He equally saw Roux's dismissal, discussed below, as an "injustice préjudiciable aux intérêts français". The only French member, apparently, was a certain Millet from Alexandria who was hardly in touch, cf. Confidential conversation with Suares, 11 May 1908, *ibid.*, sub-dossier Sucreries 1908. In 1909 he was replaced by Thierry-Mieg, *ibid.* sub-dossier Sucreries 1909.
- [47] Shareholders meeting of 22 January 1910. Raphael Suares had died. The new Board included Périer, Cattaoui Bey, G. Leurson, L. Homme, Comte R. de Matharel, Thierry-Mieg, and S. Wellhoff; it is maybe indicative that a British firm, Russell, Kerr, and Wyatt continued to audit the company, see report on CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Documents sur l'industrie sucrière.
- [48] Letter consul Ribot (Alexandria) to Chargé d'Affaires, 18 March 1910, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910. On the equipment, see P.F. MARTIN, *Egypt - Old and New* (London 1923), p. 166.
- [49] See report for 1911-12 (six French out of eight members). For the 1930s, see letter by a certain L.L. Frère of 28 June 1935 on CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940. On the 1927 law, see *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation*, May 1928, p. 17. In 1948, the Board was composed of eight Egyptian nationals, as against only one (nominally) British member (Ralph Harari), and one (genuinely) French member (Baron Louis de Benoist), cf. J. Beinin, *The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry, Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a Modern Diaspora*, Berkeley, 1998, p. 258.
- [50] Letter Joseph to Henri, 15 March 1909, in the possession of Guy Naus.
- [51] See his invitation to the French Minister on the occasion of the Khedive's visit to Nag' Hammadi, 9 February 1909; or his invitation to the French Chargé d'Affaires to visit Hawamdiyya, 30 July 1909; CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1909. See also Harari's letter (on stationery of the Mortgage Co. of Egypt!) to the French Minister DeFrance, thanking him for his visit to the factories at Armant and Nag' Hammadi, 16 November 1911, *ibid.* carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.
- [52] Together with the French Mixed Courts advocate A. Gallois, he submits an interesting brochure which proposes the founding of an Egyptian mortgage company to develop *waqf* lands, CAD, Le Caire, carton 228.
- [53] Cf. rejection of a Palestinian (?) physician, Bordeaux educated, in 1927, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.
- [54] Lists on CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucrerie 1893-1895.
- [55] M.E. YAPP (ed.), *Politics and Diplomacy in Egypt, The Diaries of Sir Miles Lampson 1935-1937*, Oxford, 1997, p. 273.
- [56] In 1912 the sugar industry was said to employ 15,583 workers, 14,926 day labourers, 390 skilled or semi-skilled Egyptians, and 267 European workers or employees, E. GOLDBERG, *Tinker, Tailor, and Textile Worker, Class and Politics in Egypt, 1930-1952*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1986, p. 96; TIGNOR, *State*, pp. 209-210. Cf. F. HARBISON and I.A. IBRAHIM, *Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprises*, New York, 1958, p. 42.
- [57] Letter by a certain Muhammad Khalil, "bawwab" [concierge] at the Agence de France, 27 June 1914, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.
- [58] Consul to the Chargé d'Affaires, 28 January 1908, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1908.
- [59] Letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 5 December 1907, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1907. It is unlikely that business disagreements were the cause: Roux, whose interest undoubtedly was the optimal operation of the refinery, had suggested importing raw sugar from abroad, cf. Conversation with Suares, *ibid.*, sub-dossier Sucreries 1908; the company later, indeed, imported sugar from Java. From the records it would appear that Roux was

- the author of an extensive article on the sugar industry, published in *L'Egypte Contemporaine* of 1910, it seems under the pen-name of C. Artaud. If this is true, relations could not have been so bad, because Naus thanked him for sending advance proofs of what he called a "magistral article", (28 January 1910), *ibid.*, sub-dossier Documents de l'industrie sucrière. Cf. SAUL, p. 447, see also p. 434.
- [60] *Report on the Economic and Financial Conditions*, April 1923, p. 27. Cf. also WAHBA, p. 28 the Belgian Société des Sucreries, *sic*); SAUL, p. 397.
- [61] His autobiography, *Private Army*, London, 1950, describes his military career. The quote is from p. 13. Cf. A. COOPER, *Cairo in the War 1939-1945* (London, 1989), p. 86. A *curriculum vitae* is enclosed in a letter by Delcoigne to Spaak, 12 January 1942, MAECE, AF 10/4 (1919-1943).
- [62] Ceysens, married to Marie Renard, died in Cairo in 1956, where all their seven children had been born, interview with Guy Naus, 2 February 1996; On M. Renard, see *Chronique d'Egypte* 3/4 (1926-7), p. 101.
- [63] Letter L.L. Frère, 28 June 1935, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier 72/1.
- [64] According to the Belgian Embassy list of 1930 (Introduction, note 61), also a certain Ing. Edmond Bernard, Marie Kiven, and André Soudan were employed by the sugar company's head office. An earlier list of around 1923 mentions in this respect only two Belgian employees of the sugar company, in addition to the usual judges and consular agents. As to the "aumôniers", we add in parentheses that the refinery in Hawamdiyya had also a mosque built, with a favourable effect on the workers, as an Egyptian royal source remarked, see AL-MAM-LAKA AL-MISRIYYA, *al-Rihla al-Sultaniyya fi Iqlim al-Jiza, Sanat 1921*, Cairo, 1935, p. 10 (and equally a mosque at Sornaga's factory, *ibid.*, p. 29).
- [65] GOLDBERG, p. 95.
- [66] P.F. MARTIN, *Egypt, Old and New*, London, 1923, p. 166.
- [67] G. BAER, "Slavery and its Abolition", in his *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt*, Chicago, 1969, pp. 165 and 187.
- [68] Even before World War I Naus had proudly stated that the company trained "élites artisans", note on Economic Significance, CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Documents de l'industrie sucrière; Roche, "In Memoriam" pp. 27-28 and 30. Cf. MAZUEL, p. 49n.
- [69] Cf. J. BEININ and Z. LOCKMAN, *Workers on the Nile*, Princeton, 1987, p. 38, table 1.
- [70] Undated statistical table (1912?), CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Documents de l'industrie sucrière.
- [71] ARMINJON, p. 255, states 14,926; TIGNOR, *State*, p. 34, quotes 20,000 workers for 1911, of whom 15,655 directly employed by the sugar company; see further GOLDBERG, p. 96; *EgInd.* January 1926; *ibid.* January 1928 (Sidqi's estimate); the *Stock Exchange Yearbook* for 1941 lists 27,000 employees of the Sucreries; Roche, "In Memoriam" pp. 27-28, speaks about 9,000 seasonal workers, and even about 100,000 agricultural labourers; the latter figure possibly represented *fallahin* dependent on the sugar branch in general.
- [72] *Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions*, for May 1937, p. 4, quoting the Speech from the Throne of 21 November 1936, thus after the initialing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, and still before the 1937 Montreux conference on the abolition on the Capitulations.
- [73] Beinini, *Dispersion*, p. 258.

4. The Association (Federation) of Industries

4.1. THE FOUNDING OF THE ASSOCIATION

Apart from the sugar industry, Henri Naus Bey's name is probably most identified with the Egyptian Federation of Industries (*Ittihad al-Sina'at al-Misriyya*), of which he was the President from its foundation until his death in 1938. In this position Naus not only worked for the advancement of industry in Egypt — much of which was still in foreign hands — but at the same time he also gained important advantages for his own Sucreries.

The Federation was founded in 1922, at a meeting in the summer resort of San Stephano, next to Alexandria; it still operated under the title of Association of Industries in the Egyptian Region (*Jam'iyyat al-Sina'at fi al-Qutr al-Misri*). The change in name from Association to Federation took place in 1930 [1].

There are divergent versions as to who had taken the initiative to its founding. It is possible that the idea was first raised by Prince Fu'ad in 1910 [2]. It had, possibly, started with a suggestion put forward before the war by the Italian entrepreneur Ettore de Castro, who had since left Egypt — a suggestion which had then been pursued by his compatriot Samuelle Sornaga. Naus, in any case, attributed the idea to Sornaga, who, however, preferred to serve as the Federation's Vice-President [3].

Sornaga had established a large factory for bricks, tiles, pipes and plaster in 1895, at al-Wadi (Kafr 'Amar), some 70 km south of Cairo, to which such more specialized products as sanitary ware and ceramic insulators were added. Sornaga had outspoken ideas on the urgent need for a "programme complet et organique" to develop new industries in Egypt to cope with a range of major problems: the ill-effects of overpopulation, and of monoculture, the lack of local entrepreneurial initiative, and foreign (*sic!*) domination — ideas which he had summarized in a 32-page booklet entitled *L'industrie en Egypte*, published in July 1916. One of his proposals, indeed, was to bring about industrial "syndicates" to defend the common interests of factory owners against foreign (!) pressures: "Nous sommes dans un pays fataliste où l'on attend tout de la Providence, qui pour la généralité est représentée par le Gouvernement. En janvier 1914, nous avons pris l'initiative de la création au Caire d'une Association internationale entre commerçants et industriels, dans le but d'obtenir un centre de réunion et de former des groupements entre les diverses catégories de commerçants et d'industriels... Les industriels égyptiens n'ont aucune organisation syndicale, ni aucune fédération pour défendre leurs intérêts contre ces influences et pressions étrangères". Furthermore he pleaded for a moderate and well-planned protectionist regime [4].

Sornaga's attitudes reflect a general change in economic thinking on the role of local industry, including petty commodity production. This change began to crystallize from around 1910 in different francophone publications in Egypt, and culminated in the report of the Committee on Commerce and Industry, published in 1918 [5].

Among the fourteen founding members in 1922 we also find Linus Gasche, the Swiss Administrator-Director of the "Filature Nationale" in Alexandria. Gasche's career shows a remarkable similarity to that of Naus: he was trained as a textile engineer in Switzerland and Italy, and was hired by the "Filature" in 1911, at the age of 26. Another founder was Ernest Trembley, his counterpart of the Belgian-owned cement factory [6]. It is worth noting that most of the foreign-resident founding members were genuine industrialists, not the kind of entrepreneur with investments in agricultural land, real estate, and industry, then a more common type among the local Egyptian élite. Each of them, or rather their companies, furnished an initial sum of £E 2,000. An important role has, furthermore, been ascribed to Dr I.G. Levi, who would become the Federation's influential Secretary-General [7]. There can be little doubt that the Federation as an idea was a follow-up of the report by the Commission of Commerce and Industry. Its chairman, Isma'il Sidqi, though not figuring on the list of original founders of the Federation, but almost certainly somehow involved behind the scenes, would from 1929 occupy the position of Vice-President, and after Naus' death, that of President. We can only speculate why Naus became the President of the Federation: no doubt he possessed great personal qualities, enjoyed excellent business contacts, and spoke both French and English. Also the scope and nature of the company which he headed may have played a role. And lastly, the fact that he was a Belgian, representing a less dominating power than Britain or France, may have had something to do with his election [8].

It would seem that early Egyptian evaluations of the Federation were positive [9]. The British too, on the whole, saw the establishment of what they called "an industrial combine" as a positive innovation which "cannot be but of greatest advantage" [10]. We do not know to what extent the founding of the Federation of British Industries in 1916 which, interestingly enough, also advocated a protectionist tariff reform, had inspired both this official evaluation or the aspirations of the founders of the Egyptian Federation [11].

Scholarly evaluations of the Federation, on the other hand, have been divergent. Jacques Berque is rather cynical, and describes a lack of direction, at least in the first years. He ignores, however, some limited achievements which took place as early as 1923 [12]. In that year the Association already obtained a circular issued by the Ministry of Finance pressing government agencies to prefer local products, as well as some minor tariff concessions by the Government [13].

Anouar Abdel-Malek, an Egyptian Marxist, called the Federation "le syndicat du patronat égyptien", in particular because of Isma'il Sidqi's involvement. Marius Deeb also sees the Federation mainly as an instrument of the "haute

bourgeoisie", but what could it have been otherwise as a body of industrialists? In Deeb's reasoning, the Federation was created as a basically negative response to the post-war economic and social challenges: true, there was the feeling of an economic slump which came after the boom of the war years and also the pressure of cheap imports. But he overemphasized the fear that a fast population growth would cause upheavals and labour unrest, as well as the need to give a counter-impulse to the nationalist enthusiasm which surrounded the founding of Banque Misr [14]. The Federation has also been depicted as a group of monopolist capitalists, manipulated to one extent or another by foreigners, who pursued (their own) commercial rather than (national) industrial goals [15]. More recently, Beinín and Lockman have drawn renewed attention to the Federation's prejudice against comprehensive labour legislation, an aspect which will be discussed below. We tend to follow Robert Tignor's more balanced view, which focuses rather on the Federation's contribution to the economic development of Egypt [16]. In our interpretation, most of the leaders of the Federation — also the resident foreigners — were driven by a genuine ambition for Egypt's development. Though their personal or family interests as businessmen without any doubt came first, many or most of them also entertained a broader vision [17].

This, however, cannot be a study of the Federation's merits and shortcomings, but is intended as a biographical study of its President. Suffice it to say that we see the Federation, in the form it assumed from the later 1920s onwards, as a broadly-based economic pressure group, mainly of the industrial sector. In this vein Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a prominent Egyptian sociologist, has called it "an effective lobby with both parliament and the government" [18]. The Federation, indeed, effectively pleaded for consultation with the government in joint committees. From its very beginning it advocated the protection of industry, legislation on labour and fiscal matters, also with regard to licenses, weights frauds, etc., laws on all of which were lacking at the time [19].

While Egyptian parliaments and governments took relatively little systematic interest in economic matters, Naus insisted on the importance of "political economy", especially with regard to public opinion, and I.G. Levi often emphasized economic planning. A memorable publicity aspect were the large industrial exhibitions at the Gezira (Jazira) grounds in Cairo which the Federation organized. These supposedly contributed to some change in public opinion regarding the Egyptian industries and in attitudes of the government and the press.

With such targets in mind, the Federation regularly invited government ministers to its functions and publicized speeches or toasts in their honour [20]. It would, however, seem that representatives of the Wafd figured much less frequently among the guests of the Federation — unless we also consider Tal'at Harb of the Banque Misr as such. But then again, we also have to remember that during the entire era of Naus' leadership, the Wafd, as the relatively more progressive party, was in power only four times for a total of 28 months, while Sidqi, representing the conservative political wing, alone ruled for three and a

half years. In the end, the Federation, like Banque Misr, established itself as a genuine economic power group, to be integrally annexed and remoulded in the image of the post-1952 revolutionary government.

4.2. THE GROWTH AND "INDIGENATION" OF THE FEDERATION [21]

It was with some pride that Naus annually reported an increase in the number of members of the Federation. Starting with 34 members, already 140 had joined by December 1926. In 1930 the Federation already counted 234 members, and this number would rise to almost 400 by the time of his death [22]. With a strong industrial pressure group in mind, Naus created an imaginary "famille industrielle", as he frequently called it. A metaphor suiting his own bourgeois upbringing, but equally conforming to Egyptian discourse. He also suggested adopting the motto of the Belgian coat of arms "l'Union fait la Force" [23].

From the late 1920s onwards, the Federation started to establish syndicated chambers of specialized industrial branches, e.g. the cigarette and leather industries, as well as the river transport branch. Apparently, the idea was that sectorial interests could thus be better advanced. Some scholars have seen this trend as leading to a "rational division of markets", even to the point of the formation of cartels, and there may also be some truth in the argument that this tendency favoured big and medium enterprises over small ones [24].

There was one much more salient aspect to this growth, in addition to just numbers: the Board of the Federation, then still the Association, had started out in 1922 with eleven members of whom only four were Egyptians. But the trend in industrialization was unmistakably towards a growth of indigenous Egyptian interests, and a concomitant relative decline of European investments. As more and more Egyptian members joined the Federation after 1922, a steady Egyptianization (*tamsir*) took place. Among the founders had been such Egyptian industrialists as 'Abd al-Majid al-Rimali who, in 1926, even became a member of parliament, and 'Abd al-Fattah Lawzi Bey, a silk manufacturer [25]. Even if there may be a legitimate academic argument on a lasting disproportion between foreigners and Egyptians — in 1955 still 55 % of the directors of stock companies were foreigners — this was a practical victory [26]. A limited expression of this progress was the expansion of the Federation's Arabic secretariat and the appearance of an Arabic section to *L'Egypte Industrielle*, which, reading from the opposite cover-page, could now be called *Misr al-Sina'iyya* [27]. Moreover, a representative of the Department of Trade and Industry had joined the Board since 1932 [28].

If we disregard, for one moment, the personal background of the Federation's directors and members, or the origin of their capital, it is a fact that the organization came to embrace most local industries, with all the Egyptian workers and employees involved [29]. Gradually, Naus underscored all the big names among

the emergent Egyptian industrialists, from Tal'at Harb, who joined relatively early in 1925, and Amin Yahya to even Ahmad 'Abbud, who all would play some role in the Federation [30]. Indeed, if we follow Vitalis' division into various business groups, all were finally represented: the Banque Misr, the Yahya Amin and the Ahmad 'Abbud groups alike [31].

What is indeed surprising is the fact that the Federation came to include two of the strongest exponents of Egyptian nationalism — the first of them being Banque Misr, which had been established in 1920 as an exclusively Egyptian bank to promote the economic interests of the nationalist struggle [32]. The former scholarly emphasis on a strict dualism between an Egyptian-nationalist Banque Misr and a foreign-dominated Federation of Industries had been proven, already some time ago, to rest on a misconception. In the long run, Banque Misr developed into an industrial and business concern while the Federation assumed the character of an economic pressure group. Some of the leaders became simultaneously involved in both organizations, e.g. Isma'il Sidqi, Yusuf Cattaoui and the bank's founder himself. Tal'at Harb, though lionized in Egyptian nationalist literature, can be proven to have had strong connections to French business interests from an early date onwards. The second such development, from this point of view, was the joining, in the early 1930s, of Ahmad Husayn's Piastre Plan (the *Mashru' al-Qirsh*). Whatever one may think of the Young Egypt ideology behind it, or of the small-sized, but symbolically significant, *tarbush* (fez) factory, which was set up with money that had been collected from the public, this was another clear sign of actual Egyptianization [33].

The fact that Naus praised Tal'at Harb as one of the principal initiators of the national effort, "unequalled in Egypt", and cordially saluted Banque Misr for joining, is remarkable, to say the least [34]. One decade earlier there had been, or could have been, many points of friction between Naus and Harb, especially against the background of Harb's attacks on the sugar company and the Belgian tramway company for making too large profits. Moreover, he had continuously emphasized the need for domestic Egyptian investments, the hegemony of Egyptian nationalism, and the exclusivity of the Arabic language. With the relative compromises which Banque Misr had to make over time, and the assuming of separate roles of Banque Misr and the Federation, rivalry abated [35].

4.3. THE DESIRED ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

From 1923 the Government had made available a sum of £E 100,000 to Banque Misr for loans to small industrialists, but only part of it was used for that purpose [36]. Nevertheless, this proves that the Government had recognized that it could play some stimulating role in the industrialization process.

The Federation, in many respects, was effective in its role of an economic pressure group on the Government. In 1927, for instance, it advocated the creation of a Department of National Economy, and strongly recommended optimal governmental encouragement to develop the country's natural resources — agrarian as well as industrial — as well as its transport facilities [37].

Though Egypt would only much later embark on a truly "étatist" economic path, it is worth noting that the Federation, under the impression of the global economic crisis, once more in the 1930s, emphasized the need for a regulatory role of the government in industrial matters. Things indeed started to change. The Cotton Exchange (1930-31) was formalized, the "Crédit Agricole" (June 1930/August 1931) was founded, and some companies belonging to the Banque Misr concern received government credit guarantees and other support. But what concerns us most is the agreement with the Sucreries (signed in February 1931). All these were "aspects of institutionalizing the responsibility of Government towards the national economy" in the words of a researcher of the Sidqi government. Though there had been a Department of Commerce before, a fully-fledged Ministry of Commerce and Industry too was created in 1934 [38].

While the Egyptian government, like that of Britain or France, should pass legislation to solve basic problems — Naus argued — the rest should be left to private initiative. Initially Naus spoke only about a task for the government in the fields of labour and transport legislation, industrial and agricultural credit, and the saving of utility companies, some of which were then in trouble [39]. But although he admitted that the ill-effects of the global economic crisis affected Egypt less than countries in the West, he gradually came to advocate an expansion of the role of government, e.g. giving more support to private enterprises. Naus attempted to show the government that, in spite of fears as to diminishing income, the tariff reform of 1930 had not been to the detriment of the Treasury, and consumer prices were maintained or even lowered. He repeatedly showed himself full of praise for the Government's efforts to keep its budget balanced. Though calling for reason and moderation, he declared himself not opposed to new taxation as such: "*Le Monde industriel et commercial ne répudie pas d'office la perspective de taxations raisonnables, pourvu qu'elles évitent des systèmes inquisitoriaux ou compliqués... et qu'elles réalisent une répartition équitable et supportable des charges*". Egypt's industry, Naus added, was just out of its infancy and still going through a difficult period [40].

In Naus' view, industrializing efforts must lead to a favourable trade balance, which would enable purchases abroad; it must provide the Nation with consumption goods in the largest possible quantity and at the lowest possible price for its material and moral well-being; it must, with prudence and moderation, proceed in such a way so as to achieve harmony between the revenues of private persons and those of the state [41].

4.4. THE TARIFF REFORM OF 1930

The Federation's major success was undoubtedly the customs tariff reform of 1930 which, for the first time, instituted — moderate — protection for local industries. It was the outcome of protracted lobbying and manifold reports and comments. Not a few researchers have seen the tariff reform as the move which finally put Egyptian industry on its feet [42]. The reform had been recommended as early as the publication of the report by the Committee of Commerce and Industry in 1918 and ever since its establishment by the Association of Industries. The Association even held an enquiry among its members in 1926 to give its demand more weight. That a major breakthrough had taken place, was already acknowledged in 1938 by Hafiz 'Afifi, a prominent reform-minded politician [43].

Naus may be supposed to have gained some insights on tariff questions from his father. Joseph had worked for the replacement of the old wholesale 5 % *ad valorem* tariff, which had been in force in Iran since 1828, by a more differential system of import duties [44]. The British-Iranian agreement of 1902 had done away with export duties as well as octroi taxes. The *octroi* — a municipal tax in Cairo and Alexandria as well — had already been formally abolished but was, by way of exception, still upheld on sugar until 1902 [45].

In early 1909, in a report to Prince Husayn Kamil, we find Naus expressing the wish for a comprehensive tariff reform, though he admitted that the Hawamdiyya refinery should first be able to work on locally produced sugar before the 8 % *ad valorem* tariff in force could be changed. In 1914 Naus, when requested by the government to increase the area under sugar cane, had seized the opportunity in his correspondence with the French Minister DeFrance to speak out against the "anomaly" of the existing tariff system [46].

The institution of a new tariff system became possible upon the expiry of a last bilateral trade agreement of the previous kind, the one signed with Italy. The new tariff, in fact, replaced an Ottoman legacy, beginning with the 1837 Balta Liman agreement with Great Britain, and then other European states, the principles of which were upheld by a convention of 29 October 1889. By 1926 it was realized that the expiry of the commercial convention with Italy, dating from 1892, expected for 15 February 1930, would create a suitable opportunity to achieve a major change in tariff policy. The Egyptian Government started to reduce some import and quay duties, and was ready to appoint a preliminary commission to study legal changes. The Association issued an appeal to both Chambers of Parliament in December 1926, and submitted to them reports in favour of protectionist measures in January and March 1927. On 2 January 1928 the formation of an international commission of experts (with a Canadian, a Frenchman, and an Italian) was announced; it was to work out a new, specific tariff rather than one based on *ad valorem* fees. It is probably fair to conclude that the Federation of Industries had worked as a pressure group, but had not

been involved in the actual legislative process [47]. The new tariff was duly decreed on 14 February 1930 and almost immediately went into force [48].

Seen in historical perspective, it is not surprising that H. Barker, the President of the British Chamber of Commerce, remained opposed to the new tariff. After all, the Capitulations were still in full force. "Egypt is, and must be, first and foremost an agricultural country and it is thought that she would do well to pause ere she develops a system of high protection for industry", wrote the British Commercial Secretary G.H. Selous. The British were prepared to accept the new tariff only provisionally, for one year only [49]. While the tariff reform favoured local industrialists and cultivators, it must also be admitted that it came, to some extent, at the expense of the Egyptian poor, but this was mainly used as a cynical British argument, voiced also by the *Egyptian Gazette*. On the whole, the Arabic press seems to have hailed the new tariff [50]. The French Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria had supported protectionism already for some time, even though much debate had taken place about its rationale [51].

Naus' favouring of protection over Free Trade, as we have seen, tallied with general post-World War I economic thinking in Egypt, and was not devoid of tension with British interests. Maybe because, technically speaking, he was more a managing director, and not an entrepreneur or investor in his own right like Samuella Sornaga, Michel Salvago and others, he could afford to act as the representative of a national Egyptian industry. Naus, diplomatically, even referred to the precedent of Muhammad 'Ali who, at the beginning of the 19th century, had developed his industries allegedly by providing the sort of protection now needed again [52].

"We do not wish for 'systematic protection' or an 'artificial life' but a minimal assistance in the form of a preferential tariff which can promote industry", declared Naus in a public statement in 1925. Rejecting such artificiality, he emphasized that Egypt should merely be given a chance to exploit its own resources. The raising of duties on imported cotton, even on the (inferior) raw cotton which was domestically grown, would promote spinning and weaving and lower the price of textiles for the *fallahin*. Also, a reformed tariff should facilitate the import of modern industrial machinery [53].

With the global depression there also came a change of attitude in government policy. Tariffs had hitherto constituted a major source of income for the Treasury. The change achieved could be described as a mildly protective tariff system. Mild, since fiscal considerations could still be said to be stronger than developmental ones [54]. In any case, the Federation initially considered the tariff regulations inadequate (e.g. for the sugar industry) and argued that some industries would even be worse off (e.g. the shoe industry). In addition to this, the negative effects of commodity stocking and inflation were mentioned but slowly such criticism gave way to a more balanced view. However, in later years, the Federation kept pressing for changes in the tariff which it considered too timid [55]. British commercial circles remained reserved, at least till 1933,

fearing that "local manufacturers, having once tasted the sweets of a protective tariff, should clamour for more" [56]. On the whole, however, there were no adverse foreign reactions. After all, in the 1930s, Egypt was not alone in introducing a protective tariff.

In reality, Naus had little to complain about: first of all, the implementation of the new tariff, with adaptations yet to be made, fell to the responsibility of the Sidqi government which had come to power in June 1930, undoubtedly a development hailed by Naus. Even more conspicuously, it was Naus' own industrial branch which had obtained more than any other. The tariff reform fixed exceptionally high rates for sugar: 215 % for raw sugar, 120 % for refined sugar, 60 % for glucose, and 30 % for confectionery. In the first years, several small amendments were made in the sugar tariff. There was a remarkable upsurge in the value of the Sucreries' shares [57]. Nevertheless he argued in 1932 that the reform had not yet yielded the expected benefits, and that its character had remained fiscal rather than economic. Yet the proportion of Government revenues from customs rose significantly [58]. Though admitting, in the following years, that the effects of the reform proved to be beneficial to industry, amendments in the tariff system still would have to be made for specific commodities and manufactures. Gradually tariffs would have to be lowered for raw materials, semi-finished products, and machines. On the other hand, the reduced tariff for some locally-produced items had created havoc and hesitation. Good progress, however, had been made by the spinning, metal and building industries [59].

Naus continued to plead that the government order municipalities to give preference to local products. It was felt in circles of the Federation in 1935 that several disadvantages of the industry could be redressed by intervention of the government, as, for example, with regard to expensive loans and the still high duties on fuel. In general, reference was made to countries such as Greece, Turkey and even Palestine under the British Mandate, where more protection was given. As the Federation's annual report for 1935 stated: "... l'intervention de l'Etat est devenue indispensable dans bien des cas où la situation était autrefois laissée au libre jeu des forces économiques. L'Egypte, comme tous les autres pays... doit... pratiquer ce que l'on s'accorde à appeler l'économie dirigée, la 'planned economy' des Anglo-Saxons [60]".

4.5. NAUS AND LABOUR QUESTIONS

We have seen no substantive evidence which supports the hypothesis that the Association of Industries had been founded in 1922 in response to growing industrial action among the workers [61]. If such a motivation existed, it was in any case secondary to other economic interests of the founders. It would seem to us that Naus, along with other contemporary industrialists, took a conservative, though not completely negative, stand on labour legislation [62].

But in order to understand his public position on labour questions, we have first to investigate his practical policy in the sugar company itself, which, as we have seen above, was one of the largest employers in the country. A few decades earlier, Cronier was quoted as having said: "Les employés sont des citrons, on exprime tout le jus et on les jette dehors" [63]. Naus' attitude was certainly more humane.

The continued supply of inexpensive labour was a major interest of the sugar company, something which many industrialists would attempt to stress with equal persuasion as Naus did. From their point of view it could be argued, and was of course argued by the employers, that any rise in salaries would adversely affect the profits of their companies, and thus also the labour market. Considering the threat of supply of cheaper sugar from abroad, and the relatively high costs of sugar cane, land and irrigation in Egypt, the Sucreries argued that its only relative advantage was the domestic supply of inexpensive labour [64]. The continuation of this factor had therefore to be guaranteed. Moreover, Naus probably calculated that industrial wages were higher than agricultural wages, and that his recruitment of *fallahin* as seasonal workers was therefore not in any danger. It would also seem that Naus, preferring a labour force as large as production costs would allow, over further mechanization, adduced social motives for this policy: the provision of work to an overpopulated country [65].

The ethnically divided structure of the labour force at the company's factories made occasional incidents and tension inevitable. As far back as in 1899, the Société Générale had requested the intervention of no one less than the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Butrus Ghali, after two French employees had been robbed at the Shaykh Fadl plant. In 1902 a French bookkeeper was assassinated in Nag' Hammadi, in spite of the fact that no fewer than 23 *ghafirs* (watchmen) were supposed to be at guard. During the following year, a Greek of French nationality was assassinated near Qina, and there was also an incident in Biba; the latter can be more clearly defined as a labour dispute: Egyptian workers disobeyed orders and beat up some of the French engineers and technicians [66].

Gradually, the sugar company had to deal with organized labour unrest or rather with recurrent demands for higher wages and improved working-conditions. The earliest strike recorded, in favour of shortening the 12-hour working day, in fact, dates back to 1910. It was apparently broken by the management by "sowing dissension" among the workers. The strikes of 1919, the year of the large-scale revolt (or Revolution, the *Thawra*) against the British, however, remain somewhat of an enigma, since it is difficult to distinguish between nationalist agitation and labour demands proper. Petitions and oral requests from Abu Qurqas and Armant, for instance, were undoubtedly inspired and organized by local notables. These requested the Director of the sugar company to submit a protest against the British occupation, and demanded independence, by means of none other than the French Embassy. It is worth noting that in the unruly month of March 1919, Naus himself travelled, it would seem undeterred, to

Upper Egypt to meet local spokesmen — obviously of the notables rather than of the workers. Though some riots were reported from Hawamdiyya too, a major attack on the refinery was averted by joint persuasion of the police, local notables and veteran workers [67]. If the assumption is correct that much of the *fallahin* and beduin activity during the Revolt of 1919 stemmed from a wish to prevent the transfer of food from the countryside to the big cities, the unrest at the sugar company becomes understandable. On the other hand, the high-quality sugar produced at the refinery in Hawamdiyya was not an important staple product for the *fallahin*, which may explain the limited nature of incidents there [68].

The post-war years saw more genuine labour struggles. It would seem that the 2-to-4 piastres paid to the day-labourers (a much lower rate than the monthly 300-600 piastres of the skilled workers), which had been the norm before World War I, had become an inadequate income in the post-war era with its sharply rising cost of living [69]. While there appears to have been strikes over payment and dismissals in Nag' Hammadi, it can be ascertained that at least one labour conflict over higher wages in Hawamdiyya too, was settled in late 1919 by the Labour Conciliation Board. In a letter on labour trouble in Nag' Hammadi, sent to the French Minister, Naus called the workers' demands "invraisemblables", but nevertheless stated to have gone to "l'extrême limite des possibilités" [70]. In 1920, strikes were reported at Shaykh Fadl, Nag' Hammadi and again in Hawamdiyya, the place with the largest contingent of permanent workers, if not the most critical operation of the company. This also explains why a 25 % increase in salary was granted.

Recurrent, though not continual, scenes of labour unrest between European managers and local *fallahin* workers took place in Upper Egypt. In Armant in 1923, an engineer shot a worker, but later that year a manager there was wounded in a labour dispute [71]. When a foreman at the Kom Ombo factory created "unrest" among the workers in 1926, he was dismissed. The upshot was a strike protesting his dismissal, broken by the police at the instigation of the management. The foreman in question was banished to his village of origin [72]. In 1927, Gay-Lussac, the company's inspector at Dab'iyya, who made nightly rounds on horseback "avec une rigueur extrême de nature à lui créer des rancunes", died from wounds sustained in a confrontation, apparently with the local *ghafirs*. The French consul complained that it was the sixth such incident in six years and called for a thorough investigation by the police [73]. A survey on labour questions for 1929 reports few strikes, but does mention several petitions regarding dismissals, or the withholding of indemnities by the sugar company [74].

More or less spontaneous strikes at Hawamdiyya, where the refinery employed a more stable, urbanized labour force, were reported in 1921 and 1923 [75]. More than among the seasonal workers in the Upper Egyptian factories, Hawamdiyya in these years became exposed to unionized activity. The director complained that agitators had hung pictures of revolvers on the walls to

emphasize labour militancy [76]. It appears that Egyptian activists in exile also attempted to organize the workers [77]. By 1923, indeed, some form of a union came into being, which prompted a more determined stand by the company. Naus' own point of view at the time is unknown to us. But it is a fact that a Workers' Club in Hawamdiyya was kept shut on a pretext. The union leader, 'Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, was locked out the very day in 1924 on which the club was scheduled to be opened [78]. In 1934 and 1936 there was more serious trouble in Hawamdiyya, this time over union demands over wages and management. While in 1935 labour unrest was reported from a large number of factories, Hawamdiyya remained quiet, in spite of the fact that many workers had joined the Union, led by the well-known labour activist Muhammad 'Abd al-Halim. But then again the refinery was one of the many places taken up by a surge of labour unrest in 1936. "It looked quite ugly last night but finally they sent out an Egyptian battalion who, after what sounds like quite a good scrap with the rioters, including the killing of one of the latter, and several casualties among the Egyptian troops, the thing appears to have been settled, at any rate for the moment", commented Sir Miles Lampson, the High Commissioner, haughtily. This wave of industrial action even reached Kom Ombo in the south [79].

The sugar company had apparently made some effort to supply minimal social conditions to its personnel, probably beginning in the 1930s [80]. A distinction between the higher scaled, predominantly European "employés", the office workers, and the "ouvriers", the factory workers, is in place. The office staff were better off as the company, under the harsh conditions of Upper Egypt, provided suitable accommodation and recreation (as well as churches and, it seems, also mosques), water, electricity, some basic provisions, and apparently also educational facilities for the children of the employees. They also participated in a provident fund. The skilled factory workers formed a second category; they worked nine hours per day, 49 hours per week. In case of illness they too, reportedly, had access to a company clinic and dispensary, and were entitled to half their salary (in case of injury they were said to receive their full salary). Moreover they received a week's holiday a year and severance pay to the amount of one week's salary for every year they had been employed [81].

The majority of the unskilled *fallahin* workers would fall into the lowest category. Undoubtedly, they were worse off than the others, though during the months of their employment they enjoyed a larger income than their fellow-workers subsisting on agricultural work only. There is, at least, one eyewitness report by the Greek-francophone writer Marie Cavadia to the effect that poor workers in Shaykh Fadl spontaneously hailed Naus. But then again, remarried, she had become the wife of nobody less than Mamduh Riyad, at one stage a member of parliament — and grandson of an erstwhile Prime Minister —, but himself deputy Director-General of the Sucrieries in the 1940s [82].

As President of the Federation of Industries, and a large employer himself, Naus may have been consulted by the government on matters of labour legisla-

tion from 1929 onwards. When, in 1927, a predominantly Egyptian commission was created by the Wafdist government to work out legislation regarding the stability of the economy, before anything else, I.G. Levi, the Federation's secretary, was appointed as a member on it [83]. With the number of 500,000 industrial workers — and increasing labour consciousness and rising unemployment before his eyes —, Naus expressed the hope that the newly established Labour Bureau (1930) would contribute to the well-being of the economy. He himself appears to have been in touch with Qaysi Pasha, the Minister of the Interior, and with R.M. Graves, the Head of the Labour Bureau, as to the preparation of new legislation "for the benefit of all". Indeed, with Isma'il Sidqi as Prime Minister and a regressive constitution in power, the year 1931 saw a bill on child labour enacted, followed in 1933 by a law on female labour. A law on a 9-11 hour workday was passed in 1935 [84].

Naus, with other industrialists, favoured piecemeal legislation. When in February 1932, a first International Labour Organization (ILO) mission, led by Harold Butler, arrived in Egypt to advise the Sidqi government on labour legislation, Naus hosted the delegation for a large dinner-party at the Muhammad 'Ali Club. After welcoming Butler on behalf of the Federation of Industries, and promising its full cooperation, Naus clearly defined the parameters: on the one hand he declared: "Les industriels d'Egypte nourrissent à l'égard de leur nombreux personnel des sentiments extrêmement cordiaux... Le sort des classes ouvrières est très près de nos cœurs". Human dignity demanded certain essential guarantees and rights (as well as duties) for the workers. He defined their fate as being close to his heart as they were the real motors of national productivity. On the other hand, he emphasized the importance of local conditions: social progress and industrial equilibrium would have to be harmonized. In this respect, Naus welcomed the efforts to arrive at laws on child and female labour, indemnities in case of injury, and improved hygiene and labour conditions in factories. However, he unequivocally rejected the enactment of a comprehensive Labour Code, which he called a "synthèse imprudente d'illusoires théories" [85].

"The ILO, on which we would like Egypt to take a seat" — declared Naus in 1933 again — "has worked on our labour legislation, which will have to be implemented in stages for the benefit of industrialists and workers alike. We have warned against a complex labour legislation which even industrialized countries have not achieved after one hundred years. This should be done in stages, carefully considering local factors. We are in favour of the widest possible application of new laws to workers, rather than giving certain 'castes' [probably meaning labour unions] certain advantages or privileges. Social legislation, moreover, should not adversely affect price levels, which could work to the detriment of industry and commerce" [86].

In December 1932, still under Isma'il Sidqi as Prime Minister, Naus was appointed on the "Conseil supérieur consultatif du Travail", headed by Ziwari Pasha. Among its 23 members, the predominance of members of the Federation

of Industries springs to the eye: its Secretary-General I.G. Levi, but also Amin Yahya, S. Sornaga, René Cicurel, and Salvator Cicurel were some of the other members [87]. Their suggestions were probably instrumental in the formulation of more labour laws. Marius Deeb blamed Naus personally for rejecting proposals to legalize trade unions put forward by the Wafd government, which had come to power in 1935. Allegedly, Naus was prepared to admit only factory-based organizations. This then was the background to a protest demonstration in March 1938, organized by 'Abd al-Halim [88].

An additional aspect was the outspoken support for more state-sponsored vocational training, from which industry, of course, could greatly benefit. This theme already figures in the 1918 report of the Committee on Commerce and Industry, and recurs from time to time in Naus' speeches, as well as in statements by his colleagues. Though our information is incomplete, it seems that Naus, together with Sidqi, 'Abbud and 'Ali Mahir in 1938, or slightly earlier, also founded a committee to combat unemployment among Egyptian graduates — a problem which began to be felt more sharply in the 1930s [89].

Naus' opinions on labour matters, in the following years, remained moderately conservative, but at the same time, he showed himself benevolent and humane, and certainly not totally dismissive of regulation by state legislation. He held the paternalistic view that the growing class of workers should be "nourished and educated". After the passing of female and child labour laws, he pledged the "spontaneous" cooperation in further legislative projects, albeit "in an appropriate framework". The latter applied, it would seem, to a bill which limited working hours, which the Federation deemed suitable for commerce, but economically detrimental to industry. In short, in Naus' view, such were the dilemmas involved in the improvement of labour conditions: on the one hand, taking care of the good treatment of the workers, e.g. their moral and social hygiene, limiting working hours, and good cooperation between patrons and workers. But alluding to a speech by ILO-mission chairman Harold Butler, on the other hand, "not killing the chicken with the golden egg", that is safeguarding the survival of the enterprises [90]. Still, in 1937, the Federation spoke out against further labour legislation, which was deemed detrimental to industrial relations [91].

A law officially recognizing labour unions would be passed only in 1942, after the Wafd had been returned to power by the British. In 1944 the Federation supported a wage rise, as well as an improvement in the peasant workers' nutrition and a regularizing of rental contracts, all of which were thought to be beneficial to industry [92].

4.6. THE RAILWAY TARIFFS

Another achievement of the Federation under Naus' leadership ought to be mentioned; this was the reduction, in stages, of the railway tariffs. This was an

issue of major interest to the sugar company. Actually, this was the only major industry with various production plants in the country's periphery, dispersed as they were in Upper Egypt. Cheap transport of sugar over the long distance from Upper Egypt to the refinery at Hawamdiyya was an economic priority. We have already seen that before 1905 the sugar company had conducted its own transport system in the south, but had then sold it off to the government, maybe to its regret. State railway tariffs were said to be twice as high as before World War I. Indeed, before World War I, they were the government's second-largest item of revenue, exceeded only by revenues from the land tax, and followed by indirect taxes such as those from customs and from tobacco [93]. In 1926 the Egyptian Government had already promised that "unless the Egyptian State Railways can see their way to reducing freight rates on sugar exported by the [sugar] company, the Customs Administration will waive the export duty..." [94]. Nevertheless, it still took years of pressure and negotiating, and a reform in the status of the railways, before the Federation finally obtained the lowering of the tariffs. Other incessant demands with regard to an integration of land and river transport systems remained unfulfilled [95].

NOTES

- [1] 'Abd al-Salam 'Abd al-Halim 'AMIR, *al Ra'smaliyya al-Sina'iyya fi Misr min al-Tamsir ila al-Ta'mim*, 1957-1961, Cairo, 1993, pp. 23-24, who ascribes the founding role to Naus. We will use the term "Federation" for the entire period starting in 1922. The use of the term *qutr* (region) by the Association is interesting, as it may indicate some hesitation with regard to Egypt's statehood. It is indicative that Isma'il Sidqi, when visiting Palestine in 1932, used the same word *qutr* for Egypt and Palestine together. I. GERSHONI and J. JANKOWSKI, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945*, Cambridge, 1995, p. 152.
- [2] See Mahmud BAYRAM in *Livre d'Or de la Fédération Egyptienne de l'Industrie, publié à l'occasion du 25^e anniversaire de sa fondation*, Cairo, 1948, p. 33. Also SIDQI, *Mudhakkirat*, p. 111, ascribes the founding to Fu'ad's impact.
- [3] Speech 1927, *Recueil des Discours*, p. 5.
- [4] *L'industrie en Egypte* (Cairo 1916), pp. 26-29. Cf. *EgInd.*, January 1925; SUBAYH, pp. 89-91. See further OWEN, *Cotton*, p. 299, and on Sornaga's book, pp. 349-350. On a visit by the then Sultan Fu'ad to Sornaga's factory, and a detailed description of its installations and manufacturing processes, see *al-Rihla*, pp. 16-29. During the same trip Fu'ad also paid a short visit to the Hawamdiyya refinery, where he appeared to be impressed by the boiler, pp. 8-10.
- [5] Cf. K. KOPTIUCH, "Other Workers: a Critical Reading of Representations of Egyptian Petty Commodity Production at the Turn of the Twentieth Century" in Z. LOCKMAN (ed.), *Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East, Struggles, Histories, Historiographies*, Albany, 1994, pp. 41-70.
- [6] On Gasche's involvement, see A. MULLER, *Schweizer in Alexandrien 1914-1963, Zur Ausländischen Präsenz in Ägypten*, Stuttgart, 1992, pp. 114-115 and 123-124. Gasche remained Vice-President of the Federation until well after the Revolution.
- [7] TIGNOR, "The Egyptian Revolution", p. 59.
- [8] Gasche, Sornaga, or the Greek industrialist M. Salvago could equally have been suitable candidates. Salvago, however, was disliked by the King, with whom Naus had excellent relations, cf. List of Personalities for 1937, PRO, FO 141/660/353.
- [9] AL-RIFA'I, pp. 12-13.
- [10] *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation of Egypt for 1922*, April 1923, p. 23. See also PRO, FO 141/814/10464. The *Report for April 1924*, p. 30, remarked: the Industrial Combine

- has now 80 members, a combined capital of £E 25 m, employing 150,000 workpeople, "of which about 97 % are Egyptians, and forming with their families an aggregate of 800,000 inhabitants".
- [11] S. BLANK, *Industry and Government in Britain, the Federation of British Industries in Politics, 1945-1965*, West Mead, 1973, pp. 11-15.
 - [12] BERQUE, pp. 337-338, claims that the Federation published a pamphlet on birds. The *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation of Egypt for 1923*, April 1924, p. 30, mentions achievements such as a circular by the Ministry of Finance to various agencies to prefer local products; a decree to exempt certain goods from export and quay duties; a reduction of duties (drawback) on transformed and re-exported products, as well as on plate glass, PRO, FO 141/814/10464. *EgInd.*, January 1925, also mentions some measures with regard to river transport.
 - [13] *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation*, April 1924, pp. 30-31.
 - [14] ABDEL-MALEK, p. 22 *et passim*; M. DEEB, "Bank Misr and the Emergence of the Local Bourgeoisie in Egypt" in E. KEDOURIE (ed.), *The Middle Eastern Economy*, London, 1976, pp. 74-75.
 - [15] RAMADAN, pp. 100-104 (quoting from a study by Ibrahim 'Amir not available to us); M. MUTAWALLI, *al-Usul al-Ta'rikhiyya li'l-Ra'smaliyya al-Misriyya wa-Tatawwuruha*, Cairo, 1974, pp. 125-126 *et passim*.
 - [16] E.g. in TIGNOR, "The Economic Activities", pp. 436-438.
 - [17] Cf. VITALIS, *Capitalists*, pp. 59-60.
 - [18] Saad Eddin IBRAHIM, "Egypt's Landed Bourgeoisie" in A. ÖNCÜ *et al.* (eds.), *Developmentalism and Beyond, Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, Cairo, 1994, p. 24.
 - [19] The Association was to be the "guardian of the natural interests and rights of its adherents, it wishes the prosperity of the country, and will be consulted by the government", speech 29 November 1927, *EgInd.*, December 1927. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 5-6.
 - [20] Cf. Prime Minister Isma'il Sidqi's speech, then also Vice-President of Federation, 14.3.1931, *EgInd.*, February-March 1931; Minister of Finance Ahmad 'Abd al-Wahhab was also honoured, *EgInd.*, February 1935; or the presence of several cabinet ministers at the Federation's annual assembly, speech 1 May 1935, *EgInd.*, May 1935. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 47.
 - [21] No term is really satisfactory to describe the gradual take-over of foreign interests by Egyptians. While Tignor often employs the term "indigenation", VITALIS, *Capitalists*, p. 14, has used the term "domestication", which, however, has a connotation of "taming". Many others have used the term "Egyptianization" (*tamsir*), which became widely used in Egypt itself, particularly after the Company's Law of 1947. Egyptianization, however, does not accurately reflect the views of Naus and his colleagues, because they considered their industries to be Egyptian anyway.
 - [22] Speech 7 April 1930, *EgInd.*, April 1930; 300 members, speech 14 March 1931, *Ibid.*, February/March 1931. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 12-13 and 20.
 - [23] For these terms, see speech 6 June 1928, *EgInd.*, June 1928; speech 20 April 1934, *Ibid.*, May 1934; speech 1 May 1935, *Ibid.*, May 1935. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 33, 45, 50, 57, 60, as well as p. 42.
 - [24] Speech 30.3.1932, *EgInd.*, April 1932; editorial *ibid.*, March 1930; speech 21.4.1933, *ibid.*, May 1933. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 33, 45, 50, 57, and 60. On the rational division, see TIGNOR, *State*, pp. 74-75; DEEB, "Bank Misr", p. 78, implies that small industries were discriminated against.
 - [25] Speech 29 November 1927, *EgInd.*, December 1927. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 5.
 - [26] Deeb, "Bank Misr", p. 79, disputes, on purely arithmetical grounds, a genuine process of indigenation. Cf. Mutawalli, p. 233.
 - [27] Though nowadays to be quoted as *Misr al-Sina'iyya*, we believe that the French title is more suitable for the period under discussion; the same is true for *L'Egypte Contemporaine*. Naus even obtained a subsidy of £E 2,000 from the Government, ostensibly to hire personnel for the Federation's newly founded Arabic secretariat. This sum, according to BERQUE, p. 338, was however squandered.
 - [28] ABDEL-MONEM, p. 200.
 - [29] The *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation of Egypt for 1923*, April 1924, p. 30, for instance, stated that the Association represented a combined capital of £E 25 million, and that

- it employed 150,000 "workpeople" (with their dependent families 800,000), 97 % of whom were Egyptians, PRO, FO 141/814/10464.
- [30] Speech 1 May 1935, *EgInd.*, May 1935. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 47.
- [31] VITALIS, *Capitalists*, pp. 30ff.
- [32] DAVIS, pp. 138-139; VITALIS, *Capitalist*, pp. 45-48.
- [33] Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatat), together with the Muslim Brothers, were probably the most outspoken political movements against foreign "monopolies" and foreign interests in Egypt in general.
- [34] See editorial, *EgInd.*, 15 May 1935, and speech 15 March 1938, *Ibid.* Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 57.
- [35] Speech 30 March 1932, *EgInd.*, April 1932; speech 21 April 1933, *ibid.*, May 1933. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 29 and 40.
- [36] *Report on the Economic and Financial Conditions*, April 1924, p. 22.
- [37] *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation*, May 1927, p. 35.
- [38] ABDEL-MONEM, pp. 203-211. The ministry was founded under the extra-parliamentary government of Tawfiq Nasim, with Ahmad Hilali Bey in charge of this portfolio as well as of Public Instruction. Naus welcomed this move, speech 1 May 1935, *EgInd.*, May 1935. A Ministry of Social Affairs was first formed in 1939. Cf. M. Colombe, *L'évolution de l'Égypte, 1924-1950*, Paris, 1954, pp. 338 and 342. A proper Ministry of Industry had to wait till 1956, the Nasirist era, cf. N.N.M. Ayubi, *Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt*, London, 1980, pp. 190-191.
- [39] Editorial *EgInd.*, March 1930; speech 7 April 1930, *ibid.*, April 1930; or more emphatically: "industry is in an anaemic state"... "parliament should pay more attention"... "this government, still weak, it must hurry up, lest some industries will become exhausted... the hour is serious", speech 30 March 1932, *ibid.*, April 1932; "Important amendments must still be made", speech 21.4.1933, *ibid.*, May 1933; speech 22 January 1935, *ibid.*, February 1935. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 14-15, 27-28, 35 and 45.
- [40] Speech 30 March 1932, *EgInd.*, April 1932; speech 21 April 1933, *ibid.*, May 1933; Naus hailed the government for maintaining a balanced budget, speech 1 May 1935, *ibid.*, May 1935. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 26-27, 36-37 and 44. Obviously, this too was connected to the tariff reform. Tignor, *State*, p. 90, however, gives the impression that Naus was totally opposed to taxes.
- [41] Speech 29 April 1938, *EgInd.*, March 1938. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 59-60.
- [42] In terms of import substituting industrialization, the tariff reform was most successful in the food sector, though less so in the intermediate and capital goods sectors. Cf. R.L. TIGNOR, "Dependency Theory and Egyptian Capitalism, 1920 to 1950", *African Economic History*, 9 (1980), p. 110.
- [43] *EgInd.*, May 1926; Hafiz 'AFIFI, 'Ala Hamish al-Siyasa, Ba'd Masa'iluna al-Qawmiyya, Cairo, 1938, p. 192.
- [44] DESTREE, pp. 55ff., 90 and 92. Joseph Naus' reforms, however, were meant to reinforce the Treasury and, possibly, to please the Russians rather than to protect any local industry in Iran.
- [45] Copies of a report to Prince Husayn Kamil, and note of taxes, both undated and unsigned (but both most probably in Naus' hand), CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Documents de l'industrie sucrière.
- [46] Letter Naus to Defrance, 22 September 1914, and a report on the tariff (28 September 1916), CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.
- [47] VITALIS, *Capitalists*, p. 47, appears to be wary of too far-fetched conclusions on the Federation's negotiating powers. Cf. similarly SUBAYH, pp. 155-162 who reports a meeting in 1930 of Sidqi, Salvago and Gasche with Nahhas, who was then Prime Minister. This would mean that Naus for some unexplained reason did not participate.
- [48] *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation*, May 1927, pp. 12-13 and 32; *ibid.* for May 1928, pp. 15-16; *ibid.* for June 1929, pp. 21-22; *Economic Conditions in Egypt* (as the same publication was now called) for July 1931, pp. 34-35.
- [49] *The Egyptian Gazette*, 21 January 1930; *Economic Conditions* for July 1931, p. 34; and *ibid.* for July 1933, p. 41. Cf. RACHOVICH, p. 322.
- [50] As reported in the *Egyptian Gazette*, 23 January and 17 February 1930; see also the ambiguous stand of the "Union des Agriculteurs", *ibid.*, 3 February 1930, and the journal's editorial on 15 February 1930. See further TIGNOR, *State*, p. 13, p. 109ff., 127-129.
- [51] *Rapport Annuel 1928-1929*, pp. 93-97.

- [52] Speech 14 March 1931, *EgInd.*, February/March 1931. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 19. In our interpretation, however, we could object and say that Muhammad 'Ali had promoted his industries mainly for the sake of his personal ambitions.
- [53] Speech 25 February 1925, *EgInd.*, March 1925; editorial, *ibid.*, February 1927; speech 20 December 1927, *ibid.*, January 1928; speech 19 March 1929, *ibid.*, April 1929; report for 1929, *ibid.*, March 1930. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 4, 10 and 11.
- [54] While the British resented Sidqi's protectionist policies, and his financial help to some branches (e.g. the Alexandria Navigation Co.), they were satisfied with his neatly balanced budget, Abul-Fadl, p. 230.
- [55] Report for 1929, *EgInd.*, March 1930. See also S. RADWAN, *Capital Formation in Egyptian Industry and Agriculture, 1882-1967*, London, 1974, p. 189.
- [56] *Economic Conditions in Egypt* for 1935, p. 50.
- [57] *The Egyptian Gazette*, 14 February 1930; MAZUEL, p. 183; *Economic Conditions in Egypt* for July 1933, p. 45. See also R. MABRO and S. RADWAN, *The Industrialization of Egypt, 1939-1973*, Oxford, 1976, pp. 52-53; ABDEL-MONEM, pp. 56-57, 200-202.
- [58] Speech 30 March 1932, *EgInd.*, April 1932. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 30-31. The new tariff system was favourably discussed by I.G. Levi, "Le régime douanier égyptien", *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, 21 (1930), pp. 105-116, but then criticized by I.G. LEVI and L. GHADDI, "Observations générales sur le nouveau tarif douanier", *ibid.* 23 (1932). A similar confusion pervades Naus' speeches. Cf. *Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions* for May 1937, pp. 14-15; *Memento économique, l'Egypte*, p. 155.
- [59] Speech 21 April 1933, *EgInd.*, May 1933; speech 21 April 1933, *ibid.*, May 1935. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 34-35 and 46-47.
- [60] Speech 30 March 1932, *EgInd.*, April 1932; for the quote see Report for 1935, *ibid.*, April 1936. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 30.
- [61] Such a hypothesis emerges from studies by DEEB, BEININ and LOCKMAN, and VITALIS.
- [62] I.G. Levi claimed that European labour codes were unsuitable to Egypt, where industry was still in a "primitive stage", *EgInd.*, January 1928. He had pleaded his point of view in favour of gradual and cautious legislation, instead of a wholesale labour code, before the Labour Bureau in 1927. See also his "Les débuts de la législation sociale égyptienne", *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, 25 (1934).
- [63] Note on Cronier on CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucreries 1905-1906.
- [64] Roche, p. 21. Conditions in the sugar factories, however, were "by English standards... very unhealthy" wrote a British advisor at the Ministry of Public Works in 1919, PRO, FO 848/6.
- [65] Roche, "In Memoriam" *Le Journal Sucrier Egyptien*, 8 (February 1940), p. 27.
- [66] See notes on CAD, Le Caire, carton 232, sub-dossier Sucrerie, incl. a letter by Naus (19 September 1902) on the murder in Nag' Hammadi requesting the intervention of the French Chargé d'Affaires.
- [67] GOLDBERG, *Tinker*, pp. 97-99.
- [68] MU'ASSASAT AL-AHRAM, 50 'Amman 'ala Thawrat 1919, Cairo, 1969, with facsimile reports from the PRO, dated 18 March and 22 till 28 March 1919 showing attacks on Hawamdiyya. Cf. the interesting hypothesis put forward by E. Goldberg, "Peasants in Revolt-Egypt 1919", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 24 (1992): 261-280, where, unfortunately, he says little on the sugar supply.
- [69] GOLDBERG, *Tinker*, p. 96.
- [70] Letter 19 January 1920, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940. A petition attached shows the names of 23 mainly technical workers, some of whom are very young, aged 6 and 10.
- [71] BEININ & LOCKMAN, p. 126; CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.
- [72] Report on the labour situation, 14 October 1926, PRO, FO 141/583/932.
- [73] Letters to French Minister, 15 August 1927, and November 1929, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.
- [74] PRO, FO 141/649/265.
- [75] GOLDBERG, *Tinker*, pp. 99-101.
- [76] BEININ and LOCKMAN, p. 126.
- [77] See the intercepted letter of the "Congrès National Egyptien" in Berlin (signed by a certain Yahya Ahmad al-Dardiri), October 1922, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.

- [78] Keown-Boyd to Furness, 21 October 1924, PRO, FO 141/583/9321.
- [79] Note by Graves, PRO, FO 141/617/237. For the quotation see YAPP, p. 618. See further *Report on the Economic and Commercial Conditions*, May 1937, p. 159. Hawamdiyya remained a focus of workers' militancy, cf. *idem*, November 1947, p. 54.
- [80] Speech by G. Schirmann on behalf of the company's personnel, praising Naus for his efforts to establish a social security fund, *Discours prononcés à l'occasion du 25^e anniversaire de l'entrée de M. H. Naus Bey*, Cairo, 1927. Cf. J. and S. LACOUTURE, *L'Egypte en mouvement*, Paris, 1956, p. 360, where they state that the Kom Ombo sugar plant (in the 1950s) was one of the few beneficiaries of social legislation. However, they considered the "demi-paysans" employed not yet to be a working-class.
- [81] Roche, "In Memoriam" pp. 28-30.
- [82] Marie Cavadia, "A la mémoire d'Henri Naus" *Journal Sucrier Egyptien*, 8 (Feb. 1940), p. 10. On her background, see COOPER, p. 222; and FENOGLIO, "L'Activité", pp. 464 and 490. On Riad, see *Le Mondain Egyptien*, 1943, p. 217.
- [83] Report of 22 April 1929, PRO, FO 141/583/9321. See also Tignor, *State*, p. 143.
- [84] *EgInd.*, April 1930; speech 14 March 1931, *ibid.*, February/March 1931. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 20. The Labour Bureau, significantly enough, initially came under the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Security.
- [85] Press cutting, apparently from *La Bourse Egyptienne*, in the possession of Guy Naus. On the Butler mission, see BEININ & LOCKMAN, pp. 204-205. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 24.
- [86] Speech 30 March 1932 with praise for Mahmud Fahmi Qaysi Pasha, who had played a major role in preparing the labour bills, *EgInd.*, April 1932. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 28.
- [87] *Journal Officiel*, 30 January 1933; Report by Graves, 20 February 1933, PRO, FO 141/760/316. See further Memo by Kelly, 18 April 1935, FO 141/617. Also ABDEL-MONEM, p. 179. Ziwar, a conservative politician, who had been Prime Minister, served at the time as senator.
- [88] M. DEEB, "Labour and Politics in Egypt, 1919-1939", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 10 (1979), pp. 200-201.
- [89] CAD, Le Caire, carton 44, "Mouvement social 1935-1936", where the date (1938) of the relevant documents is confusing.
- [90] Speech 1 May 1935, *EgInd.*, May 1935; report for 1935, *Idem*, 1 April 1936; report for 1936, *ibid.*, 15 April 1937; speech 29 April 1938, *ibid.*, May 1938. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 45 and 65.
- [91] MUTAWALLI, pp. 125-126, about a circular to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, quoted in *al-Misri* of 23 January 1937.
- [92] DEEB, "Large Landowners and Social Transformation in Egypt, 1940-1952", in T. Khalidi (ed.), *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, Beirut, 1984, p. 430.
- [93] WILLCOCKS, 3rd ed., vol. I, pp. 124-125 (budgets for 1905 and 1910: the railways brought in roughly £E 3 millions and 3.4 millions out of a total of £E 15 millions and 16 millions respectively).
- [94] *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation*, June 1926, p. 10.
- [95] *EgInd.*, January 1926; speech 19 March 1929, *ibid.*, April 1929; speech 14 March 1931, *ibid.*, February/March 1931; speech 21 April 1933, *ibid.*, May 1933; speech 1 May 1935, *ibid.*, May 1935. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 11, 19, 39 and 45.

5. Naus and Egyptian Society: Ideas and Activities

In this chapter, we propose to conduct a close reading of Naus' ideas and attitudes with regard to a number of important social and economic questions of his time. We will do this mainly by means of the programmatic speeches, which he delivered as President of the Federation. In these he drew much upon Sornaga's and Sidqi's ideas: there is an aversion of monoculture, a drive for economic independence, encouraging industrial education, and a clear acknowledgement of the central role of the state in directing the economy. Something amounting to his own credo on industrial development was published in an article by his hand which appeared in 1929 in the Belgian journal *Revue Economique Internationale*, and reproduced in the locally prestigious *L'Egypte Contemporaine* the year after [1]. Terms such as "progress" and "prosperity", as well as "harmony" and "solidarity", pervade his public statements.

Using his speeches as a source, of course, requires some reservation. Naus' thoughts are generally well-organized and cautious, often overconsiderate, and maybe not particularly innovative. On the other hand, we suppose that the repeated emphasis on certain issues, though not exclusively his, characterizes his personality, and more important, inspired a wider audience. His speeches certainly reflect a mode of thinking which prevailed also among his colleagues, in particular the foreign industrialists in Egypt.

What makes the reading of his speeches fascinating is our own hindsight. After the long-term vicissitudes in economic thinking in Egypt itself and, more specifically, after the "étatiste" tendencies of the Nasirist era, and the emphasized rejection of "Imperialist" or "Reactionary" trends in economic thinking, there is reason for a re-examination. Against the background of the parameters of the *Infitah* (Open Door Policy) under Sadat, with its joint (foreign-local) ventures and with large foreign investments and expertise in Egypt, part of Naus' views, in certain respects, appear to be more in line with present-day thinking [2].

5.1. INDUSTRIALIZATION FOR THE SAKE OF DEVELOPMENT

While Naus called himself "un industriel incorrigible", he could not neglect the still predominant interests of Egypt's agricultural sector. Though not a big landowner himself, he had been (we have not been able to trace the exact years) a Vice-President of the "Union des Agriculteurs", and a member of the "Conseil consultatif d'Agriculture" [3]. In the first place, his own sugar industry was intimately linked to agriculture. "If agriculture is Egypt's eldest daughter, industry is her younger sister (*sœur cadette*)". Similarly, we find him even advocating

an improvement of the cotton crop and opposing a limit to its acreage, in order to raise income in that branch [4]. Secondly, the Federation came to include members from the agro-business and contracting sectors. Naus repeatedly expressed the view that industry, agriculture and, indeed, commerce as well, were complementary branches, the harmony between which was important to Egypt's development [5].

The advancement of industry in Egypt, however, was necessary as a vehicle of development. "The 'conquest of independence' as well as the awakening of a civil spirit, demographic growth, and taking care of the well-being of the population" — wrote Naus in 1929 — "demand improved economic equipment, in particular industrial development, which can release latent national energies" [6]. Among the measures which he also deemed necessary were enhanced electrification, and the advancement of vocational education, to which end he even conducted an enquiry together with Sidqi Pasha [7].

Moreover, in his view, the systematic development of industry in Egypt would lessen the existing pressures on agriculture and land, absorb qualified, but presently underemployed youngsters, create new labour opportunities, promote domestic trade, improve the standard of living, and lead to a more equitable division of wealth. Industrialization, said Naus in one of his speeches, could lessen the pressure of Egypt's growing population which had quadrupled in a century. However fertile the Nile valley is, said Naus, modern Egypt needs a second breast: "C'est l'Industrie qui offre aux travailleurs et à l'Agriculture elle-même, les moyens illimités d'évolution, de prospérité, de vie meilleure". Supporting an industrial enterprise is not a personal favour, any increase in production and work is beneficial, declared Naus somewhat apologetically. It must be admitted that Naus' own sugar industry proved that it was capable of creating new labour opportunities [8]. An employee of the company estimated in 1940 that, mechanization notwithstanding, its own labour force had tripled in forty years [9].

The Federation, still undergoing a process of maturation, moved towards unqualified preference for industrialization: Isma'il Sidqi and Hafiz 'Afifi came to criticize the post-1937 distribution of the tax burden, which they considered favourable to the landowners and detrimental to the industrialists. In 1945 Isma'il Sidqi took landowners to task for not giving more support to industrialization. Remarkably, the Federation turned out to support land reform in the hope that investments would be diverted into industry [10].

5.2. THE PERCEIVED CONTRIBUTION OF FOREIGNERS

Naus saw himself as one of those "foreign experts" (*spécialiste étranger*) who were managing large Egyptian industrial enterprises, when he stated "qu'une longue collaboration et un attachement sincère à l'œuvre égyptienne ont assi-

milés aux meilleurs artisans de la prospérité nationale” [11]. In general, Naus saw the involvement of foreigners as a positive contribution to the prosperity of the country: “Nous rendons à la Patrie égyptienne [*sic!*] un hommage filial qui par-dessus nos cheminées et nos fourneaux s’élève lumineux dans l’avenir”. In accordance with the idea that Egypt had always been a melting-pot, or cross-roads, of nations, and that international cooperation could lead to new industrial enterprises, all forces should be mobilized, without distinguishing between “fils d’origine” and “fils d’élection”.

Refusing to make any distinction between the members of the Federation, and increasingly being forced into an apologetic mood, Naus declared: “Je ne fais aucune distinction parmi nos membres. Je les considère tous comme ‘Égyptiens’, car ceux qui ne le sont pas de naissance, ont passé ici la majeure partie de leur existence. Ils sont définitivement attachés à l’Égypte par tous les liens sentimentaux et matériels... Les capitaux et la technique européenne sont de précieux auxiliaires aux forces locales... C’est par l’union de tous que nos efforts pour le bien de l’Égypte porteront plus efficacement et plus rapidement leurs fruits. Et ce Patrimoine est commun à tous, ceux d’origine ou d’élection, qui se consacrent au Pays et lui vouent toute leur affection [12].

5.3. EGYPT’S POLITICAL EMANCIPATION

The observations imparted by Henri Naus to the Milner Mission, which came to investigate Egyptian aspirations following the uprising of 1919, enable us to put his views in an evolving political perspective. Though this official commission of inquiry was boycotted by the nationalists, the abundant evidence collected makes interesting reading. Sir Alfred Milner was clearly impressed by Naus: “He is evidently a very able man with statesmanlike conceptions. I am told, and quite believe, that he has always been a good friend to us and very helpful”. Though Naus spoke about “blunders” and “grave mismanagement”, and blamed in particular the Financial Advisor Sir William Brunyate for these, he showed himself unequivocally in support of continued British rule. British officials, he implied, had to be respected. However, he was, at the same time, of the opinion that the Egyptians deserved better and should gradually be allowed a greater share in the management of their own affairs. “There were many Egyptians now who were very fairly capable up to a certain point, and no European should be put into a position here which an Egyptian could by any possibility fill, even if less efficiently. What was needed for the country was the retention of a few Englishmen and those of a very high standard”, said Naus, and added: “A compromise should not be difficult which would save the self-esteem of the Egyptians and allow them to feel that they had some share in the administration of their own affairs” [13].

When Naus’ public biography, or, for that matter, the biographies of other prominent foreign industrialists, is viewed against the background of the Egyptian

struggle for political emancipation, their relative reticence is striking. They often seemed to welcome the gradual process of Egyptianization as described above. Naus later declared himself in support of Egypt's independence. True, the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, which granted Egypt formal, albeit in practice limited, independence only slightly affected the existent foreign economic interests, at least for the time being.

Negotiations for the abolition of the Capitulations, which led to the Montreux Convention of May 1937, appeared to be more far-reaching. Foreign communities in Egypt followed the negotiations with some anxiety but not panic [14]. It would still take until 1946-7, towards the end of the transitional period abolishing the Capitulations, and the more stringent legislation on the involvement of foreigners in stock companies (e.g. the Companies Law of 1947), before the squeeze began to be genuinely felt in their circles [15]. But that was almost a decade after Naus' death.

However, the fact is that Henri Naus, at the beginning of March 1937, offered his resignation to the Board of the Federation of Industries, and even persuaded Vice-President Sornaga and other non-Egyptian colleagues to do the same. The deeper background to this unexpected move is opaque; information is cryptic. The reason might, under the diplomatic circumstances — with Montreux coming up —, have been tactical. But there might very well have been a growing assertiveness among the Egyptian members of the Federation, which developed from the early 1930s onwards. We should not forget that Isma'il Sidqi, Naus' associate in so many economic projects, and particularly during his three years as Prime Minister, had been dismissed in 1933. Agitation for a return of the 1923 Constitution had been successful. This had been followed, in May 1936, by the ascendancy of another Wafd government under Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, which was considered to be more sympathetic to workers than to employers. What is maybe more relevant is that there were rumours to the effect that some Egyptian members of the Federation had left because they felt under-represented. 'Abd al-Salam Subayh sees a connection between this undercurrent, and a greater emphasis in Naus' speeches on the perfect equality between foreigners and Egyptians. Something of the sort may have happened behind the scenes and may also serve as an explanation for the enlarged Egyptian representation on the Federation's Board [16].

The formal explanation given was that Naus' resignation was prompted by his belief, that time had come to cede his place — "*par délicatesse*" — to an Egyptian. Such a symbolic change of leadership, however, was, at least for the time being, prevented by the quick intervention of Isma'il Sidqi, and other Egyptian members of the Board. Sidqi held a speech praising the economic contribution of foreigners to the industrial development of Egypt, and called for further close cooperation [17]. Naus remained President.

It could very well be that political developments had overtaken Naus, but we do not assume that he was insincere or trying to save whatever he could from his

Egyptian rivals, when he declared in April 1938, in what would be his last official speech as President of the Federation: "Dans l'exercice de son entière Souveraineté, que nous saluons fièrement [*sic!*], des pleins pouvoirs législatifs, juridictionnels et fiscaux, ayant conquis une place marquante dans le Conseil des Nations, l'Egypte... élabore et construit son cadre matériel et moral de progrès et de prospérité" [18].

5.4. NAUS' PECULIAR INTERPRETATION OF EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM

Though remaining very attached to Belgium, even outside observers called Naus an "Egyptien de cœur", and Egypt his "pays d'adoption" [19]. This may well have been true for many of his foreign contemporaries, few of whom appear to have suffered from a complex of dual loyalty which is often decried by staunch nationalists. The distinction between "Egyptiens de naissance" and "Egyptiens d'adoption", which Naus frequently used, was not his invention, but was a common phrase among the foreign resident élite: "[Ils] sont animés du même et profond attachement pour le pays", was the common feeling [20].

It is worth noting that Naus felt no problem at all using the term "national" or the possessive adjective "our" for Egypt, even if this may have differed from the interpretation given by Wafdists or other Egyptian patriots, who determined the predominant ethos of the era. "Many believed that they were indeed Egyptians, even without Egyptian citizenship or wanting to claim it", concluded Robert Tignor [21].

It is therefore not surprising that Naus saw the Federation as promoting the general welfare and advancement of Egypt which he loved so much. "L'Avenir d'Egypte? Nous le voulons magnifique, nous y contribuerons", he exclaimed in 1931. Or in 1933: "Par un heureux paradoxe, ce Pays millénaire que nous chérissons, où se confondent noblement les affections filiales et les affections d'élection inséparables et ferventes, a le privilège d'être un pays jeune, et, à beaucoup d'égards, un pays neuf. Son développement demande encore beaucoup de travail et d'enthousiasme à l'effort — qui se manifestent partout, de façon évidente, mouvante souvent". In a similar vein, on its 12th anniversary, Naus once more emphasized that the Federation, cooperating with the government in legislation and consultation, had worked in Egypt's national interest [22].

Egypt in Naus' view was what we would call today a developing country — moreover, "renaissante" in his words. "Il est grand temps et de toute nécessité que l'Egypte exploite avec la plus grande intensité les ressources de son sol, de son sous-sol, de ses eaux, de son climat et de sa population si prolifique". Egypt's happiness and prosperity will be ours: "... une Egypte évoluée que nous souhaitons heureuse et prospère... son bonheur sera le nôtre" [23].

It is probably fair to say that, in general, a sort of spasmodic division of labour existed, in which the foreign resident industrialists left the purely polit-

ical games, that is party and parliamentary politics, up to the Egyptian élite. The Federation then, was one of the arenas where foreigners could get closest to Egyptian politics. It was there that Naus and his foreign colleagues did speak out and did take action on — what they themselves considered as — purely economic issues. Issues which were as yet much less taken up in parliament or by most of the political parties. However, behind the scenes, more might have been going on: it has been suggested that Naus, together with others, who were fearful of the growing influence of Ahmad 'Abbud Pasha and of Zaki al-Ibrashi, a close aid to the King, were in 1934 indeed involved in the downfall of the weak and short-lived government headed by 'Abd al-Fattah Yahya, Sidqi's successor [24].

While sustaining Egypt's political and economic emancipation, Naus, somewhat paradoxically, supported the existing form of autocratic monarchy. There can be no doubt that Naus was a royalist at heart; he considered monarchies — whether in Egypt or in Belgium — as the safeguards of stability and progress. He was extremely careful not to take a stand on any of the political dealings of the King, for whom he invariably expressed nothing but praise, or on those of the politicians, or even on the unhappy fate of the 1923 Constitution. Its provisions were often overridden, and were between 1930 and 1935 replaced by an even more autocratic Constitution. Indeed it is well-known that the constitution was based on Ottoman and Belgian precedents, and that Belgian jurists such as Van den Bosch and Eeman had been consulted on the making of the constitutional monarchy. But credit to the Belgians cannot be unqualified: it is less well-known that Van den Bosch had recommended an adaptation even of the rather conservative Belgian electoral system, given "the mentality and degree of intellectual development" of Egypt. As Van den Bosch was close to Naus, one wonders whether his attitudes may give us also a clue to Naus' way of thinking. However, there is nothing unequivocal on public record. Van den Bosch, in any case, resigned as "Procureur Général" in 1929, a few months after a controversial newspaper interview in which he had called the 1923 constitution too advanced for a majority of illiterates, and in which he defended its suspension by King Fu'ad for whom he had nothing but praise [25].

5.5. THE EXPANSION OF NAUS' BUSINESS INTERESTS

In order to form an impression of Naus' relationship towards other foreign interests in Egypt, or their relationship towards him, it is worthwhile examining the list of his directorships in stock companies. This is a field of rivalries mainly between French, British and Belgian interests, which is not easy to explore. We have to remember that Naus came to Egypt as a mere technician, and started his career in the service of a French company. We are able to reconstruct some of

his formal involvement as a director of various companies according to published sources. Here we discover a network of personal and business relations, which sheds light not only on Naus' public standing but also on the cooperation of the local and foreign élites in general. Many names, as well as those known from the sugar company, recur. These are fascinating interlocking interests which need further study. The interesting point here is not Naus' association with a number of French or French-dominated companies, most of which had some bearing on his stake in the sugar industry, but his increasing involvement in Belgian companies. We will examine both categories.

As we have seen above, Naus had been involved in the "Société Egyptienne d'Irrigation" from the first decade of the century, it being closely linked to the Sucreries [26]. Though this company was founded in 1896 as a joint venture of French capital and local Egyptian partners, the latter soon lost interest, and control seems to have shifted solely to French shareholders. When the Egyptian government, owing to electoral considerations or to the pressures of speculators, around 1930, declared that it would end the concession [*rukhsa*], the sugar company requested the intervention of the French Ambassador on the grounds that it had done much to develop the region. The latter, however, declined, and it seems that the company was, indeed, shortly after liquidated [27].

Naus held a similar position in the Wadi Kom Ombo company, which possessed 70,000 *faddan* of land, mainly concentrated in the sugar-growing regions of Upper Egypt. Among its directors were also many Jewish capitalists, such as Suares, Rolo, and Cattaoui, and at an early stage also Cassel. The Cattaouis occupied, from 1922 onwards — not by coincidence —, a parliamentary seat representing the Kom Ombo district [28]. The interlocking directorates between those and some other, smaller, land companies such as Gharbieh Land Co., Kafr El-Dawar Agricultural Co., the Anglo-Egyptian Land Allotment Co., the "Société vinicole et viticole d'Egypte", and the "Agricole & Industrielle d'Egypte" company have already been charted before. Naus was involved in all of these [29].

In the utility sector, in 1917 Naus also became an Administrateur of the "Société des Eaux du Caire", which, moreover, had its seat not far from his home in Giza. The company's plant clarified, filtered and from 1928 onwards also chlorinated Cairo's drinking water (in those neighbourhoods where it was supplied, we must add), and almost without any doubt contributed towards an improvement in public health; the last large-scale cholera epidemic in Cairo was recorded for 1902. Founded as a concession to a French company under Khedive Isma'il in 1865, French interests had remained predominant. These were generally, and not merely in some symbolic fashion, represented on its board by a delegate of the "Crédit Foncier" and/or the "Crédit Lyonnais". Besides, Prime Minister Nubar Pasha's family had remained an interested party. In Naus' era, his grandson Arakil Bey Nubar would figure as a dominant director. It seems that whenever vacancies occurred, Nubar pressed for the nomination of Egyptians on the

Board. The ensuing tensions were allegedly diffused by Naus, so that by 1935 or even earlier — much to the dismay of the French — the Board counted five Egyptians (among whom was former Prime Minister Muhammad Tawfiq, and Cattaoui) as against three Europeans, including Naus [30]. In 1935, in this capacity Naus would also play a role in settling a long-standing dispute on the consumer price of water [31]. Naus was also on the board of the “Société frigorifique d’Egypte” (founded in 1904), a daughter company of the “Société des Eaux” [32].

Undoubtedly the most important company which Naus actively served as Administrateur was the “Crédit Foncier”. He entered its board in January 1920. This was a gigantic land-owning and mortgage-credit company, founded in 1880 by a French group taking advantage of new legislation on mortgages, and joined by local figures, mainly Jews and Greeks, such as Raphael Soares, as well as I. Aghion, A. Ralli and C. Salvago. It had started with a capital of some £E 2 millions. In 1902 the “Crédit Foncier” had been instrumental in raising, on the French capital market, the money needed for the take-over of the Daira Sanieh Co. Between 1907 and 1914 its capital had increased by over £E 6 millions, and it was stated to possess £E 56 millions in 1929 [33]. It afforded credit not only to landowners, but also to hospitals, educational and religious institutions. After the Suez Canal Company, this was the largest French capital investment in Egypt. Though French interests remained predominant, the company was responsive to Egyptian directors, and employed a staff of agricultural experts, many of whom were local Jews [34]. In 1930, for instance, it was headed by the Frenchman M.E. Miriel but among its directors we find, apart from a majority of leading foreign resident capitalists, also the names of Tal’at Harb, and former Prime Minister Adli Yeghen [35].

As we have emphasized before, most Belgian interests were tightly controlled by metropolitan Belgian capitalism [36]. As early as 1916, the Belgian consul in 1916 had roughly divided the interests of his compatriots into four or five business groups: the “Groupe Empain” with its railway and tramway interests, the “Groupe Eïd” with its agricultural and land companies, the “Groupe Rolin” with urban development projects, and the “Groupe Lambert & Rolin”, which equally held tramway interests, but also breweries, a cement factory and a department store. In the same simplistic way he added a “Groupe Naus”, which consisted merely of the “Banque hypothécaire” [37].

There was, in our view, no such “Groupe” Naus, at least not in the sense of the other Belgian investors mentioned. In fact, only over time, when Naus became a well-known and well-connected industrialist, do we find him serving on the boards of companies held by all four other groups [38]. An analytical comparison of divergent sources on directorships of stock companies leads to the conclusion that he was more, though not exclusively, involved in local foreign-cum-Egyptian ventures than in Belgian or other metropolitan companies [39]. Though the interests and the personal connections between

the different companies sometimes fluctuated owing to mergers and liquidations, almost all the companies in which Naus was actively involved had their "siège social" in Cairo. The business interests of not a few could be said to be of relevance to the sugar company. We suppose that his involvement in Belgian enterprises proper was secondary and evolved during the 1920s and 1930s, that is two decades or more after most of these had been founded. It is unfortunate that none of the companies mentioned has as yet been systematically studied.

Naus was Vice-President of the "Banque belge et internationale en Egypte". Before 1929, it had been known under the name of "Banque belge pour l'Etranger" — a subsidiary of the "Société Générale de Belgique" — and before that the "Banque sino-belge (1912)". In anticipation of the tariff reform of 1930, and with the intention to create new industries, it was now registered as a local bank with its seat in Cairo. Its founders and most of its directors and managers, however, were Belgians. This bank has been called "the powerhouse behind most of Belgium's activities in Egypt". It controlled a number of important construction and real-estate activities, *inter alia*, in Heliopolis, as well as the "Société égyptienne d'électricité". It never needed to appeal for more capital to its shareholders, as deposits by Belgian companies in Egypt gave it sufficient leeway. At the time of its sequestration in 1961 it was said to be the seventh-largest bank operating in Egypt [40]. Naus is also mentioned as a director of the Bank of Abyssinia, which had its head office in Addis Ababa, but which was a British-dominated Egyptian stock company, and in fact a branch of the National Bank of Egypt [41].

A typically Belgian branch, moreover, was the railway and tramway sector, associated with the names of Empain and Rolin, where we find Naus as director of several companies, albeit probably not in an active role. His allegiance to the Sucreries, and his usual tact, made him avoid taking a public stand in the fierce competition which was going on at that time between British and Belgian companies for electrification and some other large-scale projects [42]. Not surprisingly, we find him as Vice-President of Empain's well-known Cairo Electric Railways & Heliopolis Oases Company, and the "Société anglo-franco-belge de matériel de chemin de fer" [43]. In the urban real estate and construction sector, in which Belgians had played a pioneering role at the turn of the century, we find directorates in such companies as the Belgian-Egyptian Ezbekieh company, the Cairo Suburban Building Land Company, the Koubbeh Gardens Company, and the Egyptian Enterprise and Development Company [44]. In the same category fell the Belgian-held "Ciments d'Egypte" factory at Ma'asara and the Cement Portland Tourah company. There were also some smaller Belgian commercial ventures in Egypt [45]. Not unexpectedly we find Naus mentioned as Vice-President of the "Compagnie sucrière congolaise", but he was also involved in some other Egyptian-based Belgian companies which had invested in the Congo [46].

5.6. WHICH WAS NAUS' EGYPT?

It has been observed that many members of the foreign residential bourgeoisie "lacked sympathy for the Arabic and Muslim heritage... [being] committed to European values... [but] remained as a social group in an economic enclave" [47]. The latter part of this evaluation is debatable, but Naus was no exception to its general tenor. The social environment of the *élite* to which he belonged deserves closer study. Opposites such as foreign-Egyptian, or colonialist-oppressed, are much less relevant than an *élite*-masses division. Naus lived physically and mentally in a social environment which did include indigenous Egyptians, but which knew more cooperation, socializing (including intermarriage) and *esprit de corps* than has sometimes been assumed [48].

Though of Flemish origin, Naus felt himself a Francophone. French was the *lingua franca* which linked all *élite* groups in Egypt together. He spoke and corresponded in French, also with his father, and French and Dutch with his wife, but knew also English. This was a combination of languages which must have been of great use. On the other hand, Naus hardly knew Arabic, except for some colloquial phrases. Given the contemporary Arabization process, and the establishment of an Arabic secretariat even at the Federation of Industries, it strikes one today as strange that he was hardly capable of reading that language but, at the time, in *élite* circles, this was socially acceptable. The language barrier created a social distance in which all *élite* groups were equally interested, except maybe some of the nationalist leaders. It was later much resented by the middle-class groups coming to power.

Naus also differed from the assimilating non-Egyptian-born *mutamassirun* (Egyptianizing) in that he never adopted the *tarbush* (fez), the contemporary symbol of Egyptianness. Some of his indigenous Jewish or Greek counterparts did. The *tarbush*, more or less compulsory for those employed by the State, also had a sociologically equalizing effect. But all photographs show Naus wearing a fashionable felt hat, occasionally a top hat, or even going bareheaded. The story of his father who had run into trouble in Iran wearing a turban may have remained on his mind [49].

Naus built a splendid villa, named "Les Flamboyants" in Giza, which occupied an entire bloc on what is today al-Nil Street along the Nile. The significance of the name is not clear, because Naus reportedly was anything but an extravagant person. The exotic garden tended by Naus' wife Anne did receive some horticultural prizes. Though a matter of socio-economic status, rather than of ethnic cohesion, in this upper-class area, the neighbours were mostly French-speaking. Those preferring English would mostly be found in other *élite* areas such as Zamalik, and in Ma'adi. We suppose that this created a certain social cohesion. Of the impressive list of neighbours belonging to this high society, several play a role in Naus' biography: Marcel Vicenot and Emile Minost, both directors of the "Crédit Foncier", lived nearby. Another neighbour was Louis van Damme, the

General Manager of the “Banque Belge”. ‘Ali Mahir and ‘Ali Shamsi Pasha were a few of the prominent Egyptians in the neighbourhood. Among them we find also some rich Coptic families, such as Wissa-Wasef, Wasif Butrus-Ghali, as well as the famous Armenian Nubar family. Almost next to Naus’ villa, Raphael Suares had built one of the most impressive family mansions to be seen in Cairo, but he was no longer alive when Naus moved into the neighbourhood. Suares’ “palace”, which is maybe a better word, later became the domicile of Muhammad Mahmud Bey al-Khalil, whom we will meet below [50].

There were many intimate connections with the Egyptian élite — first and foremost with Isma‘il Sidqi Pasha, whom Naus never failed to praise, *inter alia*, for obtaining the collaboration of all nationalities. He once called Sidqi “un Apôtre de l’effort industriel”. It would seem that Sidqi also valued Naus but, given the former’s personality, they never developed a deep personal friendship [51]. In fact, many Egyptian politicians served as directors on the boards of foreign stock companies. Isma‘il Sidqi, for instance, was a director of at least nine such companies [52].

With regard to Naus’ broader business connections among the Egyptian élites, some of the Jewish capitalists stand out. In fact, since so much of his business interlocked with Jewish enterprises and initiatives — from Cassel, Suares and Cattaoui to Harari and Levi —, it is not difficult to understand why he himself was sometimes mistaken for a Jew. Maybe it was also the German-sounding name which gave rise to such an association. However, in the context of the Egyptian élites of the time, it did not mean much and, in any case, this error never assumed anything of the dimensions of the anti-Semitic campaign which his father had undergone in Iran [53]. Against this background, it is understandable that in 1933, following the coming to power of Hitler, Naus — anyway anti-German — expressed himself shocked. On one occasion he voiced this view in the presence of the powerful British advisor Keown-Boyd. The latter’s attitude towards what he preferred to call the local “Jewish-Nazi struggle” (meaning the local Jewish outcry against German propaganda) was biased, to say the least [54].

Typical of his time, and certainly not only for foreigners, Naus was fascinated by the archaeological discoveries of the 1920s. Between inspections of the sugar factories in Upper Egypt, he would make it a point to visit excavations [55]. Many of the spectacular antiquities were, indeed, located in the vicinity of the sugar factories. The Sucreries owned a steam yacht, the “Cheich Fadl”, which was more than once put at the disposal of high-ranking visitors to facilitate their visits to the temple of Kom Ombo and other sights along the Nile [56].

In this way he became one of the founders and the first local chairman of the “Fondation Egyptologique Reine Elisabeth” — a project to which he remained very devoted [57]. The foundation was established in 1923 on the occasion of the Belgian Queen’s visit to the newly-discovered tomb of Tutankhamen. At a reception hosted by Andraus Bishara, the Belgian Agent in Luxor, a sum of over

£E 1,000 was collected (with £E 100 from Naus), more or less spontaneously, for the Foundation-to-be. The tour of the site was directed by the prominent Belgian Egyptologist Jean Capart who, for more than two decades, would remain the academic director of the foundation [58]. Naus, moreover, saw this association as a means to “faire connaître et aimer la Belgique en Egypte, faire connaître et aimer l’Egypte en Belgique”. It enjoyed the lively interest of the Royal families on both sides [59]. Also, it comes as no surprise that he was instrumental in obtaining permits for the Foundation’s missions to dig at Shaykh Fadl and elsewhere [60]. Naus made it a point to personally attend its annual assembly in Brussels before returning to Egypt from his summer holiday. The Foundation’s seat in Brussels still holds one of the finest Egyptological collections and libraries in Western Europe, and continues to publish the journal *Chronique d’Egypte*.

This personal interest as well as the general Pharaonic spirit of his time pervaded Naus’ speeches, in which references can also be found to the use of honey or sugar, and to the existence of an ancient sugar industry. Moreover, he used to draw attention to Pharaonic frescoes depicting industrial crafts such as spinning and weaving, emphasizing the antiquity of both agriculture and industry in the country [61].

On the other hand, Egypt’s Islamic culture and heritage, or even any reference to the Arab sugar manufacturing tradition, was absent from his public utterances. That Naus was well aware of the Arab — and Mamluk — contribution to the sugar industry and trade, is evident from a communication he sent to Mazuel in 1936, before the latter completed his book on the history of sugar in Egypt [62]. We conclude that this was probably not the Egypt which fascinated him. He may not have been bothered at all by the shifting ideological climate in Egypt at the time — from a Pharaonic to an Islamic and Arab orientation. There is nothing in his speeches on the emerging Young Egypt and Muslim Brothers movements; but then again, the latter started to stir up some labour trouble at Hawamdiyya only from about the early 1940s [63].

The picture of living withdrawn in a foreign enclave is too simplistic; it was also, to a large extent, a matter of cultural orientation. We have already seen that Naus was involved in the development of the Egyptian University, the jewel in the crown of the Egyptian education system. He was equally a founding member and later Treasurer and Vice-President of that venerable “think tank” of those days, the “Société Khédiviale d’Economie Politique, de Statistique et de Législation”, which published the influential journal *L’Egypte Contemporaine* [64].

Naus was also asked in 1928 to join the Board of the philanthropic foundation *Mabarrat Muhammad ‘Ali*, or “l’Œuvre de Mohammed Ali”, an organization founded in 1909, *inter alia* by the famous feminist Huda al-Sha’rawi [65]. Naus remained actively involved in charitable matters for about thirty years, also taking an interest in medical progress at the Qasr al-‘Ayni Hospital. A month-long study trip through the Soviet Union which he made in July 1933, together with

the Belgian magistrate Maurice de Wee — a rather unusual destination at the time — was connected to his involvement in the Red Crescent. A promised meeting with Stalin or Molotov, however, did not materialize. His report on his trip, though promised to the *Revue du Caire*, was, unfortunately, never published [66].

Naus also encouraged Muhammad Mahmud al-Khalil to found his “Société des Amis de l’Art” — mainly French Impressionist art —, obviously in the setting of the Cairene élite — and helped him to put this association on a proper footing. Al-Khalil, who had been Minister of Agriculture in the short-lived Nahhas government of 1937, went through a controversial political career but ultimately became President of the Senate. His relations with Naus probably dated back for a decade or two. What is more relevant here, is the fact that he would become the President of the sugar company after 1938 [67].

A look at *The Mondain Egyptien*, the contemporary *Who’s Who*, shows that Naus, almost inevitably for a man of his standing, was a member of Club Mohamed Aly, the Gezira Sporting Club, the Royal Automobile Club d’Egypte, as well as of the Egyptian branch of Rotary — all foci of social importance for the élites —, though not of the British-oriented Turf Club [68].

From 1909 Naus headed the “Cercle Belge du Caire”, which had been established in 1907 with some 60 members [69]. Naus became a Belgian focal point in Cairo, serving as a sort of unofficial councillor to the small Belgian community in Egypt. In support of Naus’ request in 1922 to raise the Belgian Agency in Cairo to the rank of a full-fledged Embassy, as would indeed soon happen, the Belgian consul already reported that the former was “la personnalité la plus en vue de la colonie belge au Caire” [70]. Upon the “Cercle”’s 25-year jubilee he was honoured and gave a speech in which he expressed his allegiance to the Belgian dynasty [71]. In fact, there had been several visits to Egypt by members of the Belgian royal family, in which Naus had played a visible role [72]. He also headed the “Société de Bienfaisance Belge du Caire”.

NOTES

- [1] “L’Industrie Egyptienne”, *Revue Economique Internationale* (1929), pp. 439-458 and *L’Egypte Contemporaine*, 21 (1930), pp. 1-16.
- [2] WAHBA, p. 55.
- [3] Muhammad Mahmud KHALIL, *Le Journal Sucrier Egyptien*, 8 (February 1940), pp. 6-7.
- [4] Speech quoted in editorial, *EgInd.*, February 1927. Naus also lauded the “Crédit Agricole” as an agent of development, speech 21 April 1933, *ibid.*, May 1933. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 37. See further a speech quoted in MAZUEL, p. xv.
- [5] On the “dual theme” of agriculture and industry, see speech 25 February 1925, *EgInd.*, March 1925; speech quoted in editorial, *ibid.*, February 1927; speech 19 March 1929, *ibid.*, April 1929; speech 30 March 1932, *ibid.*, April 1932. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 2, 9 and 30.
- [6] *Revue Economique Internationale* (1929), p. 454 and *L’Egypte Contemporaine* (1930), pp. 13-14.
- [7] Speech 14 March 1931, *EgInd.*, February/March 1931. In face of rising unemployment, the Labour Bureau had recommended industrialization and public work as solutions, in particular

- with regard to the absorption of many graduates from universities and professional schools, speech 30 March 1932, *ibid.*, April 1932. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 28.
- [8] NAUS, *Revue Economique Internationale* (1929), pp. 454-455; MAZUEL, p. xv. See also editorial *EgInd.*, March 1930; speech 7 April 1930, *ibid.*, April 1930; speech 30 March 1932, *ibid.*, April 1932. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 13-14.
- [9] Roche, "In Memoriam" p. 27. Indeed, between the population census of 1907 and 1937, the population increased 1.4 times, and the male labour force in industry in general went up from 281,000 in 1907 to 345,400 in 1937. See D.C. MEAD, *Growth and Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy*, Homewood, 1967, p. 304.
- [10] TIGNOR, "Equity", p. 47; M. DEEB, "Large Landowners", p. 431; P. CLAWSON, "The Development of Capitalism in Egypt", *Khamsin*, 9 (1990), p. 94; ABDEL-MALEK, p. 80.
- [11] *Revue Economique Internationale* (1929), p. 453.
- [12] Quotes from speech 20 April 1934, *EgInd.*, May 1934. See also speech 25 February 1925, *ibid.*, March 1925; editorial *ibid.*, March 1930; speech 14 March 1931, *ibid.*, February/March 1931; speech 1 May 1935, *ibid.*, May 1935. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 3, 21, 42 and 48.
- [13] Conversation with Milner, and note by R. Roald, 24 December 1919, PRO, FO 848/5. We have not been able to find a report on the uprising, mentioned in the evidence, which Naus had allegedly submitted to the French Minister.
- [14] KITROEFF, p. 123, remarks that the Greeks also were unperturbed because they were not severely affected by the abolition of the Capitulations.
- [15] Meanwhile the number of foreigners in Egypt started to decline, that is even before the nationalizations of 1956 and 1960-1.
- [16] SUBAYH, pp. 165-169; 'Amir, p. 24, who estimates that in 1938 still half of the Federation's members were foreigners. We think, however, that Naus' ideas on this aspect of equality had remained fairly consistent from an earlier date onwards. On the other hand, one wonders why *L'Egypte Industrielle* published no annual speeches by Naus for 1936 and 1937.
- [17] *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 9 March 1937, mentions that the Arabic press too praised Naus' staying on.
- [18] Speech 29 April 1938, *EgInd.*, March 1938. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, p. 58.
- [19] P. Roche, "In Memoriam" p. 15.
- [20] Cf. a speech by the Vicomte de Fontarce, quoted in the *Bulletin de l'Association Internationale des Propriétaires Fonciers Ruraux et Urbains en Egypte*, vol. 1 (1911), CAD, Le Caire, carton 38 (Propriété Immobilière 1911-1914). Note the term "internationale"; members of this association were Edgard Suares, Rolo, Salvago, and Carton de Wiart.
- [21] Cf. TIGNOR, "The Economic Activities", p. 417; *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 1, 33, 41, 54.
- [22] *EgInd.*, April 1930; speech 14 March 1931, *ibid.*, February/March 1931; speech 21 April 1933, *ibid.*, May 1933; speech 20 April 1934, *ibid.*, May 1934; Naus regretted that the Federation had not yet received the recognition it deserved, speech 1 May 1935, *ibid.*, May 1935. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 21, 40-41 and 42.
- [23] Speeches of 1928 and 1932, Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. i, 8, 12-13 and 34.
- [24] VITALIS, "Business Conflict", pp. 188-191.
- [25] On Van den Bosch, see also above, as well as his *Vingt années*, pp. 52-68. In this book, he calls the period of the eminent Wafdist leader Sa'd Zaglul (d. 1927), a dictatorship. This contradicts the more common interpretation, according to which the suspension and then the replacement of the 1923 Constitution are seen as the anti-democratic episode. On his resignation see also PRO, FO 141/466/1491.
- [26] CAD, Le Caire, carton 223, sub-dossier 70/1. The society with its lands and installations had a capital of £E 85,000 in 1913 and was then headed by Boghos Nubar Pasha. In 1918 we find some directors of the Sugar company on its board, e.g. Cattaoui, Ternijnck, and Schirmann, see Assemblée Générale of 30 March 1918, *ibid.*, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.
- [27] See notes on CAD, Le Caire, carton 231.
- [28] CAD, Le Caire, carton 223, sub-dossier 70/1 Banques. In 1934 the company was rumoured to be interested in entering the Paris stock exchange, *ibid.*, carton 228. See also BAER, *Landownership*, pp. 92, 98, 116, 123-126, 128, 130, 192; SID AHMAD, *Nashat*, pp. 147-153.
- [29] BAER, *Landownership*, pp. 131-132. In several of these, other Belgians, e.g. Eid, Rolin are equally represented, as were Jewish capitalists, e.g. Cattaoui and Harari. Surprisingly, Naus is

- not mentioned as a director of the "Société Foncière du Domaine de Cheikh Fadl", see CAD, Le Caire, carton 223, sub-dossier 70/1.
- [30] On the company in general, see CHARLES ROUX, "Le Capital", p. 480. Further, letter L.L. Frère, 28 June 1938, CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier 72/1. See also *L'Egypte Nouvelle* (no page numbering).
- [31] On the company in general, see CAD, Le Caire, carton 231, sub-dossier Eaux du Caire, which shows recurrent conflicts on the differential tariffs of water for irrigation and consumption (*inter alia* at cheaper price for army barracks and military industries in 'Abbasiyya). On the conflict of 1935, see an undated press cutting (probably from *La Bourse Egyptienne*) in possession of Guy Naus. Cf. SID AHMAD, *Nashat*, pp. 380-381. As being connected to the Belgian railway interests, we also mention here the "Société Egyptienne d'Electricité".
- [32] CHARLES ROUX, "Le Capital", pp. 496, 499.
- [33] On Naus entering the board of the "Crédit Foncier", see CAD, Le Caire, carton 225. See further CHARLES ROUX, "Le Capital", pp. 484-485; OWEN, *Cotton*, pp. 290-291, quoting CROUCHLEY, *Investments*, p. 56. OWEN states an initial capital of £E 3 millions, *ibid.*, p. 279. See also RIAD, pp. 90-91.
- [34] A.M. IBRAHIM, *L'organisation du Crédit Foncier en Egypte*, Paris, Thesis, 1924, pp. 8, and 71-85. See further CAD, Le Caire, carton 223, sub-dossier 70/1 Banques, which contains also some details on its personnel. See also BAER, *Landownership*, pp. 69-70, 100-108, 110-11; OWEN, *Cotton*, p. 277; and TIGNOR, *Egyptian Textiles*, pp. 86-87. In a letter to the MAE in Paris, dated 22 September 1919, the French Minister expressed the fear that the "Crédit Foncier" would be taken over by the British Cassel-Harari group, MAE, QdO, Afrique 1918-1929, K72. A contemporary, detailed report to Paris by Miriel, the French Director, specifies that the 23-man board was divided as follows: 6 ministers or under-secretaries of state, 10 "indigènes ou sujets locaux israélites", 2 Italians, 2 British, 1 French, 1 Greek, and 1 Belgian (who was Naus), *Ibid.*, Afrique 1918-1929, Egypte, Correspondance politique, dossier général. Cf. TIGNOR, *State*, pp. 188-195.
- [35] See the booklet entitled *Le Crédit Foncier Egyptien 1880-1930*, which contains ample details on its financial operations, CAD, Le Caire, carton 226.
- [36] TIGNOR, *State*, p. 20.
- [37] De Gaiffier d'Hestroy to Foreign Minister Jaspar, 11 April 1916, MAECE, AF10 (1921-1924).
- [38] For the Empain and Rolin groups, see below. In addition, the "Anciennes Entreprises Rolin et Co.", and Baume et Marpent companies can be mentioned. For the Eid group see the company Edgar Eid ("Usines") company and the "Compagnie Agricole du Nil", in which Eid had large interests. Also the "Caisse hypothécaire d'Egypte" was a Belgian company, in which both Eid and Rolin were involved.
- [39] The following has been reconstructed on the basis of a biographical note dating from around 1923 on MAECE file 2665bis, as well as a similar note from 1930 on AF10 (1930-1935). LaLaing to Jaspar, 5 September 1923, 2665bis. Some companies, however, had ceased to exist. Cf. E. PAPASIAN, *L'Egypte Economique et Financière*, Cairo, 1929, esp. pp. 186-224: the Irrigation Company no longer figures here. The same Belgian files also contain a survey for 1932. Some details could also be derived from the announcement by the family on Naus' death (kindly supplied by Guy Naus).
- [40] See A. FORTE, *Les Banques en Egypte*, Paris, Thesis, 1938, pp. 96, 192-196. Also *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation*, June 1929, pp. 20-21. The "Banque belge pour l'étranger" drew its directors mainly from the Belgian community, both local residents and inhabitants of Belgium, see CAD, carton 223, sub-dossier 70/1 Banques. According to a letter by the French Minister to the MAE, 26 January 1929, the board of the renamed bank included Empain, Naus, Jacobs, Rolo (and Carton de Wiart, not mentioned in this letter), but also two Egyptians (Amin Yahya Pasha and Mahmud Shukri Pasha) and two Swiss nationals, see MAE, QdO, K71. The report to Paris was inspired by the fear that France remained the only country represented in Egypt without a bank working under Egyptian nationality. See further DUCRUET, pp. 395-401; RAAFIAT, "the Belgians", and H. RIAD, *L'Egypte Nassérienne*, Paris, 1964, pp. 87, 95-96 and 107.
- [41] See MAE, QdO, K71. Also CAD, Le Caire, cartons 226 and 233, sub-dossier 70/1 Banques. Naus, however, for some reason was not on the Board of the National Bank, founded in 1898 by Cassel, Salvago and Suares, which lists Rowlat, Baker, Harari, Miriel, Nubar, Rolo, Saba, Salvago and Suares.

- [42] VITALIS, "Business Conflict", pp. 181-185.
- [43] He was also a director of the "Tramways du Caire" and the "Chemins de fer de la Basse-Egypte", both Belgian and founded by Empain.
- [44] On the Ezbekieh company in 1919, which was considered to be a "purely Belgian" company, the shares of which were once owned by ex-Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi, but later taken over by French and British financiers, see for 1919-1925, PRO, FO 141/681/9512. Naus was also on the administrative council of the Anglo-Belgian Company of Egypt Ltd. (1906), which had been the largest shareholder of the Fayum Light Railway Co. but also possessed tracts of land in Cairo.
- [45] Such directorates included Wouters, Deffense & Co. (importers of metallic and chemical products), the "Société Commerciale Belgo-Egyptienne" (carbonates), H. & R. Melot & Co. (oil and grease), the "Compagnie d'Entreprises Commerciales en Egypte" (steel, with Armenian Belgian interests), "Belpétrole", and Et. Petit (furniture). The "Société du Textile à Choubra" could not be identified as a Belgian interest. It may be a coincidence that we do not find Naus mentioned in connection with a number of other Belgian companies such as the "Société Anonyme des Brasseries d'Egypte"; "Société Anonyme des Travaux Publics"; "Société des Grands Hôtels d'Egypte" (Cattaoui, Mosseri); the Menzalah Canal & Navigation Co.; the Cairo Suburban Building Lands Co. Though we know nothing of Naus' own portfolio of shares, the British Residence periodic Lists of Personalities do mention that he was an important shareholder of "S.A. Bieres Bomonti et Pyramides".
- [46] E.g. the "Société Générale Egyptienne pour l'Agriculture et le Commerce" (in which Rolin and Jacobs had interests), and the African Enterprise and Development Co. (a subsidiary of the Heliopolis Co. with interests in the Congo and the African lake district).
- [47] TIGNOR, *State*, p. 252.
- [48] Cf. A.L. STOLLER, "Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31 (1989), pp. 134-161.
- [49] Cf. R. SOLE's novel *Le Tarbouche*, Paris 1992.
- [50] For a description of this neighbourhood community, see d'AUMALE, pp. 101-102; *Le Mondain Egyptien*, 1943, p. 251 et *passim*. Cf. TIGNOR, "The Economic Activities", p. 443. An imaginative reconstruction is S. RAAFIAT, "Post Mortem des villas de Giza", CEDEJ, Observatoire Urbain du Caire, *Lettre d'information*, no. 44 (1996), pp. 17-22. On the large number of sumptuous villas built in Giza since the beginning of the century, see further BARAKA, pp. 109 and 116.
- [51] Speech 25 February 1925, *EgInd.*, March 1925; speech 20 December 1927, *ibid.*, January 1928. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 2-3, 7, 17, 47, 54 and 58. Judging from the personal archives of the High Commissioner Sir Percy Lorraine (PRO, FO 101), Sidqi did remain in intensive friendly touch with him after he had left Egypt. It is an intriguing fact that following Naus' death *L'Egypte Industrielle* — apart from a rather superficial obituary — did not publish a more extensive appreciation, not even by his successor as President. Isma'il Sidqi also fails to mention Naus in his *Mudhakkirati*, Cairo, 1991 (but much earlier published in the weekly *al-Musawwar*). In any event, his memoirs deal rather with political than economic issues.
- [52] MUTAWALLI, p. 246; RAMADAN, p. 115.
- [53] SUBAYH, p. 338, mentions Naus in the same breath with some prominent Jews. On the involvement of Jews in the economy, see M. MIZRAHI, "The Role of Jews in Economic Development" in Sh. SHAMIR (ed.), *The Jews of Egypt*, Boulder and London, 1987, e.g. the Suares family in the Sucreries and Kom Ombo companies, pp. 85-87. There is considerable overlapping between SID AHMAD's *al-Nashat* and his later *al-Hayat al-Iqtisadiyya wa'l-Ijtima'iyya li'l-Yahud fi Misr*, 1947-1956, Cairo, 1991. An interesting and relevant series of articles on the "History of Jewish Capitalism in Egypt" was published by al-Ahram *al-Iqtisadi* between 23 March 1981 and 4 May 1981. On Iran, cf. DESTREE, p. 123.
- [54] Minute, 12 May 1933, PRO, FO 141/699/581.
- [55] The famous Belgian archaeologist J. Capart in his obituary on Naus, *Chronique d'Egypte*, 27 (1939), pp. 18-19. For Pharaonism as a dominant trend in those days, see I. GERSHONI & J.P. JANKOWSKI, *Egypt, Islam and the Arabs, the Search for Egyptian Nationhood*, New York, Oxford, 1986, pp. 164-190.
- [56] F. CHARLES ROUX, *Souvenirs diplomatiques d'un âge révolu*, Paris, 1956, pp. 198 and 233. Cf. *Chronique d'Egypte*, vol. 3-4 (1926-7), pp. 101-102.

- [57] On her visit — incognito — to Tuntankhamen's tomb in 1923, see PRO, FO 141/794/16328.
- [58] Interview with A. Mekhitarian, the veteran Secretary of the Foundation, Brussels, 2 February 1996. On Capart, see W.R. Dawson and E.P. Uphill, *Who Was Who in Egyptology*, London, 3rd ed., 1995. See further, for instance, Capart's thanks to Naus in the preface to his *Thèbes, La gloire d'un grand passé*, Brussels, 1925, p. 7. On Bishara, a Copt, who represented France as well in Luxor, see also CHARLES ROUX, *Souvenirs*, p. 198.
- [59] Eulogy read by F. van den Bosch at the "Fondation Egyptologique Reine Elisabeth", 7 October 1938, and later published together with the appreciation by Capart in *Chronique d'Egypte*, 27 (1939), pp. 1 and 17-19. For a visit of the Foundation in Brussels by King Fu'ad, see *ibid.*, vol. 5-6 (1927-8), pp. 22-28. On King Fu'ad's interest, *ibid.*, vol. 12 (1936), pp. 230-242. On a farewell dinner for the new Egyptian Ambassador off to Belgium, *ibid.*, vol. 13 (1937), p. 131. On the lasting friendly relationship with Queen Elisabeth, see the Royal Palace Dossier, Secretary of Queen Elisabeth, no. 112, and the dossier Decorations no. N/2, copies from which were kindly sent to me by the Royal Palace. It is noteworthy that Belgian Royal interests in ancient archaeology also found expression in the naming of an archaeological institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, but its opening led to a crisis between the Foundation and the Egyptian government.
- [60] *Chronique d'Egypte*, vol. 1 (1925), pp. 32-33 and 41; *ibid.*, vol. 2 (1926), p. 9; *ibid.*, vol. 7 (1928), p. 189; *ibid.*, vol. 7 (1931), p. 17.
- [61] Editorial, *EgInd.*, February 1927; speech 1 May 1935, *ibid.*, May 1935; speech 29 April 1938, *ibid.*, 15 March 1938. Cf. *Recueil des Discours*, pp. 47 and 60, as well as a communication from Naus quoted by MAZUEL, p. 1.
- [62] MAZUEL, pp. 8, 9, 11-12, 15 and 21.
- [63] His son-in-law Rolf Friedrich, in the 1940s, had to move around with a bodyguard owing to threats from circles of the Muslim Brothers, interview with Marie-Rose Naus. It is to be noted that both Hawamdiyya and the cement industry in Tura were, so to say, in the orbit of urban Cairo. But in fact, in 1937 the Belgian Ambassador Dange had already written to Brussels that he felt "vulnerable" in face of rising Muslim fanaticism, which could turn against Belgian interests, 1 July 1937, MAECE, AF10 (1936-1940). See also TIGNOR, "The Economic Activities", p. 444.
- [64] *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, 1 (1910), pp. 4, 12. The "Société" would later go through the epithets Sultanic and Royal. Its annual roster of members clearly shows the interaction between the local and foreign intellectual élite of Egypt at the time.
- [65] Muhammad Mahmud al-Khalil, *Le Journal Sucrier*, p. 6.
- [66] See Dumani's obituary in the issue of November 1938, p. 374. Naus had been in Russia once before in 1901-1902, on a French service passport. Information on the trip from a communication by Guy Naus, 17 March 1996.
- [67] See Muhammad Mahmud Khalil's eulogy, *Le Journal Sucrier*, p. 7. At some stage Khalil had been involved in the "Banque Belge", RIAD, p. 83n. On his standing in Egyptian society, see BERQUE, pp. 422, 472, 544 (where he calls him "the most European of Egyptians") and 561. See also COLOMBE, p. 339. On Khalil and the sugar company, see *The Cairo Directory* 1939, Cairo, 1939, p. 234. The position of President of the Board had previously been held by Victor Harari, *ibid.* for 1936 (Cairo 1936), p. 215. Khalil's priceless personal collection of impressionist paintings would in 1971 become the nucleus of a (temporary) museum in Zamalek. The collection was then transferred to the refurbished "palace" of the Suares family, see *al-Ahram Weekly*, 12-18 October 1995. See also Samir RAAFAT, "The House Suares Built and How it Became the Mohamed Mahmoud Khalil Museum", *The Egyptian Mail*, 6 May 1995. RAAFAT gives 1924 as the founding date of the "Société des Amis". On the association itself, and its mixed Egyptian (e.g. also Hafiz 'AFIFI) and foreign board (incl. G. Wiet and Hugues Naus), see *Le Mondain Egyptien*, 1943, p. 48. On the art collection, see M. SALMAWY & M. EL-RAZAZ, *Mohamed Mahmoud Khalil, l'Homme et le Musée*, Cairo, 1995 [in French and Arabic].
- [68] *Le Mondain Egyptien*, 1937, p. 218. Baraka, pp. 189-194, and esp. table 4.4., indeed, ranks the first three of these clubs as the most prestigious in Cairo at the time, while the Rotary is entered sixth.
- [69] In this position he apparently succeeded the consul-general Maskens, cf. *The Egyptian Directory* 1941, Cairo, 1904, p. 323.

- [70] De Gaiftier d'Hestroy to Foreign Minister Jaspas, 11 April 1922, MAECE, file AF10 (1921-1924).
- [71] Press cuttings in possession of Guy Naus, dating from 1929, and from *Goha - Journal Humoristique Egyptien*, 17 June 1934.
- [72] Not specifically mentioned, however, for 1925 visit, PRO, FO 141/794/16328, also not for 1933 visit, FO 141/704/532. In 1930 Naus organized a large reception for the Queen at the Nag' Hammadi factory, see *Chronique d'Egypte*, vol. 5 (1930), p. 174.

6. Epilogue: The Naus Legacy

Naus suddenly died on 23 September 1938 in Hotel Astoria in Brussels, while on a periodic visit to Belgium. At the moment he had already been called back to Egypt owing to the threatening international situation. Obituaries, however biased they may be as a source of history, were indeed profuse: "Personnalité belge de premier plan, homme de grand cœur, excellent patriote, Henri Naus Bey était aussi l'homme d'affaires européen le plus en vue et mêlé à toutes les activités de la vie économique du pays". Or "Belge profondément marqué des qualités de la race, Egyptien de cœur". In Belgium he was called "un drapeau tricolore belge planté sur les bords du Nil comme un signe de ralliement, en même temps qu'un pionnier de notre expansion économique". Indeed, for outsiders he remained a Belgian, "patriote et même chauvin". And in Egypt, the daily *al-Ahram* wrote in equally warm words that "this country will undoubtedly sense a large void from both the economic and social point of view owing to the passing away of this great man" [1].

"Le secret de sa réussite fut dans l'application d'une intelligence vive et large à ne travailler que dans le réel, mais guidée par des principes solides et éprouvés". "En lui, il y avait l'âme d'un chef.(...) Le chef d'une vaste industrie qui a connu des hauts et des bas, d'une industrie liée intimement à l'économie nationale" and "Il fut le type même de 'l'honnête homme'" were some of the descriptions of his personality [2]. "Les qualités d'intelligence, de cœur et d'urbanité du défunt, étaient exceptionnelles". "Où qu'il fût, il était actif, compréhensif, puissant. Et aux œuvres désintéressées, à tout ce qui peut soulager les misères humaines, il se donnait comme aux affaires, de toutes ses forces..." [3]. A close collaborator described him as having been "a bit of British allure, very firm, very determined, but also very sociable, endearing and congenial. He was capable of taking decisions within minutes" [4].

Naus had been frequently decorated — no exception for a man of his position at that time. He held a rare collection of orders from Belgium (Officier de la Couronne, Croix d'Officier de l'Ordre de Léopold), Egypt (Grand Cordon de l'Ordre du Nil), as well as from Tunisia, Greece, France (Légion d'Honneur), the Netherlands, Italy, and Persia [5]. But some of these decorations did not come without hesitation. We have already mentioned the delay in his being awarded an Order of the British Empire. In 1935 he received the French "Légion d'Honneur". The award, it seems, had become inevitable for somebody ably managing one of the largest French enterprises in Egypt, but it is worth noting some of the reservations which were expressed. With regard to his management of the sugar company, as well as the Cairo water company, a supposed shareholder praised Naus for his qualities and achievements but, anxious to preserve

French interests, also wrote: "Et à ce propos, peut-être, pourrait-on lui reprocher d'aller trop facilement, par tempérament, au devant de la conciliation surtout avec les Egyptiens et d'abandonner à ceux-ci sans assez de résistance un terrain qui aurait pu être défendu et gardé" [6].

Naus had carefully groomed his only surviving son Hugues as his successor to the sugar company, providing him with the appropriate education. Tragically, Henri Naus' eldest son Noucky (Joseph Henri), serving in the Belgian army, had been killed in 1917 at the front in Flanders. His third son Edgar had died in 1912 from the complications of a pediatric operation in The Hague [7]. Succession by his daughter Marie-Rose was apparently, under the social conditions in Egypt, out of the question.

Thus in 1938, when his father died, Hugues was thirty-six years old, with a training in engineering and with a degree in financial management from the University of Brussels. It was characteristic for Henri Naus Bey to have "banished" his son first to the factory in Armant, from where he had been expected to work himself up through the echelons of the sugar company. He had made his own career in exactly the same way [8].

Like many other foreign residents in Egypt such as Gasche, Cozzika, Trembley, and Salvago, Henri Naus typically saw the future of his son at the helm of his company. This would not be a salient biographical detail, certainly not at the time, if it did not apply to the foreign residential élite in Egypt. It certainly reflected great optimism, in spite of ongoing processes of Egyptianization in the economy, and in spite of a looming end to the Capitulations system. Processes which they did not oppose. Part of the explanation may lie in their trust in the stability of the regime — with a king at its head — and in the late 1930s possibly also in the understanding that another world war would bypass Egypt.

Upon Henri Naus' passing, the Belgian Ambassador still expressed the hope that, in spite of many strong contenders, Hugues Naus would succeed to his father's position and thereby safeguard what he apparently still considered as "le pavillon national" in Egypt. From this letter it would appear that the Ambassador himself was not free from strong biases, writing "...nous craignons qu'à son départ [Henri's] il ne soit remplacé par un Egyptien, ou Musulman ou surtout Juif [*sic!*]..." The Belgian Ambassador even suggested that in order to save Naus' position for a Belgian, Peniakoff (then with the rank of Major in the British army) should be considered.

Indeed, however painful for the family, even today, it must be admitted that Hugues was professionally much less capable than his father. Confidential information, summarized by the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires Delcoigne, suggests that he possessed a closed character, suffered from an inferiority complex due to his Javanese complexion, and thus became "happé... par les milieux égyptiens 'baladis' (gens de sang mêlé)" [*sic*], was over-ambitious (even aspiring to the Presidency of the Suez Canal Company), and since acceding to the fortunes of his father, tended to gambling. "Hugues est un homme coulé", meaning a hopeless

case, was his judgement. The Belgian diplomat, moreover, expressed his surprise, that — “Dieu seul sait pourquoi” — Hugues had shown himself “nettement germanophile”. He had allegedly even escaped being called up while on a stay in Belgium in 1939. This information is probably biased, but it tallies with some bad blood which had been created in British circles as well. During, or following an extensive visit to Ethiopia in 1935, Hugues had expressed a view that “Egypt ought to be pro-Italian in order to negotiate its support for England” [9].

There appear to have been various speculations about Hugues’ removal from the management of the sugar company, and in particular about his subsequent call-up for the Allies in Egypt at the age of 39, a few months short of being exempt. It is impossible to say, whether Hugues’ call-up was engineered by a conspiracy between ‘Abbud, Ceysens, and Delcoigne, as some members of the family think. The episode would not have been worth elaborating upon, were it not for Hugues’ tragic fate. He managed to reach London, where he even succeeded in meeting the Belgian Foreign Minister in exile, Spaak. The upshot was that he was sent, not to the front, but to the Congo to help augment sugar production there in the framework of the war effort. His ship, the “Céramique” was, however, torpedoed near the Azores on 7 December 1941 [10].

We doubt, however, whether Hugues would have had a chance to not only step into his father’s shoes, but to walk in them, given a fierce struggle for power at the top of the company. The much older and more experienced Albert Ceysens had graciously ceded the directorship to Hugues — himself, for the time being, retaining the post of Deputy Director [11]. While Mahmud Bey Khalil served as President of the sugar company, it was in practice managed by Ceysens, Mamduh Riyad Bey, and Moise Dichy Bey, a Jewish lawyer, who had earned a reputation as a legal advisor at the 1937 Montreux Conference [12]. More important, Ahmad ‘Abbud Pasha, the powerful industrialist — mistrusted by the Belgian Embassy as by others. — had already managed to take hold of the company. By the 1940s he was already considered to be the richest tycoon of Egyptian industry, enjoying an income of £E 41,000 p.a. Delcoigne confidentially reported that some time before ‘Abbud had proudly told him that his affairs at the stock exchange had succeeded, and that he had become the master of the Sucreries. ‘Abbud added that the Palace had intervened in order that the former largest shareholder, Cozzika, gave way to him. As we see it, in a certain respect, his becoming chairman in 1941 was the logical outcome of an all-round process of Egyptianization which had already been underway for a decade or two, as shown above. In the same way, ‘Abbud’s joining of the board of the Federation of Industries was a foregone conclusion.

But ‘Abbud’s predominance could be only a temporary phase. The sugar company would go through an additional change. While it has, by now, been convincingly shown that the hegemony of foreign or even *comprador* interests was an invention of the Free Officers, their main economic campaign was directed against “monopolies”. Indeed, in 1947, a promising young Egyptian

economist had criticized the Convention of 1931 on the grounds that non-intervention by the Government could have lowered the sugar price to the benefit of the domestic consumer, instead of favouring the landowners who had reaped the benefits [13]. But it could be argued with equal conviction that Naus had been instrumental for the survival of the sugar industry with its large labour force, and for Egypt's self-sufficiency in sugar, which was lost only in the 1960s [14]. Importing sugar for a rapidly expanding population would have meant an additional burden on the Egyptian treasury. Also, however limited in significance, Naus and some of his colleagues had been right in pointing out the need for breaking the cotton monoculture.

While Naus had become rich, 'Abbud had become even richer. Following a protracted dispute over the payment of an alleged tax debt of £E 4,866,000, 'Abd al-Nasir placed the sugar company under sequestration in August 1955. This was allegedly done in order "to safeguard the interests of the shareholders and the public" [15]. The sugar company was nationalized in 1961 and was merged with Cozzika's alcohol plant in 1967. Today a larger concern than ever, it bears (in official French translation) the name "Société des Sucreries et de Distillerie d'Egypte".

A commemorative plaque in the entrance hall of the recently redecorated head office, still at its old place but now called Gawwad Husni Street, bears the portrait of Henri Naus Bey. A pamphlet on the company's operations, published around 1984, reviews erstwhile chairmen. However all those before 1954, Rafael Suares, Ernest Cronier, Victor Harari, Muhammad Mahmud al-Khalil, and Ahmad 'Abbud lack photographs. Naus remains unmentioned, though his signature figures on a facsimile reproduction of the act of inauguration of the Kom Ombo factory in 1912. A governmental publication on the long-standing achievements of sugar cultivation and processing, proudly states the pioneering role of Egyptians in the sugar refining branch. Only a few pages are devoted to the last two centuries. But in an almost Freudian slip, the establishment of the Hawamdiyya refinery, is ascribed, at least in part, to Belgian capital [16].

The company's archives are said to have been transferred to the Ministry of Industry. My repeated requests to gain access to the company's records, or even to its published reports or its journal *Le Sucrier Egyptien*, remained unanswered. Sugar remains, what is called, a strategic commodity.

The library of the "Société d'Economie Politique", at what is now called Ramsis Street, which could be expected to contain material pertaining to its founding members, including Naus and their activities, has become a slumbering and dusty place [17].

Henri Naus' widow Anne, then living in Zamalik, who was very attached to Egypt, and her daughter Marie-Rose reluctantly left Egypt for Switzerland in 1954, together with so many other foreign resident families in the same decade [18]. Of "Les Flamboyants", which was initially sold to the Saudi-Arabian Embassy, only a small, neglected pavilion remains, but this is the fate of so

many villas in a modern urban environment with high-rise apartment buildings going up. Obviously there is nobody living around who can still remember the former residents.

Following Naus' death, a street in the westernized part of Cairo, not far from the National Museum, was named after him. Though the street sign hung on for some time — I seem to remember it from one of my first visits to Cairo —, it has since disappeared. After the revolutionary renaming of so many streets which once bore the names of the former "feudal" élite, it is today known as Ahmad Shukri street, the merits of whom could not be traced. According to one of its inhabitants he was an officer who fell in the 1973 war. The nearby Elie Mosseri street has been renamed Sayyid Taha Street, though the name of Champollion nearby has been retained [19].

Naus' death may have accelerated the process of indigenation or Egyptianization of the Federation of Industries. His succession, first by Isma'il Sidqi, then in 1949, by Hafiz 'Afifi, was the most logical sequence possible. The imposing Immobilia building at Sharif Street still stands and, until very recently, housed the headquarters of the present Federation, as it has evolved over the Nasir years and after [20]. Also its journal *al-Sina'a al-Misriyya*, now exclusively in Arabic, still appears. Under a law of 1958 it became the — more corporative — Federation of Egyptian Industries and Industrial Chambers. Nothing inside reminds of Naus, Isma'il Sidqi or Ahmad 'Abbud. The fifty years' jubilee book for 1972 only briefly reviews the "first stage" (1922-1947) of the Federation, with some emphasis on the tariff reform, but without mentioning any names [21]. Indeed the essence of the tariff revision of 1930, the most important achievement of the Naus years, survived till 1962, when a more differential tariff system was introduced [22]. The Federation's role may become prominent once more when economic liberalization proceeds further [23].

After most French and British interests had been nationalized in 1956, the remaining Belgian companies followed suit in December 1960. Against the background of the assassination of Lumumba, and Belgian policy in the Congo in general, in February 1961, a mob attacked the Belgian Embassy. There was also the beginning of a fire, in which all archives are said to have been lost. Later that month, the properties belonging to the 300 Belgians still living in Egypt were sequestered. Diplomatic relations with Belgium were suspended till 1964 [24].

The AIAP, which symbolized Naus' altruistic side, continued to exist for some time under the name of First Aid Public Assistance Association, as did, of course, the Red Crescent. To pay homage to its deceased President, the AIAP, in 1939, published his collected speeches in a *Recueil*, proceeds from the sale of which accrued to the association. In the 1940s, and even as late as 1955, Dr Ali Mahir, four times Prime Minister, served as its President. In addition to a first-aid clinic and a day-and-night service, it continued to run a pharmacy and a blood transfusion service. At some point the AIAP was merged with the Red

Crescent into the Jam'iyyat al-Is'af wa'l-Hilal al-Misriyya (under the Ministry of Health) [25].

One wonders why so many known primary sources on the era discussed are difficult to retrieve from the public libraries of which Cairo has not a few. The ideological rupture after 1952-1961 with the *ancien régime* and everything that it embraced, certainly provides a major explanation, but we may also surmise a linguistic break with the past. While all former Egyptian élites held the French language in common, the new generation of Free Officers and the so-called New Middle Class in general, had gone to state schools. Apart from a much stronger emphasis on Arabic, English superseded French as the most important foreign language, which created an additional dimension of distance, if not alienation, from a past which was ignored for ideological and emotional reasons [26].

It would appear that interest in the pre-Revolutionary era is somehow re-emerging and, what is more heartening, a more balanced view of it. In the modern era, Egypt is not the only country to have gone through political vicissitudes and upheavals. But France, for instance, has learnt to neatly balance its various regimes and epochs in its collective historic memory. In Egypt, some of the aspects which were deliberately ignored are being opened to research and reinterpretation. Yet more liberal access to the sources is still desired. Gradually, the traumas of Egypt's protracted nationalist struggle and the concomitant too schematic representation of the pre-Revolutionary era, its "feudal élite" included, are being overcome. Naus' personality — in all its human, political and economic aspects — and in particular his contributions to Egypt, and those of his contemporaries, for better or for worse, can then be made available for rehabilitation.

NOTES

- [1] Eulogy read by F. van den Bosch at the "Fondation Egyptologique Reine Elisabeth", 7 October 1938. See also a similar obituary by him in *Le Soir*, 24 September 1938. For further obituaries, see one by E. Regnier (n.p., n.d.), *La Bourse Egyptienne*, 23 September 1938, *The Egyptian Gazette* and *al-Ahram*, both on 24 September 1938; and Georges Dumani [Doumani], a prominent, Lebanese-born journalist in the *Revue du Caire*, the organ of the francophone writers in Cairo, vol. 1/4 (November 1938), pp. 372-374. Later obituaries appeared in the *Bulletin de l'Association des Chimistes*, 55 (1938), p. 961; *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, 29 (1938), after p. 447. See also a letter, regretting his death, by the Belgian Ambassador Delcoigne to Foreign Minister Spaak, 19 October 1938, MAECE, file AF10 (1936-1940). A long and perceptive appreciation was written by R. Roche, in the memorial issue of the *Journal Sucrier Egyptien* (Vol. 8, February 1940), esp. pp. 15-16.
- [2] *La Revue du Caire*, November 1938, pp. 362-373. The same obituary also contains a cryptic allusion to a "legend" — we suppose, to his temporary resignation as President of the Federation of Industries: "Cependant, il n'a jamais consenti à faire sienne l'erreur des grands", p. 374.
- [3] Obituaries in the annual reports of the "Banque Belge et Internationale", (*Rapport du Conseil d'Administration... Exercice 1937-8, Cairo 1938*, p. 5) and the "Crédit Foncier" for 1938, p. 21, CAD, Le Caire, carton 225.

- [4] Interview Mekhitarian.
- [5] Royal Palace, Dossier Decorations N/2.
- [6] See letters of 29 May 1935 (by a certain Louppe, director of the Five-Lille company), CAD, Le Caire, carton 233, sub-dossier Sucreries 1910-1940.
- [7] Communication by Guy Naus, 17 March 1996.
- [8] *Le Mondain Egyptien*, 1943, p. 205. Cf. obituary by unidentified author and source in possession of Guy Naus.
- [9] On the trip to Ethiopia, together with Berty Taqla, which involved business meetings on behalf of the Banque d'Abyssinie, and a reception by the Emperor Haile Selassie, a communication was received from Guy Naus, 17 March 1996, with a quotation from a letter by Hugues dated September 1935.
- [10] Ambassador Delcoigne to Spaak, 19 October 1938, and 12 January 1942 (confidential), MAECE, AF10 (1936-1940). Hugues' alleged meeting with Spaak could not be traced in the Spaak Archives, Brussels. Another tragedy would befall the family: Hugues' widow died in an air crash near Alexandria in 1945.
- [11] Some unverifiable private information would point at a conspiracy between 'Abbud and Ceysens. Ceysens himself finally rose to the position of Director-General, see *Egyptian Directory* 1947, Cairo, 1947, p. 161.
- [12] KRAMER, pp. 46 and 126. See further *Le Mondain Egyptien*, 1943, p. 122.
- [13] A. GRITLI, "The Structure of Modern Industry in Modern Egypt", *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, 38 (1947): 363-570, see esp. pp. 517-521, 555-556. The article was extremely influential with regard to later studies on the subject. TIGNOR, *State*, pp. 141-142 ascribes the high price of textiles, bread, sugar, oil and fuel to the tariff reform. For an opposite view, arguing that the consumer price of sugar had remained stable in Egypt while its world prices had doubled since the outbreak of the war in 1939, see Roche, "In Memoriam" p. 21.
- [14] J. WATERBURY, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat, the Political Economy of Two Regimes*, Princeton, 1983, p. 199. Possibly the sugar company may, for better or for worse, be said to have caused a change in local consumption patterns. This interesting question was raised by Owen in his articles. No doubt there was an increasing preference for refined sugar. Cf. *The Times* (trade supplement), 28.4.1923; cf. also Report on the *Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt*, 1937, p. 113.
- [15] "Sugar Company Sequestered", *Mideast Mirror*, 27 August 1955: 11-12. See also VITALIS, *Capitalists*, p. 212. Mahmud al-Darwish was appointed as sequestrator. According to Beinín, *Dispersion*, p. 258, by this time only 26% of the company's shares were still held in France. Under the political conditions of those days even part of the Cattauis, perhaps the most Egyptianized of the original shareholders, left the country in 1956. Some writers, until today, consider them to have been part of an alleged, monolithic bloc of Jewish capital, *ibid.*, p. 259.
- [16] Ministry of Agriculture, Economics Affairs Sector, *Sugar Crops and Sugar Production in Egypt and the World* (Cairo 1994), p. 135. For the company's past, present and future operations, see e.g. the large notices in the weekly *al-Musawwar* of 15 and 29 March 1996.
- [17] See also D. REID, "The Egyptian Geographical Society; from Foreign Laymen's Society to Indigenous Professional Association", *Poetics Today*, 14 (1993), p. 565.
- [18] Marie-Rose, who had been living in Ma'adi, was divorced from Rolfe Friedrich — the stepson of Ernest Trembley, the influential chief executive of the Tura cement factory — and himself working for that company, S.W. RAAFAT, *Maadi 1904-1962, Society and History in a Cairo Suburb*, Cairo, 1994, pp. 183-184.
- [19] The street runs from Muhammad Hajjaj Street to Sayyid Taha Street. No map dating back to the 1940s with Naus street marked on it could be traced. A study on the changing of street names is overdue.
- [20] On changes in the status and powers of the Federation, see 'AMIR, pp. 299-300. On the Jewish owned Immobilia Company see SID AHMAD, *al-Hayat al-Iqtisadiyya*, p. 67; VITALIS, *Capitalists*, p. 217.
- [21] *al-Kitab al-Dhahabi, asdarahu Ittihad al-Sina'at al-Misriyya bi-Munasabat Murur Khamsin 'Amman 'ala Insha'ih*, Cairo, 1972, pp. 6-8.
- [22] WATERBURY, p. 93.
- [23] M.M. CIUGALE and H. MOBARAK, *Private Sector Development in Egypt*, Cairo, 1996, pp. 137-168.

- [24] See the lists of sequestrations in the issues of *Al-Ahram*, 20 October until 1 November 1961. Cf. *Oriente Moderno*, 41 (1961), pp. 280-281. DUCRUET, pp. 323-327, and pp. 395-401. See also 'AMIR, pp. 259-269 on remaining foreign interests until 1961; WAHBA, pp. 56-58 and 82-83; and R.L. TIGNOR, "Decolonization and Capitalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945-1963", paper read at Ben-Gurion University, Beersheba (Israel), 9 March 1995, pp. 62ff.
- [25] *Le Mondain Egyptien*, 1943, p. 49, and I. ISTIPHAN, *Directory of Social Agencies in Cairo*, Cairo, 1956, pp. 75-76. On the Red Crescent see pp. 67-68. A nearby square is still called Maydan al-Is'af [First Aid Square].
- [26] Cf. I. FENOGLIO, "Réforme sociale et usage des langues" in A. ROUSSILLON (éd.), *Entre réforme sociale et mouvement national, identité et modernisation en Egypte (1882-1962)*, Cairo, 1995, pp. 270-271.

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


Fig. 2. — Henri Naus Bey (1875-1938) (*Source: Chronique d'Egypte*).



Fig. 3. — Sugar-cane field (*Source: Mazuel*).



Fig. 4. — Selection of plants (*Source: Mazuel*).




Fig. 5. — The Nag Hammadi factory (*Source: Mazuel*).



Fig. 6. — The Kom Ombo factory (*Source: Mazuel*).




Fig. 7. — Attendance roll of the opening ceremony of the Kom Ombo factory: Naus' signature is on the mid-right fringe (Source: from a pamphlet of the sugar company).




Fig. 8. — A battery of sugar-crushing mills (*Source: Mazuel*)




Fig. 9. — Vacuum evaporation cauldrons at the Hawamdiyya refinery
(*Source: Mazuel*)





Fig. 10. — From a pamphlet published in 1989 by the sugar company: notice the way the pre-1952 chairmen are presented (Rafael Suarez, Ernest Cronier, Victor Harari, Muhammad Khalil and Ahmad Abbud).

Le grand sucrier



HENRI NAUS BEY

Fig. 11. — Caricature of Henri Naus and his manifold activities (Source: *La Semaine Financière et Politique*).



Fig. 12. — Naus in conversation with King Fu'ad (courtesy G. Naus).



Fig. 13. — Naus addressing King Fu'ad (courtesy G. Naus).




Fig. 14. — Naus (bareheaded) with Egyptian notables (courtesy G. Naus).



Fig. 15. — Naus in the midst of a meeting of the uniformed personnel of the Association Internationale d'Assistance Publique (courtesy G. Naus).



Fig. 16. — Naus (left) at a reception of the Egyptian University, together with his wife Anne (in the middle) and the rector Lutfi al-Sayyid (on her right) (*Source: La Bourse Egyptienne*).




Fig. 17. — A meeting of the Federation of Industries (courtesy G. Naus).



Fig. 18. — Prime Minister Sidqi addresses a tea party of the Federation of Industries: Naus is at his side (*Source*: Sabri Abu al-Majd).



Fig. 19. — The Immobilia building in downtown Cairo, until recently the seat of the Federation of Industries (*Source*: U.M. Kupferschmidt).