

English-Speaking Missions  
in the Congo Independent State

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(1878-1908)

BY

**RUTH M. SLADE,**

PH. D. (LOND.)

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## INTRODUCTION

This study attempts to estimate the contribution which Protestant missionaries have made to the history of the Congo, during the period of the Congo Independent State and the early years of Belgian colonial rule. These Protestant missionaries were, in the main, English-speaking missionaries, both Englishmen and Americans. The Swedish Protestant mission has not been studied in the same detail as the English and American missions, since this would have required a knowledge of Swedish and access to missionary archives in Sweden. Belgian Protestants were beginning to show an interest in missionary work in the Congo by the end of the period, but they had not yet begun work of their own there. Only one of the Catholic missions in the Congo Independent State was an English-speaking mission, and special attention has been paid to the circumstances in which it began work there. In general, however, Catholic missions have only been mentioned when their work provides a parallel with that of the Protestant missions, or an illuminating point of comparison with it.

The history of LEOPOLD II's Congo enterprise has long been obscured by polemic; the King has been presented either as a philanthropic monarch responsible for putting an end to the Arab slave trade in the Congo and for bringing the benefits of civilization to a vast region of Central Africa, or else as a selfseeking despot

who oppressed the Africans for the sake of the rubber which he was able to obtain from the country and thus made their condition far worse than it had been before the coming of Europeans. There is therefore a mass of polemical literature concerning the Congo Independent State, but no modern definitive history. The principal secondary works which attempt a general history, A. J. WAUTERS' *Histoire politique du Congo belge*, F. MASOIN's *Histoire de l'État Indépendant du Congo*, and A. BERRIEDALE KEITH's *The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act*, are now out-of-date, but the recent work of Professor J. STENGERS (several of whose articles are cited in the footnotes) provides a partial compensation for the lack of a complete objective study of the history of the Congo Independent State. For the period of LEOPOLD II's early interest in the Congo I have made use of R. S. THOMSON's *Fondation de l'État Indépendant du Congo*, supplemented by the recent research of the R. P. A. ROEYKENS, O. M. Cap., presented in *Les débuts de l'œuvre africaine de Léopold II* and in other books and articles. For the events leading up to the Berlin Conference Miss S. CROWE's *The Berlin West African Conference* remains the fullest study, while much light is thrown on the period of the anti-Congolese campaign by M. A. STENMANS' work, *La reprise du Congo par la Belgique*. The *Biographie Coloniale Belge* has been found useful for reference.

Turning from secondary works on the secular history of the Congo Independent State to those which deal with Protestant missionary history, it should be noted that an excellent brief summary of the history of Protestant missions in the Congo was prepared by Dr. G. CARPENTER to commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of their work in 1953. Apart from this, the only general survey which has been attempted is A. STONE-LAKE's *Congo past and present in the World Dominion*

Series. It was not the intention of either of these authors to concentrate upon the period of the Congo Independent State, nor to draw upon archival sources for their studies, and I have used these two works mainly as a basis for comments upon the later developments of Protestant missionary work in the Belgian Congo. D<sup>r</sup> K. S. LATOURRETTE'S *History of the Expansion of Christianity* and Professor C. P. GROVES' *The planting of Christianity in Africa* have been useful for reference.

Although it does not deal with the Congo region, it will be obvious that I owe a great deal, particularly in the third chapter of this study, to D<sup>r</sup> R. OLIVER'S *The Missionary Factor in East Africa*, for there are many similarities between the methods employed by Christian missions in the Congo and by those in East Africa whose history D<sup>r</sup> OLIVER has studied.

There is a singular lack of official histories of the English societies at work in the Congo, but for the Christian and Missionary Alliance R. B. EKVALL'S *After fifty years* has been used. Miss E. WHARTON'S *Led in Triumph* gives a careful account of the mission of the American Presbyterians in the Kasai, the Rev. H. SMITH'S *Fifty years in Congo* does the same for the Disciples of Christ, and the Rev. W. B. WEAVER'S *Thirty-five years in the Congo for the Mennonites*. Contemporary and nearly contemporary works have been useful; Holman BENTLEY'S *Pioneering in the Congo* and Sutton SMITH'S *Yakusu* are invaluable for the early years of the Baptist mission, while Fanny GUINNESS' *The New World of Central Africa* provides an account of the Livingstone Inland Mission. F. S. ARNOT'S records of his missionary travels have been useful for the early history of the mission of the Plymouth Brethren in the Katanga. For the Disciples of Christ there is E. N. DYE'S *Bolenge*, for the Southern Methodists T. E. REEVE'S *In Wembo Nyama's Land*, and for the Northern Methodists Bishop

John SPRINGER's *Pioneering in the Congo*. Biographical works have also been used, and are cited in the bibliography and the footnotes.

One of the most valuable sources of information used for this study has been the periodicals which were published, usually monthly, by the missionary societies at work in the Congo. These are listed in the bibliography, together with one or two of the journals which have been of outstanding importance for a study of the missionary part in the anti-Congolese campaign. Catholic missionary periodicals, the English religious press, and the secular press, English, American and Belgian, have been consulted on specific points, mainly in connection with the agitation against the Congo State after the turn of the century. Some thirty English, American and Belgian journals are cited in the footnotes, but do not appear in the bibliography. Apart from the more specialized use made of missionary periodicals for a study of the relative amount of publicity which the various missions gave to the anti-Congolese agitation, these journals have been found invaluable as collections of letters and diaries of the pioneer missionaries in the Congo. Early letters have been preserved in this form when all trace of them has disappeared from the archives of the missionary societies, or when, as in the case of the Plymouth Brethren, such archives are non-existent. Another useful source of contemporary information, for the period 1902-14, has been found in the Reports of the General Congo Protestant Missionary Conferences, which from 1902 onwards usually met every second year. It is mainly from these missionary journals and reports that it is possible to build up a picture of the day-to-day life of the missionaries, and of the changing pattern of missionary policy in the Congo.

Preparation for this study has involved an examination of all the relevant archival material which has been

preserved by the English and American Protestant societies whose missionaries were sent to the Congo Independent State. In some cases the amount which is left is disappointingly small; missionary societies concentrated upon the task of the present without giving much thought to the judgement of history upon their efforts, and missionary secretaries gave more consideration to the urgency of their work than to the arrangement of their archives. But an examination of minute-books, where these exist, has been particularly valuable for tracing the development of the official policy of the missionary societies towards the Congo reform campaign; especially in the early years, little hint of this was allowed to appear in the missionary periodicals. Correspondence between the missions at home and the missionaries in the field, and between the missions and the Foreign Office on the one hand and the State Department on the other, has also been found useful in this connection. An examination of missionary correspondence with the Congo Reform Association (Morel papers) and with the Aboriginies' Protection Society, has revealed the attitude of many individual missionaries to the anti-Congolese agitation. The same papers have also thrown light on the official position of the missionary committees and boards. Archival sources for the history of the Catholic missions in the Congo have not been consulted. Although I have made use of one or two letters written by Catholic missionaries on the subject of the Congo régime, having found them almost by chance in the course of my work at the *Archives Générales du Royaume*, a study of the Catholic missionary attitude towards the anti-Congolese agitation does not lie within the scope of this inquiry, which is limited to the history of the Protestant missions in the Congo. Any comment made upon the attitude of the Catholic missions for the purposes of comparison is therefore

very tentative and might well be corrected by an examination of the Catholic archival sources. Only the papers of Cardinal GIBBONS have been consulted for the light which they throw upon the Congo agitation in the United States.

Official English, Belgian and American records have also been useful for this study. Correspondence between the Foreign Office and the British Consulate at Loanda and the British Embassies at Brussels and Lisbon (Public Record Office, Series F.O.84, F.O.10, and F.O.63) together with various collections of papers at the *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères* (under *Association Internationale du Congo*, *Conférence de Berlin*, and the Strauch Papers) have been found useful for an examination of the part which was played by the English Protestant missions in the period of the foundation of the Congo Independent State, and in the political negotiations which took place before and during the Berlin Conference. The correspondence between the Foreign Office and the British Consulates at Loanda and Boma includes a certain number of letters sent by English missionaries to the British Consul, and these are particularly useful for missionary views on the political situation in the Congo. Their number is limited, however, for Free Church missions were anxious to keep clear of political entanglements so far as they could. For the post-1902 period much of the correspondence between the Foreign Office and the British Consuls in the Congo is published in *Accounts and Papers*, and is a useful source of information for the missionary part in the anti-Congolese campaign. Besides consular letters relative to the settlement of American missionaries in the Congo, the State Department Congo records are chiefly valuable for the light which they throw on the course of the Congo agitation in the United States.

The Belgian archival sources used have been fully



listed at the end of this study. The Lambermont Papers have given evidence of the part played by the English missions at the time of the Brussels Conference, while the Van Eetvelde Papers have been particularly useful for their collection of reports made by officials of the Congo Independent State between 1904 and 1906 (the *Courrier du Congo*), and for VAN EETVELDE'S correspondence with LEOPOLD II and with Sir Hugh Gilzean REID, a friend of the Secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society and of one of the leading missionaries of the Society. It is gradually becoming clearer today that the famous fire, in which it was formerly supposed that LEOPOLD II had succeeded in burning all the archives of the Congo Independent State, was not so serious as Congo historians originally feared. More of the Congo State records are now coming to light, and in the course of this study I have used a collection of official Congo State papers relating to the English-speaking missions, housed at the *Ministère des Colonies*, where the classification of State records long buried in obscurity is now in progress. Since these records are becoming available for research, and since there is a growing interest in the history of LEOPOLD II'S enterprise in the Congo, it is possible to look forward to the time when we shall have a definitive history of the Congo Independent State. However, much preparatory research still needs to be done. Although the main interest of this work has been concentrated upon Protestant missionary history, the study also makes a small contribution towards the complete history of the Congo Independent State which has yet to be written.

Since this study was presented as a doctorate thesis of the University of London in May 1957 only very minor changes have been made in the text, as no new work bearing on the main subject has appeared in the intervening period to justify the re-writing of any particular

part. Fuller treatment of the question of the attitude of Catholics in England and the United States towards the anti-Congolese campaign (cf. pp. 301-3, 310-14) can be found in King Leopold II and the attitude of English and American Catholics towards the anti-Congolese campaign, in *Zaire*, XI, 6, June 1957, pp. 593-612. Here I have made use of the Archives of St Joseph's College, Mill Hill, which help to elucidate the part played by the one mission in the Congo which was both English-speaking and Catholic.

My thanks are due to the many archivists, librarians and other officials of the English and American missionary societies with which I have been concerned in this study, who have generously given their time to assist my research. I am also indebted to those archivists in Brussels who have guided me among the collections of official and private papers there relative to the history of the Congo Independent State and to my own study in particular. I am especially grateful to D<sup>r</sup> G. CARPENTER, formerly Executive Secretary of the Africa Committee of the Division of Foreign Missions of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U. S. A., to whose sympathetic interest in my study I owe the possibility of exploring the archives of the American missions, to Professor J. STENGERS of the *Université libre de Bruxelles* for his invaluable guidance on the sources available for the history of the Congo Independent State, and above all to D<sup>r</sup> R. OLIVER of the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London, for his stimulating comments on the writing of missionary history and his kindly criticism of my work over a period of four years. I am also most grateful to the Rev. C. J. L. NAPIER, M. A., for his indefatigable help in proof-reading and indexing during the preparation of this study for publication.

*Louvain.*

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R. M. SLADE.

## ABBREVIATIONS

A. B. I. R.	Anglo-Belgian India-Rubber Company.
A. B. M. U.	American Baptist Missionary Union.
A. F.	<i>Aborigines' Friend.</i>
A. G. R.	Archives Générales du Royaume.
A. I. C.	Association Internationale du Congo.
A. P. C. M.	American Presbyterian Congo Mission.
A. R. S. C.	Académie royale des Sciences coloniales.
B. C. B.	Biographie Coloniale Belge.
B. M. S.	Baptist Missionary Society.
B. M. M. C.	Board of Missions of the Methodist Church.
B. P.	Bentley Papers.
B. T.	<i>Baptist Times.</i>
C. B. M.	Congo Balolo Mission.
C. de B.	Conférence de Berlin.
C. M. N.	<i>Congo Mission News.</i>
C. M. S.	Church Missionary Society.
E. S.	<i>Echoes of Service.</i>
F. O.	Foreign Office correspondence.
G. C. R.	Report of the General Conference of Protestant missionaries at work in the Congo.
G. P.	Gibbons Papers.
L. I. M.	Livingstone Inland Mission.
L. M. S.	London Missionary Society.
M. des C.	Ministère des Colonies.
M. H.	<i>Missionary Herald.</i>
M. I.	<i>Missionary Intelligencer.</i>
Miss.	<i>The Missionary.</i>
O. O., C. R. A.	<i>Official Organ of the Congo Reform Association.</i>
P. L.	Papiers Lambermont.
P. S.	Papiers Strauch.
R. B.	<i>Regions Beyond.</i>
R. H.	Rhodes House.
S. C. S., W. A. M.	<i>Special Congo Supplement, West African Mail.</i>
S. D.	State Department correspondence.
S. P.	Stapleton Papers.
V. E.	Papiers Van Eetvelde.

## CHAPTER ONE

MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE IN THE CONGO,  
1878-1885

Side by side with the scientific, commercial and political interests which inspired the movement of Portuguese expansion set on foot by Prince HENRY the Navigator, there had always been a direct missionary aim. Thus there had been Christian missionaries on the Congo coast four hundred years before GRENFELL and COMBER of the Baptist mission sailed eighty-five miles up the river on their prospecting tour in 1878. The Portuguese attempt in the Congo was the first Christian missionary effort of any considerable size or with any continuity of history in Africa south of the Sahara. Its early success had seemed to give promise of future fruitfulness. The King of Kongo had been baptized; his son had sent many youths of rank to be educated in Lisbon and some had been ordained priests; one of his grandsons had even been consecrated bishop. From such a beginning wise leadership might well have produced a stable, indigenous Christianity. Yet this early prosperity had been followed by the disappearance of the Church from Congo soil. In 1879 there remained only the ruins of a cathedral, a crucifix among the King's other fetishes, and confused memories of the earlier teaching <sup>(1)</sup>.

Protestant missionaries who arrived in Congo during the last quarter of the nineteenth century naturally assum-

(1) W. H. BENTLEY, *Pioneering on the Congo*, London, 1900, 2 vol., I, p. 35.

ed that they need not look far to find the cause of this failure ; they had grown up with the idea that Roman Catholicism involved corruption, superstition and idolatry, and they were prepared to attribute the disappearance of Christianity solely to the fact that it had been introduced into the Congo in a Catholic form. It is hardly surprising that they sought no other reason, for they regarded " ...Popery as a corrupt and corrupting religion... only a baptized paganism " (1), and they were firmly convinced that the " light ", even in good and devoted Catholic missionaries, " ... was dimmed by false doctrine and superstition " (2). They believed that because of its very nature Catholicism had been unable to convey any sense of the glorious liberty of the children of God — rather that it had replaced one form of servitude by another ; that it had been unable to bring any conception of the unique glory of the Father revealed in the face of JESUS CHRIST — rather that it had replaced one form of idolatry by another. It seemed to them that so impure a Christianity had no power to drive out the ingrained fears and animism from African society, and that after a brief triumph it was inevitably doomed to extinction. Their opinion of Catholicism was necessarily formed by post-Reformation polemic, and they had little idea of the way in which social, political and economic factors had hindered the adoption of Christianity in the sixteenth century while favouring its spread throughout the Congo basin in the nineteenth century.

In the nineteenth century, European penetration of the interior was a major factor in the spread of Christianity throughout Africa. In the sixteenth century too, the prestige value of the missionary, as a European, had accounted for his early successes. When the Portuguese

(1) F. E. GUINNESS, *The new world of Central Africa*, London, 1890, p. 179.

(2) BENTLEY, I, p. 40.

missionaries had first landed on the African coast, they had appeared to the Congolese peoples as gods upon earth <sup>(1)</sup>. They had possessed all the advantages of a culture and civilisation very far removed from that which they encountered in the Congo. It was not surprising that the King of Kongo had been impressed by the presents which DIEGO CAM's second expedition had brought him on behalf of JOHN II of Portugal, nor that an expectation of material advantage should have been partially responsible for his conversion. To a large extent his hopes had been fulfilled. His baptism had immediately preceded an expedition against the Bateke in which he had been victorious because supported by Portuguese arms <sup>(2)</sup>. At his request the King of Portugal had sent him masons, carpenters and agriculturalists, as well as priests. His sons and those of subordinate chiefs had received the advantages of education. In the nineteenth century the same story was repeated ; missionaries were welcomed not for their religion but for the material advantages that they brought with them. But there was a vital difference, for in the nineteenth century European rule had come to stay. The missionary continued to be a social asset as a guide during the period of readjustment ; missionary education continued to have an obvious and practical value in fitting Africans for the new way of living that was being forced upon them. In the earlier period, however, European rule in the Congo was ephemeral. In 1484 DIEGO CAM had staked the Portuguese claim to possession of the Congo territories by erecting a stone pillar surmounted by a cross on the south bank of the river. And the preaching of the Cross

<sup>(1)</sup> F. FIGAFETTA, *A report of the Kingdom of Congo...* drawn out of the writings and discourses of the Portuguese, D. Lopes. Rome 1591, trans. M. Hutchinson, London, 1881, p. 71.

<sup>(2)</sup> E. G. RAVENSTEIN, *The strange adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, in Angola and the adjoining regions*, London, 1901, pp. 109-10.

in Congo had become linked with Portuguese political influence to such an extent that the decline of Christianity had kept pace with the decline of Portuguese power.

Christianity in Congo had remained tied to its Portuguese origins. The King of Kongo had been quickly won over — but by an invitation to throw aside his fetishes and embrace the true faith that had been very closely linked to the offer of an alliance with the King of Portugal and all its attendant advantages. A Portuguese veneer had been spread over Congolese society. Portuguese dress had been adopted, the feudal system had been imitated at the court of the King of Kongo, Portuguese names had been given at baptism, and the King's capital had been renamed San Salvador. But all this had been on a superficial level, and the Church had needed to make a deeper impact upon society. The failure to plant its roots firmly in native soil must to a large extent explain why Christianity faded away with Portuguese power. Since in the beginning political considerations had so largely influenced conversion, Christianity could have survived only if it had achieved a fundamental change in the way of life of the Congo peoples, if it had taken on native dress, if it had penetrated, rather than covered, the social system which it had found. But an episcopal visitation in 1597 had revealed the fact that Christians were practising polygamy openly <sup>(1)</sup>, and it seems that to a large extent images and crosses had replaced fetishes in Congo because they were thought to be more effective for the same purpose <sup>(2)</sup>. In spite of the personal devotion of many of the early missionaries and the energetic support given by several of the kings

(1) J. CUVELIER and L. JADIN, *L'Ancien Congo d'après les archives romaines, 1518-1640*, Brussels, 1954, p. 76.

(2) RAVENSTEIN, p. 114.

of Kongo to the Christian cause, there is little evidence of a radical change of life among the population.

It is true, of course, that Christianity in Congo remains even to-day very closely linked to its Western origins, and that African Christians still depend to an undue extent upon European leadership. But it can be claimed that Christianity has made a far deeper impact upon Congolese society than it did in the earlier period. Certainly its spread throughout the Congo basin has kept pace with European penetration, just as in the sixteenth century it remained confined to the coastal regions under Portuguese rule or influence. But if European missionaries were now forced to leave the Congo, it seems unlikely that Christianity would fade away as it did earlier. And this is after only eighty years of missionary effort ; the Portuguese were in Congo far longer. A somewhat similar process can be traced in the history of missions in China — a hopeful beginning, a period of decline, and a modern missionary movement which has left Chinese Christians standing firm at a time when almost their only link with their Western brethren is that of prayer.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, missionary villages and plantations were the first centres of Christianity — little islands of Christian living divorced from African tribal life. But at a later stage African evangelists and catechists went out from these centres to plant Christianity in free tribal society. The structure of that society was changing, not only because of the influence of the missionary, but also because of that of the State. The introduction of a money economy meant that the number of a man's wives was no longer the only possible measure of his wealth. The State, like the Church, set its face against polygamy, witchcraft and disease in a way which it had never done in the sixteenth century. A type of society was developing in which Christian living was possible and no longer were detribalised



Africans the only converts. Church discipline could be stricter than it had apparently been before. Christianity gradually penetrated tribal life as had not been the case in the earlier period.

In another way the State helped the Christian mission. The restraining influence of a firm government became strong enough to control those Europeans who without it found the demoralising effect of African life too great for them to resist. The radical opposition which all too often existed between the standards of the missionaries and those of other Europeans in Congo naturally caused confusion when in the eyes of the Africans every European was *ipso facto* a Christian. The Portuguese missions had suffered greatly from this contrast, for many of the Portuguese officials had gone out intending to make a quick fortune from slave-trading and then to return to Portugal. And when the first Protestant missionaries arrived at the Congo mouth in the late nineteenth century, they found the European traders there living what appeared to them to be purposeless, immoral and vicious lives. Their savage treatment of the slaves they owned was almost incredible <sup>(1)</sup>. The missionaries concluded that work on the coast would be impossible in these conditions. Similar difficulties arose in the interior in the early days of the Congo State from the unchecked licence of some of its officials. But the spread of responsible European government made the work of the missionary both easier and more permanent.

In the sixteenth century the demoralising effect of African life had been seen even in the priesthood. As early as 1515 ALPHONSO I had been forced to ask the help of the King of Portugal in suppressing the irregularities of those "unworthy preachers of the Holy Catholic Faith" who brought scandal on the Church by their

(1) BENTLEY, 1, *Pioneering on the Congo*, London, 1900, pp. 45-49.

inordinate desire for power and their covetousness (1). Sometimes priests forced to flee from Portugal because of their misdeeds had found their way to Congo, and had discharged their duties there as mercenaries, rather than as pastors (2). Fifty years later a rising against the Portuguese had been justified on the grounds of the vices and abuses practised by the clergy (3). In the nineteenth century, this situation did not arise. Nor, again, was the numerical weakness of the missionary force so great a hindrance to the effective presentation of Christianity. Undoubtedly, in the earlier period, Congo missions had suffered from the fact that Portuguese priests had been increasingly absorbed into South American missions (4). Modern missions have also been more successful in their efforts towards an African priesthood and ministry, however far they have as yet fallen short of their hopes. Certainly the Portuguese missionaries had raised Africans to the priesthood, but they had done so too quickly, so that converts still very close to their own past had failed to live up to the responsibilities of spiritual direction for which they were insufficiently prepared. And when pastoral oversight had been quite inadequate, the Church had naturally enough been at the mercy of every change of the political wind.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the standard of education reached by African Christians was very different from that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Protestant missionaries, not doubting that their converts were to be people of the Book, multiplied translations of the Scriptures and often made literacy one of the qualifications for Church membership. Catholic missions also provided schools and translations,

(1) RAVENSTEIN, p. 114.

(2) CUVELIER and JADIN, p. 36.

(3) RAVENSTEIN, p. 120.

(4) P. F. EUCHER, *Le Congo, essai sur l'histoire religieuse de ce pays depuis sa découverte (1484) jusqu'à nos jours*. Huy, 1894, p. 82.

spurred on by this competition in an age when all young Africans who had come into contact with Europeans were clamouring for education. But in the sixteenth century, any real instruction in the Christian faith had been limited to an intelligent minority, to those who had been prepared to learn Latin and to be taught in Portuguese. Thousands had been gathered into the Church by baptism, and had then been left pitifully unaware of the real meaning of the sacrament. Within three months of the arrival of the first Jesuit party (three priests and a lay brother) five thousand baptisms had been recorded. In 1581 a Jesuit who came to Congo had baptized fifteen hundred people, and a second Jesuit a few years later had baptized a thousand <sup>(1)</sup>. It was only to be expected that some of these new converts had been able to tell little more about the ceremony than that they had "eaten salt". Mass conversions on this scale were valueless if not followed up by intensive pastoral oversight. But there had been no careful instruction of the people in their own tongue — indeed, priests had often been ignorant of the local language <sup>(2)</sup>. The Jesuits had introduced vernacular hymn-singing, but little attempt had been made to use the vocabulary of the people as the medium of Christian education. Only the few had been able to read Portuguese, while there had been almost no Christian literature in the vernacular for the masses (a Jesuit had produced the first manual of religious instruction in Kikongo at Lisbon in 1624) and the scriptures had remained untranslated. It had been easy enough for a Latin liturgy to be misinterpreted against a pagan background. And while the Jesuits in Congo had begun the formation of an African priesthood, they had apparently not experimented — as they had done

<sup>(1)</sup> C. P. GROVES, *The Planting of Christianity in Africa*, London, 1948, I, p. 129.

<sup>(2)</sup> CUVELIER and JADIN, p. 77.

in China under RICCI — with an interpretation of Christianity in native dress. There had been no women missionaries, who alone could have reached the Congolese women — as they did in the late nineteenth century — and thus the homes of the people had failed to become training centres of Christian living.

There was another vital difference between the presentation of Christianity in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. The nineteenth century missionary movement into Africa was borne up on the surge of anti-slavery and humanitarian sentiment which had swept through England and had influenced the continent too. But in the sixteenth century the missionary had been accompanied by the slave trader. By his way of living the trader had denied the teaching of the missionary, and by his attitude proclaimed the fact that he regarded the African as a unit in the slave-gang rather than as a child of God. At the time Christian consciences had seemed untroubled by the contradiction. The missionaries themselves had kept slaves, and had even been reponsible in some cases for their sale, for although the King of Portugal had equipped and had sent missionaries to Congo and Angola, their upkeep had depended upon the sale of slaves. To the south of Congo the Bishop of Loanda had sat in the harbour to bless batches of slaves as they had been shipped off to America. It was not until the late nineteenth century that a Portuguese priest was ready to point out that the prosecution of the slave trade alongside the Christian mission had been one of the most effective hindrances to the establishment of the Church in Congo <sup>(1)</sup>.

Finally, it would seem that the Portuguese attempt to evangelize the Congo had come to nothing because it had been too exclusively Portuguese, and therefore

<sup>(1)</sup> P. BARROSO, speaking before the Lisbon Geographical Society, March 1889, quoted BENTLEY, I, pp. 37-9.

had depended unduly upon the stability of Portuguese political influence. It is true that LEOPOLD II did his utmost to encourage Belgian missionaries to evangelize the Congo State, and to exclude French missionaries from the territory. It cannot be suggested, however, that Belgian missionary effort in the Congo was a mere instrument of royal policy, and naturally the numbers of English and American Protestant missionaries there had no connection with the State. But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it had been usual for the King of Portugal to be the intermediary in any relations between the King of Kongo and the Holy See, although there had been several attempts to create direct contact <sup>(1)</sup>. In spite of the acute shortage of priests, the Portuguese had tried to keep missionaries of other nationalities from entering the Congo. In 1640 Italian Capuchins sent by the Propaganda had been refused passports at Lisbon, and strangely enough it had not been until a few years later, when the Calvinist Dutch had enjoyed their brief period of power on the coast, that the King of Kongo had secured free entry for these missionaries. A direct embassy from the King to the Pope, which had travelled by way of Holland, had been a sign of independence much disliked by the Portuguese. After they had driven the Dutch out, they had imposed terms of peace which insisted that all missionaries should obtain a Portuguese passport, and should communicate with Rome via Lisbon <sup>(2)</sup>. Such ecclesiastical dependence had meant that periods of friction with Portugal had inevitably affected adversely the state of the Church in Congo.

During the seventeenth century Portuguese interest had been increasingly diverted southwards to the Angolan slave trade, and Loanda had replaced San Salvador

<sup>(1)</sup> CUVELIER and JADIN, p. 4.

<sup>(2)</sup> RAVENSTEIN, pp. 127-8.

as the main centre of activity, while the Kingdom of Kongo had come to be regarded as a mere backwater. Since Portuguese evangelistic activity had been so closely linked with Portuguese political interest, this had meant the virtual disappearance of missionary work. By the end of the seventeenth century the last few Portuguese missionaries had deserted the Congo and moved south in the wake of the traders. As we have seen, the Church had not been established firmly enough to survive when political support was withdrawn.

The Italian Capuchins in Congo had been reinforced by several new parties during the seventeenth century. But Christianity had made little progress; it had not, of course, been presented by different denominations as in the nineteenth century, but there had been the rivalry of a double jurisdiction — on the one hand the Bishop of Loanda and the secular clergy, and on the other the Capuchins who had been placed in charge of the Apostolic Prefecture of the Congo <sup>(1)</sup>. In the eighteenth century an isolated missionary effort had been undertaken by French secular priests, who had gone out to Congo in three small expeditions between 1766 and 1775. The French missionaries had been liked by the people and had made a real effort to learn the language, until finally illness and death forced them to abandon their work <sup>(2)</sup>. But for two centuries only such occasional attempts had been made to nourish and extend the faith planted in the Congo regions by the early Portuguese missionaries.

The intermittent efforts of the Capuchins and the French secular priests provide the connecting link between the apparently flourishing Portuguese missions of the sixteenth century, and those undertaken by both

<sup>(1)</sup> A. ROEYKENS, *Les Capucins et les missions congolaises au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Aequatoria, Coquilhatville, XI, 1948, 4, p. 130.

<sup>(2)</sup> J. CUVELIER, *Documents sur une mission française au Kakongo, 1766-1776*, Brussels, 1953, p. 15.

Catholics and Protestants in the later nineteenth century. In the see of Loanda, to the south, the link was stronger. There the Church was never reduced to quite the same straits as in the Congo, for in Angola the Portuguese preserved their political interest. But Christianity remained tied to the coastal regions ; there was no attempt to move inland. It was the same in the rest of Africa during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But while on the west, south, and east there were the stirrings of a desire for missionary penetration into the interior in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, in Congo the mid-century Catholic revival of interest in coastal work was in effect a revival of the fifteenth-century missions, not a part of the new movement. It did not even reach so far inland as the Portuguese mission had done. In 1865 the Holy Ghost Fathers already in the Gaboon were given the Apostolic Prefecture of the Congo, after the Capuchins had admitted that they could send no more missionaries <sup>(1)</sup>. In 1866 the vice-prefect set out with two companions on a tour of inspection. He began by visiting the Bishop of Loanda to admit his claim of jurisdiction over the Congo, although in fact the diocese now served only the three coastal centres of Loanda itself, Benguella and Mossamedes. When he arrived at the Congo mouth he found that only a few images and crucifixes remained as a witness that Christianity had once flourished in the Kingdom of Kongo. Although to the south of the river at San Antonio there lingered vague memories of the missionaries of earlier days, there was not even this at Boma to encourage the little party <sup>(2)</sup>. The Holy Ghost Fathers decided to renew the mission on the lines of a freed slave settlement. In 1873 a station was planted at Landana on the coast,

<sup>(1)</sup> A. ROEYKENS, Les Pères du Saint-Esprit et l'acceptation de la mission du Congo au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, *Aequatoria*, XIII, 1950, 2, p. 71.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Ibid.*, *Aequatoria*, XIII, 1950, 3, p. 94.

while others were planned for Banana, Boma and San Antonio.

But within a decade there was a staggering change. Missionaries were no longer content with this revival of coastal work ; they were looking at the Congo river as a highway into Central Africa. They were determined to advance up the main river and its tributaries until they had evangelized the whole of the Congo basin. Their effort in the Congo was one part of the great nineteenth-century movement of missionary penetration into the heart of Africa. For two centuries the slave-trade had kept the continent closed. Europeans held coastal footholds in Central Africa, from the Cameroons to Loanda and from Mombasa to Mozambique, but neither traders nor governments had shown any interest in the interior, and the missions had remained content with their freed slave colonies on the coast — the Baptists first at Fernando Po and then in the Cameroons, the Holy Ghost Fathers in the Gaboon and at Zanzibar, and the Church Missionary Society and the Methodists at Mombasa. But religion in England had struggled through a period of deism and formalism until it was awakened by the Evangelical revival. This revival was to affect the evangelization of Africa in two ways. It awakened the social conscience of Christians, and gave a great impetus to missionary vocation ; thus it was responsible both for the humanitarian attack against the slave-trade, and also for the missionary zeal which found scope for its energy in advance into the African interior. The two were very closely linked. We have already seen how the Portuguese connection with the slave-trade had hindered the establishment of Christianity even on the coast. It is no exaggeration to say that the antislavery movement was an essential prelude to the plantation of Christianity in the heart of the African continent.

The movement provided a forceful motive for inland



penetration. It was no easy task to advance into the interior. River navigation was often difficult in Africa, and overland journeys into the heart of the continent under a tropical sun and through malarial swamps, held little attraction and no obvious purpose when European interest was almost exclusively occupied by the slave trade on the coast. The Congo river presented special problems, for the series of falls between the estuary and Stanley Pool had most effectively halted the Europeans who had attempted to sail up-stream. Neither DIEGO CAM in the fifteenth century nor Captain TUCKEY in 1816 could have had any idea of the thousands of miles of navigable waterways which lay beyond the Pool, a network which was later to provide such a magnificent means of access into Central Africa. But once an interest in the interior had been aroused by a desire to attack the slave trading system at its source of supply, almost any base on the coast became a starting point for advance inland.

The lead came from the West coast, with BUXTON and the Abolitionists following CLAPPERTON and LANDER. Their apparently fruitless experiment had immediate repercussions upon missionary policy; the C.M.S. missionaries who were at work at the Niger mouth began to think in terms of inland penetration, they decided to adopt new methods, to embark upon intensive training of African evangelists and upon a study of the vernaculars of the interior <sup>(1)</sup>. On the East coast the journeys of KRAPF and REBMANN from Mombasa in the 'forties, their dreams of a chain of mission stations stretching across the African continent <sup>(2)</sup>, had indicated the stirring of a new movement. But finally it was from South Africa that there came the decisive move which was to have its effect upon missionary work as far away as the Congo.

<sup>(1)</sup> GROVES, *The Planting of Christianity in Africa*, London, 1948, II, p. 16.

<sup>(2)</sup> R. OLIVER, *The missionary factor in East Africa*, London, 1952, p. 6.

It was LIVINGSTONE who, not content with the intensive methods of the London Missionary Society in South Africa, sought to blaze a trail by which Christianity and commerce could advance together into Central Africa. He laid bare all the horrors of the Arab slave-trade in the African interior, he stirred a nation to attack the evil at its source, he won acceptance for the thesis that if Christianity were to conquer Africa, the missionary must be accompanied by legitimate trade and by the benefits of civilization, so that the great social evils of African society would be brought to an end and the slow penetration of Christian principles made possible. In response to LIVINGSTONE'S challenge and example, missionaries pressed their way into the interior from the bases on the South and East and West coasts where they had been content to remain so long. The evangelization of the Congo basin was one part of the greater movement. Just as the wave of enthusiasm aroused by LIVINGSTONE'S last journey brought the Scottish missions and the Universities' Mission to Central Africa to Nyasa from the East coast, so it led the Baptists working in the Cameroons to try the Congo route into the interior, and a small independent group in England to undertake a Congo mission which was to be called the Livingstone Inland Mission.

While the humanitarian attack upon the slave-trade and a new surge of missionary zeal had provided the motive for this Christian penetration into the heart of Africa, the means were not lacking. The missionaries who arrived in Congo at the end of the nineteenth century could make use of material aids unknown to the Portuguese. They followed the explorers who were beginning to chart the African interior; indeed, just as Stanley's second expedition had drawn the C.M.S. to Victoria Nyanza and the L.M.S. to Tanganyika in its wake, so it was STANLEY'S triumphant demonstration that the

Congo provided a highway into Central Africa that gave a great impetus to the mission which the Baptists had already decided to undertake by way of the Congo river. The Portuguese missionaries had not carried so far the spirit of scientific curiosity and the enthusiasm for material progress that was reducing the physical barriers to inland advance in the nineteenth century. Even before its preliminary expedition had set out, the Baptist mission was expecting to place a steamer on the waters of the Congo (<sup>1</sup>). By the turn of the century missionaries were able to use railway communication between the coast and the upper river. This ability to turn the new and exciting discoveries of modern science to good account in the service of the missionary cause aroused intense enthusiasm among the mass of missionary supporters in England and America. For the nineteenth-century evangelization of the Congo was a popular movement such as it had never been in the sixteenth century.

There was another vital difference. The movement of Portuguese missionary expansion in the sixteenth century had in effect been a pre-Reformation movement. Although ancient Christendom was being torn apart, the missionaries had carried no echo of such controversies to Africa. There was no divided interpretation and preaching of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic faith in the Congo. But by the nineteenth century it was precisely the children of the Reformation who, having consolidated their own doctrinal position and their ecclesiastical organization, had begun to turn their attention to missionary advance. Thus the divided pattern of European Christianity was reproduced wherever European missionaries carried their faith. Catholics and Protestants advanced side by side up the Congo

(<sup>1</sup>) BENTLEY, I, p. 59.

river with their conflicting claims. As in other parts of Africa, the Protestant entry was linked with the anti-slavery movement whose impetus came largely from England. The Catholic revival of interest — already noted on the coast — turned its attention inland partly because of a desire not to be left behind by the Protestant pioneers <sup>(1)</sup>.

This inter-confessional rivalry introduced a completely new factor into Christian mission work in the Congo. Later, the State endeavoured to keep Protestant and Catholic missionaries at a certain distance from each other, but this was not always practicable and where missionaries came into contact, the old polemic was worked out again on African soil. Three centuries of separation had elapsed since the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, and as a result the Catholic and Protestant missionaries in the Congo were alike in knowing very little about each other. The Catholic was convinced that Protestants did not teach the virtues necessary to salvation, but insisted upon giving the Bible to Africans without their understanding its teaching <sup>(2)</sup>; the Protestant was equally certain that Catholics replaced morality by empty formulas and by magical sacraments, and handed out rosaries and crucifixes as fetishes <sup>(3)</sup>. It was a strange caricature of the other's faith and practice that each passed on to the Africans, so that when Protestant evangelists and Catholic catechists came to blows over the disputed possession of a village, doubtless both parties were sure that they were fighting for God against the henchmen of the Devil. There is, of course, a sense in which rivalry stimulated the progress

<sup>(1)</sup> P. CARRIE, quoted in *Missions Catholiques*, Lyons, XII, 1880, p. 65.

<sup>(2)</sup> BENTLEY, I, p. 161.

<sup>(3)</sup> Congo Missionary Conference, 1909, A report of the fifth general conference of missionaries of the Protestant Societies working in Congoland, Bongandanga, 1909, pp. 3, 9.

of the Christian mission ; both Catholic and Protestant missionaries were eager to press on with all speed up the Congo river for fear of being outdistanced by the others. This was small gain, however, to weigh against the fact that those who preached to the Africans the unity of all men in Christ, belied their teaching by their own divisions.

Thus the later nineteenth-century movement of missionary expansion in the Congo was very different from the earlier attempts at evangelization there. It was borne up by the anti-slavery agitation in Europe ; it broke vast areas of new ground and made use of scientific knowledge of which earlier ages had not dreamed. It introduced Christianity in Protestant and Catholic forms. There was, however, one striking similarity ; it coincided with European penetration. Once the faith had secured a foothold, there was certainly a more successful attempt than there had been in earlier years to root it in native soil, but as before the initial impact was made by Europeans, and Christianity spread in those areas which were submitted to European influence.

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Somewhat surprisingly, it was the ruler of one of the smallest of European countries who was among the first to realise some of the implications of the European penetration of Central Africa. For LEOPOLD II, King of the Belgians, whose position as constitutional monarch of a small European state did not provide him with sufficient scope for his phenomenal energies and spectacular talents, such realisation was the prelude to prompt action. In 1876 he called an international geographical conference to Brussels, and himself became president of the International African Association created by the conference. The Association's main task was the promo-

tion of exploration in the unknown parts of equatorial Africa. But, in spite of its title, it was organised in national committees and quickly became the vehicle of national interests in Central Africa. At first, all its expeditions started from the East coast. It was only gradually that LEOPOLD'S interest turned almost entirely to the Congo, although there is reason to believe that the King was aware of this neglected region in the West at a surprisingly early date <sup>(1)</sup>.

Certainly the older Powers of Europe appeared to have little presentiment of the future value of the Congo route into Central Africa. True, there were some slight signs of a revival of Portuguese interest in the Congo, for a Portuguese nominee was placed on the throne at San Salvador, after a succession dispute in the 'fifties had been settled by armed intervention <sup>(2)</sup>. And the British Government had been interested in limiting Portuguese slave trading operations in the coastal waters, although it seems that it had no territorial ambitions in the Congo whatsoever. When, in 1874, CAMERON took possession of the whole basin in the name of Great Britain, the Colonial Office gave him not the slightest support <sup>(3)</sup>. A second opportunity for annexation came in 1878, when STANLEY repulsed the envoys of LEOPOLD II who met him at Marseilles on his return to Europe after his journey down the Congo, and did his best to arouse English enthusiasm for the opening up of the Congo basin <sup>(4)</sup>. Only after he had failed in this self-imposed task did he accept service under LEOPOLD. But lack of English interest in his plans meant that when

(1) The R. P. A. ROEYKENS, O. F. M. Cap., has made a detailed study of this subject, in *Les débuts de l'œuvre africaine de Leopold II (1875-1879)*, Brussels, 1955.

(2) BENTLEY, I, p. 142.

(3) S. E. CROWE, *The Berlin West African Conference*, London, 1942, pp. 202-3.

(4) R. S. THOMSON, *Fondation de l'État Indépendant du Congo*, Brussels, 1933, p. 62.

STANLEY returned to the Congo in 1879 to make a road to the Pool, he was in the employ of the King of the Belgians.

If the vision and imagination capable of realising the importance of the Congo as a highway into Central Africa, and of inspiring provision of resources for the practical work of opening up the river, came on the secular side from the King of the Belgians, they were matched on the missionary side by those of Robert ARTHINGTON, the miser of Leeds. At first sight there might seem little comparison between the two men. But both had an absorbing interest in geography — the King who “ probably knew the world better than any sovereign of his time ” (1) and gathered together a library of books on colonial affairs, and the missionary strategist who in his one room at Headingley read all day and much of the night, kept up a large correspondence with travellers in Asia, Africa, and South America, and, although he grudged money for food and firewood, spent it liberally on missionary magazines (2). It was a typical suggestion of his that missionary deputations should be provided with large, carefully-drawn maps for their use at public meetings (3). Both men had a world vision, but both concentrated their attention increasingly upon Africa. As Duke of Brabant, the future LEOPOLD II had travelled widely, visiting Constantinople, Spain, Egypt, and the East Indies (4), his interest in geography being allied to his interest in the expansion of Belgian commerce, and to the hopes he had expressed as early as 1860 that Belgium would undertake the work of colonisation (5). ARTHINGTON had never left England, but

(1) *Ibid.*, p. 23.

(2) A. M. CHIRGWIN, *Arthington's Million*, London, 1935, pp. 27-8.

(3) B. M. S. Minutes, 21 IX 80.

(4) L. DE LICHTERVELDE, *Léopold II*, Brussels, 1949, p. 40.

(5) THOMSON, pp. 24-5.

from 1850 onwards he had become absorbed in the study of the Christian missionary enterprise, in which he was animated by the conviction that the Second Coming of Christ waited only for the preaching of the Gospel in every part of the world <sup>(1)</sup>.

In the second half of the nineteenth century it was not surprising that such men saw in Africa a field worthy of their energies. Both South Africa and the Nile region had early claimed ARTHINGTON'S interest. During the 'seventies he was far readier than most men of his time to realise the possibilities of entering the heart of the continent from the West coast by way of the Congo, in spite of the failure of the West coast relief expedition which, under Lieutenant GRANDY, tried unsuccessfully to pass the cataracts in 1873 in an attempt to carry help to LIVINGSTONE. He knew that GRANDY was convinced of the possibility of penetration to the upper river, and also that although the ruling chief at San Salvador was to a certain extent under Portuguese and Catholic influence, he was very ready to receive English missionaries <sup>(2)</sup>. Thus it was that ARTHINGTON, supported by CAMERON'S surmise that the Lualaba was in reality one of the head-waters of the Congo, not of the Nile <sup>(3)</sup>, was ready to take the Congo approach to the interior seriously, even before STANLEY had descended the river.

It was ARTHINGTON'S hope that the L.M.S. would enter Central Africa from the East, while the B.M.S. — which was already working in the Cameroons — was to start from the West coast, so that finally missionaries would meet in the region of the Great Lakes. With his eye on the eastern route, he offered five thousand pounds to the L.M.S. if the Society would begin work on Lake

<sup>(1)</sup> CHIRGWIN, pp. 30-1.

<sup>(2)</sup> GRANDY to ARTHINGTON, 22 XII 74, quoted in ARTHINGTON to the B. M. S. Committee, 14 V 77, printed in BENTLEY, pp. 58-9.

<sup>(3)</sup> V. L. CAMERON, *Across Africa*, 2 vol., London, 1877, II, p. 10.



Tanganyika ; in 1877 the first expedition left the coast for Ujiji. In November 1875 STANLEY'S letter inviting English missionaries to visit King MUTESA of Uganda appeared in the *Daily Telegraph*. The following day ARTHINGTON wrote to KRAPP, a German Lutheran who had formerly worked under the C.M.S. on the East coast, offering to pay the travelling expenses of anyone whom Krapf thought suitable to go. The man who, looking westward from Mombasa in the 'forties, had longed to see a chain of mission stations stretching across Africa <sup>(1)</sup>, was one to appeal to ARTHINGTON, but KRAPP felt that the C.M.S. should undertake the work, as the society was already established on the East coast. He therefore forwarded the letter to the C.M.S. secretary with the remark that " Mr ARTHINGTON is a very wealthy man at Leeds, he is a very spiritual man too, but he has his peculiarities " <sup>(2)</sup>. The society might, he added, expect a contribution from him if it undertook work in Uganda <sup>(3)</sup>.

Thus ARTHINGTON'S interest in the Congo river was no isolated one, but a part of his great concern for the preaching of the Gospel throughout the whole central belt of the continent. Firmly convinced that had CAMERON passed on down the river from Nyangwe, he would have reached those rapids beyond which TUCKEY and GRANDY had not penetrated, ARTHINGTON approached the B.M.S. in May 1877 with the offer of one thousand pounds if the society would undertake mission work in the Congo. It was clear that his interest lay in the interior, not in the coastal regions. With extraordinary confidence he declared his hope that " soon we shall have a steamer

<sup>(1)</sup> E. STOCK, *The History of the Church Missionary Society*, 4 vol., London, 1899-1916, I, p 462.

<sup>(2)</sup> KRAPP to WRIGHT, 3 XII 75. C.M.S. 142.

<sup>(3)</sup> The C. M. S. did so, but as the result of an anonymous offer of five thousand pounds made on 17th November. Stock, III, pp. 95-6.

on the Congo and carry the Gospel eastwards, and north and south of the river, as the way may open as far as Nyangwe" (1). The B.M.S. Committee accepted his offer, and in September the *Missionary Herald* announced the new venture and appealed for men and money. The great significance of the step was shown when, on the 17<sup>th</sup> September, the *Daily Telegraph* reported STANLEY'S arrival at the mouth of the Congo.

This exciting news inspired a second English mission to enter Central Africa by the Congo route. A little group centred on Henry and Fanny Grattan GUINNESS had for some time regretted the exclusive concentration of African missions upon the coastal regions, and had been eager to send a party to the interior (2). In the 'sixties, GUINNESS had been influenced by Hudson TAYLOR, the founder of the China Inland Mission, and his imagination had been fired by the vision of the missionary advance of Christianity into the heart of unknown regions. Later, it was near the little house in East London where Hudson TAYLOR had spent long hours patiently revising his translation of the New Testament, and had gathered together volunteers and funds for a mission to inland China, that GUINNESS and his wife founded the East London Institute at Harley House, as a training college for missionaries (3). The Institute already sent out missionaries to many parts of the world. But just as Hudson TAYLOR was a pioneer in his concern for inland China in the 'sixties, so, a decade later, GUINNESS was drawn to the African interior, and shared his hopes with some of the supporters of the Institute. The news of STANLEY'S appearance at Boma led the group to plan a mission which would enter the continent by way of

(1) BENTLEY, I, pp. 58-9.

(2) GUINNESS, p. 79.

(3) F. H. and M. G. TAYLOR, *Hudson Taylor and the China Inland Mission* London, 1918, p. 56.

the newly-discovered Congo route. It was to be called the Livingstone Inland Mission — for the Congo was known for a short time as the Livingstone river, and, moreover, this was another venture inspired by LIVINGSTONE'S challenge and example.

Thus two parallel attempts were made by English missions to reach the interior by way of the Congo. In January 1878, George GRENFELL and Thomas COMBER of the Baptist mission in the Cameroons accepted their Committee's commission to undertake a pioneer survey of the lower river <sup>(1)</sup>, and immediately set sail on a journey which took them to the Congo mouth, and eighty-five miles up the river as far as Musuku. Before returning they wrote to the King of Kongo, to inform him that they hoped to pay him an early visit. Hardly had GRENFELL and COMBER left than, in February 1878, STROM and CRAVEN arrived at Boma as the advance guard of the L.I.M., to be joined after a few months by TELFORD and JOHNSON.

So far, as we have already seen, the Catholic missionaries working on the coast had shown little interest in inland penetration by way of the Congo river. The first decisive Catholic reaction to the opening up of Central Africa came, like that of LEOPOLD II on the secular side and that of ARTHINGTON for the Protestants, from Europe. The initiative again belonged to a far-sighted and imaginative individual who was capable of grasping the significance of the European advance into Central Africa. He, like LEOPOLD and ARTHINGTON, was endued with the energy, perseverance, and powers of organisation which could turn the movement to good account for the purpose he had most at heart. It was to Cardinal LAVIGERIE that the Catholic advance into the interior of the continent owed its primary impulse. The Cardinal

(1) W. Y. FULLERTON, *The Christ of the Congo river*, London, 1928, p. 27.

of Algiers had already founded a new missionary congregation — the *Société de Notre-Dame d'Afrique* or the White Fathers — to work among the Moslems of North Africa. But like ARTHINGTON and LEOPOLD he did not confine his attention to any one part of Africa, and he followed with close attention the proceedings of the Brussels Conference and the formation of the International African Association. The Protestant majority at the Brussels Conference alarmed him ; the stations to be set up by the Association were purely secular in purpose and, he thought, would tend to be Protestant or anti-religious in sympathy. Thus he was convinced of the urgent need for Catholic missionary advance. The Cardinal greatly over-estimated the Protestant influence at Brussels, for in fact, the Protestant missions about to enter Central Africa were quite independent of any government support, and England, the most influential Protestant power represented at Brussels, was holding aloof from the Association altogether.

But LAVIGERIE was eager to act promptly. In the summer of 1877 he suggested to Rome that a mission should be sent to the Great Lakes region, and early in 1878 he set forth his plan in a secret memorandum addressed to the Prefect of the Propaganda <sup>(1)</sup>. His White Fathers were offered for mission work in Central Africa, where their first efforts were to be directed towards the foundation of freed slave orphanages. These would in turn lead to the establishment of Christian colonies set like beacons of light in the midst of pagan surroundings. The conception was very different from that of ARTHINGTON, who wanted the Gospel preached with haste in every accessible part of Africa, in order that the Second Coming of Christ should not be delayed. The Cardinal was thinking in terms of the plantation of outposts of

(1) M. STORME, *Rapports du Père Planque, de Mgr Lavigerie et de Mgr Camboni sur l'Association Internationale Africaine, Brussels, 1957.*

Christianity as the prelude to a planned attack upon the paganism of Africa, and to the establishment of the Church. Once he had secured the approval of Rome, he did not delay. The first party of White Fathers left Marseilles in April 1878, and groups were soon settled at Tabora, in Buganda and on Lake Tanganyika. The Cardinal's first attempts were made from the East coast, although his interest lay in the whole central belt of Africa from east to west, for in 1878 Rome had decided to set up four mission territories in Central Africa — Victoria Nyanza, Tanganyika, and Eastern and Western Congo — all four being placed under the care of the White Fathers. But for the moment LAVIGERIE was primarily concerned with East Africa; ARTHINGTON and the Protestant missionaries had preceded him in their attempt to make use of the Congo route into the interior.

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The English missionaries at work in the lower Congo were obliged to defend what appeared, to their supporters at home, to be an undue emphasis upon geographical tasks rather than upon spiritual progress. Happily they could put forward a claim to follow in the true Livingstonian tradition, since this explorer-missionary was accepted as an authority on the evangelisation of Africa by High Churchmen, Low Churchmen and Free Churchmen alike. Had not LIVINGSTONE himself declared that the end of the geographical feat was the beginning of the missionary enterprise? During their first few years in the Congo, missionaries were forced to concentrate their energies upon tackling the problems posed by the geography of the region between the coast and Stanley Pool, and missionary committees had to admit to impatient subscribers that “the spiritual stage of missionary

work... has not yet been reached in Congoland" (1). Until 1877 the lower river falls had completely barred access into Central Africa by way of the Congo. Less than a hundred miles up river, Yellala Falls — "TURKEY'S FURTHEST" — had remained the limit of European penetration. Then suddenly STANLEY'S journey down the river had shown the immense possibilities which lay beyond, and had demonstrated that above the Pool the river was navigable for thousands of miles. Yet the problem of penetration to the interior remained formidable enough, for above Vivi there were nearly three hundred miles of cataracts to be passed before the Pool was reached, with only one stretch of navigable water between Isangila and Manyanga. And overland travel was full of discouragement, especially between Manyanga and the Pool, where an apparently endless switch-back track cut across the forested valleys of the Congo tributaries.

Europeans who made the effort to travel inland needed a vast amount of equipment — medicine chests, tools, provisions, geographical instruments, notebooks, cloth and other barter materials. But at first it seemed impossible to persuade the coastal peoples to act as carriers on the way to the Pool, for their former slave-raiding had left a legacy of hatred which made them afraid to venture very far from home. So there was the additional difficulty of bringing carriers from a distance — STANLEY was accompanied by a party of Zanzibaris when he arrived at the Congo mouth in 1879, while early B.M.S. and L.I.M. expeditions relied upon men of the far-famed Kru tribe (2). It was impossible for AUGOUARD to start for the Pool in 1881 until he had procured Gabo-

(1) *The Regions Beyond*, the journal of the East London Institute for Home and Foreign Missions, London, Feb. 1881.

(2) BENTLEY, I, p. 94 ; GUINNESS, p. 230.

nese carriers <sup>(1)</sup>. There was no alternative ; attempts to use donkeys for transport proved to be as impracticable in Congo conditions as were LEOPOLD'S plans to use elephants brought from India <sup>(2)</sup>.

The climate, the insects, the fevers of the lower Congo increased the hardships of swift forced marches over flat ground, of arduous climbs and sudden descents, of bridge-building with canes and creepers. Guides were needed from almost every village, for it was often impossible to follow the zigzag course of the river ; when they refused their services or put too high a price upon them, the hills had to be crossed by the confusing network of African paths which straggled between the towns. It was best to use the summer, the dry season, for travel, but then the missionaries found themselves hindered by the fear that their coming would mean no rain <sup>(3)</sup>. The white man was thought to be more powerful than the traditional rain-makers, and to possess all the secrets of witch-craft, so that he could control the weather at will. There were other fears too — the missionary might be looking for slaves <sup>(4)</sup>, or he might leave behind him a smallpox epidemic <sup>(5)</sup>. All kinds of hindrances could be put in his way by the suspicious tribesmen ; time was consumed by their refusal to sell food, then by long haggling over its price, by lengthy discussion of the presents expected from the European, by the pretence of a display of hospitality designed to delay him as long as possible.

Understandably enough, European traders had not considered it worth their while to press inland, when

<sup>(1)</sup> G. GOYAU, *Monseigneur Augouard*, Paris, 1926, p. 42.

<sup>(2)</sup> BENTLEY, I, p. 130 ; GUINNESS, pp. 224-9.

<sup>(3)</sup> BENTLEY, I, pp. 137, 313.

<sup>(4)</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 315.

<sup>(5)</sup> A small-pox epidemic had chanced to coincide with GRANDY'S expedition, and so had become connected in the minds of the lower river peoples with the passage of an European.

ivory had been brought to them at the coast by middlemen living in the towns near the European factories. Dutch, French, English, Spanish and Portuguese factories were established at Banana and at Boma, but above Boma there were only two small independent trading posts at Musuku and Noki. Trade was good; the cowries, beads, cloth, firearms and spirits offered by the traders were eagerly accepted in exchange for ivory, palm oil, rubber and ground nuts. The missionaries who first arrived at the Congo mouth were highly critical of coastal life. Traders bought slaves for their own use, since local labour could not be persuaded to enrol freely, and HOPKINS, the British Consul at Loanda, had for some time been aware of the ill-treatment suffered by these slaves <sup>(1)</sup>. Missionaries objected, too, to the use of spirits as barter goods. They longed to work in the interior, "where the Gospel might be preached unhindered by the hostile influence of demoralising traders" <sup>(2)</sup>.

But the fact that the traders themselves had not tried to penetrate to the interior, meant that any European party moving inland would find its difficulties increased by the protective trade policy of certain of the tribes between the coast and the Pool. There were two main trade routes, used first for slaves and later for ivory. On the north bank, European goods were passed from town to town at the markets held, on succeeding days, in the open spaces between the towns. Below Manyanga STANLEY was to find the people eager to trade directly with Europeans. Each group saw that it would be to its own advantage to have white traders close at hand, and as trade lower down the river was not in the hands of a single influential group, there seems to have been no concerted action to discourage European settlement.

<sup>(1)</sup> He wrote of the use of thumb-screws, and mentioned cases of the drowning of slaves by European traders. HOPKINS to F. O., 28 IV 77. F. O. 84/1478.

<sup>(2)</sup> J. B. MYERS, *The Congo for Christ*, London, 1895, p. 17.



But between Manyanga and the Pool the situation was very different. As early as 1877, when STANLEY had first passed down the river, Bakongo and Bazombo middlemen had tried to conserve their own profitable position by persuading the Babwende to keep Europeans away.

A second trade route ran from the south shore of the Pool through Tungwa to San Salvador, and thence to the Congo mouth, or to the coast at Loanda. On this route, the Bazombo in the Makutu region around Tungwa were unwilling to give up their profitable position as middlemen, and so opposed European penetration. The missionaries met with opposition wherever trade was in the hands of powerful and clearly-defined groups. The unfriendliness of NGA LIEMA, a Bateke chief living near Stanley Pool, provides an example of this. Based on Kintamo on the south shore of the Pool, NGA LIEMA controlled a profitable trade, buying from the Bayanzi who brought ivory from the upper river and reselling at a profit to Bakongo and Bazombo traders in exchange for European trade goods. Although an upstart, he had made good marriage alliances, had grown wealthy and invested his profits in slaves, guns and powder, and had become a force to be reckoned with. The Bawumbu, the original owners of the land round Kintamo, had gradually fallen completely under his influence. Later, it was by an appeal to the self-interest of the Bawumbu that STANLEY won their friendship and so was able to plant a station at the Pool, and to break the Bateke trade monopoly.

So both on the north bank and on the south, Europeans could expect to meet with trade opposition. STANLEY decided to follow the north bank; when he returned to Congo in 1879 he planted his first station at Vivi and planned to construct a road from Vivi to Isangila. After hauling up a boat in order to use the navi-

gable water between Isangila and Manyanga, he intended to continue the road between Manyanga and the Pool. Meanwhile, the B.M.S. missionaries had followed the well-worn trade route to San Salvador, capital of the Kingdom of Kongo. As they had expected from GRANDY'S report, PEDRO V appeared glad to see them. He gave BENTLEY and CRUDGINGTON a royal audience when they arrived, professed himself delighted with the mechanical toys which COMBER and HARTLAND presented to him a few days later, and was eager to hear their preaching. The boys at San Salvador proved anxious to learn to read, expecting literacy to be a quick road to easy profit.

But although the missionaries found that prospects for work at San Salvador were hopeful, their primary aim was to press further inland. When COMBER returned to discuss mission policy with the Committee early in 1879, San Salvador was accepted as a base station, but the declared duty of the Society was to prosecute this most interesting work... having always in view reaching the interior of the continent by the waterway of the mighty Congo river <sup>(1)</sup>. The Committee directed that Makutu, a little further inland, was to be occupied as soon as possible by a catechist from the Cameroons. So the missionaries settled at San Salvador, built houses of grass, then of stone, began medical and educational work, conducted services, but all the time consciously aimed at opening a road to the Pool by encouraging the spread of a favourable report of their activities throughout the country <sup>(2)</sup>. There were constant efforts to press inland. When they were turned back from Makutu, they immediately tried to advance by way of Zombo or Sanda. As early as May 1880, when the prospect of reaching Stanley Pool seemed very distant, ARTHINGTON

(1) B. M. S. Minutes, 15 I 79.

(2) BENTLEY, I, p. 155.

offered the Society a thousand pounds towards the purchase of a steamer for use on the upper river — on condition that the B.M.S. should plant stations well above the Pool, with the aim of linking up with the L.M.S. on Lake Tanganyika. The Committee decided that it would “ cheerfully comply ” with this request <sup>(1)</sup>. It would not yet increase the number of missionaries in the field, as COMBER had asked, but would wait until the Pool was reached, since this was to be the “ permanent base ” of the mission <sup>(2)</sup>.

Thus there was one attempt after another to reach the Pool from the south by using the Makutu, Sanda and Zombo routes from San Salvador <sup>(3)</sup>. Time after time, however, the missionaries were kept back by the protective trade policy of the tribes through which they had to pass. In one attempt late in 1880 COMBER was struck by a bullet, and he and HARTLAND barely escaped with their lives. Eighteen months of discouragement seemed to prove that the mission must look in another direction for a road to the Pool.

The L.I.M., in contrast, had never been attracted to San Salvador. Before writing to the B.M.S., ARTHINGTON had approached GUINNESS with the suggestion that he should organise a mission to the Kingdom of Kongo, but GUINNESS had refused because he believed that lingering memories of Catholicism would hinder the work <sup>(4)</sup>. It was STANLEY's appearance at the mouth of the Congo that led to the formation of the L.I.M., and the immediate aim of the mission was to reach the Pool as quickly as possible. CRAVEN, the pioneer missionary, surmised that armed force would be necessary to overcome opposition on the north bank, and so he decided to

<sup>(1)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 15 VI 80.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Ibid.*, 21 VII 80.

<sup>(3)</sup> BENTLEY, I, pp. 77-83, 130-4, 165-6, 190-4, 205-10.

<sup>(4)</sup> GUINNESS, p. 177.

keep to the south of the river. He settled at Palabala, built a house and opened a school ; early in 1879 a second party planted a station fifty miles further up the cataract gorge at Banza Manteke <sup>(1)</sup>.

By the beginning of 1880, L.I.M. supporters began to realise that it was not so easy to reach the Pool as they had expected. Early in 1880 a better-equipped expedition was sent out under McCALL <sup>(2)</sup>, who hoped to arrive at Stanley Pool before the end of the dry season. This proved an impossible task ; donkey transport failed, and carriers were almost unobtainable. But from Banza Manteke it was only a short distance to the navigable water between Isangila and Manyanga, and McCALL was able to travel a little way up river in local canoes before the beginning of the rains. The disappointment of his failure to go further convinced the committee responsible for the L.I.M. that a mission could reach the upper river only at a very heavy cost in transport, barter goods and equipment. The group had undertaken the venture expecting that it would soon become self-supporting, but it was clear that in spite of all CRAVEN's efforts at raising crops, this hope would never be realised. Previously GUINNESS had been an ordinary member of the committee ; now it was decided that responsibility for the L.I.M. should be taken over officially by the East London Institute <sup>(3)</sup>.

Thus, in the autumn of 1880, STANLEY was slowly making his road along the north bank of the river, the Baptist missionaries were unsuccessfully struggling to break through the opposition on the routes northward from San Salvador, and the L.I.M. had only reached Banza Manteke. But these were not the only parties interested in reaching the Pool. France was beginning

<sup>(1)</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 189, 198.

<sup>(2)</sup> *R. B.*, April 1880.

<sup>(3)</sup> GUINNESS, p. 240.

to realise the importance of the Congo, and Count Savorgnan DE BRAZZA was in the field, leading an expedition which, although nominally sponsored by the French committee of the International African Association, was in reality a rival to STANLEY'S in an attempt to be first at the Pool. In October 1880 DE BRAZZA forestalled STANLEY after a journey up the Ogowe and a speedy overland march. At the Pool he made a treaty with the chief MAKOKO, and annexed the north bank, together with a smaller piece of territory on the south, in the name of France <sup>(1)</sup>.

DE BRAZZA'S activity was to have a considerable effect upon missionary enterprise in the lower Congo. For eighteen months B.M.S. missionaries had unsuccessfully made one attempt after another to reach the Pool from San Salvador, and they were ready to try a new route. Then, simultaneously, came the news that DE BRAZZA had come down from the Pool by the north bank, and that the Makutu opposition had collapsed. It was decided, therefore, that while COMBER should make yet another attempt by the southern route, BENTLEY and CRUDGINGTON should try the north bank <sup>(2)</sup>. Since the missionaries were moving inland, they expected to meet more opposition than DE BRAZZA had done, and realised that they needed to move quickly. From Vivi they were able to use the road to Isangila which STANLEY had just completed, but without a boat they were then faced with a five hundred mile journey to the Pool and back, travelling overland in completely unknown territory. Speed alone could serve them, and it was after a journey of only twenty-one days from Vivi that they successfully reached their goal in February 1881.

In the summer of 1881 CRUDGINGTON returned home to confer with the Committee. It was decided to keep

<sup>(1)</sup> THOMSON, pp. 77-80.

<sup>(2)</sup> BENTLEY, I, p. 298.

the station at San Salvador, but the Committee regarded it as "absolutely necessary" to move forward to the Pool. Intermediate stations were to be planted at Isangila and Mbu on the north bank, and a base station on the north-west shore of the Pool at Ibiu. GRENFELL was to return to England to superintend the building of a steamer for use on the upper river, and six new men were to be sent out (1). A Plymouth subscriber had supplied the Society with a small steel sectional boat like STANLEY'S, and this was to carry stores between Isangila and Manyanga. As far as Isangila STANLEY'S road could already be used, and the section between Manyanga and the Pool would soon be completed. Altogether the prospect of a move forward to the Pool seemed very hopeful, and B.M.S. supporters were as enthusiastic in providing funds as those of the L.I.M. had been when MCCALL set out for Stanley Pool in 1881 (2).

Although MCCALL had not at first succeeded in reaching his goal, the L.I.M. had not given up hope. As early as 1881 it had accepted the gift of the *Henry Reed*, a steamer for use on the upper river (3). Unlike the B.M.S., the mission decided against using STANLEY'S road on the north bank, and planned to continue the line of stations which it had already begun on the south. Thus Mukimbungu was planted early in 1882, and then Lukunga, thirty miles further on (4). Nine new missionaries had arrived during 1881.

DE BRAZZA'S activity in the Congo led the Baptist mission to make its attempt on the Pool by using the north bank route; it had a still greater effect upon the policy of the Holy Ghost Fathers. DE BRAZZA was eager

(1) B. M. S. Minutes, 20 VII 81.

(2) BENTLEY, I, p. 372; GUINNESS, pp. 209-10.

(3) GUINNESS, p. 268.

(4) STANLEY, too, had decided to cross the river above Manyanga. Later the main caravan route was on the south bank, and the B. M. S. also crossed over.

for the establishment of French missionaries at the Pool, for he felt that their presence would lend additional weight to the Makoko treaty. In 1881 he visited the Holy Ghost mission at Landana, and found there a young missionary who was very ready to support his plans. Prosper-Philippe AUGOUARD was impulsive by nature; he had abruptly left his seminary rather than submit to an unjust punishment <sup>(1)</sup>, and gone off to fight for France in the war of 1870. Once ordained priest, he preferred missionary labours in Africa to parish life at home, and was enthusiastic at the thought of doing pioneer work in the interior. Encouraged by DE BRAZZA, it was not long before he was expounding the idea of a mission "qui ne s'arrêterait que lorsque les Pères de Landana auraient rencontré leurs confrères du Zanzibar sur les lacs Nyanza et Tanganyika" <sup>(2)</sup>. Like ARTHINGTON, he had caught the vision of a line of Christian mission stations stretching from the Congo mouth into the heart of the continent, there to be linked with a chain begun on the East coast.

For AUGOUARD, as for the Baptist mission, the first step was the Pool. In April 1881 he started up river from Landana. It was not until July that he was ready to leave Boma, but by the beginning of August he had followed STANLEY up to the Pool. Here he left two catechists before returning to the coast <sup>(3)</sup>. During 1882 he was fully occupied at the missions of St Antoine and Boma, but had not forgotten his hope of moving towards the upper river. Finally in the summer of 1883 he was ready to go forward <sup>(4)</sup>, and in September arrived at the Pool. Five hours' journey to the south he planted the station of Linzola.

(1) J. DE WITTE, *Monseigneur Augouard*, Paris, 1924, p. 6.

(2) GOYAU, p. 36.

(3) G. BESLIER, *L'Apôtre du Congo*, Paris, 1932, p. 90.

(4) GOYAU, p. 59.

By this time, both the B.M.S. and the L.I.M. had established themselves at Stanley Pool and were beginning to look ahead towards work on the upper river. In 1881 STANLEY had founded his post of Leopoldville at the Pool, so the missions had felt it safe to assume that the Association would keep the route open <sup>(1)</sup>. There was even hope of a railway, for in the autumn of 1882 STANLEY was in Europe urging the project of a line to link the coast with the upper river <sup>(2)</sup>. Thus in 1882 the B.M.S. obtained a site at the Pool from STANLEY, and in the following year built Arthington station <sup>(3)</sup>. Similarly the L.I.M. obtained land from STANLEY, and settled at Leopoldville in 1883 <sup>(4)</sup>.

Both missions had built up a line of communications between the coast and the Pool by 1883. The L.I.M. continued to use the southern route, with an intermediate station at Maseke, between Lukunga and the Pool <sup>(5)</sup>. The Baptists, like STANLEY, moved to the south bank for the second stage of the lower river journey. The B.M.S. Wathen station (named after Sir Charles WATHEN of Bristol) had been planted at Manyanga in 1881, but two and a half years later was removed to a site at Ngombe Lutete. This was on the caravan route to the south of the river, for easier overland portorage now meant that the mission no longer needed a boat on the Isangila-Manyanga stretch. The temporary post at

<sup>(1)</sup> This was the *Association Internationale du Congo*. The *Comité d'Études du Haut-Congo*, created in December 1878, aimed at the future commercial exploitation of the Congo basin. It was dissolved late in 1879, to allow Leopold to take full control of the Congo enterprise and so be free to follow a political programme, but he continued to use the name until the end of 1882, when the term *Association Internationale du Congo* took its place. The missionaries used the two names indiscriminately for STANLEY's expedition or even referred to it as the *Association Internationale Africaine*.

<sup>(2)</sup> H. M. STANLEY, *The Congo and the founding of its Free State*, London, 1885, 2 vol., I, p. 463.

<sup>(3)</sup> BENTLEY, II, p. 14.

<sup>(4)</sup> GUINNESS, p. 355-6.

<sup>(5)</sup> *R. B.*, April May 1883.



Isangila had already been moved to the south bank, and given the name of Bayneston. It was hardly surprising that at home, where there was little conception of the difficulties involved in moving inland to the Pool, there should be complaints that the missionaries changed their stations with unreasonable frequency <sup>(1)</sup>. But this was still a period of preparation. Upper river work was the goal constantly held before supporters of the missions at home. In the spring of 1883 the B.M.S. stressed the fact that Stanley Pool was to be regarded as a *base* station <sup>(2)</sup>, while in the autumn the L.I.M. pointed out that it hoped, before long, to advance to the upper Congo <sup>(3)</sup>.

By the end of 1884 there were two missionary steamers at the Pool — the B.M.S. had the *Peace* there; the L.I.M. had the *Henry Reed*. GRENFELL had made his first prospecting trip on the upper river. The energetic SIMS of the L.I.M. was planning a station at the Equator, while GRENFELL had plans for one B.M.S. station at Lukolela and another at Bolobo. Both missions were looking ahead to the time when they would have a station at Stanley Falls. The B.M.S. had already laid down a definite programme. After a donation of two thousand pounds had been received from ARTHINGTON in the summer of 1884, as an encouragement for a speedy move forward, the Committee decided that ten stations were to be planted between the Pool and the Falls, with two missionaries at each. Six new men were to be sent to the field as soon as possible <sup>(4)</sup>. It seemed that at last the preliminary stage of missionary work in the Congo had ended, and that the main work — the evangelisation of the upper river — had begun. The B.M.S. Committee at once appealed for the men and the means to establish

(1) BENTLEY, I, p. 448.

(2) B. M.S. Report, March 1883.

(3) *R. B.*, Aug.-Sept. 1883.

(4) BENTLEY, II, p. 77.

a line of stations covering the thousand miles between the Pool and the Falls <sup>(1)</sup>.

During their first five years of preparatory work in the lower Congo, missionaries had been geographers and explorers, linguists and builders, mechanics and carpenters. They were faced with a strange assortment of tasks. The L.I.M. announced in 1881 that three of its recruits were engaged in studying tanning, shoe-making, the erection of sawmills and waterwheels, and similar useful skills <sup>(2)</sup>. It was GRENFELL himself who constructed the *Peace*, after the two engineers sent out to do so had died on their way to the Congo <sup>(3)</sup>. BILLINGTON did the same for the *Henry Reed* <sup>(4)</sup>. The death-roll in these early years was a heavy one, although no heavier than that of the employees of the Association. Missionaries had gone out unprepared for the living conditions of the lower Congo, they had little medical skill, and were perhaps unwisely energetic in a tropical climate. By the end of 1881 the L.I.M. had lost four men, and three more died in 1882. In 1883 the B.M.S. had six deaths to report. There was no idea of giving up the work on that account; when BENTLEY and CRUDGINGTON had first shown the way to the Pool to be a practical possibility, the B.M.S. Committee had not been afraid to ask for men prepared to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the future mission in the Congo interior <sup>(5)</sup>.

The Holy Ghost Fathers were somewhat critical of Protestant activity. They themselves were thinking not primarily in terms of the conversion of individuals, but of the plantation of the Church on African soil. A stable organisation of Christianity seemed to them to entail

<sup>(1)</sup> *The Missionary Herald*, London, Aug. 1884.

<sup>(2)</sup> *R. B.*, Feb. 1881.

<sup>(3)</sup> BENTLEY, II, pp. 62-63.

<sup>(4)</sup> GUINNESS, pp. 360, 386.

<sup>(5)</sup> *M. H.*, August 1881.

the establishment of permanent centres of Christian life. The Boma mission, a settlement of freed slave children, with its large plantations, its agricultural and industrial training, was certainly very different from the lower river stations of the B.M.S. and the L.I.M., some of them intended as temporary posts only, and none of them designed to cater for the social as well as the spiritual welfare of large numbers of children. AUGOUARD was critical of the lack of practical and agricultural training, which he considered as necessary as intellectual and moral education (1). He was surprised at the interest of the Protestant missionaries in geographical and ethnographical problems, and at their constant movement from place to place in their attempt to find the best way to the Pool. In fact, however, even the temporary stations were busy with the more orthodox missionary tasks of teaching, preaching and healing. Very early the missionary began to gather a little group of boys to whom a particularly intensive instruction was given. Already in 1883 it was realised that Europeans could not evangelize the whole territory, and it was held that mission stations should be the centres where the future African evangelists were trained (2). Selected children were brought to England, both to hold out to missionary supporters at home living examples of the results of missionary labours, and to help the missionaries on furlough to continue with their laborious language study. The earliest converts came from such little groups ; indeed, the first L.I.M. baptismal service was held in England (3).

At San Salvador the boys were anxious to learn to read, and further inland the people were eager to be healed. Epsom salts and quinine were sufficient to make

(1) *Missions Catholiques*, XVIII, 1886, p. 94.

(2) *R. B.*, June-July 1883.

(3) GUINNESS, p. 317.

a profound impression. The good news of the advent of the missionary was announced thus at Stanley Pool by MBONGA, accompanying COMBER :

‘ The English have come to mend or make the country and to put everything straight. God has sent them, they have got His book and will teach you all His words. They will teach all your boys to read and write and speak English, and will train them into all good habits. They have thousands of medicines too with which they know how to heal all sick people. ’ (1)

In doing their best to carry out this comprehensive programme, the missionaries came to wield no little influence in the neighbourhood around their stations. There were constant demands for teaching, for healing, for advice, for arbitration, if seldom enough for the message which they had come to bring. On the whole the missionary was accepted as a useful acquisition to African society, but he was not understood. As BENTLEY remarked : “ It is the prevailing opinion that the Ingeleza is very good, but his goodness is a hopeless enigma ” (2). Thus far his actions might seem strange enough, for he had apparently spent most of his energy on geographical problems. Yet at the same time, early missionary efforts in medical, educational and evangelistic activity showed the lines along which his work was to develop, once the vision of reaching the African interior became a reality.

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Their early experiences served to show the missionaries how greatly they would be helped by the establishment of a stable European authority in the Congo. Their peaceful attempts at preaching, teaching, and healing were constantly disturbed by the unsettled conditions of the lower river. Each town in the region was hostile

(1) COMBER to BAYNES, 28 X 82. B. M. S.

(2) BENTLEY to UNDERHILL, 9 V 82. B. M. S.

to its neighbour, and petty wars broke out between them at the slightest provocation, while there was no powerful chief with authority over a large area who could be persuaded to take the missionaries under his protection. Only European government could provide the peace and security that they needed to carry on their activities. Among people for whom "gentleness, patience, and long-suffering were only cowardice and weakness" (1), the missionary was ready to welcome the establishment of justice even by force of arms. This was true in the lower Congo, where missionaries were often glad enough to seek the protection of STANLEY and the Association, but on the upper river they were to realise even more forcibly that European arms alone could stem the current of the Arab invasion flowing eastwards down the Congo.

European government would not only bring relief from the constant outbreaks of fighting natural to African tribal life, but it might also be expected to abolish the evils of the old social order, and to provide the amenities which would relieve the missions of some of their burden of temporal concerns. The question for the missionaries was not, in any case, whether they desired to see European authority in the Congo, but which Power was to rule there. STANLEY'S journey had effectively placed the Congo river upon the map of Africa, and it was clear that by the end of 1878 the basin was attracting the attention of European governments. Portugal was beginning to realise that if her ancient claims to the region were to be justified, they must be supported by a display of activity. France was represented on the coast by her traders and missionaries, and both groups would be eager to press inland once the way opened up. STANLEY had accepted service under LEOPOLD, and was about to set off in charge of the King's first expedition.

(1) BENTLEY, I, p. 430.

Great Britain had shown a complete lack of interest in territorial acquisition in the Congo basin, and certainly Free Church missions were not at all anxious to give the impression that they were there in the interests of the British Government. But they could not remain aloof from political questions, with Portugal, France and the Association all rivals in the field.

At first sight it seems surprising that the missions had not supported STANLEY'S campaign to arouse English interest in his scheme for the opening up of the Congo basin. This campaign had been begun by suggestions in his letters to the *Daily Telegraph*, and continued by his articles, public meetings and lectures throughout 1878. It was especially in the north of England that he hoped to arouse a sense of the commercial value of the Congo (1). Probably because they were among those who thought that STANLEY "put commerce before religion" (2), the missionary societies had appeared quite unmoved by the idea of Great Britain acquiring the Congo. The Baptists, of course, had few of the close personal links with Westminster enjoyed by the C.M.S. (3), and their comments were marked by a certain idealism rather than by practical political considerations (4). Not yet realising how much Congo missions were to owe to STANLEY'S work, Free Churchmen had stood aloof from the explorer and his methods, criticising his ruthlessness, and contrasting his use of force with the behaviour of LIVINGSTONE (5).

(1) F. HIRD, *H. M. Stanley*, London, 1935, p. 171.

(2) D. STANLEY, *The autobiography of Sir Henry Morton Stanley*, London, 1909, p. 334.

(3) OLIVER, p. 12.

(4) "One thing the Continentals, and especially the Germans, have determined on — that England shall not be allowed to annex the newly discovered region. And they are right. The Congo should not be annexed to any nation, but should be free to all". *The Freeman*, organ of the Baptist denomination, London, 26 IV 78.

(5) *Freeman*, 2 XI 77.

But if the Baptist mission expected little assistance from STANLEY in 1877, it expected downright opposition from Portugal, both because she was a Catholic power <sup>(1)</sup>, and because her encouragement of the slave trade would hinder missionary work <sup>(2)</sup>. The first party to arrive at San Salvador in 1879 encountered her old-established influence. PEDRO V gave the missionaries a warm welcome, but he warned them that if they wished to "live always" at his capital they should obtain permission from the Portuguese Governor at Loanda, or he might find himself in trouble <sup>(3)</sup>. COMBER accordingly wrote to the Governor — somewhat to the dismay of the British consul at Loanda <sup>(4)</sup>, since the British government had never recognised the claims of the Portuguese to the Congo region. HUNT himself, however, made unofficial representations on behalf of the Baptist mission. He found that the Portuguese Governor was very eager to adopt a protective tone towards the Congo region, although on religious grounds the Governor professed himself unwilling to assist a Protestant settlement at San Salvador.

The Baptist missionaries felt that their earlier misgivings were justified when, at the beginning of 1881, the Portuguese tried to strengthen their position in the Congo by means of a missionary expedition to San Salvador. The British consul had no doubt of its political aims <sup>(5)</sup>, and feared that it might "compel the Protes-

<sup>(1)</sup> "The Portuguese officials... under the influence of the Catholic authorities of St. Paul de Loanda... will do their best to stop the expedition". *Freeman*, 2 XI 77.

<sup>(2)</sup> *M. H.*, Dec. 1877.

<sup>(3)</sup> BENTLEY, I, p. 116.

<sup>(4)</sup> It is "certainly irregular, taking into consideration the geographical position of the Congo, trying to place himself under the protection of the Governor General of Angola, and only addressing H. M. Consul incidentally". HUNT to F. O., 20 VIII 79. F. O. 63/1087.

<sup>(5)</sup> "...it will probably be the means of obtaining the consent of the King and people to a military occupation by the Portuguese". COHEN to F. O., 10 XII 80. F. O. 84/1566.

tant mission to abandon its labours, hitherto so successfully and peacefully carried on". The three priests who arrived at Loanda in January were accompanied by a military and a naval officier. They brought presents and a letter from the King of Portugal to PEDRO V, and a Portuguese gun-boat was to be sent monthly to watch over their interests. The presence of the two rival missions at his capital put PEDRO V in a difficult position ; unsure whether it was politic for him to support one rather than the other, he pled sickness on Sundays, and for several weeks attended neither Mass nor the preaching of the Word <sup>(1)</sup>.

It was clear to the English missionaries that if Portuguese influence in the Congo grew stronger, so also would Catholic influence. It seemed probable, too, that French Catholic missionary effort would be closely linked with the advance of the French flag. The Baptists had already met the activity of the Holy Ghost Fathers at San Salvador, for in November 1879 PEDRO V had received a letter from the Superior at Boma to warn him against his English visitors. Its resume of Protestant history, starting with HENRY VIII, LUTHER and CALVIN, left the King so confused that he applied to the Baptist missionaries for elucidation <sup>(2)</sup>. Although he was ready to welcome the Holy Ghost Fathers <sup>(3)</sup>, they did not in fact settle at San Salvador, for at the time their Boma mission absorbed all available personnel, and later they allowed the Portuguese to take charge of the district.

The incident had left the Baptist missionaries with no very friendly feelings towards the Holy Ghost Fathers, and thus they tended to be suspicious of French political activity in the Congo. CRUDGINGTON and BENTLEY

(1) BENTLEY, I, p. 379.

(2) BENTLEY, I, p. 161.

(3) PEDRO V to P. CARRIE, 13 VII 80 ; translation in *Missions Catholiques*, XII, 1880, p. 571.



discovered something of DE BRAZZA's work at the Pool even before STANLEY knew of it. When they arrived there early in 1881 they found that the French flag had been planted on the south bank, and they were met by a hostile reception from people who had been told by DE BRAZZA that they were now Frenchmen, and that other Europeans who came to take their country were to be driven off (1). As soon as BENTLEY and CRUDGINGTON reached Musuku they sent a report of the episode to the British consul (2), and when CRUDGINGTON returned home in the summer of 1881 he urged the Committee to inform the Government immediately of the French action at Stanley Pool (3). Several approaches were made, but the Foreign Office reply was non-committal (4), for it was not until later that it became seriously alarmed about the intentions of France in the Congo. The Baptist missionaries had been aware in the spring that AUGOUARD was planning a mission at the Pool (5), and they were anxious not to be forestalled there (6), while the Holy Ghost Fathers were equally eager not to be outdistanced by Protestant advance (7). We have already noticed a close connection between French political and missionary efforts; DE BRAZZA wanted missionaries at the Pool to uphold the flag until France could take official possession of the country, and AUGOUARD was ready to think in terms of a double allegiance: "Pour Dieu! Pour la France!" (8). It is not surprising, therefore, that the

(1) BENTLEY, I, p. 355.

(2) CRUDGINGTON to COHEN, 14 IV 81. F. O. 84/1801.

(3) B. M. S. Minutes, 21 VI 81.

(4) 'Lord GRANVILLE has not sufficient information to allow him to pronounce definitely on Count DE BRAZZA's proceedings'. F. O. to BAYNES, 11 VIII 81. F. O. 84/1801.

(5) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 30 IV 81. B. M. S.

(6) BENTLEY, I, pp. 383-4.

(7) Letter of CARRIE, 15 IV 81, in *M. C.*, XIII, 1881, pp. 434-35.

(8) M. B. STORME, *Evangelisatiepogingen in de binnenlanden van Afrika*, Brussels, 1951, p. 557.

Baptist missionaries were apprehensive of the extension of either French or Portuguese political influence in the Congo, since it involved a corresponding increase of Catholic activity.

There appeared to be one alternative. During their first few years in the lower Congo, the missionaries had naturally come into contact with STANLEY'S expedition. Their earlier suspicions of the explorer disappeared when they found themselves making use of his road, while his cordiality towards them <sup>(1)</sup> contrasted favourably with the treatment they had received from the Portuguese at San Salvador and the French at the Pool. It therefore seemed to them providential that the *Association Internationale du Congo* had taken upon itself the task of introducing European civilization into the Congo basin. We shall examine later the care with which LEOPOLD stressed the philanthropic and international character of his enterprise, and concealed his economic and national aspirations. So it was quite natural that in its memorandum to Lord GRANVILLE on the subject of DE BRAZZA'S activity, the B.M.S. should use, as an argument against the French claims, the fact that if recognised they would "render useless the work of STANLEY for the King of the Belgians and the International Association for establishing open communications between East and West Africa" <sup>(2)</sup>.

\* \* \*

It was not only the Portuguese and the French who regarded the presence of missionaries in the Congo as a political factor which could be exploited for the national advantage. LEOPOLD II was equally aware of the profit which the politician could draw from missionary enter-

(1) BENTLEY, I, p. 365 ; COMBER to BAYNES, 21 II 81. B. M. S.

(2) BAYNES to F. O., 25 VI 81. F. O. 84/1801.

prise in Central Africa. He had sought missionary support for the International African Association by stressing its willingness to give assistance to all missions, without distinction of denomination. LEOPOLD fully realised that Protestants might readily suspect an Association with a Catholic King at its head <sup>(1)</sup>, yet also that LAVIGERIE had regarded it as a Protestant and free-thinking enterprise. The King viewed both Catholic and Protestant missions in Africa from a political standpoint ; he hoped to conciliate both by a neutral policy.

Naturally LEOPOLD did his utmost to encourage Belgian missionary enterprise in Central Africa. As soon as the International African Association had been founded at the Brussels Conference, the King visited the mother-house of Scheut in search of Belgian missionaries to support the Belgian branch of the Association, which was at first interested in the penetration of Central Africa from the East coast. The community had not the resources to respond, but the King did not give up hope and continued his pressure <sup>(2)</sup>. He suspected that LAVIGERIE'S White Fathers would be the spearhead of French, as well as of Catholic, advance in Africa, and the obvious answer was to persuade the Cardinal to recruit Belgian missionaries for his Society. LAVIGERIE finally agreed to do so in 1879, and the King offered twenty scholarships to boys destined for the African mission, as an aid to recruitment in Belgium. LEOPOLD also approached the Belgian Jesuits, but since they were fully occupied elsewhere, they were unable as yet to help him <sup>(3)</sup>.

(1) This did in fact happen ; in 1876 Sir Bartle FRERE proposed a subscription scheme in Scotland on behalf of the International African Association. A committee was formed to plan this, but was dissolved when it was found that the Catholic Powers had a majority of votes. STEVENSON to F. O. 15 V 84. F. O. 84/1811.

(2) M. STORME. Léopold II, les missions du Congo et la fondation du séminaire africain de Louvain, *Zaire*, VI, 1, Brussels, 1952, pp. 5-6.

(3) L. DENIS, *Les Jésuites belges au Kwango*, Brussels, 1943, p. 51.

It was not until after 1885 that Belgian missions undertook to evangelize the Congo. Meanwhile, LEOPOLD was faced by the presence there of English Protestant missionaries who perhaps appeared to him to represent a possible political menace. At the end of 1877 the King had become aware of the B.M.S. decision to send missionaries up the Congo river. The Baptist secretary, Arthur Henry BAYNES, had himself approached the Belgian Minister in London to inform him of the Society's plans at the suggestion of Arthur KINNAIRD, Liberal Member of Parliament for Perth, and a supporter of missionary work <sup>(1)</sup>. LEOPOLD responded with immediate interest, and wanted to subscribe to the *Missionary Herald* <sup>(2)</sup>. Thus he was well aware that the English missionaries did not intend to settle at the coast, but to round the cataracts and use the Congo river as a highway into Central Africa. Where they went, the King surmised that the flag might well follow ; the presence of English missionaries could later provide an excuse for the British Government to claim the Congo basin as a sphere of influence. The Baptists intended to penetrate to the heart of Africa, there to meet other English missionaries who had entered the continent from the East coast. LEOPOLD could see that this might well lead to the existence of a broad band of British influence stretching across Central Africa from east to west.

The King's policy towards the English Protestant missionaries in the Congo was of necessity very different from his treatment of the French Catholic missionaries working there <sup>(3)</sup>. He probably believed that both groups represented a possible political threat to his Congo enterprise, and he was well aware of DE BRAZZA'S influence

<sup>(1)</sup> KINNAIRD to UNDERHILL, 10 IX 77. B. M. S.

<sup>(2)</sup> SOLVYNS to BAYNES, 7 XII 77, 24 XII 77. B. M. S.

<sup>(3)</sup> A. ROEYKENS, *Le baron Léon de Béthune et la politique religieuse de Léopold II en Afrique, Zaïre*, X, 1, 3, Brussels, 1956, pp. 10-68, 249-60.

upon the movement of the Holy Ghost Fathers towards Stanley Pool. But in the case of the French Catholic missionaries LEOPOLD could negotiate with the Propaganda, and hope to secure their eventual replacement by Belgians. He could not adopt a similar attitude towards the English Protestants, since their societies were not linked together by a central authority, and since there were too few Belgian Protestants to replace them. So, unable to secure their withdrawal from the Congo, the King was determined to draw what profit he could from their presence there. In the Congo, they were to accept the authority of the Association; in return, the King would win their sympathy by special assistance and favour, so that in Europe, their influence would be used to support his enterprise. Prior to the foundation of the Congo Independent State in 1885, LEOPOLD was endeavouring to win European assent for the idea of entrusting the administration of the Congo basin to the *Association Internationale du Congo*. He needed all the support he could get, and realised that the Protestant missionaries could become valuable allies in England. It was this realisation which shaped his early policy towards them.

LEOPOLD found the B.M.S. willing to respond to the interest he had expressed in the Society's plans, and in the summer of 1879 he received a deputation at Brussels. He promised that he would do what he could to facilitate the missions' relations with STANLEY, provided that the missionaries in their turn would not interfere with STANLEY's policy <sup>(1)</sup>. Well aware that in the Congo English missionaries could be either the rivals or the

(1) " Les missionnaires qui vont au Congo sont venus me prier de chercher à établir de bons rapports entre Stanley et eux et... je me suis montré disposé à l'essayer, dans le cas où les missionnaires de leur côté voudraient à titre de réciprocité se montrer déferents pour ce que Stanley pourrait leur demander ". LEOPOLD II to STRAUCH, 17 VIII 79. P. S. 8.

allies of his enterprise <sup>(1)</sup>, the King realised that he must secure the support both of the Baptist mission and of the L.I.M. The L.I.M., like the B.M.S., seemed very ready to welcome the advent of STANLEY'S expedition, and spoke of LEOPOLD'S interest in the Congo in eulogistic terms <sup>(2)</sup>. The King was anxious to keep the Society's good-will. Just as he had presented a chasuble to the Holy Ghost Fathers at Zanzibar in 1878 in an effort to win the favour of the French missionaries for the International African Association <sup>(3)</sup>, so he made a grant of scientific apparatus to the L.I.M. expedition which went out to the Congo early in 1880 under McCall <sup>(4)</sup>.

Undoubtedly STANLEY at first regarded missionary parties as rivals to his own expedition <sup>(5)</sup>. As GRENFELL

<sup>(1)</sup> The *Document Notte* gives further details on the incident referred to in the King's letter of 17 VIII 79: "Des missionnaires anglais cherchent à pénétrer au Congo par San Salvador avec l'intention d'aller à Stanley Pool et de s'y établir. Ils sont venus à Bruxelles demander si M. STANLEY ne voudrait pas les protéger. Le Roi a répondu qu'à titre de réciprocité, M. STANLEY pourrait peut-être les aider dans le cas où ils se montreraient dociles aux conseils de M. STANLEY et s'établiraient là où il leur indiquerait. Si les missionnaires achètent des terres directement aux indigènes, ils deviendront des concurrents. M. STANLEY pourrait donner aux missionnaires pour un long bail renouvelable et avantageux, des parties de terre dont il avait obtenu la concession des chefs noirs. Ces missionnaires pourraient devenir des auxiliaires; placés sur les terres du Comité, ils devraient respecter les règlements". Note du Roi pour M. STANLEY.

<sup>(2)</sup> "In the providence of God, an event has now occurred likely to exert a most helpful influence on the fortunes of this mission. Mr. STANLEY... has just returned... to finish and perfect his work... Here then is the first explorer of his day commissioned, not as before by two newspaper editors, but by a most influential philanthropic society, with the King of the Belgians at its head — a society which would never sanction cruelty, oppression, or deeds of blood and violence — commissioned to go and open up permanently vast regions... What an unspeakable cause of gratitude!... Without any expense or trouble to Missionary Societies, this expedition, it may be hoped, will open the road up which missionaries may follow with comparative ease". *R. B.*, Nov. 1879.

<sup>(3)</sup> STORME, *art. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>(4)</sup> *R. B.*, April 1880.

<sup>(5)</sup> "Le parti qui est le plus énergique rival de l'expédition est celui des missionnaires anglais qui ont cinquante hommes de Sierra Leone bien armés et vingt-deux ânes; ils ne sont pas embarrassés de bateaux et leur route est aussi courte que celle de STANLEY. Ils sont préparés depuis 1877 et il ne peut y avoir de doute qu'ils n'arrivent les premiers et qu'ils occupent le meilleur site. STANLEY

realised, he was unwilling for them to make such early use as they did of his road, afraid that they would thus secure land direct from the Africans (1). The King intended the missions to rent land for their stations from STANLEY, and this would be impossible if they went ahead of him up the river. While he was still unsure of his own success, STANLEY preserved a cautious attitude towards the Baptist missionaries (2). But in spite of this, they appreciated his work. They often received help from the local agents under his direction, they were certainly glad to make use of his road, and they found that they could win considerable popularity as arbiters through whom the Africans could more easily approach the Association (3). Whereas the L.I.M. began to criticize STANLEY'S use of force — Mrs GUINNESS explained that the mission preferred to use the south bank rather than mix with the armed parties on STANLEY'S road (4) — the B.M.S. missionaries defended it. BENTLEY wished that some of the "ultra-kind people at home" would go and advise the Expedition on the spot, since constant outbreaks of local resistance made the use of force essential (5).

n'en peut cependant rien ; sa tâche est vingt fois plus difficile". Letter of STANLEY, 14 VI 80. *Document Notte*, p. 38.

(1) "M. SPARHAWK (left in charge of Vivi station by STANLEY) seemed vexed at the idea of the route being traversed before it was "thrown open" — he seemed to echo the sentiments of his chief. I said our society's movements could not interfere with the projects of the expedition: he said the first party to get up would secure the best ground for a station, very sharply". GRENFELL to BAYNES, 7 11 81. B. M. S.

(2) "Je suis obligé, malheureusement, d'écrire sévèrement par même courrier au lieutenant HAROU, à Manyanga. J'apprends qu'il envoie les Krummen malades à la Mission anglaise... ce fait donne presque le droit à la Mission de se montrer indiscret et de se mêler un peu trop de nos affaires... J'espère que vous prévendrez ce jeune homme, M. HAROU, qu'il est contre nos intérêts d'entretenir des espions ou des intrigants avant la réussite de nos affaires au Stanley Pool..." STANLEY to STRAUCH, 10 X 81, in A. MAURICE, *Stanley, Lettres inédites*, Brussels, 1955, p. 107, no. 18.

(3) BENTLEY to UNDERHILL, 9 V 82. B. M. S.

(4) *R. B.*, March 1883.

(5) BENTLEY to BAYNES, 12 VIII 82. B. M. S.

Gradually the bonds which linked the Baptist mission with the Association grew tighter. Before he returned to Europe in 1882, STANLEY planted a station at the Pool; when he met COMBER on his way down river, he offered the B.M.S. a plot on the land he had claimed there for the Association. Thus he was strictly obedient to the King's instructions. Previously the B.M.S. had bought land direct from the Africans <sup>(1)</sup>, and so LEOPOLD had regarded the Society as the Association's rival. But if the Baptist missionaries agreed to build in accordance with STANLEY'S suggestion, they would become dependents and allies of the Association, they would have to recognize its rights of ownership, and respect its regulations. COMBER realized that there would be difficulties for the missionaries in so close a relationship with the Association <sup>(2)</sup>, but he also knew that the B.M.S. station at Manyanga would have been burned down by the Africans had not STANLEY'S agent there intervened to protect the mission. There was yet another consideration; if the B.M.S. did not accept the offer, Catholic missionaries might win an advantage by doing so <sup>(3)</sup>. Thus COMBER and BENTLEY travelled up to the Pool and in July made a contract with STANLEY'S agent there for the lease of one hectare <sup>(4)</sup> of the Association's ground.

This contract was carefully scrutinized both in Brussels and in London. LEOPOLD preferred to settle the

<sup>(1)</sup> At Manyanga, for example, an arrangement was made on 12th April 1882 between the chief of Ndandanga and the chief of Kitambika on the one hand, and BENTLEY for the B. M. S. on the other, whereby the chiefs in consideration of a present given them in August 1881, now completed by a gift of eight coats, handed over to the B. M. S. the land between the stream Luselo and the creek of Mornvu.

<sup>(2)</sup> "Are we to be protected by the 'fort' and perhaps partly identified with the A. I. A. ? Or are we to run the risk of settling among the people who, for some long time, will not understand us or our mission ?" COMBER to BAYNES. 4 VII 82. B. M. S.

<sup>(3)</sup> COMBER to BAYNES, 24 VII 82. B. M. S.

<sup>(4)</sup> Approximately two and a half acres.



terms on which the Association was to lease land himself, rather than to leave this to subordinate officials in the Congo (1). The B.M.S. Committee took up a somewhat similar attitude, when it dealt with the subject early in November. It accepted the annual rent of a hundred and fifty pounds, but wanted the option of the renewal of the contract at the end of the three-year period to rest with the Society alone, for it feared "priestly influences from Belgium" which "might ensure our receiving notices to quit". It objected to Article VI (2), believing that missionaries should hold themselves free to give what help they could to all "respectable parties", and to the limits placed upon free movement by Article VIII (3), for we "must know nothing of rivalry with, nor must we cultivate association with, any secular bodies whatever".

So the Secretary was sent to Brussels to seek STANLEY'S influence in the modification of the draft contract. This had been carefully worded, in accordance with the King's instructions, to ensure that the missionaries at the Pool would become dependents and allies of the Association, rather than its rivals. But it was important for LEOPOLD to secure the goodwill of the B.M.S. Committee in England, where he needed the support of public opinion; in any case he did not want the Baptist

(1) "Vous ferez bien d'écrire à celui de nos agents que la chose concerne peut-être et à Londres et à HANSENS qu'à moins qu'un accord soit intervenu avec les missionnaires anglais on tâchera d'y arriver ici et de fixer ici les conditions auxquelles nous pourrions leur laisser le terrain". LEOPOLD II to STRAUCH, 16 VIII 82. P. S. 118.

(2) "They engage not to give any intelligence, help, or assistance in their trading projects to other parties or expeditions which would come into the country for trading purposes".

(3) "In consideration of the facilities granted... the missionaries engage not to get ahead of our party on the upper Congo. If in the future they follow our expedition up the river, they shall not be allowed without the consent of the gentlemen of the expedition to settle in any part of the river or interior, whether belonging to the Comité or not, the longitude of which shall be above our last established station."

missionaries to move from Association ground. With a long-term advantage in view he was prepared to sacrifice some of the precision of the contract. BAYNES' visit to Brussels was too good an opportunity to miss ; LEOPOLD summoned him to the royal presence <sup>(1)</sup>, and during a cordial interview accepted the modifications proposed by the B.M.S. <sup>(2)</sup>. The Society was enthusiastic ; the Committee presented an address of thanks to LEOPOLD, and the December *Missionary Herald* commented on the graciousness of the King and of all the Association officials whom BAYNES had met in Brussels.

LEOPOLD had successfully established a relationship with the B.M.S. which led the Society to respond at once when it was approached by the Belgian consul in Manchester on behalf of the King. J. H. HUTTON was working at Manchester to secure a body of opinion favourable to LEOPOLD's enterprise in the Congo ; the city's Chamber of Commerce was ready to support him since it feared that the extension of either French or Portuguese influence in the Congo would lead to the imposition of high tariffs there. HUTTON hoped to unite English trade and missionary interests on the basis of their common dislike of the French and the Portuguese ; such an alliance would serve the King well. So HUTTON began to show a friendly interest in the work of the B.M.S. ; his brother inspected the *Peace* before she was shipped from England on behalf of LEOPOLD, and he himself sent some bales of cloth from his mill to help towards the expense of carrying the steamer up-river <sup>(3)</sup>.

At the same time, he urged both the B.M.S. and the L.I.M. to take note of the political situation. Portugal was reviving her ancient claims to the Congo region and suggesting that these should be recognized by Great

<sup>(1)</sup> LÉOPOLD II to STRAUCH, 16 XI 82. P. S. 142.

<sup>(2)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 21 XI 82.

<sup>(3)</sup> HUTTON to BAYNES, 27 XI 82. B. M. S.

Britain. The Government seemed likely to agree, for it had begun to be uneasy about French intentions in West Africa (1). HUTTON informed the missionary societies that the Manchester Chamber of Commerce had sent a memorandum to the Foreign Office, criticizing both the Portuguese claims and the de Brazza treaty, and urging the Government to take the initiative in trying to secure the neutrality of the Congo basin — or, in other words, to support LEOPOLD'S "international" association. HUTTON feared that if the British Government did nothing, France and Portugal would come to an agreement by which Portugal would hold the lower river, and France would take the upper river and Stanley Pool. He pointed out how greatly Protestant missionary work in Congo would suffer from such an arrangement, and remarked that "no doubt your society will take immediate action" (2).

The differing responses of the B.M.S. and the L.I.M. showed the fruits of LEOPOLD'S cordial attitude towards the Baptist mission. When MRS GUINNESS approached BAYNES on the subject raised by HUTTON'S letter, she declared that "French annexation if a *reality*... would be better than no government, *by far*. As H.M.G. do not mean to do anything themselves, it seems the best we can hope for" (3). She had realised the commercial aspect of LEOPOLD'S enterprise in the Congo — for the mission had come into collision with STANLEY, who regarded it as a rival in this field (4) — but was completely

(1) CROWE, pp. 16-7.

(2) HUTTON to BAYNES, 18 XI 82. B. M. S.

(3) Fanny GUINNESS to BAYNES, 20 XI 82. B. M. S.

(4) "As to the attitude taken up by the Belgians I have good reason to believe that it is simply and only because they believe we will trade. Captain HANSENS spoke about our 'programme' and that trade was put down as one of our objects or that at least we could engage in trade if convenient for the purpose of supporting ourselves. I acknowledged that was originally the basis of the mission but that recently all had been changed. However... it will take considerable time to take that suspicion out of their minds". CLARK to SIMS, 16 I 83. A. B. M. U.

religious liberty in the Congo, and upon the protection of Protestant missions there. It was not easy to find an adequate formula <sup>(1)</sup>, but the Government could not be satisfied with ambiguous wording, under pressure from the missionary societies and from Parliament <sup>(2)</sup>. It was a difficult question for Portugal, who had no more desire to see French Catholic missionaries than English Protestants in her Congo possessions, and was jealously guarding the Congo territories which she claimed to be dependent upon the diocese of Loanda, against the encroachments of LAVIGERIE's White Fathers. At the time there were considerable difficulties with Rome over the question, and it was not a propitious moment to grant guarantees to Protestant missionaries <sup>(3)</sup>. Negotiations on the point continued, but although the Anglo-Portuguese treaty finally gave full rights to the English missionaries <sup>(4)</sup>, the societies believed that they could put little trust in the observance of its provisions.

The treaty was signed in February 1884, and from then onwards the B.M.S. took part in the agitation designed to stop its ratification. BENTLEY, who was home on furlough, strongly criticized the treaty in letters to the press <sup>(5)</sup>, and enthusiastically supported the claims of

<sup>(1)</sup> " On a cru indispensable de remplacer l'expression ' missionary operations ' par celle de ' culto religioso ', ' religious worship '. En laissant subsister la première expression, le Gouvernement Portugais aurait de grandes difficultés avec le Vatican ". Éclaircissements donnés par M. d'ANTAS, 10 I 83. F. O. 84/1803.

<sup>(2)</sup> " D'ANTAS begs us not to let them into difficulties with the Vatican — this is balanced by our difficulties with Parliament ". Memorandum by ANDERSON F. O. 84/1803.

<sup>(3)</sup> " Il est bien difficile que la cour de Lisbonne concède explicitement à des étrangers dissidents ce qu'elle refuse à d'autres étrangers professant la religion de l'État ". GREINDL to FRÈRE-ORBAN, 17 I 83. A. I. C., II, 5.

<sup>(4)</sup> Article VI: " All forms of religious worship and religious ordinances shall be tolerated, and no hindrance whatever shall be offered thereto by the Portuguese authorities.

Missionaries of religion, whether native or foreigners, and religious bodies, shall have a perfect right to erect churches, chapels, schools, and other buildings, which shall be protected by the Portuguese authorities "

<sup>(5)</sup> *Daily News*, 12 IV 84; *Times*, 14 IV 84.

the Association to recognition as a sovereign state (1). In April LEOPOLD's concession to France of the right of pre-emption of Association territories roused British apprehensions (2); during the King's attempt to restore his popularity in England, BENTLEY and the B.M.S. were his firm supporters (3). The Society was tireless in its efforts against ratification of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty. In April it presented a petition to Parliament, and the Baptist Union followed suit. The denomination officially encouraged its members to take part in the agitation (4), and the Foreign Office received a spate of petitions from individual Baptist congregations. Although unimpressed by the arguments brought forward (5), the Foreign Office had to take account of the strong feeling against the Portuguese treaty in England. Finally it was to a large extent French and German opposition to the treaty that caused the decision against ratification (6), but the effect of the English agitation must not be underestimated. Throughout its course, missionary supporters and philanthropists in England — and especially the B.M.S. — had proved useful allies for the King of the Belgians.

LEOPOLD was prepared to pay a considerable price for the continued support of the Society. BAYNES had for some time been trying to secure the Stanley Pool

(1) "The best course would be to refuse to ratify the treaty, and then to hand over the lower Congo to the A. I. A... The King of the Belgians, not the King of Portugal, is the man who ought to be trusted with the guardianship of one of the greatest waterways of the world". *Pall Mall Gazette*, 20 V 84.

(2) THOMSON, pp. 163-9.

(3) STRAUCH to LEOPOLD II, 27 V 84. In J. STENGERS, *Rapport sur le dossier, Correspondance Léopold II.* — STRAUCH, *Bulletin de l'Institut Royal Colonial Belge*, XXIV, 4, 1953, pp. 1203-9.

(4) FREEMAN, 18 IV 84.

(5) "I believe these things are got up by paid agents, who go a round of dissenting chapels... Shall we acknowledge merely, or answer that a careful study of the treaty will show that all points to which they refer have been considered?" Note by LISTER. F. O. 84/1810.

(6) CROWE, pp. 23-33.

site on a firmer basis ; the King, however, had refused to give more than a seven-year lease (1). But in the summer of 1884 he reversed his policy, granted the Society a perpetual lease at the Pool, and made a similar concession for a new site on the upper river at Lukolela (2). Only a conviction that B.M.S. support would be really useful to him could have induced the King to do this. In the autumn he went even further, and agreed that all B.M.S. leases on the upper river should be drawn up on similar lines. In addition, he decreed that rent due according to the terms of those leases should become payable only after it had been demanded by an accredited official of the Association. It seemed unlikely that such a demand would be made (3).

COMBER had urged BAYNES to be speedy in embarking upon these negotiations. Perhaps he realised that immediately preceding the Berlin Conference, the attitude of the British public towards his enterprise was of the greatest importance to LEOPOLD, and that therefore the King would be likely to favour the Society's requests. The Conference had been called together by BISMARCK to regulate European advance into Central Africa, and LEOPOLD hoped that during its course he would be able to secure recognition of the Association as a sovereign state. The Association's flag was recognized by the United States in April 1884, and by Germany before the beginning of the Conference (4). LEOPOLD hoped for a similar recognition from the British Government, and his overtures to the B.M.S. had made the Society equally eager. Following the King's grant of the Stanley Pool and Lukolela concessions, the *Freeman* (5) in June and the *Missionary Herald* in July expressed hope that

(1) B. M. S. Minutes, 18 XI 83.

(2) *Ibid.*, 17 VI 84.

(3) BAYNES to the Committee, 30 IX 84, B. M. S. Minutes, 7 X 84.

(4) CROWE, pp. 79-80.

(5) *Freeman*, 13 VI 84.

LEOPOLD's work in Congo would result in the creation of an independent state there, a state based on free trade principles and securing religious freedom for all; in October the *Freeman* pleaded for British recognition of the Association's flag (1). Any such influence upon public opinion in England was important for LEOPOLD on the eve of the Berlin Conference (2).

The B.M.S., interested in the Conference not only from the point of view of its mission in the Congo, but also from that of its work in the Cameroons, had no hesitation in accepting a Foreign Office suggestion that the Society should send accredited representatives to Berlin (3). For LEOPOLD their presence meant increased support there. Those working on his behalf at the Conference were to be found among the delegations of Belgium and the United States (4), for, as the Association was not yet recognized as an independent state, it could not send an official delegation. BAYNES' arrival in November meant another supporter for the King's enterprise. Officially questions of sovereignty were not dealt with at Berlin at all, but the Conference was used as a field where these could be fought out, and in practice they were regarded as more important than the official business.

In December, when representatives of the Association and of France were negotiating over their respective territorial claims in the lower Congo, BAYNES telegraphed for BENTLEY to replace him at Berlin. France was demanding a large area of territory on the south bank

(1) *Ibid.*, 3 X 84.

(2) "Les dispositions du public anglais à notre égard... serviront probablement de base aux instructions de sir Edward MALET". STRAUCH to LAMBERMONT, 2 X 84. C. de B., I, 59bis.

(3) BAYNES to GRANVILLE, 24 XI 84. F. O. 84/1815.

(4) The Belgian plenipotentiaries were LAMBERMONT and the Belgian Minister at Berlin, and BANNING was one of the Belgian delegation; the American Minister, who sympathised with the Association, co-opted SANFORD and STANLEY.

of the river, on the basis of the Makoko treaty ; BENTLEY could help the Association to combat these claims, for he could speak with exact knowledge of the extent of MAKOKO'S territory, which was not as great as DE BRAZZA had supposed. The B.M.S. was prepared to take the risk of working for the King <sup>(1)</sup>. AUGOUARD had been in Paris pressing the French Government to support DE BRAZZA'S efforts <sup>(2)</sup> ; with equal eagerness BENTLEY and COMBER co-operated with the representatives of LEOPOLD at Berlin <sup>(3)</sup>. The B.M.S. wanted all its stations to remain on Association ground, and therefore hoped that the Association would successfully combat the claims not only of France but also of Portugal <sup>(4)</sup>. However, to the Society's great regret, the final delimitation left its station at San Salvador in Portuguese territory. Throughout the negotiations, the Baptist mission had completely identified its interests with those of the King of the Belgians. Thus — apart from the question of San Salvador — it was delighted with the outcome of the Berlin Conference. Great Britain recognised the Association as an independent state in December, and all the other Powers represented at Berlin had done the same by the time the Conference ended. Thus, together with the Powers of Europe, the Association was able to sign the General Act of Berlin in Fe-

<sup>(1)</sup> " There is no doubt that if the French get the territory they want, they will remember anything the B. M. S. says or does. But after all... it would be pretty much the same, whether we speak or not, if the French succeeded. However, you will have counted all that cost and if you have brought me here you mean me to open my mouth... STANLEY says I may be wanted here until today week... " Draft BENTLEY to BAYNES, 10 XII 84. B. P.

<sup>(2)</sup> GOYAU, pp. 67-8.

<sup>(3)</sup> Draft BENTLEY to STANLEY, 26 XII 84. B. P.

<sup>(4)</sup> " I have begged Mr. STANLEY not to yield to the Portuguese north of the Ambriz River, on which are the Arthington Falls ; as the Portuguese will then get the great ivory factories but it will save San Salvador, all the Bakongo, and the best part of the Zombos... You will see the A. I. A. will have to make large concessions, but nothing vital to us, for what is vital to us is vital to them ". Draft BENTLEY to BAYNES, 12 XII 84. B. P.



bruary 1885. This Act decreed that the Congo basin was to be a free trade region, and that the Powers were to combine to suppress the slave trade there. During the debates the Association was hardly mentioned by name, but all the delegates at Berlin assumed that it was to be invested with authority to carry out the programme which they were laying down for the Congo basin. Nor were they under any illusion concerning LEOPOLD'S position in the Association, and they were not surprised when he assumed its direction in name, as well as in fact. DE WINTON had replaced STANLEY as the King's representative in the Congo; in July he proclaimed LEOPOLD "Sovereign of the Independent State of the Congo", and a month later the King notified the Powers to the same effect.

In July the B.M.S. presented an address of congratulation to LEOPOLD on the creation of the Congo Independent State. The King had stated again and again his philanthropic aims in Central Africa, his intention of ridding the Congo of the slave-trade, his determination to introduce law and order, and legitimate commerce. With such a programme before the infant state, the future of the new B.M.S. stations which were to be planted along the upper river seemed bright indeed. Article VI of the General Act of Berlin accorded special protection to missionaries of all denominations, and there was no reason to expect, judging from the past attitude of the Association, that this would not be given. Apparently the B.M.S. did not regret that the Conference had not accepted BISMARCK'S suggestion of giving "favour and aid" to missionary enterprise in the Congo basin. The Powers would, of course, have found it difficult to do so in view of the strong pressure from Turkey that Moslem missionaries should be placed on an equal footing with Christian missionaries (<sup>1</sup>), when Islam was

(<sup>1</sup>) E. BANNING, *Mémoires politiques et diplomatiques*, Paris-Brussels, 1927, p. 24.

the most serious enemy of European colonisation in Africa. It could not be foreseen that later, the fact that "favour and aid" had been replaced by "protect and favour" at Berlin, would be used by LEOPOLD in a sense hostile to Protestant missionary enterprise. Nor did the mission recognise the outstanding weakness of the Berlin Act. Although the Act was designed to foster free trade, and to encourage administration in the interests of the Congo peoples, its very stipulations defeated these objects and led inevitably to a State monopoly of commerce. But in 1885, the B.M.S. could not foresee the very difficult position in which its missionaries would later be placed in consequence of this.

The recognition of the *Association Internationale du Congo* as the Congo Independent State in 1885 marked the end of the period of the foundation of the State — a period in which LEOPOLD and the B.M.S. had been of considerable mutual assistance. From 1885 onwards there was a change in the attitude of the King. He had always wanted Belgian missionaries in the Congo, but while he had been working for the recognition of the Association as an independent state, he had made good use of the support which the English missionary element could give him in his efforts to influence public opinion in England. After 1885 foreign missionaries could no longer serve his purposes in the same way; his main preoccupation was the imprinting of a national character upon the Congo, so that he naturally favoured the efforts of Belgian missions. But in 1885 the English Protestant missionaries could hardly be expected to foresee the conflicts which were to arise in later years. The *Freeman* even felt it necessary to remind the B.M.S. of the traditional Baptist teaching on the separation of Church and State <sup>(1)</sup>. But although it expressed some foreboding

(1) "We hope our missionaries will not put their trust in princes, that they will jealously guard the independance of the communities they found, that they will

that relations might not always be so easy, it was anxious " that there should be a grateful remembrance, should difficulties or misunderstandings arise, of the kindnesses shown by Mr STANLEY to our brethren in the early days of the mission " by command of King LEOPOLD ". God... grant to him... a rich reward in the establishment of a prosperous and wealthy kingdom on the banks of the Congo ! ”.

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## CHAPTER TWO

### MISSIONARY EXPANSION, 1885-1900

It seemed to ARTHINGTON that episcopacy, presbyterianism and methodism were all useless impedimenta for the missionary. Later he modified his ideas, but in the 'eighties he was entirely out of sympathy with a missionary who was prepared to settle permanently in one district so that he might slowly build up and educate a Christian community there <sup>(1)</sup>. He felt that it was sufficient for the missionary to preach the Gospel and then to pass on at once to the next unevangelized tribe. ARTHINGTON chose the B.M.S. as a society which he thought was likely to follow his policy of speedy advance and eventually to reach the Great Lakes and the heart of Africa by way of the Congo river. It was fortunate for his purpose that in one of its missionaries, GRENFELL, he found a kindred spirit, for GRENFELL was always eager to press on towards the interior. It was also fortunate that much of the appeal of the Congo mission to the rank-and-file supporters of the B.M.S., lay in the thought that it would lead to a chain of Christian mission stations stretching across Africa. The home authorities of the mission were even tempted by this enthusiasm to claim the establishment of posts far in advance of the facts. Puzzled missionaries in the Congo read in the magazines they received of stations for

(1) CHIRGWIN, p. 29.

which the personnel and stores were not even prepared (1).

The views of ARTHINGTON and GRENFELL and the enthusiasm of the ordinary subscriber at home dominated early B.M.S. policy in the Congo, sometimes against the wishes of the Committee. GRENFELL himself was not satisfied by merely preaching and passing on, but saw the necessity of building up a stable Christian community. On the other hand, he responded to ARTHINGTON'S pressure for speedy advance, since he saw the task of the pioneer missionary as first and foremost one of exploration. Like LIVINGSTONE, he realised that the acquisition of accurate geographical knowledge was the necessary prelude to Christian mission work. Until the missionary had made a thorough survey of the territory to be occupied, he could not pick out the dense centres of population. GRENFELL believed that mission stations should be planted at these centres, while the intermediate areas were to be left to subsequent African evangelization. His plan was to preach, teach and heal where Africans were to be found in the largest numbers. This left out of account, of course, the fact of a shifting cultivation, and of the readiness of the people to settle near a mission station where one had been established. But in any case GRENFELL was thinking in regional, rather than in strictly local terms. It seemed to him futile to concentrate staff on the lower river, when the population of centres like Bolobo, Lukolela, Bangala and Upoto was ten times denser than that of the cataract region (2).

Both ARTHINGTON and GRENFELL were determined that Christian missionaries should exploit the thousands of miles of navigable waterways stretching inland from the Pool. They saw that these presented an opportunity unique in Africa, and realised what missions could ac-

(1) COMBER to BAYNES, 31 VII 86. B. M. S.

(2) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 22 III 89. B. M. S.

comply with the aid of steam navigation. They were prepared to experiment. ARTHINGTON presented the B.M.S. with a steamer, the *Peace*, specially designed for conditions in the Congo. She was of unusually shallow draught, and was given a water-tube boiler of a type which caused a revolution in steamship development. Carriers had to take the steamer over STANLEY'S road between Vivi and the Pool, and therefore the weight of all but three loads was restricted to sixty-five pounds. The new type of boiler was easily portable in separate parts, and there was the additional advantage that sufficient steam to start the boat could be raised from cold water in ten minutes <sup>(1)</sup>. Supporters of the Society and the London crowds showed great enthusiasm when the *Peace* was exhibited near Westminster Bridge before being taken to pieces and shipped to the Congo <sup>(2)</sup>. After GRENFELL had reconstructed the steamer at the Pool, he spent a great deal of his time, for several years, in making exploratory journeys on the upper river. The B.M.S. Committee at home did not always consider this desirable <sup>(3)</sup>, feeling that the supporters of the society expected conversions, not maps, to be the fruits of the Congo enterprise. But it was largely GRENFELL'S early work that decided the future places of missionary settlement ; this applied both to the B.M.S. and to missions which arrived in Congo at a later period.

Between January 1884 and December 1886 GRENFELL undertook seven exploratory trips which opened up the main waterways of the Congo basin to European know-

<sup>(1)</sup> BENTLEY, II, p. 10.

<sup>(2)</sup> FULLERTON, p. 64.

<sup>(3)</sup> " I do not know what Mr. GRENFELL'S plans are for the future, but I do hope that, for a while at any rate, we shall be able to do less exploring work, and concentrate our energies upon the stations we already occupy. I hope the *Peace* will not go forth on any of these long journeys, but will ply between Lukolela and Stanley Pool, with a view to keeping our brethren at Lukolela well furnished ". BAYNES to BENTLEY, 31 I 88. B. M. S.



ledge, and culminated in 1887 with the Royal Geographical Society's publication of his chart of the Congo <sup>(1)</sup>. GRENFELL'S work was not only of benefit to the missions. The State had the greatest interest in the charting of territory which it owned but which it had yet to occupy, and proved eager to monopolise the knowledge which GRENFELL was acquiring by his journeys in the *Peace* <sup>(2)</sup>. In 1884 GRENFELL discovered the Ubangi mouth, reached the confluence of the Kwango and the Kasai, and ascended the main Congo river as far as Bangala. Between October 1884 and March 1885 he discovered the Ruki to be the junction of the Juapa and the Busira ; he travelled up the Itimbiri for a hundred miles until he reached its falls, the Aruwimi as far as the Yambuya cataracts not far from its confluence with the Congo, and the Lomami for a hundred and forty miles. When he came down river after reaching Stanley Falls, he turned northward into the Ubangi and followed its course for two hundred miles as far as the Zongo rapids, and thus it was possible for geographers to guess at the identification of the Ubangi with SCHWEINFURTH'S Uele. In 1885 he explored the eastern and southern tributaries of the Congo — the Lulonga, the Maringa, the Busira and the Juapa — and followed this up in the following year by the exploration of the Kasai, the Lulua and the Kwango. GRENFELL'S work was supplemented by that of the State explorers — VAN GELE on the Ubangi, WOLF on the Sankuru, LE MARINEL on the Lualaba,

(1) H. H. JOHNSTON, *George Grenfell and the Congo*, London 1908, 2 vol., I, p. 170.

(2) " The subject to which I desire to draw your attention is the double position you at present occupy, viz. that of missionary and explorer... As a missionary you are entitled to help and consideration... As an explorer, the State is entitled to all discoveries that may be made by you within its territory ; all maps executed, and observations taken, should also belong to the State... from the recent numbers of the R. G. S. of England, it would appear that all your discoveries and observations are sent for the information of that Society ". DE WINTON to GRENFELL, 8 VIII 85. B. M. S.

VAN DE VELDE on the Kwango — and by the voyages of DELCOMMUNE on all the southern tributaries and on the main river. The Aruwimi became better known as a result of STANLEY'S Emin Pacha Relief Expedition in 1887. Thus it was clear that navigable waterways led into almost every part of the Congo basin, that they were the obvious routes for missionary penetration, and that a steamer was an essential part of the equipment of any mission which hoped to start work above the Pool.

Besides demonstrating the amount of navigable water open to steamers, GRENFELL'S exploratory work meant that the ethnography of the Congo basin was becoming known to Europeans. It was not only the course of the river and its tributaries which GRENFELL surveyed with the greatest accuracy ; he was also eager wherever he travelled to acquire vocabularies, to note the physical characteristics, the customs and the way of life of the peoples who lined the river banks. At first one group, the pygmies, was almost entirely ignored by the missionary societies. The pygmies belonged to the forest regions which were the most difficult of access ; they preferred to live in seclusion from their Bantu neighbours and were even more distrustful and shy of the European ; their settlements were of the most temporary nature. SCHWEINFURTH had noted occasional pygmies in the Uele, while GRENFELL saw some Batwa pygmies on the Busira in 1885, but their main groupings, in the forests of the Aruwimi-Ituri, the Juapa, the Sankuru, the Lua-laba and the region to the west of Lake Tanganyika, lay off the usual routes of European travellers. STANLEY found some pygmies in the north-east during his journey with the Emin Relief Expedition, but little was known of their existence and less of their characteristics until LLOYD of the C.M.S. travelled westward through the

Aruwimi forest in 1898 <sup>(1)</sup>, and until the American Presbyterian missionaries in the Kasai came into contact with the Batwa pygmies between the Kasai and the Lulua <sup>(2)</sup>.

It was also natural that at first the missionaries should ignore two other groups. GRENFELL had not yet penetrated to the north-east, to the valleys of the upper Ubangi, the Uele and the Ituri, where the population consisted of recent immigrants from the Sudan. Nor had he reached the east, where Nilo-Hamitic peoples from the north had settled on the shores of Lake Albert and in the valley of the Semliki. In missionary planning, therefore, these groups were left out of account until a much later date.

The Bantu-speaking tribes of the central Congo basin and the southern tributaries provided the most obvious field for evangelism beyond the Pool. A broad distinction could be made between the older inhabitants and the more recent immigrants. To the first class belonged the Bakete, the Bawumbu, the Baboma, the Bayanzi and the other tribes to be found in the Kwango, the Kasai and the district of Lake Leopold II. The second was represented by the Basonge, the Balunda, the Budja, the Mobango and the Bayeke, amongst others. On the whole the second group formed a ruling class; their ancestors had come from the north-east as hunters, warriors and smiths, had enjoyed the prestige later given to Europeans, and had transformed the forest negroes into servile groups of vassals. They had set up kingdoms like that of the Bakuba between the Kasai, the Sankuru and the Lulua, and empires like that of the Baluba farther to the south-east. This Kasai region provides a clear example of the process; here the original Bakete had been brought into subjection by the Bakuba and

<sup>(1)</sup> A. B. LLOYD, *In dwarf land and cannibal country*, London, 1900.

<sup>(2)</sup> JOHNSTON, II, p. 507.

the Baluba. The missions realised that it would be to their advantage if they could first win the dominant tribes to Christianity. GRENFELL was particularly attracted by the Baluba when he visited the Kasai in 1886. They were more energetic, and possessed a higher civilization than the Bakete. But at first European knowledge of ethnography was sketchy; the rivers provided the chief means of missionary penetration, and the earliest efforts of the missionaries were inevitably directed to the most easily accessible riverine populations.

Besides giving the missionaries some idea of the ethnography of the region, exploration of the Congo and its tributaries also demonstrated the extent of Arab influence in the east of the State, and the horrors of the trade in ivory and slaves. As in East Africa, this revelation constituted a plea which the missionary could not ignore. And although ARTHINGTON'S aim was not primarily humanitarian, GRENFELL'S exploratory work brought to Europe knowledge which could not be ignored by the philanthropist. GRENFELL'S journey to the Falls at the end of 1884 had given him some idea of what the slave trade meant in terms of human suffering. Above Basoko he had seen hundreds of canoes carrying homeless families in flight before a band of Arab raiders searching for slaves and ivory; he had found beds, stools, fishing-nets — loot for which the Arabs had no use — floating down the river; he had noticed the smoking ruins of numbers of African towns; he had discovered people sleeping in their canoes because they feared night attacks on their villages. He had visited TIPPO-TIP at the Falls and realised the widespread influence of the man who offered to forward letters to Ujiji or to the East coast, whose authority, based on Manyema, extended over a large part of Central Africa, and to whom all the tribes a hundred miles down the Congo paid tribute. What GRENFELL had seen of slave raiding

between the Aruwimi mouth and the Falls made him plead that the Arab invasion from the east must be brought to a halt <sup>(1)</sup>. It was clear that this could only be done by European force, for the Bantu riverine tribes were proving powerless in the face of the Arabs and of the Manyema tribes under Arab influence.

The State was facing this problem, for LEOPOLD, like the missionary societies, naturally regarded exploration as the prelude to occupation. To fulfil its obligations under the Berlin Act and to prove itself worthy to administer the huge area of Central Africa which LEOPOLD had secured, the State had both to occupy its territory effectively, and to bring the Arab slave trade in the interior to an end. The two were allied problems ; until the disturbances and chaos which resulted from Arab raiding were removed there could be no peaceful occupation. The accomplishment of these tasks directly affected the missionary societies. After 1885 they had to obtain State permission to plant a station, and this permission was often refused when conditions were insecure, unless the missionaries could demonstrate the possession of sufficient force to guarantee their safety. In any case, the missions themselves had planned to advance on the upper river in the wake of the State. The B.M.S. was naturally anxious for the safety of its own stations when at the end of 1885 the State abandoned its posts at Bolobo and Lukolela, and only remained at the Falls by permission of TIPPO-TIP. The position of the missions was even more precarious when in 1886 the State was forced to leave the Falls.

The abrupt change which developed in the Arab attitude towards missionaries all over Central Africa between 1884 and 1888, has already been studied in connection with the missionary history of East Africa <sup>(2)</sup>. Before

<sup>(1)</sup> BENTLEY, II, p. 104.

<sup>(2)</sup> OLIVER, pp. 101-3.

1884 Arab interests were purely commercial, since the large bands of Manyema under Arab leadership who travelled far down the Congo in their search for ivory, showed no tendency to stay and govern. But between 1884 and 1888, when the Arabs were meeting with increasing European competition both from the West and from the East coasts, their policy changed; they began to aim at political power, and sought to drive the Europeans out. The campaigns undertaken by the Congo State against the Arabs had a direct bearing upon mission work, for when Arab policy was to sweep all Europeans out of Central Africa, an isolated mission station was not strong enough to survive without the protection of European government. In more settled regions the missions were not inclined to appreciate State intervention; they could not obtain sites without lengthy negotiations<sup>(1)</sup>, and found taxation a heavy financial burden. But in face of the Arab threat in the interior, State protection was a necessity if the missions were to survive.

The missionaries realised that it was only as the State gradually pacified its eastern regions that they would be able to advance inland in its wake. In 1887 the State station at the Falls was nominally secured by the appointment of TIPPO-TIP as Governor on behalf of the State, after he had promised to put an end to slave-raiding. The agreement had been signed by STANLEY, leader of the Emin Relief Expedition, on behalf of LEOPOLD II. SIMS was hopeful when he heard of the arrangement, for he expected TIPPO-TIP to "see that free commerce pays better than traffic conducted by slaves and consisting of slaves"<sup>(2)</sup>. State and missions

<sup>(1)</sup> "Before... we had only to settle with the natives, and in a few days could make the usual presents and start to build. Now, there is correspondence with the Administrator General... you get the royal assent when you can... for at least a year our tenure is uncertain". BENTLEY to BAYNES, 23 II 86. B. M. S.

<sup>(2)</sup> *R. B.*, July 1887.

were allies in their desire for peaceful conditions in the east. When LEOPOLD insisted that the Emin Relief Expedition should take the Congo route, he was convinced that it would help to open up the north-eastern corner of the State territory. Since the missions would benefit from such a result, he hoped that they would be willing to assist the expedition.

There was one practical way in which he and STANLEY expected the help of the missions. Since there were very few steamers on the Congo, STANLEY would have great difficulty in moving the expedition up river, and the use of the *Peace* and the *Henry Reed* (transferred to the American Baptists when the L.I.M. handed over the mission to them <sup>(1)</sup>) would be invaluable to him. ARTHINGTON had earlier refused LEOPOLD'S request that the B.M.S. should lend the *Peace* to the State for six months to carry men and supplies to the upper river for a campaign against the Arabs <sup>(2)</sup>, but STANLEY decided to try again for permission to borrow the steamer. Once more, however, ARTHINGTON met the suggestion with an immediate refusal <sup>(3)</sup>, declaring that "it would be *improper* to associate it (the *Peace*) in any way with this enterprise" <sup>(4)</sup>, or indeed with any armed expedition <sup>(5)</sup>. Since ARTHINGTON had given the steamer to the B.M.S. on condition that it should be used solely for missionary work, the Society could do nothing but continue to refuse all requests addressed to it by the Emin Relief Committee <sup>(6)</sup>.

The B.M.S. missionaries on the Congo, however, thought it necessary to help the expedition, and when STANLEY arrived at the Pool in April 1887, BENTLEY

<sup>(1)</sup> *Infra*, p. 97.

<sup>(2)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 16 II 86.

<sup>(3)</sup> H. M. STANLEY, *In darkest Africa*, London, 1890, 2 vols., I, p. 47.

<sup>(4)</sup> ARTHINGTON to BAYNES, 15 I 87. B. M. S.

<sup>(5)</sup> *Ibid.*, 21 I 87. B. M. S.

<sup>(6)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 15 II 87, 15 III 87.

decided to hand over the *Peace* with a good grace (1). STANLEY had already taken the precaution of delaying the delivery of any letters which he thought might contain the Committee's decision (2). The case of the *Henry Reed* was more difficult; BILLINGTON and SIMS refused to hand over the steamer unless this action was sanctioned by the Boston authorities, and finally, after several efforts at persuasion had failed, the *Henry Reed* was requisitioned. Various accounts of the incident differed in the degree of responsibility which they allotted to STANLEY himself and to LIEBRECHTS, Governor of the Stanley Pool district (3). At home the expedition had aroused considerable enthusiasm, and STANLEY'S reports were awaited with eagerness. When his account of his use of the *Peace* and the *Henry Reed* appeared in the press in June, it brought the B.M.S. a considerable amount of unwelcome attention. Some of the supporters of the Society were highly critical of the association of the *Peace* with Emin Relief Expedition (4). R. N. CUST

(1) "...had you given positive orders to the contrary, they *would have been of no use*, for I am in a position to state that she would have been immediately requisitioned, had we refused, by the State officials... To save the devastation of the country by STANLEY'S crowd, furious with hunger, was considered by the State officials sufficiently urgent to warrant a State interposition". BENTLEY to BAYNES, 24 V 87, in B. M. S. Minutes, 20 VII 87.

It was not only the State officials who considered the matter to be urgent. MACKINNON had sent a telegram to STANLEY on 9th March: "...agent should requisition *Peace* and *Henry Reed* if necessary. Highest authority approve...". This was followed by a telegram on 18 March: "Baptist Mission refuse *Peace*". Mackinnon Papers. S. O. A. S.

(2) W. G. BARTTELOT, *Life of E. M. Barttelot*, London, 1890, p. 87.

(3) According to the account of J. ROSE TROUP (*With Stanley's Rear Column*, London, 1890, p. 87) the responsibility belonged to LIEBRECHTS, while according to the latter (*Souvenirs d'Afrique*, Brussels, 1909, pp. 169-174) it belonged to STANLEY. STANLEY'S accounts of the affair appear in his letter to MACKINNON of 26th April 1887, published in the English press on 17th July 1887, in his official report published in the blue book *Africa* no.4, 1890, and in his book, *In Darkest Africa*, London, 1890, I, pp. 83-92.

(4) "I do not consider we have such a 'clean sheet' in the history of our Denomination that we can afford to leave the impression on people's minds that it matters little to our consciences whether the *Peace* is employed for CHRIST or TIPPO-TIP". SARNWAYS to BAYNES, 12 VI 87. B. M. S.



of the C.M.S. suggested that representatives of the British missionary societies should meet to consider the matter and to protest to the King of the Belgians (1). ARTHINGTON himself regarded the matter with gloom :

“ The *Peace* is in polluted hands... I should not be surprised, although I do not *expect* it — if it were dashed to pieces. ” 2

The *Freeman*, the official organ of the Baptist denomination, stressed as usual the dangers of any position but complete independence of the secular power :

“ The less missionaries have to do with rulers the better... They who seek favours from sovereigns and States should be ready to render some equivalent for favours shown. Both our own society and the L. I. M. are indebted to Mr. STANLEY and the King of the Belgians for help rendered and concessions made, and, therefore, it is only natural that officials of the Congo State should look for some return. But such alliances are compromising. A heavy price has often to be paid for benefits conferred. ” (3)

The Emin Relief Expedition certainly did very little to fulfil the hopes which had been aroused when it set out. LEOPOLD II had insisted that it should take the Congo route, but he found that this brought him very little help in the task of subjecting his Congo territories to an ordered administration. His frustration (4) was shared by the missions. The long uncertainty about the fate of the Expedition only heightened the sense of impotence felt by the missionaries lower down the river, as they saw their chances of progress eastward effectively barred. They had hoped that the Emin Relief Expedition would help in opening the country to civi-

(1) CUST to BAYNES, 21 VI 87. B. M. S.

(2) ARTHINGTON to BAYNES, 30 VI 87. B. M. S.

(3) *Freeman*, 24 VI 87.

(4) “ VAN EETVELDE... said he earnestly hoped that if any further expedition were to be sent to EMIN PASHA's relief it might take the East Coast route, as the Government of the Congo State had had nothing but trouble, anxiety and vexation (difficulties with the Arabs, missionaries and natives) since the departure of Mr. STANLEY's expedition ”. Lord VIVIAN to F. O., 25 XI 88. F. O. 84/1895.

lisation, but even European leadership had proved unable to restrain the rear section (drawn from cannibal tribes which had come under Arab influence) so that it left behind it devastation equal to that which was normally the consequence of an Arab ivory or slave raid. GRENFELL watched developments with increasing irritation, and saw little hope save in the effective European occupation of Central Africa :

“ Considering then, the news we hear from Lake Nyassa, the gathering of increasing numbers of raiders who are not amenable to authority when their personal interests are at stake, and the fact that the recent (Emin Relief) Expedition is opening up to these lawless bands wide districts of hitherto untouched country, it will not be difficult to understand how it is that we are anxious about the future. The Congo State by arming and training the Bangalas is forming a barrier between the upper and lower sections of the river which the Arabs will never pass ; but if they reach as far as Bangala they will have the better part of the Congo basin in their hands. This is a matter which concerns not only the Congo State, and the solution of the difficulty is not in their hands alone. France, Germany and Portugal with their large African possessions furnish ready markets for the sale of ivory and for the purchase of arms and powder, essentials to the Arab sway, and are potent factors in the case, while their policy has a most intimate bearing upon the future of this long-suffering land. If the civilised powers claiming the heart of Africa would *occupy* as well as claim, would do for these territories what the Congo State is doing for Bangala, what EMIN BEY is doing for his province, what GORDON did for the Soudan, the horizon would at once brighten with promise, and the evils we now deplore would soon give place to prosperity and peace. ” (1)

From Tanganyika to the Lomami, the whole of the eastern border of the Congo State had come under Arab control. Political considerations led the State to aim at the conquest of the region. Thus State posts were founded at Basoko and Lusambo in 1889 and 1890 in an effort to stop further Arab advance. But LEOPOLD

(1) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 26 VII 88. B. M. S.

could also appeal to humanitarian sentiment in Europe, and in this the missions were his wholehearted supporters. Indeed, the protagonist of the anti-slavery crusade in Europe in 1888 was also the champion of Catholic missions in Africa. With remarkable success Cardinal LAVIGERIE was able to marshal and present the facts about the slave trade in Central Africa so that he both excited the pity of humanitarian Europe and encouraged the active intervention of European governments, intent on their own imperialist plans. His crusade was of the greatest value to LEOPOLD II. At the Anti-Slavery Conference held in Brussels in 1889-90, the King used humanitarian sentiment to secure larger revenue for the Congo State. He argued that, if he were effectively to wage a campaign against the Arabs in the eastern part of the State, and thus to bring the slave trade to an end, he must be allowed the increased resources necessary for so great a task.

The missions were well aware of the issues involved at the conference and they strongly supported the King. GRENFELL had long been conscious of the financial difficulties of the State, and since he believed that "to fight the Arabs... will cost money, plenty of money, but should not involve anything serious in the matter of fighting" (1), he was eager to see LEOPOLD with sufficient resources for a determined advance to the east. The Berlin Act had foreseen the possibility of permitting the Congo State to levy import duties, and LEOPOLD hoped that the Brussels Conference would give him permission to do so. It was easy enough to link the anti-slavery crusade with the question of import duties, since the main burden of carrying out the decisions of the Powers fell on the Congo State. When a proposition was formulated in May 1890, however, the United States and

(1) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 22 III 89. B. M. S.

Holland both opposed it. The Dutch government was acting in defence of the *Nieuwe Afrikaanse Handelsvenootschap*, a Rotterdam company whose share-holders were threatened with a decrease in their profits should the import duties be allowed <sup>(1)</sup>.

There were lengthy negotiations to persuade Holland to accept the imposition of import duties. BANNING suggested two separate agreements ; the General Act concerning the slave trade, which all the Powers participating in the Conference would sign, and a Declaration allowing import duties, which Holland would not sign immediately. Negotiations with her on the subject would continue. Accordingly in July all the Powers signed the General Act. It was concerned to stamp out the slave trade by an improvement of administration and communications in Central Africa. Stations were to be set up in the interior to prevent the capture of slaves, and to protect legitimate trade and Christian missions. The Declaration, on the other hand, stated that since new resources were needed to carry out the provisions of the General Act, the Powers with possessions in the Congo basin could levy import duties at a rate not exceeding 10 % *ad valorem*. The British missions were most anxious that the Powers should ratify the General Act, and that Holland should sign the Declaration. The provisions of the Act were likely to make their task easier, while they recognised that the administrative weakness of the Congo State was largely due to its lack of resources. So, rather than joining the Dutch campaign for the sake of their own financial interests, they supported the import duties because these would supply the revenues essential to the carrying-out of the stipulations of the Brussels Conference <sup>(2)</sup>.

Their support was useful to LEOPOLD in the pamphlet

<sup>(1)</sup> A. STENMANS, *La reprise du Congo par la Belgique*, Brussels, 1949, p. 106.

<sup>(2)</sup> *R. B.*, July 1890.

warfare which was waged throughout 1890 for and against the Dutch case (1). The press supporting the King made the most of the argument that Protestant missionaries approved the imposition of import duties (2). LEOPOLD hoped that he could also make use of their attitude in his efforts to urge the British Government to bring pressure to bear on Holland. The Anti-Slavery Society had already, in September, memorialised Lord SALISBURY against the Dutch position. In October LEOPOLD interviewed the secretary of the society and Allen left him determined to write to the *Times*, to organize deputations to Lord SALISBURY, and to get questions asked in the Commons on the subject of the Dutch refusal to sign the Declaration (3). Later in the week the King also saw BAYNES, and BAYNES in turn assured LEOPOLD that he was ready to do his utmost in bringing pressure to bear upon the British Government (4). As a result of the interview, the B.M.S. agreed to join the Anti-Slavery Society in sending a deputation to Lord SALISBURY (5). The mission did all it could to support LEOPOLD'S policy. A communication from Holland reporting on the seizure of the *Peace* by the Congo State (6) appeared in the British press on 21<sup>st</sup> November. A reply from Brussels declared that the affair had been wrongly reported, and that "the object of the Rotterdam telegram... was to turn public opinion in Great Britain against the Congo Free State in the import duties question". BAYNES had foreseen that it might have this effect and had writ-

(1) For example, a Dutch merchant published a pamphlet entitled *The Anti-Slavery Conference and the import duties in the Congo Independent State*, to which the State reply was *The Brussels Conference and Holland*, by A Friend of the Truth.

(2) *Indépendance*, 20 IX 90; *Nation*, 9 X 90.

(3) LEOPOLD II to LAMBERMONT, 19 X 90. *Papiers Lambermont*, 1889-90, 1052.

(4) *Ibid.*, 25 X 90. P. L., 1889-90, 1057.

(5) B. M. S. Minutes, 28 X 90.

(6) This was an occasion subsequent to the loan made to STANLEY during the Emin Relief Expedition.

ten at once to the *Times* to explain that the Brussels authorities had telegraphed orders to Congo for the return of the steamer, and had undertaken to give the B.M.S. compensation for any damage suffered by the *Peace*. He added that the Committee had appreciated this prompt action, and he clearly wished to present the Congo State authorities in the best possible light. Pressed on all sides, Holland finally gave in, and at the end of December agreed to sign the Declaration. In April 1892 the Brussels Act eventually came into force.

The Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference had given a new impetus to the efforts of the Congo State for the pacification of its eastern borders, and this in turn reacted on the fortunes of the missions. It was the strengthening of the "wall of governmental protection between missionaries and the Arabs" <sup>(1)</sup> which made missionary expansion eastwards possible. A campaign to destroy the Arab power began in 1892, after the massacre of a commercial expedition which had hoped to secure a footing in the Arab zone. GONGO LUTETE, a Bakusu chief from the Sankuru who twice failed in his attack on the State post of Lusambo, realised that their military skill gave the Europeans an advantage with which the Arabs could not hope to compete, and he became an ally of the State. His lead was followed by several other chiefs, to the great annoyance of the Arabs who, under SEFU, the son of TIPPO-TIP, began a series of massacres of Europeans. DHANIS replied by taking Nyangwe and Kasongo during a campaign in the Lomami-Lualaba, while CHALTIN won a great victory at the Falls when he went to the relief of the State station there, besieged by RASHID, a nephew of TIPPO-TIP. TIPPO-TIP himself had always been an uncertain ally of the State, and it was not surprising that he had decided to leave for Zanzibar when he saw that fighting was immi-

(1) *R. B.*, Oct. 1892.

nent. Dhanis successfully repulsed RUMALIZA the Sultan of Ujiji, who came to the help of the retreating Arab forces. In the Ituri LOTHAIRE and HENRI captured the Arab chief KIBONGE and pacified the whole region. By 1895 the State forces had achieved a success which they could hardly have hoped for three years earlier. Missionaries in the west, who had been following the progress of the campaign with extreme anxiety, saw its successes as victories for Christianity against the westward spread of Islam. They had not underestimated the danger, and were grateful for the activity of the State. As GRENFELL wrote to DHANIS :

“ So far back as 1884 I recognised the serious need of, and pleaded for, a settled government with a strong hand, for the administration of Congo affairs, and especially for the stemming of the Arab tide of conquest which was then setting in full force westward down the Congo. And, it is my firm conviction that but for the intervention of a civilised power we should have had today to deal with the Arab problem at Boma and on the west coast, as well as on the east. ” (1)

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The State campaign against the Arabs had apparently made it possible for the B.M.S. to advance eastwards into the interior. At home the idea of a chain of Christian mission stations across Central Africa aroused an enthusiastic response. In the Congo it seemed necessary to advance inland quickly in order to make a survey of the field to be evangelized. But obvious difficulties faced a mission whose stations formed a long line, each placed in a different tribal or language group, and for this reason not all the missions which started work in the Congo displayed the zeal shown by the B.M.S. to press inland to the heart of the continent. Even in this Society, the forward policy was largely directed by two men, ARTHINGTON and GRENFELL, the “ miser ” and the

(1) GRENFELL to DHANIS, 9 III 96, in GRENFELL to BAYNES, 30 III 96. B. M. S.

explorer. As late as the 'nineties the home committee considered a plan of extension in the lower Congo by which San Salvador and Wathen — both originally occupied as a means of reaching the upper river — would become the nucleus of a group of five or six new stations. This would have meant that resources were not available for the plantation of new upper river stations. BENTLEY was wholeheartedly in favour of the scheme, since he had worked for some time at Wathen and so was particularly interested in the lower river. His views thus conflicted with those of GRENFELL, and a tension resulted similar to that which had occurred earlier between the L.M.S. and LIVINGSTONE <sup>(1)</sup>. But from the beginning, the B.M.S. had been committed to a plan of advance.

There were other Congo missions which showed a similar enthusiasm for pressing forward into the interior. Like ARTHINGTON, Albert SIMPSON of New York believed that the Second Coming of Christ waited only for the preaching of the Gospel in all parts of the world.

“ A reporter from the *New York Journal* called one day on Mr. SIMPSON and asked him, ‘ Do you know when the Lord is coming ? ’ ‘ Yes ’, replied Mr. SIMPSON, ‘ and I will tell you if you will promise to print just what I say, references and all. ’ The reporter’s notebook was out in a moment. ‘ Then put this down : The gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations, and then shall the end come (Matt. 24 : 14). Have you written the reference ? ’ ‘ Yes, what more ? ’ ‘ Nothing more. ’ The reporter laid down his pencil and said, ‘ Do you mean to say that you believe that when the Gospel has been preached to all nations JESUS will return ? ’ ‘ Just that ’, said Dr. SIMPSON ‘ Then ’, replied the reporter, ‘ I think I begin to see daylight. ’ ‘ What do you think you see ? ’ ‘ Why, I see the motive and the motive-power in this movement. ’ ‘ Then ’, said Dr. SIMPSON, ‘ you see more than some of the doctors of divinity ’. ” <sup>(2)</sup>

Originally a Presbyterian minister, SIMPSON had bro-

<sup>(1)</sup> OLIVER, p. 42.

<sup>(2)</sup> A. E. THOMPSON, *The life of A. B. Simpson*, New-York 1920, p. 111.



ken away from his denomination in order to spend more time in preaching to the masses, and to adopt the practice of believers' baptism (1). In 1885 his Gospel Tabernacle in New York sent out five members to work on faith-healing lines. Their effort proved a failure, but the second group which followed them was more conservative and more successful (2). This International Missionary Alliance (in 1897 it joined with the Christian Alliance to form the Christian and Missionary Alliance) put forward a singularly impracticable plan in 1896 for a forward movement beginning at Matadi and stretching for a thousand miles through the south of the Congo State to Lake Tanganyika (3) — a route which cut straight across the main lines of river communication. In fact, however, the mission was forced by lack of resources to remain in the lower Congo.

But SIMPSON'S missionaries stayed there from necessity and not from choice. It was a different matter with the American Baptists, who took over the work of the Livingstone Inland Mission in 1884. This mission had left behind it a tradition of speedy advance into the interior. It was a society born of the enthusiasm aroused by STANLEY'S demonstration that the Congo provided a route into the heart of Africa, and its missionaries had never intended to settle down on the lower river. By 1884 it had planted five stations below the Pool and one on its shores, had planned a chain of upper river posts, and already established the first of these near the Equator, at the confluence of the Juapa and the Congo. But the East London Institute could no longer support a work which was developing so rapidly, and it gladly accepted the proposal of the American Baptist Missiona-

(1) *Ibid.*, p. 86.

(2) BENTLEY, II, p. 417.

(3) *The Missionary*, the missionary magazine of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, May 1896.

ry Union when, in 1884, the latter offered to take over the mission <sup>(1)</sup>. The American Baptists were looking for an opening in Africa, and while the activities of STANLEY and SANFORD in the Congo had aroused American interest in the region, their English fellow-Baptists there seemed ready to give them a welcome <sup>(2)</sup>.

The American Baptists had seventy years' experience of missionary work in India, Burma, and China, and had formulated a settled evangelistic policy which was very different from that of the L.I.M. They intended to expend all their energies on a strong central station, and gradually to build up from it a circle of out-stations. Not until the work was thoroughly established in one district did they move on to another post. They also preferred to limit themselves to one language, whereas by 1884 the L.I.M. was using several. It seemed at first that the American Baptists might adopt the L.I.M. policy in the Congo and advance inland <sup>(3)</sup>, but this idea came to nothing. The two members of the American delegation which went out to survey the Congo field in the summer of 1885 were pessimistic about the prospects before the mission, and even advised that it should be given up <sup>(4)</sup>. It was retained only after a decision to concentrate as far as possible on work in one district alone. So the Equator station was later handed over to the Disciples of Christ, and a second upper river station was closed. In 1900 only two A.B.M.U. posts were left above the Pool. Had it not been for the pleading of the missionaries in the field, the home board would have ordered the

<sup>(1)</sup> GUINNESS, p. 394.

<sup>(2)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 16 IX 84.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Baptist Missionary Magazine*, Boston, Nov. 1884.

<sup>(4)</sup> The main criticisms were that the L. I. M. missionaries were men of insufficient natural ability and education, and that a mission covering so much ground and several language groups was unwieldy and far too expensive. E. JUDSON and A. LOUGHBRIDGE to J. N. MURDOCH (Congo deputation report) 24 IX 85, and the comments of the Committee on the Congo Mission, F. JOHNSON and A. POTTER, on the JUDSON-LOUGHBRIDGE report, 1885. A. B. M. U.

evacuation of all the upper river sites <sup>(1)</sup>, and certainly the main work of the mission was done below the Pool.

It was the same with the Swedish Mission — the *Svenska Missionsförbundet* — which was also an offshoot of the L.I.M. In the middle of the nineteenth century a religious revival had led to a wave of missionary enthusiasm in Scandinavia. In South Africa individuals served here and there in non-Scandinavian missions, and then in the 'seventies a Swedish society was formed <sup>(2)</sup>. In the Congo, too, an organised mission grew out of the efforts of individuals and the interest which their work aroused at home. As early as 1881 Swedish missionaries had worked in the Congo under the direction of the L.I.M. after a period of training in England, so that the region was kept before the attention of the Swedish Protestant Churches. Unlike most of the English missionaries, the Swedes working under the L.I.M. were not Baptists, so that when the work of the society passed into the hands of the American Baptists they decided to form a mission of their own. The station of Mukimbungu was handed over to them, and although this was on the south bank of the river, like all the L.I.M. stations, they decided to work northwards, and by 1900 had occupied five stations to the north of the Congo <sup>(3)</sup>.

The English group which had formed the L.I.M. soon realised that the Swedes and the American Baptists had taken over the existing work of the mission but did not intend to press forward into the interior. The disappointment of this group and their growing sense of the importance of a forward move led to the formation of the Congo Balolo Mission in 1888. Grattan GUINNESS the elder was by this time receiving full-time assistance

<sup>(1)</sup> GRENFELL to BAYNES, 9 X 97, 23 XII 97, 15 I 98, B. M. S.

<sup>(2)</sup> K. S. LATOURETTE, A history of the expansion of Christianity, London, 1937-45, 7 vols., V, pp. 370-1.

<sup>(3)</sup> A.R. STONELAKE, Congo past and present, London 1937, p. 41.

from his son, so the East London Institute was considerably stronger than before and seemed capable of supporting another African mission. Throughout the intervening four years the contacts of the ex-L.I.M. missionaries had naturally been with London rather than with Boston. John McKITTRICK, who had been working with the American Baptists in Equatorville, brought home a Balolo boy named BOMPOLE in 1888 and asked for a mission to be set up among the Balolo of the Lopori-Maringa basin. His desire to press inland, and the presence of BOMPOLE in England, aroused great enthusiasm and brought in considerable funds. It was an auspicious moment to begin a new Congo mission, for STANLEY'S Emin Pasha Relief Expedition had focussed English attention on the Congo and on the fact that the river could be used to reach the African interior. The American Baptists gave up McKITTRICK to lead the new mission, and promised the use of the *Henry Reed* for a year <sup>(1)</sup> In the summer of 1887 the first party reached Africa, and a station was established at the confluence of the Lulonga and the Congo.

The Balolo were reported to be a warlike and intelligent people, comparatively recent immigrants of Nilo-Hamitic origin who had won for themselves the position of a ruling class among the original peoples of the Lulonga-Lopori-Maringa basin. The C.B.M. took as its field the whole of this region, which stretched from the great bend of the Congo southward to the Equator and beyond. It was concerned with speedy expansion. While the B.M.S. was pushing up the Congo and exploring the possibilities of work on its northern tributaries, the C.B.M. decided to advance by using the network of tributaries lying to the north and south of the Equator, within the curve of the main river — the Lulonga, the

(1) GUINNESS, pp. 472-3.

Lopori, the Maringa, the Juapa and the Busira, all completely untouched by missionary work.

\* \* \*

Second only to the main course of the Congo river, its great tributary the Kasai offered a valuable route for missionary penetration. In 1886 GRENFELL had completed his explorations of the Congo waterways by a voyage up the Kasai in the *Peace*. Even before this, the B.M.S. had considered expansion eastward along the Kwa. Mushie, a point midway between the confluence of the Kasai and the Kwango and that of the Kwa and the Congo, had figured as a B.M.S. station in the Society's 1885 report, although in fact the site was never occupied. GRENFELL'S voyage in 1886 convinced him that a Kasai post should be planted, for, as we have already noticed, the Baluba tribe particularly attracted him, while the State had already planted posts at Luluabourg and Luebo, and thus there was likely to be sufficient European force in the region to ensure the safety of a mission station. For the moment, however, the Society was fully occupied on the main river.

By 1890 all thought of B.M.S. advance along the Kasai had been given up, since it appeared that Bishop TAYLOR'S mission had laid claim to the river as its field for expansion <sup>(1)</sup>. As early as 1870 William TAYLOR had made experiments in India which led to his development of a system of self-supporting missions <sup>(2)</sup>, and when the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church elected him missionary Bishop for Africa early in 1884, he decided to apply similar methods there. The volunteers he accepted included not only men, but whole

<sup>(1)</sup> GRENFELL TO BAYNES, 25 III 90. B. M. S.

<sup>(2)</sup> E. DAVIES, *The Bishop of Africa ; or the life of William Taylor*, Reading, Mass., 1885, pp. 56-63.

families. This was unusual, to say the least, and it was hardly surprising that he was strongly criticised when five families with sixteen children called at Sierra Leone on their way to Loanda (1). From here the Bishop intended "to drive a chain of stations a thousand miles into the interior". After the first settlements had been made in Angola, he turned his attention to the Congo as a route into Central Africa. With the intention of advancing to the upper river, the mission procured a steamer which, according to GRENFELL, was a "regular Jules Verne affair" (2). But like many other projects of the Bishop the steamer proved singularly impracticable. It included several refinements hitherto unknown on the Congo — at night it could even be lit by electric light (3) — but since the boiler was built in one piece and was therefore too heavy to be carried around the rapids to Stanley Pool, the boat never reached its destination. Congo conditions were not suitable for self-supporting missions, the missionaries were regarded with suspicion by the Congo State agents (4), and although a few members of the party remained in the lower Congo until 1896, they did very little direct missionary work.

The one attempt to carry out the "thousand miles" scheme and push into the interior was made by Dr.

(1) "I am constantly asked by people here whom I meet daily what are these missionaries going to do with all those children? and people who know the coast so well here do not hesitate to say that they think it absolutely *wicked* to bring them out here — where they have many chances to die and only few to live... we are prepared to hear sad news within a year..." LEWIS to the State Department, 21 II 85. State Department, Consular reports, Sierra Leone, II/173.

(2) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 8 XI 87. B. M. S.

(3) *Le Mouvement Géographique*, Brussels, 30 I 87.

(4) "Les missionnaires de la société Taylor, établis à Vivi seraient, au témoignage de deux fonctionnaires sérieux, peu recommandables... Ils vivent entre eux dans la discorde, et le commissaire de district est assailli de plaintes et dénonciations... Ces détails... seraient peu intéressants... s'ils ne nous donnaient la mesure de la moralité de gens qui, d'après le commissaire de district "sont une cause de trouble dans le pays". "Report to the Administrator-General, 19 VII 89. *Archives Générales du Royaume*, Brussels, *Papiers Van Eetvelde*, 128.

SUMMERS who travelled up the Kasai and settled at Luluabourg near the State post. He died, however, in 1888 ; he was left without a successor, and gradually the Methodist Episcopal Church lost interest in the Congo altogether. Bishop TAYLOR was succeeded by Joseph Crane HARTZELL, who believed that the mission ought to concentrate upon those regions of Central Africa in which Anglo-Saxon influence was strongest. For this reason — although other fields were not entirely abandoned — there was a growing tendency to concentrate on the sphere of the British South Africa Company (<sup>1</sup>). But in the Congo Dr. SUMMERS' activity had led the B.M.S. to regard the Kasai as the field of Bishop TAYLOR'S mission, and to give up the idea of advancing by that route.

It was the American Presbyterians who finally undertook the evangelisation of the Kasai. Unlike the American Baptists who had started work in the lower Congo, they came from the Southern States. Before the Civil War the American churches had split into Northern and Southern divisions over the question of slavery — the Methodists in 1844, the Baptists in the following year, and the Presbyterians in 1861 on the eve of the outbreak of the war. Similarly the missions then in existence were divided into Northern and Southern branches. After the Civil War, there had been a movement for the education of the Negroes in the South. The churchmen and philanthropists of the south recognized their moral responsibility towards the freed slaves, and also realised that if Southerners did not take the problem of Negro education seriously, it would be impossible to keep out Northern influence. Two notable experimental centres were the Hampton Institute in Virginia and Fisk University in Tennessee. The interest

(<sup>1</sup>) LATOURETTE, V, p. 385.

of the Southern Presbyterians in the Congo was to a large extent due to the drive for Negro education in the South. The Congo had been linked with America by the Atlantic slave trade, and educated freed slaves now began to look back to their original home. The earliest pressure to undertake missionary work in Africa came from William SHEPPARD <sup>(1)</sup>, a Virginian Negro who had passed through the Hampton Institute and also the Stillman Institute in Alabama. From 1887 onwards, he consistently urged the Presbyterian Executive Committee of Foreign Missions to send him to Africa. Previously the Presbyterians had looked westwards, to China, but now they began for the first time to look east. It was two years, however, before a white volunteer came forward to accompany SHEPPARD. Other recruits were slow to follow <sup>(2)</sup>. There was no romantic appeal to Southerners in a mission to Africa; the Presbyterian Committee recognised this, and sent out a stern call to duty <sup>(3)</sup>.

In 1890 Samuel LAPSLEY and William SHEPPARD were commissioned by the Committee to "ascertain the most eligible site for a new mission station in West Central Africa", preferably in the Congo State. They were to push on into the interior, for they were directed to choose a site well removed from other missions, in a healthy highland region, the centre of a dense population, where one language would cover a wide area. When LAPSLEY visited Bolobo, GRENFELL suggested either the Kwango or the Kasai as a suitable field, with a preliminary station at Mushie. After making an exploratory canoe trip, LAPSLEY and SHEPPARD decided to plant their first post near Mushie, at the confluence of the Kwango and the Kasai, with a second where the Loango

<sup>(1)</sup> E. T. WHARTON, *Led in triumph*, Nashville, Tenn., 1952, p. 11.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Miss.*, Feb. 1892.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Ibid.*, March 1890.



met the Kasai and a third where the Sankuru met the Kasai; thus they would work up the river (1). Soon, however, the plan of a chain of stations up the Kasai was abandoned, and in line with the Committee's original idea they decided to go further inland at once. Communications with the interior were assured, since the *Société Anonyme Belge* had planted a station at Luebo, planned to establish four more posts along the river within a year, and had several steamers under construction (2).

In April 1891 LAPSLEY and SHEPPARD reached Luebo, and this seemed to them to be an excellent site for a mission. European influence had preceded them, and gave a promise of some kind of stability and order, while Luebo was a very good centre for reaching five tribes — the Baluba on the west bank of the Lulua, the Bena Lulua, whose centre of power was Luluabourg, the ruling Bakuba between the Kasai and the Sankuru, the Bakete whom they dominated, and the cannibal tribe of the Zappo-Zaps, middlemen who bought rubber from the Bakuba and the Bakete to exchange for cloth at the *Société Anonyme* post at Luebo.

The missionaries planned to concentrate their first efforts on the Bakuba. But LAPSLEY'S work was practically confined to the location of the mission at Luebo. He and SHEPPARD had decided to visit the Bakuba capital, which, like the chief, the Lukunga, had never yet been seen by a white man. But in 1892 LAPSLEY died of fever on a journey to the lower Congo, and SHEPPARD was left to go northward alone. Every hindrance was put in his way, until finally his persistence and his knowledge of the vernacular persuaded the Bakuba that his body must contain the spirit of some member

(1) *Ibid.*, July 1891.

(2) R. D. BEDINGER, *Triumphs of the Gospel in Belgian Congo*, Richmond, 1920, p. 31.

of the tribe who was trying to return to them after death. Thus he received a royal welcome. SHEPPARD was fascinated by the splendour of the Lukunga's court, the quantities of ivory he saw, the massive mahogany posts of the Council chamber, the intricate design of the woven mats upon the walls, the statues which were unusual in the Congo because the carvers had made a real attempt to portray personal features and varied expressions <sup>(1)</sup>. It was SHEPPARD's idea that the Presbyterian Mission should concentrate upon work among the Bakuba <sup>(2)</sup>. Several attempts were made to move northwards towards them, although in the meantime Luebo itself became a flourishing freed slave colony. But in 1894 ADAMSON drew attention to Mokikama, the site of a *Société Anonyme* rubber station, as a good place from which to reach the Bakuba <sup>(3)</sup>, and in 1897 MORRISON and SHEPPARD actually set out to build a station at Ibanj <sup>(4)</sup>, thirty miles north of Luebo, on the borders of the Bakuba country.

The influence of MORRISON upon the development of American Presbyterian policy in the Kasai was outstanding. Although at first he deeply regretted the evacuation of Ibanj on State orders, he soon realised that in fact it would be preferable for the mission to concentrate first on work among the Baluba. He could quote the earlier testimony of LIVINGSTONE, CAMERON and VON WISSMAN to the fact that these seemed the most promising people of Central Africa. They had attracted GRENFELL to the Kasai. Not only were they more receptive to new ideas and to European influence than the conservative Bakuba, but by using their language the mission could reach millions of people, whereas the

<sup>(1)</sup> WHARTON, pp. 37-8.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Miss.*, May 1893.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Miss.*, June 1895.

<sup>(4)</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 1897.

Bakuba dialect was understood by a very restricted number. It was MORRISON who took up this language study, and his influence which to a very great extent led the mission to concentrate on this tribe among whom there was so great an opportunity for rapid expansion. The Baluba and the Bena Lulua were being forced to concentrate upon Luebo to seek European protection against the pressure of cannibal tribes. Conditions there were more favourable for a centralised mission than in any other part of the Congo. The concentration of Africans around the mission station was welcomed by the Presbyterians; they had begun their work by founding a freed slave colony, and were delighted to find themselves the centre of a large community.

In 1897 a completely different type of mission was begun by the Plymouth Brethren among the neighbouring Bakuba of the Sankuru region. Seventy years earlier, the founders of the Brethren movement had reacted both against the idea of a State Church and against the cultivation of distinctive denominational tenets at the expense of common Christian sympathies, and with the cry of "back to Scripture", they had endeavoured to gather together the elect out of the mass of nominal Christians. They had believed that the Second Coming of Christ was near; when to their surprise it delayed, they found that instead of gathering together the Church of the "children of God" from among the Anglicans and the dissenters, they had formed one more group among many. The Brethren stood for liberty of ministry; they disliked any regularly constituted ecclesiastical authority and any type of orderly arrangement. Thus the tendency to split was there from the beginning, and while the Exclusive Brethren, or Darbyites, tried to impose uniformity of doctrine on all the Brethren, the Open Brethren broke away with an insistence upon the autonomy of the local church. The full force of the

Brethren movement was not wholeheartedly behind overseas missionary expansion. The Darbyites displayed a "supercilious contempt for aggressive evangelism" (1), although the Open Brethren did not share this attitude. But there was a general tendency among the Brethren in the later nineteenth century to stress the needs of a corrupt Christendom rather than those of the heathen (2).

The little mission on the Sankuru had no organised society and no regular support from home at its back. In 1897 two brothers, W. H. and Upton WESTCOTT, met at the mouth of the Congo to undertake pioneering work in the interior, the one after a two-years' ministry in South Africa, and the other straight out from England. A little group of friends at home had helped to provide them with their passage money and with some meagre equipment; they seemed ill-equipped for their task, however, with no organised society on which they could rely for regular supplies. But enthusiasm, courage and perseverance marked the Westcotts' efforts. They succeeded in placing a mission station at Inkongo, a point on the Sankuru twelve miles above the State station of Lusambo. Once they had begun to reduce the language to writing, and to gather together a little school, other Plymouth Brethren came to join them. But reinforcements came out as individuals, not as members of an organised mission. They were free to join in the work already established, or to go elsewhere if they wished. There could be no greater contrast than that between the two types of mission working in the Kasai region; between the individualism of the Plymouth Brethren and the discipline, cohesion and centralisation of the American Presbyterians.

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(1) W. B. NEATBY, *A History of the Plymouth Brethren*, London 1901, p. 330.

(2) F. B. HOLE, *Into His marvellous light*, London, 1947, p. 40.

In the Katanga, as in the Sankuru, the first Christian missionaries to settle in the region belonged to the Plymouth Brethren. The Katanga formed a quite distinct and separate entity in the south-eastern corner of the Congo Independent State. Geographically not a part of the low-lying Congo basin, it is in contrast a highland region where the great southern and eastern plateaux of Africa meet. Although the sources of the Congo are to be found there, the natural access from the coast was not by way of the river, for the Katanga was cut off from its navigable reaches by the long series of falls on the Lualaba. The obvious routes from the coast were those of the Arab slavers from Zanzibar across Tanganyika, from Benguella by way of the Bihé highlands, and from the south, by way of Shiré and Nyassa. Early reports had suggested that the Katanga was a land of promise. LIVINGSTONE and CAMERON had declared it to be a region of rich mineral wealth, although their statements were based only on hearsay from the Arabs whom they had met. These reports were confirmed when in 1884 REICHARD and BÖHM of the German section of the International African Association succeeded in penetrating the Katanga from Tanganyika, and when in the following year the Portuguese explorers CAPELLO and IVENS arrived there after travelling inland from Mossamedes. The Katanga was believed to be rich in both copper and gold.

In contrast to other parts of the Congo basin, it was also distinguished by the degree of political organisation and order which had been achieved there before the coming of Europeans. Like MUTESA of Buganda and MIRAMBO of Unyamwezi, MSIRI of Bunkeya was a strong ruler of a centralised state, although he was a newcomer to the region, a Nyamwezi trader who had succeeded in securing recognition as the heir of the chief Katanga, and in building up his inheritance into a large and power-

ful empire. His subjects were drawn from many tribes, with the Basanga, the Balunda and the Baluba prominent among them, while the bounds of his empire stretched from the Lualaba to the Luapula, and from the Luvua to the Congo-Zambesi watershed. MSIRI'S contacts were wide. He continued the traditional trade with the Arabs from the east, but in addition he pioneered a West coast trade, sending ivory to the Portuguese factories there in return for powder and cloth<sup>(1)</sup>. Bunkeya was a meeting-place for traders from districts as far apart as Angola, Uganda and Zanzibar.

MSIRI was eager for direct contact with Europeans. The West coast trade which he had established had whetted his appetite for more and more of the cloth and above all for the powder which it brought him, for his power had been built up and maintained by his use of imported firearms at a time when many of his fellows were suspicious of such revolutionary developments in the art of war. He was well aware of the European desire for mineral wealth, which he himself could so easily supply. At the same time he was ready to welcome a chance to undermine the influence of the Arabs at Bunkeya. Forced into co-operation with them, he nevertheless feared their power and desired their wealth. So when he received the news that a lonely European was approaching from the west and desired to take up residence at his court, MSIRI had no difficulty in deciding how to meet his visitor. He planned to welcome him and to grant him permission to settle as a move in the diplomatic game against the Arabs. The news held out hope of an alliance which might result in an increase of his power and independence.

Frederick Stanley ARNOT was the European who in 1886 was approaching Bunkeya quite unaware of the

(1) F. S. ARNOT, *Garenganze*, London, 1889, p. 233.

part which was being cast for him in advance by MSIRI. He was one of the many missionaries whose interest in Central Africa had been aroused by LIVINGSTONE. At the age of six he had heard the explorer speak, as a child he had played with his children, and listened as they read aloud their father's letters, filled with all LIVINGSTONE'S pity for the unfortunate victims of the Arab slave trade, and with his indignation at the great social evils of African society. As a child he had decided that his life-work would be to follow where LIVINGSTONE had pioneered the way <sup>(1)</sup>. True to the tradition of the Plymouth Brethren, he refused to join an organised missionary society. As the WESTCOTT brothers were to do later, he and a friend set out for Central Africa with little equipment, small resources, and no guarantee of further supplies. In South Africa his friend left him, and ARNOT'S first missionary journey — from Durban up to the Zambezi and across to the West coast at Benguela was made alone. His original objective had been the high land to the north of the Zambezi, and he was still determined to settle in this region, since he believed that his trek through a country of scattered population and his long stay in the Barotse valley had demonstrated that the essentials for a successful mission in Central Africa were a healthy plateau and a dense population. MSIRI'S fame attracted him to the Katanga, for he had heard reports of a powerful monarchical state, well-populated territory, large copper-mines and rich agricultural land. He learned that MSIRI was ready to welcome Europeans to his court, and was full of hope that a mission would be successful <sup>(2)</sup>. It was too good an opportunity to be lost.

<sup>(1)</sup> E. BAKER, *The life and explorations of Frederick Stanley Arnot*, London, 1921, p. 18.

<sup>(2)</sup> "I met a company from the chief MSIRI, of Garenganze... sent with a letter to the King's brother-in-law... a half-caste, who read to me the letter..."

When ARNOT arrived at Bunkeya, MSIRI offered him a warm welcome, the choice of a site on which to build, and royal protection. In a highly centralised state where the primary preoccupation of the ruler was his own prestige, it would have been impossible to set up a strong independent mission station. In any case, ARNOT had no desire to do so, although he did gather together a little group of children, a few of the unwanted captives of the Arab slavers (1). There were striking resemblances between his position and that of MACKAY in Buganda (2). ARNOT'S only possible policy, like MACKAY'S, was to dance attendance at court. Thus he was in competition with the Arabs who were constantly on the watch to lower his stock with MSIRI, although Bunkeya, unlike Buganda and San Salvador, was not a scene of rivalry between Catholic and Protestant missionaries. But it seemed impossible to build up a Christian party there; for MSIRI was too powerful, and intolerant of any possible rival claims on the loyalty of his subjects. During the two years which ARNOT spent alone at Bunkeya, and the following two when SWAN and FAULKNER had relieved him and were living at MSIRI'S court cut off from all European contacts (3), the missionaries lived in almost complete subjection to the chief. As missionaries the Plymouth Brethren met with little success, for although MSIRI would discuss the existence of God over breakfast (4), the Sunday services were unpopular, the people found all manner of excuses for absence and less than

which contained an earnest appeal that *white men might come to Garenganze...* Of course it was a traders that he wanted white men, but I felt I had something even better than good trade, which, if MSIDI could only comprehend, he would gladly receive". ARNOT, 16 X 84, in GARENGANZE, p. 122.

(1) ARNOT, Garenganze, pp. 213-4.

(2) OLIVER, p. 74.

(3) *Echoes of Service*, reporting the missionary work of the Plymouth Brethren, Bath, Feb. 1891.

(4) ARNOT, Garenganze, p. 175.



a dozen usually attended them (1). There were social evils at Bunkeya which the missionaries were powerless to attack. With MSIRI as their protector, they could not object to the devastation of the countryside nor to the murder of an individual when these crimes were perpetrated at MSIRI's pleasure, they could not denounce the capture of neighbouring tribesmen and their sale as slaves to the Arabs when this increased MSIRI's wealth, nor could they condemn the widespread polygamy when MSIRI was the chief offender. MSIRI even proposed that SWAN himself should teach him more of the European "war wisdom". This, he tactfully suggested on the outbreak of the Valukaluka revolt, would be the means of saving many lives (2). In spite of SWAN's refusal, and in spite of the missionaries' vain protest at the constant bloodshed in Bunkeya, the chief always remained friendly towards them, flattered by the presence at his court of white men who interfered very little with his way of life, and whom he could treat much as he wished. The servility of their attitude was noted by Vice-Consul SHARPE :

"The missionaries (SWAN and FAULKNER) treat MSIDI as a great King, do *nothing* without first asking his permission, are at his beck and call, almost his slaves : he sends for them continually for trivial things, and they meekly submit. They dared not come to see me on my arrival for several days, because MSIDI told them not to come ! They live like natives, on corn porridge and occasionally stinking meat." (3)

The Katanga was the one part of the Congo State where the missionary had been the protagonist of European advance. Elsewhere, although he might have surveyed the Congo waterways before the State explorers had done so, his actual settlement had followed

(1) BAKER, p. 219.

(2) SWAN's diary, 20 V 90, in *E. S.*, Feb. 1891.

(3) SHARPE to JOHNSTON, 8 IX 90, in JOHNSTON to F. O., 3 V 91. F. O. 84/2114.

the foundation of State and trading posts. In the Katanga the missionary situation was similar to that in East Africa. It has been shown how in East Africa the presence of missionaries of various European nationalities was one of the determining factors in the European division of the territory (4), and there was the possibility that the settlement of a few English Plymouth Brethren might have a decisive effect in the Katanga. Since 1885 the region had been nominally included within the boundaries of the Congo Independent State (2), but nothing had been done towards the "effective occupation" required by the Berlin Act. LEOPOLD, however, was beginning to recognise the importance and the urgency of this matter; in 1888 certain sections of the English press were maintaining that unoccupied parts of the Congo State could be taken by whichever Power had ambitions there. If the British Government was not directly interested in the Katanga, some English circles had no doubts about its value. Should the question of annexation be seriously raised, the way had been prepared for a sympathetic public opinion at home by the interest which ARNOT had aroused on his return to England in 1888. His main aim, of course, had been to raise funds for the mission and secure volunteers to return with him. Since from the point of view of evangelisation the results of his two years' stay in Bunkeya were negligible, he tended to look hopefully to future

(4) OLIVER, p. 161.

(2) The recognition of the *Association Internationale du Congo* by Germany in November 1884 had not included the Kasai nor the Katanga within the boundaries of the Association, since Germany considered herself to be in possession of certain rights in the two regions, following the exploration of POGGÈ and VON WISSMAN, REICHARD and BÖHM. The recognition by France and Portugal in February 1885 had done so, however, since neither of these Powers had territorial ambitions there; later Germany had agreed to the extension. When in August 1885 VAN EETVELDE notified the Powers of the territorial limits of the Congo Independent State there were no objections to the inclusion of the Katanga within those limits.

rather than to present achievements, and to paint a rose-coloured picture of the setting of the work. MSIRI himself was treated indulgently. ARNOT stressed his friendliness; he was "most agreeable, indeed... a thorough gentleman". In his enthusiastic description of the Katanga, ARNOT emphasized the beauty of the country, the peace and order which obtained there under MSIRI's rule and the healthy climate, while he spoke in passing of the copper deposits of the region. The general impression he left in England was that the Katanga was a most desirable part of Central Africa. He was appealing to the missionary-minded public in his addresses all over England and Scotland, but ARNOT was also noticed by the more limited circle of geographers and philanthropists whose influence contributed so much to the British interest in East Africa. He was made a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society for his exploratory work <sup>(1)</sup>, while his account of the activities of the Arabs in the Katanga provided a fresh revelation of the extent of the slave trade in Central Africa.

ARNOT's narrative inevitably left the idea in England that the advance of European rule would be an unmitigated blessing to the Katanga. It would provide communications from the coast, it would hold MSIRI in check, and it would cut off the Arab slave-trade at one of the sources of its supply. Because of the natural wealth of the Katanga, philanthropy could go hand in hand with profit. But there was no driving-force behind this feeling, and certainly ARNOT made no attempt to agitate for British occupation. The real enthusiasm and initiative came from Cecil RHODES, who realised that the British South Africa Company could profitably extend the sphere of its operations northward as far as the Katanga. In Nyasaland the fact that English missionaries were

(1) BAKER, p. 234.

already established there furthered RHODES' plans for the extension of British influence, and provided a useful justification for British annexation <sup>(1)</sup>. The British South Africa Company may have hoped that the presence of the Plymouth Brethren in the Katanga could also be used for this end. The attitude and the circumstances of the Brethren were, however, very different from those of the Scottish mission in Nyasaland. The latter were faced with the prospect of Portuguese government, notoriously hostile to Protestant missions, while the Congo State was obliged by the Berlin Act to give positive encouragement to missions of all denominations. The Plymouth Brethren were quite clear that they wanted to see the benefits of civilised government in the Katanga as soon as possible, and on balance they considered themselves likely to obtain them more quickly from the Congo State than from their own countrymen in the shape of the British South Africa Company <sup>(2)</sup>. By 1890 they had concluded that "the one great hindrance to the Gospel was the lack of settled government", but they were supremely indifferent as to which European government was to remove the hindrance <sup>(3)</sup>. They were not at all enthusiastic about the

<sup>(1)</sup> OLIVER, pp. 124-8.

<sup>(2)</sup> "In three or four years a railway is expected to connect the mouth of the Congo with Stanley Pool... steamers could be transported, and the power of the State government might rapidly spread... much more than is likely to be the case with the South Africa Company's territory". *E. S.*, Dec. 1889.

<sup>(3)</sup> "The daily papers also mention the fitting out of a large expedition to proceed in steamers towards the Lualaba district with the intention of reaching Garenganze and establishing there the authority of the Free State. More remarkable still is a statement that the southern limit of the Congo State has never been defined, and that probably the Free State officials on their arrival may find that England claims the Lualaba (or Garenganze) district. With the *Graphic* of June 28th a map was published showing the British and German possessions in South Central Africa, and one of these is a new territory called "British Central Africa", stretching from Lake Nyassa westward beyond Nana Kandundu and taking in the country to the north of the Zambesi, including Lakes Bangweolo and Moero, and of course the whole kingdom of MSIDI. We had always supposed that the Free State included the basin of the Congo, and that therefore Garan-

activities of RHODES and JOHNSTON. The only point which they saw in favour of British intervention was that it might be followed by the opening-up of an East coast route to the Katanga ; thus they would avoid some of the difficulties of the West coast route through Portuguese territory <sup>(1)</sup>.

The traditional attitude of the Plymouth Brethren towards the civil government was one of complete aloofness. The Church did not interfere with the State. It was the function of the State to secure order and thus to provide peaceful conditions in which the elect could live and multiply. The spheres of law and justice, of social and economic welfare, were relegated to the State and not reserved for the Church. Even had conditions at MSIRI'S court been favourable for the setting up of a theocratic state, the Plymouth Brethren would not have attempted to do this. Similarly they showed no interest in political life at home. They had no group in Parliament which could produce pressure for the declaration of a Protectorate over the Katanga, such as the C.M.S. provided in the case of Uganda <sup>(2)</sup>. They could offer the government no organised public opinion which would refuse to allow British recognition of the claims of the Congo State in the Katanga, in the way in which the Church of Scotland refused to allow the recognition of Portuguese claims in Nyasaland <sup>(3)</sup>. They were simply not interested in applying this kind of pressure ; they did not believe that it was the duty of the elect to do so.

ganze was within that State. It remains, however to be seen whether our brethren at Garenganze may yet find themselves within British territory. The great matter for God's children is to press on with *their work*, and especially to anticipate the disturbing influences of the world's commerce, not waiting to know under what ruler they may find themselves... ". *E. S.*, Aug. 1890.

<sup>(1)</sup> *E. S.*, Jan. 1891, March 1892.

<sup>(2)</sup> OLIVER, pp. 157-8.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

In the field the missionaries preserved a similar neutrality. RHODES' first representative to reach the Katanga at the end of 1890 was the geologist Joseph THOMSON, but smallpox and famine turned him back before he reached Bunkeya <sup>(1)</sup>. The second Englishman there was Alfred SHARPE, one of JOHNSTON'S Vice-Consuls in Nyasaland who was in the pay of RHODES. He arrived at Bunkeya in November 1890, a few days in advance of LANE, THOMPSON and CRAWFORD, missionary reinforcements sent in by ARNOT from the West coast. Unfortunately for SHARPE'S purpose, MSIRI had a fixed idea that visitors who came from the east brought disaster. SHARPE was also unfortunate in the marked lack of enthusiasm with which the Plymouth Brethren met him. He suggested to SWAN, who acted as his interpreter, that MSIRI should simply be told that the British wanted to be his friends. The chief could thus, he hoped, be persuaded to put his mark to a treaty handing over his territory to the British South Africa Company, and the missionary could add his name as a witness <sup>(2)</sup>. SWAN, however, insisted on reading the whole treaty to MSIRI. As the Vice-Consul had feared, MSIRI met him with a firm refusal to sign. SHARPE was forced to leave in disgust, barely escaping with his life <sup>(3)</sup>, and in his report to JOHNSTON he commented bitterly on the attitude of the English missionaries at Bunkeya :

“ MSIDI would have no interview with me without Mr. SWAN being present : this was a nuisance. On speaking to MSIDI about treaties and concessions, he refused utterly — said Mr. ARNOT had told him to have nothing to do with anyone who wanted him to sign papers, and that it meant giving away his country... These missionaries do a great deal of harm when they take upon themselves to

<sup>(1)</sup> R. J. CORNET, *Katanga*, Brussels, 1946, pp. 63-4.

<sup>(2)</sup> C. A. SWAN, *Difficulties and dangers in early days*, in *A Central African Jubilee*, London, 1931, p. 108.

<sup>(3)</sup> G. E. TILSLEY, *Dan Crawford of Central Africa*, London, 1929, p. 147.

advise native chiefs, as their advice is according to their own narrow views." (1)

All SHARPE could do was to leave the treaty with SWAN, who promised to produce it for MSIRI to sign should the chief change his mind.

Even with the settlement at Bunkeya of British missionaries less completely detached than the Brethren from all matters of civil government, the outcome was unlikely to have been different. Clearly the Foreign Office had no thought of pushing the British South Africa Company's claim to the Katanga (2). In any case LEOPOLD II had not the slightest intention of allowing the English to obtain so valuable a part of the Congo State (3). In the spring of 1891 the English press discussed the claims of the Company in the Katanga, with their three-fold basis — the residence of British subjects there, the Company's alleged treaty-making activities, and the fact that the region was unvisited by the Congo State officials — and LEOPOLD realised that effective occupation was the only hope of preserving the boundaries of the State. Although he learned with relief from the British Government in the summer that THOMSON had not reached Bunkeya (4), he was most anxious for the speedy success of the Belgian expeditions to the Katanga. These were four in number. LE MARINEL arrived at Bunkeya in April 1891 with the task of asserting State authority there, and DELCOMMUNE came in Octo-

(1) SHARPE to JOHNSTON, 8 IX 90, in JOHNSTON to F. O., 3 V 91. F. O. 84/2114.

(2) JOHNSTON's dispatch of 3 V 91 was annotated: "This disposes of Katanga disputes. No treaty made with MSIRI, THOMSON did not reach him". SHARPE's enthusiastic prophecy of the rich trade to be obtained by a station planted on the eastern shore of Lake Moero was to be shown to the B. S. A. Company, but his remark that "at MSIRI's death, which must occur soon, (this) might with ease acquire, without wars or bloodshed, all his country as he has no-one to succeed him", was not to be shown.

(3) LEOPOLD II to BEERNAERT, 9 IV 91, in E. VAN DER SMISSEN. Léopold II et Beernaert, Brussels, 1920, p. 208.

(4) LEOPOLD II to LAMBERMONT, 8 VI 91. P. L., 1171.

ber with a somewhat wider commission. They were followed to Bunkeya by two expeditions organised by the *Compagnie du Katanga* (1); the first, led by an Englishman, STAIRS, arrived in December, and the other, the BIA-FRANCQUI-CORNET party, came early in 1892.

These expeditions were not greeted by the slightest suggestion that the Brethren would have preferred to see their own countrymen in the Katanga. When LE MARINEL arrived with his caravan of three hundred he found three missionaries at Bunkeya — SWAN, LANE and CRAWFORD. These three had resolved to take up a position of strict neutrality should trouble break out (2) — neutrality between LE MARINEL and MSIRI, not between Belgian and British claims. In fact all went smoothly, except for MSIRI's refusal to accept the State flag (3). LE MARINEL established a State post, left VERDICK and LEGAT in charge, and returned to Lusambo accompanied by SWAN, who wished to discover whether the Congo route would prove to be of practical use to the missionaries in Katanga. The Brethren were favourably impressed by the behaviour of this first Belgian contingent (4).

The Plymouth Brethren preserved their neutral attitude throughout the unsettled period of the decline and

(1) This was the answer of LEOPOLD II to the threat from the B. S. A. Company. The *Compagnie du Katanga* was created in April 1891 to open up the Katanga and to carry out the administrative duties assigned to it there by the Congo State. In return it was granted a third of the State lands in the region. Shares in the Company were held by the State, by the *Compagnie du Commerce du Congo*, and by English interests — the latter encouraged in the hope of ending agitation in England for British annexation of the Katanga. The Company immediately took control of the work already begun by DELCOMMUNE, and sent out two more expeditions. The leaders of these were commissioned by the State to act for it in negotiations with local chiefs, and in securing the recognition of the State flag in the Katanga.

(2) A. G. INGLEBY, *Pioneer days in darkest Africa*, London, 1937, p. 85.

(3) CORNET, *Katanga*, p. 149.

(4) " Since the first day they have been here, all their dealings with the chief have been most judicious. They seem disposed, even resolved, to settle peacefully in the country ". Crawford's diary, 12 V 91, in TILSLEY, p. 172.



fall of MSIRI's kingdom. Whereas LE MARINEL had reported peace, plenty and order in the Katanga, the later expeditions found civil war, anarchy and famine there. These troubled conditions resulted from the revolt of the Basanga against MSIRI's despotism. The chief had lost the energy of his youth, his prestige was rapidly diminishing, and his supplies of powder were running out (1). The Basanga were quick to realise that the arrival of Europeans heralded the end of MSIRI's power, and that he would no longer be able to punish disobedience by wholesale destruction in the traditional manner. The situation at Bunkeya grew tense, water and food were scarce, and LANE and CRAWFORD decided to move away to a site on the Lufoi a little distance from the State station (2). They were careful to stress their neutral position between MSIRI and the Basanga, but were increasingly distressed by the disastrous effects of MSIRI's rule (3).

During the period which preceded the final establishment of European rule in the Katanga, the missionaries could only wait in patience and hope for better conditions in which to work. After the coming of SHARPE and LE MARINEL, however, they noted that they had a larger audience. The dozen at ARNOT's weekly meeting had been replaced by "the Lord... sending numbers of people every morning" (4). As elsewhere in Central Africa the advent of European power had brought the missionaries a new popularity. But the peace and order which they expected from European government was slow in coming. DELCOMMUNE was completely unsuccessful in his attempt to plant the State flag at Bunkeya, and left for the south, where Msiri feared that he would

(1) CORNET, *Katanga*, pp. 183-6.

(2) F. S. ARNOT, *Bihe and Garenganze*, London, 1893, p. 114.

(3) *E. S.*, Nov. 1892.

(4) CRAWFORD's diary, 6 VI 91, in TILSLEY, p. 177.

enter into an alliance with the Basanga. At this point it occurred to MSIRI that he might be able to play off one set of Europeans against the other, just as earlier he had endeavoured to use the missionaries to offset Arab influence at his court. The British and the Belgians had seemed equally anxious to impress him favourably, so his obvious move was to recall the British when it seemed that DELCOMMUNE might ally with his enemies (1). A letter to SHARPE was therefore dictated to CRAWFORD and dispatched by the King.

This letter was intercepted by STAIRS, who at the end of 1891 was approaching Bunkeya from the east, in the service of the *Compagnie du Katanga*. MSIRI at first welcomed his expedition, since, as it was led by an Englishman, he naturally concluded that it was a British vanguard sent in answer to his letter to SHARPE. When he discovered his mistake, he refused outright to hoist the Congo State flag, as STAIRS required. MSIRI was insistent that he would accept an English flag, but not that of the State (2). After all, he had grown familiar with the Union Jack; it was the flag which already flew on special occasions over the home of the Plymouth Brethren (3), who had never sought the reduction of royal power. STAIRS however was determined to show MSIRI some of the firmness which he thought the missionaries lacked (4), and he insisted on hoisting the State flag himself. A stormy interview between MSIRI and two of STAIRS' envoys ended in the death of the chief (5). MUKANDAVANTU was chosen by STAIRS to

(1) D. CRAWFORD, *Thinking Black*, 1912, pp. 301-2.

(2) J. A. MOLONEY, *With Captain Stairs to Katanga*, London, 1893, p. 185.

(3) TILSLEY, p. 119.

(4) "The English missionaries were responsible for the mistaken way in which MSIRI thought about white men: they had shown weakness and patience, and he thought all whites were the same. We saw they would be a hindrance to us". STAIRS' journal, 15 XII 91, in *Congo Illustré*, Brussels, 5 XI 93.

(5) CORNET, *Katanga*, p. 200.

succeed his father ; thus he became ruler not by hereditary right, but as a State nominee.

This *coup d'état* involved a change in missionary policy. STAIRS was insistent that it had made the task of the Plymouth Brethren easier. He wrote to tell ARNOT what had occurred, and explained that :

“ ... the country is now quiet and breathes freely, since relieved from the brutal tyranny of MSIRI. No more heads will be stuck on poles, ears cut off, or people buried alive, if I can help it. THOMPSON, CRAWFORD and LANE will have free scope, and no longer be MSIRI's ‘ White Slaves ’ as he told me they were. ”

He informed ARNOT that he hoped to prohibit the entry of powder from west or east, and added that “ all the country is joyful over the death of MSIRI ” (1) CRAWFORD agreed with STAIRS that the prospect for mission work was brighter. He had long been conscious of the invidious position of the missionaries while they lived in complete dependence upon MSIRI, and he had not shared ARNOT's illusions about the disinterested sincerity of the chief. Now the missionaries were free to go where they wished, and were not cut off from MSIRI's enemies by the chief's jealousy as they had been before. It seemed to CRAWFORD, as he appealed for the reinforcements which were so slow in arriving, that the time had come “ not for evacuation, but rather for occupancy of this country in the real sense ” (2).

On the other hand, MSIRI's death did not bring complete relief. CRAWFORD had rightly stated that “ when MSIRI's course is run and his iron rod removed from the necks of this people, it is not difficult to see that then shall ‘ every man's hand be against his fellow ’ ” (3). STAIRS' expedition left the famine-stricken land after hunger and dysentery had accounted for a large propor-

(1) STAIRS to ARNOT, 29 XII 9. Tervueren, Missions, 50.47.300.

(2) CRAWFORD, 24 II 92, E. S., Nov. 1892.

(3) CRAWFORD, 31 III 91, in TILSLEY, p. 169.

tion of its members, and STAIRS himself never reached the coast. State rule could only prevent disorder in a limited area, for LEGAT and VERDICK had been left with a force of African soldiers far too small to be really effective. Bunkeya had lost its position as a capital, and the population had scattered. Arab slave-raiding went completely unchecked <sup>(1)</sup>. In addition, the State officers thought it quite possible that they would be ordered to evacuate the Katanga altogether, should it seem that gold was not so readily obtainable there as had been expected <sup>(2)</sup>. It was a great relief to the missionaries when the arrival of a State caravan from Luluabourg indicated that the government intended to maintain its position <sup>(3)</sup>. Yet it was during these troubled years that the mission first began to enjoy any real popularity. The old order had gone, and the new authority which was to replace MSIRI was not yet established. It was a situation in which the African naturally turned to the missionary as the one bridge between the old and the new; CRAWFORD recorded that "thousands have listened... many... seemed to drink in the Word of Life" <sup>(4)</sup>.

The impress left by CRAWFORD upon the work of the Plymouth Brethren in the Katanga was of considerable importance. To the end he remained an individualist, a gifted and exacting leader rather than a colleague with whom work was easy. Only twenty years old when he reached Bunkeya, his early views on mission work were somewhat extreme. It seemed to him that material poverty and a direct dependence upon God for supplies, without any reliance upon human agency, were both an essential mark of the missionary, and also a means of living closer to the people among whom he settled.

(1) ARNOT, Bihe and Garenganze, pp. 132-40.

(2) CRAWFORD, 12 V 93, in *E. S.*, Dec. 1893.

(3) CRAWFORD, 30 IX 93, in *E. S.*, April 1894.

(4) CRAWFORD, May 1892, in TILSLEY, p. 210.

At first it was preaching that appeared to him, as to so many of the Plymouth Brethren, to be the one necessity ; it was not until later that he came to realise the importance of education, which alone could produce readers of the Word which he preached. Of his own life and health he was careless ; he was an enthusiastic, impulsive, single-hearted missionary, spontaneously loved by others who, like LAWS of Livingstonia, could not but condemn certain of the methods which he used <sup>(1)</sup>. His one aim was to endeavour to experience African life from the inside, to live with the people to whom he had come, sharing their thoughts, their hopes, their fears. His whole life was an essay in " thinking black " <sup>(2)</sup>. He was indeed remarkably successful in winning a response from the Africans to whom he gave himself, aided by his outstanding linguistic gifts, and by the continuity of his stay in Africa throughout the unsettled years of the later part of MSIRI'S reign, and of the early period of European rule.

Although in all parts of Africa it was natural for the missionary to gain a personal ascendancy over his converts, it was to a large extent CRAWFORD'S powers of leadership and his attempt to identify himself with Africans which gathered around the station on the Lufoi a great crowd of adherents who had lost any sense of security since the break-up of the old order. No outward attractions drew them there, for the standard of living of the Plymouth Brethren was lower than that of any other missionaries, and the people were certainly not encouraged to adopt an attitude of dependence. CRAWFORD and THOMPSON were most unwilling to accept the position and prestige of chiefs <sup>(3)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> LAWS' preface to TILSLEY, Dan Crawford of Central Africa.

<sup>(2)</sup> CRAWFORD gave the title of *Thinking Black* to the book which he wrote in 1911-12 on his first furlough in England, after he had spent twenty-two years without a break in Central Africa.

<sup>(3)</sup> " We find the stupid and mischievous notion has got currency that since MSIRI'S death we are the chiefs of the country, and this compels us to disabuse

CRAWFORD eventually realised that the new conditions demanded a new missionary policy. He saw that complete separation between Church and State was practicable only where the State was sufficiently organised and sufficiently powerful to maintain law and order, and to provide those conditions in which the elect could live and multiply in peace. These were not the conditions of Central Africa. They had not been the conditions in which the Church had expanded throughout Europe. Just as, over a thousand years before, the Church had been forced to concern herself with questions of law and order and social life, CRAWFORD saw that it was impossible to do otherwise in Africa. There could be no easy transference to the Katanga of a theory of Church and State which was based on experience of European civilisation in the early nineteenth century, the period when the Plymouth Brethren movement had begun. Of all the Brethren it was CRAWFORD who realised this most clearly, although he was not thinking in terms of Church and State, and was not consciously formulating a new policy. But his experience taught him that ARNOT's methods alone would not work. In practice he saw that he had to accept a social responsibility for the homeless people who came flocking round him, however much he regretted the necessity. CRAWFORD lived up to his name — KONGA VANTU, Gatherer of the People.

But at heart he was a wanderer, never happier than when on a journey. In 1892 and 1893 he made several exploratory trips in order to estimate the density of the population of the Katanga. He shared GRENFELL's sense of the importance of the strategic position of a mission station, and he finally decided to move to the northern shore of Lake Moero. The people who had gathered around him at the Lufoi insisted on accompa-

their minds of any such idea, although many insist on wronging us in the matter". CRAWFORD, 26 VIII 92, in *E. S.*, March 1893.

nying him. CRAWFORD issued a manifesto ; all tribal differences were to be forgotten, and if the people accompanied him it must be as a new and unified group going forward into a new life (1). Luanza, a few miles to the south of the first site chosen, became a self-contained, self-governing, self-supporting mission village. Other Plymouth Brethren came to work there under CRAWFORD's direction ; he set the organisation in motion, and was then free to undertake the long exploratory journeys he loved, when he preached the Word to those who heard it for the first time. In the following years some Brethren settled at Luanza, some returned to Mwena, near Bunkeya, some went to Koni Hill, and others into Northern Rhodesia. The work of the Plymouth Brethren remained individualistic, for they did not submit easily to authority and received little direction from home. But Luanza became a pattern to be followed, a pattern which included social, educational and medical work, with increasing approximation to the orthodox missionary methods of societies which did not share the very individualistic approach of the Brethren.

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Both the State and the missions were as interested in the north-eastern corner of the State territory as they were in the Katanga. Just as LEOPOLD II and ARTHINGTON had shared a common realisation of the importance of the Congo as a highway into Central Africa, so they were both attracted to the Nile. As Duke of Brabant, LEOPOLD had visited Egypt in 1853 (2). Fascinated by the Nile and by the ruins of an ancient civilisation, he returned on a second visit nine years later. Even before the Berlin Conference opened, LEOPOLD

(1) TILSLEY, p. 329.

(2) A. J. WAUTERS, *Histoire politique du Congo belge*, Brussels, 1911, p. 104.

saw that he might profit by the fact that the territory acquired by the *Association Internationale du Congo* extended to the headwaters of the Nile. In 1884 he hoped to obtain the services of GORDON to secure these headwaters for the Association, under the guise of a plan to attack the slave trade in the Nile basin. Three years later the King of the Belgians was prepared to guarantee a large salary to Emin Pasha should he agree to govern his province of Equatoria in the name of the Congo State <sup>(1)</sup>.

LEOPOLD was interested in the Sudan partly because he dreamed of becoming the heir of the Pharaohs, for he was captivated by the romance of Egypt's past. But he was also severely practical. He saw the Sudan as the gateway to the Nile, and so eventually to the Mediterranean. The Nile would provide a new outlet from the Congo State territory, which already bordered on the Atlantic. The basis of the missionary interest in the region was quite different. Christian missionaries had first been attracted to the Nile because they hoped that it might provide the means of access into Central Africa for which they were searching. LIVINGSTONE had been looking for its source when he discovered the upper waters of the Congo. ARTHINGTON's interest in the Nile was aroused long before he realised the value of the Congo, for in the 'sixties he saw the Sudan as a highway into Central Africa, and regretted that owing to the slave-trade it was impossible to begin a line of stations on the upper Nile which could be carried forward to Victoria Nyanza and even to the East coast. But, like LEOPOLD II, once ARTHINGTON had discovered that the Congo provided a route into the heart of the continent, he realised that it could also be used as a jumping-off point for the Sudan. With this in mind, he constantly urged the B.M.S. to push north-eastwards.

<sup>(1)</sup> A. BERRIEDALE KEITH, *The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act*, Oxford, 1919, pp. 47, 101-2.



It was not a simple matter to penetrate from the Congo to the Sudan. The obvious possibilities for an approach were the northern tributaries of the river, but there remained a region of dense forest which had to be crossed by land before the upper Nile could be reached. The earliest attempt was made by way of the Ubangi. In 1887 VAN GELE had continued GRENFELL'S exploration of this river and had proved its identity with the Uele. In the following year, a young missionary, Wilmot BROOKE, attempted singlehanded the task of making his way up the Ubangi and then proceeding over-land to the upper Sudan, where he intended to found a mission. GRENFELL appreciated his enthusiasm but condemned his over-confidence, and was not surprised by his failure, commenting that BROOKE, like Bishop TAYLOR, must discover "that wings of faith are not the ordained means of crossing continents" (1). In 1890 GRENFELL himself applied for ground thirty miles up the Ubangi, and also for a site near the Lubi Falls on the Itimbiri (2), with the idea of a double approach to the Sudan. Ever since the time of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition he had realised the possible value of the Aruwimi, and in 1891 he urged the Committee, during his furlough at home, to consider also this route towards Lake Albert (3). GRENFELL planned to establish a station near the limit of navigation, so that he could make preparations for an attempt to force a route through the forest which STANLEY had found so great an obstacle to his expedition to Equatoria (4).

An attempt to fulfil LEOPOLD'S dream of extending his power to the Mediterranean, involved the King in the Anglo-French struggle for the upper Nile. The whole

(1) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 18 IV 88. B. M. S.

(2) *Ibid.*, 23 VI 90. B. M. S.

(3) *Ibid.*, 14 III 91. B. M. S.

(4) STANLEY, *In darkest Africa*, II, pp. 37-101.

region of the Bahr-el-Ghazel, Equatoria, and the adjacent Congo territory was in such confusion that, like England and France, he had grounds for interference. The Mahdists had been engaged in a holy war against the Egyptians, and the Arabs pressing up from Manyema and the Aruwimi had taken advantage of the general disorder to increase the scale of their slave raiding. But the Congo State would certainly not be allowed free scope in the region. England was hoping for the recovery of her position in the Sudan, and the 1890 Anglo-German agreement had declared the territory between the Congo State and the western water-shed of the upper Nile basin to be a British sphere of influence. It was this agreement which encouraged GRENFELL to press on along the Aruwimi <sup>(1)</sup>, both because he felt that the B.M.S. might profitably work in this region of British influence to the north of Lake Albert and so extend the field of its operations to the Sudan, and also because it would be the means of meeting the C.M.S. in Uganda and thus effecting the chain of Christian mission stations across the continent which had long been his ideal. But the British claims were recognised neither by France nor by the Congo State. The French were hoping to reach the upper Nile by way of the Ubangi, since an agreement made in 1887 with the Congo State had secured the right bank of the river to French influence. Representatives of the Congo State were pressing north-eastwards towards the same goal. Although its leader died on the way, the VAN KERCHOVEN expedition of 1891-92 penetrated from the Uele to the Nile at Wadelai. Here MILZ, who had succeeded VAN KERCHOVEN, planted a State post, and he later added several others in the region.

(1) "The recent territorial acquisitions of our government in central Africa point, to my mind, to the present moment as an opportune one for a movement on our part towards the north-east". GRENFELL to BAYNES, 22 VII 90. B. M. S.

It took time for news of these movements to filter through to Europe. The reports which PICKERSGILL, British Consul at Loanda, forwarded from GRENFELL in 1893 and in the few years immediately following, provided a useful source of information for the Foreign Office (1). GRENFELL had a shrewd idea of Congo State aims in the upper Nile, and left no doubt of the disfavour with which he viewed them (2). It was therefore hardly surprising that the Congo State authorities should hinder his efforts to move north-eastwards throughout the troubled years when the region between Lake Albert and Khartoum was a bone of contention between the European Powers. These authorities had no wish for news of the unsettled state of their north-eastern territory to reach Europe, and in addition, LEOPOLD was hopeful that Belgian Catholic missions, rather than foreign Protestant missions, would occupy the region. Later, after the beginning of the anti-Congolese campaign in England, the State adopted a settled policy which was antagonistic towards any further spread of Protestant missionary work in the Congo.

(1) GRENFELL was appointed British Pro-Consul for the upper Congo in 1893, in order that a minor question concerned with the registration of a new mission steamer could be settled. He was not given the rank of Consular Agent.

(2) "There is no doubt that Foro, although once under Egyptian influence, is well within the Congo basin, and under these circumstances nothing can be said (in my opinion) about Captain NILIS pushing northward, or about his joining forces with Lieutenant MILZ in that region. But if it is with a view of pushing beyond the Congo basin into that of the Nile, or of making another move on Lado, it is quite a different affair... It is freely spoken on the Congo that it was (VAN KERCHOVEN'S) purpose to push on and down the Nile, and the fact that he brought out thirty sectional whale-boats lent colour to the rumour... The question of Lado belonging to the State is a matter some officials consider as quite settled by the fact of its having been previously abandoned by Egypt. This view, however, is not expressed in my hearing by those having authority — possibly not because they fail to hold it, but because my views to the contrary have been so plainly stated to the powers that be, both at Brussels and at Boma. Possibly there is no intention of pressing the claim upon Lado... but there can be no doubt about a large and exceptionally armed force pushing in the direction of GORDON'S old province. One hears wild talk of reaching the Mahdi from the South and smashing him up... it shows the trend of thought". GRENFELL to PICKERSGILL, 1 IX 93, in PICKERSGILL to F. O., 30 IX 93. F. O. 63/1252.

In the early and again in the later 'nineties, both ARTHINGTON and GRENFELL exercised constant pressure on the B.M.S. to advance towards the Sudan and towards Uganda. GRENFELL was based on Bolobo, but his pioneering spirit could never confine itself contentedly to the regular work of a single station. Since by 1890 only Bolobo and Lukolela had been established as B.M.S. posts above the Pool, little had been done towards carrying out the provisions of the 1884 plan for ten upper river stations linking the Pool and the Falls, and GRENFELL, in particular, felt keenly the challenge of the unfinished task (1). At home, however, the Committee was trying to balance the claims of the Congo mission against those of other fields, for Congo expenses were exceptionally heavy and the Congo mission showed promise rather than achievement. Lack of financial resources led the Committee to veto GRENFELL'S first plan for a station on the Aruwimi (2). Then for over a year, in 1892-3, GRENFELL was occupied on geographical work in the service of the State — the delimitation of the Lunda boundary which separated its south-western territory from that of the Portuguese (3). During this period it was ARTHINGTON who kept the idea of a north-eastward move before the B.M.S. He urged the Committee that "we ought on no account to miss the opportunity set before us of extending the Saviour's kingdom by carrying the Gospel in its purity into the Nile region" (4). As always, his plea was for a speedy advance into unoccupied territory, and he was prepared to back his proposal by the offer of at least a part of the necessary resources. But after considering his plan in the spring of 1892 and

(1) "I am hoping... to push north-eastwards, a matter much more important in my eyes than it is to many of my colleagues I know." GRENFELL to STAPLETON, 14 XII 97. Stapleton Papers.

(2) B. M. S. Minutes, 24 IV 91.

(3) JOHNSTON, I, pp. 187-220.

(4) ARTHINGTON to BAYNES, 24 V 92. B. M. S.

again in the summer of 1893, the Committee came to the conclusion that the cost was too great <sup>(1)</sup>. It was prepared, however, to consider ARTHINGTON'S revised proposal for the extension of its work to the Albert Nyanza and the Nile as far as the first rapid <sup>(2)</sup>.

By the 'nineties a determined Catholic advance to the upper river had begun, and it was becoming clear that the Congo State authorities preferred to see Catholic rather than Protestant missions there. It was above all this preference which made GRENFELL press for a north-eastward move so that the B.M.S. would be working in a British sphere of influence :

“ There are many reasons why British missionaries should prefer to work in their own territory rather than under a foreign flag, even although it may be the exceptionally friendly one of Belgium. These reasons all obtain against our spreading out in the Congo State, and in favour of our pushing forward towards the original objective of the Congo mission as defined by Mr. ARTHINGTON, in 1877 — territory which is today in the hands of our own Government. We commenced our work on the Congo when the country was as yet unappropriated, when in fact, it was more British than Belgian, but circumstances have changed, and we are working under a foreign administration, an administration, it is true, that is particularly friendly, but, naturally enough, one that is doing its utmost to establish the State religion of Belgium. ” <sup>(3)</sup>

For several years, however, it was not at all clear which European power would obtain a predominant influence in the upper Sudan. A veil of mystery hung

<sup>(1)</sup> ARTHINGTON had unsuccessfully urged the American Presbyterians, who were already working on the Nile, to move southward into Gondokoro and the lower Sudan, before he pressed the B. M. S. to move northward towards the same region. He offered the latter the annual interest on a sum of ten thousand pounds, to be made up by a donation of three thousand pounds from ARTHINGTON, four thousand pounds from ' friends in Great Britain ' and three thousand pounds from the American Missionary Association, the A. M. A. retaining the ten thousand pounds. The Committee estimated, however, that this would not provide a quarter of the cost of the proposed mission. B. M. S. Minutes, 22 IV 92, 20 VI 93.

<sup>(2)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 19 VII 93.

<sup>(3)</sup> GRENFELL to BAYNES, 23 X 93. B. M. S.

over the activities of the Congo authorities in the north-eastern region of the State. The Itimbiri was closed to navigation, and when GRENFELL tried to push up the Aruwimi in the summer of 1894, he was not able to go beyond the Yambuya rapids, since the whole area was under military rule and the State refused to allow unprotected expeditions to travel into the interior. The main concern of Great Britain was to stop French progress to the Nile, and with this in view she had leased the Bahr-el-Ghazel to LEOPOLD II. Hopeful of the projected Cape-to-Cairo route, England secured from the Congo State in return the lease of a strip of territory between Lakes Tanganyika and Albert Edward. This provision, however, was annulled because of German opposition. France had also objected to the Anglo-Congolese convention ; by an agreement which she made later with LEOPOLD, the King gave up his claims to the Bahr-el-Ghazel, keeping only the Lado enclave in return for certain French concessions on the Bomu. Thus the way was left open for the French to advance to the Nile.

In the mid-'nineties, when LEOPOLD, France, Great Britain and Germany were at loggerheads over the ultimate fate of the district between the Congo and the Nile, the B.M.S. decided that since the society was kept out of the Itimbiri and the Aruwimi by the State, it should press on along the main Congo river. Monsembe and Upoto had been planted in 1890. In 1896 a provisional settlement was made three hundred miles beyond Upoto at Yakusu <sup>(1)</sup>, at the confluence of the Lindi and the Congo, ten miles west of Stanley Falls. Several advantages were to be gained from the establishment of a station at this point. If the idea of advance by the Itimbiri and the Aruwimi had to be given up, the Lindi seemed the most promising possibility as a route to the

(1) BENTLEY, II, p. 282.

north-east. In addition, the importance of Stanley Falls as a future centre of communication was becoming obvious to GRENFELL ; the population around Yakusu was dense ; while the large number of languages used in the region was no real hindrance, since Kiswahili was widely understood, and already employed by Africans who were in contact with the Arabs and with the officials of the State. However, the B.M.S. did not receive State permission to settle at Yakusu until the end of 1897. VAN EETVELDE argued that the region was not peaceful enough for a missionary settlement <sup>(1)</sup>, and the interminable negotiations at Brussels caused frustration in the field. The British Consul, PICKERSGILL, accompanied GRENFELL to the Falls in the summer of 1896, and saw the tentative settlement at Yakusu. His advice to the B.M.S. concerning the site was to " hold it until you are turned out " ; he thought that the State would hardly do this, although it was clear that the authorities wished to keep " troublesome missionaries " at a distance <sup>(2)</sup>. A consul who was not himself on the best of terms with the Congo authorities <sup>(3)</sup> was not likely to urge the missionaries to comply with what seemed unreasonable requests for withdrawal. Such requests continued even after the formalities connected with the purchase of the site had been concluded <sup>(4)</sup>.

Some B.M.S. missionaries would have preferred to see a consolidation of the Society's existing work, rather than an advance into unoccupied territory. One of their objections to the Yakusu site was the fact that, at the Falls, Arab influence was so strong. But to GRENFELL this seemed one of the most important reasons for settling there. Wherever the African population had come

<sup>(1)</sup> VAN EETVELDE to BAYNES, July 1896, B. M. S.

<sup>(2)</sup> GRENFELL to BAYNES, 23 X 96, B. M. S.

<sup>(3)</sup> VAN EETVELDE to WAHIS, 4 VIII 94. A. G. R., V. E., 39.

<sup>(4)</sup> GRENFELL to BAYNES, 17 IV 98. B. M. S.

into close contact with Arab influence, education was at a premium — a situation which provided an excellent starting-point for a Protestant mission. More important, however, than this immediate advantage, was the fact that in Central Africa a battle for control had to be fought out between Islam and Christianity. Both offered literacy to the African, and where Islam was strong, Christianity did not possess the advantage of being the sole way of release from the limitations of tribal life. Islam was a far more formidable rival to Christianity in Central Africa than was paganism. If the political influence of the Arabs in the northeastern part of the Congo State had greatly declined as a result of the State campaigns, their religious influence had increased, and, further north, the Sudan was a Moslem stronghold. From Yakusu station an attack on Islam could be launched <sup>(1)</sup>. But to GRENFELL this seemed only a preliminary step. He therefore welcomed ARTHINGTON'S new plan for a prospecting journey to Lake Albert <sup>(2)</sup>; and again, in supporting the proposal he stressed to the Committee the fact that a move north-eastwards was a move towards British territory <sup>(3)</sup>. He was growing increasingly conscious of the difficulties of working under the Congo State authorities, who allowed Belgian Catholic missionaries to settle in the northeast, but seemed so anxious to hinder his own work there <sup>(4)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> " We have before us in the Soudan the widest and wildest empire of the Crescent against which the Cross is being lifted up. The *great* work of Christian missions in Africa is as yet untouched — at Sargent (Yakusu) station, just within the Arab zone, we are beginning to get into contact with it ". GRENFELL to BAYNES, 30 VIII 98. B. M. S.

<sup>(2)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 19 I 98.

<sup>(3)</sup> GRENFELL to BAYNES, 17 IV 98. B. M. S.

<sup>(4)</sup> " Je présume que M. GRENFELL veut établir sa ligne de communication avec le Nil. Il m'a parlé à plusieurs reprises de l'autorisation donnée aux PP. Prémontrés de s'établir dans l'Uele. Cela semble beaucoup le préoccuper ". MALFEYT'S report from Stanley Falls, 19 VII 98, in FUCHS to the *Secrétaire d'État*, 13 VIII 98. *Ministère des Colonies*, M. 93 (583).



English missionaries in the Congo were closely watching French attempts to reach the Nile. Her agreement with the Congo State had left France free to advance, and this had also brought her into open conflict with Great Britain, who had made it clear that an attempt on the Nile would be treated as an unfriendly act <sup>(1)</sup>. But the State expedition under DHANIS, which had been forced to return owing to the revolt of his Batetela soldiers, had been closely followed by a French expedition under MARCHAND. Both SIMS <sup>(2)</sup> and GRENFELL showed themselves concerned over the French action, and certainly GRENFELL was unwilling to help the expedition in any way <sup>(3)</sup>. In spite of considerable difficulty in arranging the transport of his party up the Congo, MARCHAND succeeded in arriving at Fashoda in July 1898. But Great Britain remained firm in her opposition to French advance; in september KITCHENER arrived at Fashoda, in November MARCHAND had to evacuate, and in the following year France bound herself not to acquire any territory beyond the Congo-Nile watershed. With Great Britain triumphant, GRENFELL pressed again for the establishment of an intermediate station on the Nile route, urging that, with this planted, the B.M.S. would have accomplished its task of planting a chain of stations half-way across the continent and could reasonably expect it to be completed from the east <sup>(4)</sup>. Once more he prospected the Aruwimi route in 1899, but the State remained hostile to the plantation of a new station. In an attempt to keep him from his purpose,

<sup>(1)</sup> KEITH, p. 110.

<sup>(2)</sup> PICKERSGILL to F. O., 15 VII 98, 8 X 98, enclosing extracts from SIMS' letters to himself. F. O. 63/1352.

<sup>(3)</sup> "The *Peace* was on the slip, and the *Goodwill* had more than she could do at the time, so I was able to say very truly it was impossible (to carry any cargo for the expedition) although I carefully avoided anything like an indication as to my feelings about the Marchand expedition". GRENFELL to BAYNES, 5 XII 98. B. M. S.

<sup>(4)</sup> GRENFELL to BAYNES, 28 II 99. B. M. S.

State officials even suggested that he should approach Lake Albert from the East coast (1). One scheme after another was taken up and then dropped because of State opposition.

In 1899 it appeared that a meeting with the C.M.S. had become a practical possibility. In that year Albert LLOYD of the C.M.S. decided that instead of returning home from Uganda by the East coast route, he would strike through the forest which separated Lake Albert from the Aruwimi, and travel down the Congo (2). His attempt was successful, in spite of State opposition to all foreign missionary work in its eastern region (3). The C.M.S. was hoping to start work among the forest pygmies, and it seemed that at last missions from the east and from the west were about to meet. But again the B.M.S. failed to push north-eastwards. LEOPOLD revived his claims to the Bahr-el-Ghazel (the lease was not formally annulled by Great Britain until 1906) and was most anxious to keep English missionaries out of the district. After strong pressure from the B.M.S., he offered to lease a plot of land at Yalamba, at the confluence of the Aruwimi and the Congo, during GRENFELL's lifetime only (4); this was a condition which the Society could not accept.

GRENFELL's later years were clouded by his failure both to move forward into the Moslem strongholds in British territory and also to complete a line of Christian mission stations stretching across Africa. He had often attributed his difficulties in the north-east to Catholic influence, but he rightly began to realise that another factor was involved:

(1) Draft DE CUVELIER to BAYNES, 3 I 99. M. des C., M93 (583).

(2) A. B. LLOYD, *In dwarf land and cannibal country*, London, 1900.

(3) „The State officials for very shame could not bar the door in his face, however much some of them would have liked to do so”. GRENFELL to BAYNES, 5 XII 98. B. M. S.

(4) WANGERMÉE to Lawson FORFEITT, 13 II 03. B. M. S.

“ I have maintained often, against those arguing to the contrary, that the Congo administration is doing its best to accord fair treatment to evangelical missionaries... I now find it difficult not to believe that we have both the State and the Catholic hierarchy opposed to our plans... there is concerted action to forestall us... It is just possible that the opposition to our Lake Albert plans on the part of the State, arises from the thought that our stations mean some political advantage to our country when future Congo questions come up for settlement. If this is so, it is no use for us to argue to assert our disinterestedness, and the best course will be for us to turn our attention in another direction. ” (1)

This he did, suggesting first advance on the Lomami (2), and then on the Ubangi (3), but not even “ benevolent neutrality ” was obtained from the State (4), which became increasingly active both in its hostility to foreign societies and in its encouragement of Belgian Catholic missions.

Both the King and the missions had envisaged the possibility of linking the Congo with the Nile. LEOPOLD had looked to the past, to the glory of ancient Egypt, and cast for himself the role of a successor to the Pharaohs. ARTHINGTON had looked to the future, to the Second Coming, and to the possibility of hastening its advent by the evangelization of the upper Nile, still unoccupied by Christian missions. LEOPOLD, geographer and economist, had seen the value of the outlet which the Nile would give into the Mediterranean, to balance that of the Congo into the Atlantic. GRENFELL, missionary explorer and statesman, had hoped that the B.M.S. would occupy the upper Nile in an attempt to combat Moslem advance in Central Africa, and to work under the British flag. Had LEOPOLD himself been without ambitions in the region, he might have been willing to

(1) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 6 VII 03. B. M. S.

(2) *Ibid.*, 25 VII 03. B. M. S.

(3) *Ibid.*, 6 XII 04. B. M. S.

(4) *Ibid.*, 18 I 06. B. M. S.

facilitate the advance of the Society into British territory. But during the 'nineties it was difficult to prophesy with any certainty the ultimate fate of the region between Lake Albert and Khartoum, or to foresee which European Power would eventually win a predominant influence there. In the circumstances, it was not surprising that LEOPOLD preferred to see Belgian Catholic missionaries in an area where the presence of English Protestants might well prove to be a source of embarrassment to the Congo State.

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The policy of LEOPOLD II was one of the most decisive factors in determining the pattern of Catholic missionary expansion in the Congo State. As soon as the King had become interested in Africa, he had urged Belgian Congregations to undertake evangelization there. In 1879 he had appealed to the Scheut Fathers and to the Belgian Jesuits to send missionaries to the Congo, but before 1885 he had met with no response from either group. LEOPOLD realised with alarm that there was a close link between the French Government and the Holy Ghost Fathers, and even between it and LAVIGERIE'S White Fathers, although the Cardinal had often protested that his was an international society. While the Scheut Fathers and the Belgian Jesuits declared that they were fully occupied in China and in India, the French Congregations were displaying considerable activity in the Congo, an activity which LEOPOLD feared would be turned to the profit of France. His apprehension was natural enough, when, for example, a missionary like AUGOUARD conceived of his task as a double one; he believed that he was in Congo "Pour Dieu! Pour la France!" (1).

(1) STORME, *Evangelisatiepogingen*, p. 557.

After the recognition of the Association as an Independent State, the King was no less anxious that the Congo should be evangelized by Belgians. In 1885 Belgian Catholics were more likely to show an interest in his policy than they had been earlier. By the elections of June 1884 the Catholic party had replaced the Liberals. Cardinal GOOSSENS, Archbishop of Malines, had several times brought the King's plans for the Congo to the notice of the Belgian clergy, and LAVIGERIE had been able to recruit a number of Belgian priests to work with his White Fathers in the Congo. In 1884 the Archbishop of Malines visited Rome on behalf of the King, to propose to the Propaganda that an African Seminary should be founded in Belgium to train secular priests for work in the posts of the *Association Internationale du Congo*. The conflicting claims of French, Portuguese and Belgian missionaries in the Congo came up for settlement by the Propaganda ; early in 1886 LEO XIII decided, after considerable pressure from LEOPOLD II, that the territory of the Congo Independent State should be reserved for Belgian missionaries as soon as the King provided sufficient recruits to make this possible. LEOPOLD stated his policy briefly in a letter to LAMBERMONT in August : " Je tiens à ce que notre Congo soit évangélisé par des Belges " (1), and continued to do all he could to stimulate the interest of Belgian Catholics in the Congo.

In October 1886, the African Seminary for secular priests was opened at Louvain. This was certainly not a complete solution of the King's problem, however, since the Propaganda insisted that religious Congregations were needed for the evangelization of the Congo. LEOPOLD therefore approached the Scheut Fathers again and this time found them more ready to respond. He was anxious that the French missionaries should evacuate

(1) LEOPOLD II to LAMBERMONT, 24 VIII 86. P. L., 1885-90, 781 /1.

the Congo at once, and made further representations to Rome with this in view. In November 1886 a compromise decision was reached by the Propaganda while the King's negotiations with the Scheut Fathers were still in progress. In principle LEO XIII reaffirmed his intention to reserve the evangelization of the Congo State to Belgians, but decreed that the French missionaries must remain at their posts until they could be replaced. In the summer of 1887 the Scheut Fathers finally agreed to co-operate with the King and to take part in the evangelization of the Congo; a year later their first party left Antwerp. In 1888 the Propaganda erected an Apostolic Vicariate of the Congo and placed it under the direction of the Scheut Fathers, so that the Holy Ghost Fathers gradually withdrew to the French Congo (1). Well might VAN EETVELDE, Administrator-General of the Congo State, write triumphantly to the Belgian Minister at the Vatican:

“Voici l'œuvre catholique du Congo fondée sur des bases définitives. Plus de patronat portugais, plus d'ingérence de missions étrangères: le nouvel état devient belge au point de vue religieux comme il l'était déjà sous le rapport politique et j'espère que nous aurons bientôt une armée de missionnaires allant contribuer à fonder au loin une nouvelle et plus grande Belgique.” (2)

But if LEOPOLD had succeeded in replacing foreign Catholic Congregations in the Congo by Belgian missions, there was no hope that he could repeat the process by replacing the Protestant societies. The English and the French missionaries were regarded as equally unfavourable to the spread of Belgian influence (3). Emile CALLE-

(1) For the policy of LEOPOLD II towards the French Congregations in the Congo and the foundation of the African Seminary of Louvain, see M. B. STORME, *Leopold II, les missions du Congo et la fondation du séminaire africain de Louvain, Zaïre*, VI, 1952, 1, pp. 1-24.

(2) VAN EETVELDE to DE PITTEURS, 2 V 88. Congo, 1<sup>re</sup> série, 1, 95.

(3) “Les missionnaires établis au Congo sont presque tous étrangers — les uns, baptistes, évangélistes, etc. sont dévoués aux idées anglaises, ceux dépendant

WAERT, one of the Belgian missionaries recruited by LAVIGERIE, thought that the enforcement of French as the official language of the Congo State might be a possible way of reducing the number of English missionaries there (1). But it was not easy, at first, to discriminate against foreign missionaries, since the Berlin Act had insisted on favour and protection for Christian missions irrespective of denomination or nationality. DE WINTON, Governor of the Congo State, reminded LEOPOLD in 1885, when the King urged him to assist a Catholic mission, that "if one mission receives State aid all other missions are entitled to similar assistance" and that "it is always wisest to avoid establishing a precedent out of which trouble may arise" (2). Fresh from a talk with GRENFELL, DE WINTON may have been echoing GRENFELL'S interpretation of the Berlin Act; his, however, was not the only possible one. Although protection was required for all missions, the Act did not forbid the granting of special aid to certain of them, and it became progressively easier to favour Belgian missions as Belgians replaced foreigners as officials of the Congo State.

But to begin with, more Belgian missions had to be attracted to the Congo. The King had appealed to the Belgian Jesuits in 1879 through the Superior of the Scheut Fathers, and in 1885 through the Propaganda, but without success on either occasion. LEOPOLD contin-

du cardinal Lavigerie ne sont généralement pas animés de sentiments favorables à l'influence belge au Congo. Orban DE XIVRY to LAMBERMONT, 21 III 88, P. L., 1885-8, 854/1.

(1) "Les rapports des missionnaires avec les administrateurs... sont très bons. Nous avons ici des gens de diverses nationalités, surtout des Anglais et des Américains, pour la plupart protestants. Si la langue française était obligatoire comme langue officielle, la Belgique gagnerait beaucoup d'influence. On dit que les Anglais disparaissent les uns après les autres pour faire place aux Belges, qui s'entendraient alors mieux entre eux que tous ces étrangers". CALLEWAERT to DE MAERNE, 14 XI 85. P. L., 1885-88, 771/1.

(2) DE WINTON to LEOPOLD II, 2 XII 85. Tervueren, *Papiers de Winton*, 187.

ued his pressure, however, and finally in 1891 the General of the Society of Jesus authorized the Belgian Jesuits to undertake a Congo mission <sup>(1)</sup>. But the King was not yet satisfied, and fresh approaches were made to Rome. As VAN EETVELDE wrote to the Belgian Minister at the Vatican :

“ Le Roi attache grand prix à ce qu’une vraie impulsion soit donnée à bref délai à l’œuvre religieuse du Congo... La Congrégation de Scheut... demande avec nous que d’autres ordres belges viennent l’aider dans sa tâche évangélisatrice. ”

He was convinced that should the Pope himself support this plea, then in all probability the Belgian Redemptorists, Benedictines and Premonstratensians would all turn their attention to the Congo <sup>(2)</sup>. During the 'nineties Belgian missions followed each other to Congo in swift succession at the call of the King. In 1893 the first Jesuit party arrived. It was the direct appeal of LEOPOLD to the Trappists of the Abbey of Westmalle which led them to the Congo two years later <sup>(3)</sup>. In 1897 the Priests of the Sacred Heart arrived. Again, it was the initiative of LEOPOLD II which brought the Premonstratensians of Tongerlo to the Congo in 1898 <sup>(4)</sup>. By the following year the Redemptorists had also been persuaded to take their part in the evangelization of the Congo State. And wherever the missionaries went, Belgian Congregations of women followed at their request, in order to work among the Congolese women.

The Belgian missions which finally took part in the evangelization of the Congo went there primarily because they were urged to go by LEOPOLD II. His negotiations with the Propaganda had secured the withdrawal

<sup>(1)</sup> DENIS, p. 52.

<sup>(2)</sup> VAN EETVELDE to D'ERP, 11 XII 96. V. E., 50.

<sup>(3)</sup> C. VAN STRAELEN, *Missions catholiques et protestantes au Congo*, Brussels, 1898, p. 35.

<sup>(4)</sup> M. GASPAR, *Les Prémontrés de Tongerlo au Congo*, Louvain, 1905, p. 5.



of the French missionaries and a denial of the claims of Portuguese jurisdiction in so far as they affected the territory of the Congo Independent State. Having thus rid himself of foreign influence, the King was anxious to facilitate in every possible way the work of the Catholic missions. They were freely given large concessions of land while their personnel and goods were often transported in the State steamers. Gradually they began to spread out in the Congo State, each Congregation being responsible for its own district. The Scheut Fathers began to follow the B.M.S. up the main river, with a post at Kwamouth. CAMBIER and VAN RONSLÉ went ahead of the Baptists by planting another station at Nouvelle Anvers in 1889, but in the following year the B.M.S. established posts yet further up the river at Monsembe and Upoto. The Scheut Fathers stopped their line of advance up the main river at Nouvelle Anvers and turned their attention to the Kasai in 1891, the year in which the American Presbyterians began to work there. It was not long after LAPSLEY and SHEPPARD had settled at Luebo that CAMBIER established a mission at Luluabourg<sup>(1)</sup>. The Belgian Jesuits, on the other hand, took the lower Congo and the Kwango as their field. VAN HENXTHOVEN established the first post near Leopoldville in 1893, and, later in the year, a second to the south of it, at Kisantu. This became the most noted of the Jesuit stations<sup>(2)</sup>. In 1895 the Trappists went to Equatorville. But when in the mid-'nineties the north-eastern part of the Congo State began to absorb so large a part of LEOPOLD'S attention, the King made a great effort to ensure that this region was evangelized by Belgian Catholic missionaries<sup>(3)</sup>, rather than by foreign

(1) L. DIEU, *Brousse congolaise*, Liège, 1946, p. 83 ff.

(2) DENIS, p. 51 ff.

(3) "J'ai reçu une bonne lettre du Baron D'ERP concernant les missions. Le Roi peut compter sur tout mon zèle pour faire aboutir notre projet de déve-

Protestants <sup>(1)</sup>. In 1897 a Sacred Heart mission was established at the Falls <sup>(2)</sup>. After a few years it was able to extend its work up the Aruwimi, although GRENFELL was not allowed to plant a B.M.S. station in the region. GRENFELL made alternative plans for advance up the Uele, but these also came to nothing because of State opposition. In 1898 the Uele was detached from the Vicariate of the Congo Independent State, and taken over by the Premonstratensians; they immediately planted a post at Ibembo, and added two more a few years later, at Amadi and Gumbari.

Thus, at the turn of the century, there were both Catholic and Protestant missions in the lower Congo, on the main river, and in the Kasai. The Catholics had not attempted to enter the Lulonga basin or the Katanga, while the State had not allowed the Protestants to enter the Aruwimi or the Uele. Certainly the King was doing his best to favour Belgian — and therefore Catholic — missions. His attitude was made clear when, in 1890, a 50 % reduction was suggested in the taxation imposed by the Congo State upon missionaries, as against that required by the State from traders and other Europeans. The purpose of the reduction was to enlist the moral pressure of the missions in support of the King's campaign to persuade Holland to sign the Brussels Declaration. This Declaration, already signed by the other Powers, allowed the Congo State to levy import duties. It was a matter of great immediate importance for LEOPOLD; he was unwilling, however, to take

lopper les missions, et leur faire attribuer l'enclave de Lado". VAN EETVELDE to LÉOPOLD II, 21 96. *Académie royale des Sciences coloniales, Correspondance Léopold II-Van Eetvelde.*

<sup>(1)</sup> The *Mouvement des Missions Catholiques au Congo* reported in February 1904 that the Premonstratensian mission in the Uele was extending its work to a third post at Gumbari at the request of LEOPOLD II, who wished to prevent the installation of Protestant missionaries there.

<sup>(2)</sup> R. P. JEANROY, *Notice sur la Mission des Falls fondée et dirigée par les Prêtres du Sacré-Cœur de Jésus*, Brussels, 1904, p. 3.

a step which should so materially benefit foreign, as well as Belgian, missions :

“ L'État favorise autant que possible les missionnaires belges. Il leur a donné des concessions *perpétuelles* de terre. Il leur donne des cadeaux et de *l'argent*. Je vois dans la note ci-contre qu'il leur serait fait une réduction d'impôts de 50 %... ” (1)

“ Si la réduction est accordée d'ici aux missionnaires catholiques les riches missions protestantes qui font du commerce vont exiger la même chose et l'État pourrait être sérieusement atteint dans ses recettes. ” (2)

“ Pour les 50 % aux missionnaires je ne veux pas, d'ici, les accorder ... car si j'accorde aux Belges je dois accorder à tous. Je donne des cadeaux aux Belges et s'il le fallait je pourrais les majorer un peu. ” (3)

The King's differential treatment of Catholic and Protestant missions was only one aspect of his general policy of imprinting a Belgian character upon the Congo State. For LEOPOLD, they were not merely Catholic and Protestant, but they were divided by a line which he found far more significant — they were Belgian and foreign missions.

\* \* \*

LEOPOLD II was very anxious to see the extension of Belgian missionary work in the Congo, and to the Catholic missionaries it seemed perfectly natural that there should be a parallel advance of Church and State into all parts of the Congo basin. The Protestant missionaries, on the other hand, arrived in the Congo holding the theory of the complete separation of Church and State. We have already seen how the Plymouth Brethren in the Katanga were forced to modify their views in the conditions of Central Africa. The Baptist missionaries, too, found that they could in no sense “ keep clear of

(1) LEOPOLD II to LAMBERMONT, 16 X 90. P. L., 1889-90, 1049.

(2) *Ibid.*, 16 X 90. P. L., 1889-90, 1050.

(3) *Ibid.*, 17 X 90. P. L., 1889-90, 1051.

all State business", as BENTLEY had so earnestly hoped <sup>(1)</sup>, a few months after the *Association Internationale du Congo* had taken the title of the Congo Independent State.

In 1885 similar problems had to be faced both by the missions and by the State. Extensive geographical exploration had to be undertaken and in this, as we have seen, GRENFELL was of the greatest help to the State, while at the same time State surveys supplemented his work and were thus of value to the missions. The difficulties of transport in the lower Congo also provided a problem which had to be met both by the new State wishing to make good its claim to authority in the Congo basin, and by the missionaries hoping to carry the Gospel ever further into the interior. From the beginning, STANLEY had seen that it was impossible to open up the Congo basin without a railway which would round the cataracts on the lower river and thus would link the coast with the Pool. STANLEY'S road around the cataracts had considerably eased the task of the missions, but, even so, the problem of portorage caused them considerable anxiety. STANLEY had brought men from Zanzibar when the lower river tribes proved unwilling carriers; such a project, however, would have been too costly for the missions to undertake, and they employed both men of the Kru tribe whom they brought from the coast east of Liberia, and also local labour when it was available. The demand for carriers far outweighed the supply, and there was constant competition between the State, the traders, and the missionaries <sup>(2)</sup>.

In 1889 came the news of the foundation of the *Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Congo* <sup>(3)</sup>; this was enthu-

<sup>(1)</sup> BENTLEY to BAYNES, 23 II 86. B. M. X.

<sup>(2)</sup> BENTLEY, II, p. 133.

<sup>(3)</sup> F. MASOIN, *Histoire de l'État Indépendant du Congo*, 2 vols., Namur, 1912, I, p. 364.

siastically welcomed both by GRENFELL, who foresaw the removal of the "great barrier" between the coast and the interior <sup>(1)</sup>, and by the Congo Balolo Mission, which was at that time beginning its work in the upper Congo <sup>(2)</sup>. Meanwhile, the State's efforts to regulate the engagement of porters in the cataract region were regarded by traders and by missionaries as an attempt to secure a State monopoly. They sent a joint protest to the Governor-General <sup>(3)</sup>, and BAYNES visited Brussels to lay a complaint before King LEOPOLD <sup>(4)</sup>. The C.B.M. publicly criticised the regulations, but tactfully observed that "it is not always easy for private people to judge of the wisdom of State measures" <sup>(5)</sup>.

The first section of the lower Congo railway, which ran from Matadi to Nkenge, was opened in 1893. This was encouraging, since another transport crisis had occurred when, in August, the Governor-General had forbidden the missions to recruit porters from the Babwende country. GRENFELL's attitude towards this and later restrictive regulations was more sympathetic than that of many of his colleagues <sup>(6)</sup>, who felt strongly the injustice of the fact that it was the missionaries and the traders who had trained the lower Congo peoples to act as carriers, and who had subsequently been forced to pay heavily for licences to employ them and finally forbidden to make use of them at all <sup>(7)</sup>. But the tension was eased as the construction of the lower Congo railway

<sup>(1)</sup> GRENFELL to BAYNES, 22 III 89. B. M. S.

<sup>(2)</sup> *R. B.*, August 1889.

<sup>(3)</sup> Minutes, 17 VII 89. B. M. S.

<sup>(4)</sup> BAYNES to the Committee, 8 IX 89, in B. M. S. Minutes, 17 IX 89.

<sup>(5)</sup> *R. B.*, Dec. 1890.

<sup>(6)</sup> "Lawson FORFEIT is more fully informed — I should be slow to advise against him. But I confess I sympathise with the Governor-General in restrictions on the transport of non-essentials. On my last journey up-river I found three State stations without salt and in a condition missionaries seldom experience". GRENFELL to BAYNES, 3 XII 95. B. M. S.

<sup>(7)</sup> FORFEIT to BAYNES, 4 IX 94. B. M. S.

progressed. In 1896 the track was opened as far as Tumba, and the B.M.S. moved its base station forward to this point <sup>(1)</sup>. Now there was no need for an intermediate change of carriers during the rest of the journey to Stanley Pool <sup>(2)</sup>. In 1898 the railway was completed ; BAYNES received a personal telegram from VAN EETVELDE with the news that " the first locomotive arrived at Stanley Pool on 16th March " <sup>(3)</sup>. It was an achievement that was welcomed with the greatest enthusiasm by the missionaries <sup>(4)</sup> ; it meant that men who had been employed in arranging lower river transport were set free for the evangelization of upper river, and for this missions were grateful to the State.

There were a number of ways in which the missions and the State were mutually helpful. When, in its early days, the State had owned very few steamers, GRENFELL had often assisted State officials by taking them up river in the *Peace*. Mission docks had been used by State steamers. Missionary doctors had treated State agents who were taken ill. Missionary hospitality was constantly offered to State officials. Missionaries were summoned by the State to act as interpreters in court <sup>(5)</sup>. They served as officers of the State for the registration of births and the solemnization of marriages. A striking example of the service given by an individual missionary to the State, is provided by GRENFELL'S acceptance of LEOPOLD'S commission appointing him to take part in the delimitation of the south-western frontier of the State, where this touched Portuguese territory. The delays involved in this Lunda delimitation meant that GRENFELL spent nearly two years in State service <sup>(6)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> B. M. S. Report, 1897.

<sup>(2)</sup> BENTLEY, II, p. 316.

<sup>(3)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 22 IV 98.

<sup>(4)</sup> *R. B.*, 1898 ; B. M. S. Report, 1898.

<sup>(5)</sup> *M. H.*, Oct., 1890.

<sup>(6)</sup> JOHNSTON, I, p. 187 ff.

Another individual instance can be seen in the action of Dan CRAWFORD. Since CRAWFORD never considered himself bound by the disapproval of his colleagues, he cheerfully accepted a temporary military command from the State, and agreed to keep order among the African soldiery left at the State fort on the Lufoi while the two Belgian officers normally stationed there were away fighting the Arabs. As he wrote :

“ To mix myself up with the government of a country is the last thing I would choose for myself. Yet, the better day that is dawning for the man preached to and his preacher will never be reached except through resolute government and punishment of evil doers... If I were connected with a missionary society I should probably be scored off the books — as though a heart which the Lord has touched can be put out of employment so easily ! ” (1)

On the other hand, a lonely missionary, isolated for some reason from all his colleagues, would rely for long periods on the nearest State post for any kind of European contact (2). Gifts of cattle for experimental purposes were made to missionaries by State officials (3). The local market arrangements were reorganized by State administrators so that the adherents of the Protestant missions might observe Sunday more strictly (4). Missionaries were given permission to cut timber without payment of the usual tax (5). The local government often assisted the educational work of the missions, by providing a school building and by recruiting children to fill it (6). It was always the practical industrial training of Africans that won support and aid from the State.

(1) TILSLEY, p. 327.

(2) *R. B.*, March 1893.

(3) *B. M. S. Report*, 1901.

(4) *Ibid.*

(5) WANGERMÉE to BENTLEY, 8 VIII 01. *B. M. S.*

(6) *The Missionary Intelligencer*, the missionary organ of the Disciples of Christ, Indianapolis, April 1900 ; *Rapport Dubreucq*, 20 X 99. *M. des C.*, M. 96 (584) *C. B. M.*

At first it was very difficult for the missionaries to realize that the *Association Internationale du Congo* had acquired the powers and authority of a civil state, for they had formerly considered its agents to be on equal terms with themselves. It was very much the same as with LUGARD and the C.M.S. in Uganda, or as with JOHNSTON and the Church of Scotland missionaries in Nyasaland. The advantages which settled government might be expected to provide were only very slowly brought to the Congo ; meanwhile more obvious were the disadvantages, in the form of taxation, restrictive regulations on land and on transport, and the general delay involved in any dealings with the administration (1). But gradually the " blessings of law and order " (2) came to be appreciated by the missionaries. They saw that the magisterial authority of the administration brought increased security to African tribal society (3), and they were quite ready to appeal to governmental force either to put an end to an obvious disorder (4) or case of cruelty (5), or impose social reform upon unwill-

(1) This was particularly galling to the American missionaries. Bishop TAYLOR wrote that " the officers of the Congo State... are extremely polite and obliging, but the amount of governmental tape that belongs essentially to the administration of an old European government is a means of grace, especially the grace of patience, to an American pioneer. " *African News*, Nov. 1889.

But English missionaries, too, reported that negotiations with the Africans, before the coming of the State, had been simpler and involved far less delay. Note on p. 86.

(2) SUTTON SMITH of Yakusu, in *M. H.*, Sep. 1901.

(3) " Within the last two days I have gone to two villages on behalf of two men who were in urgent danger of being killed on false and foolish charges of witchcraft... It is probable that fear of the government will lead to these two men being allowed to live, now that the charges against them are known to Europeans ". CAMERON to BAYNES, 1 VIII 95, in *M. H.*, Oct. 1895.

(4) " The people were quarrelling and fighting furiously, one man was severely wounded in the throat with a spear. We sent for the State Hausa whereupon all dispersed ". Diary of W. L. FORBETT, 5 IX 91.

(5) A man who had tied up his wife for a month on a charge of witchcraft was forced by C. B. M. missionaries on itineration to release her, while they " threatened him with Bula Matadi (the State) if he tied her up again ". *R. B.*, August 1896.



ing Africans (1). With a political teaching very like that of the early Christian fathers, the missionaries in the Congo told the Africans that civil government was the Divine remedy for sin :

“ They (the people of Nzundu, near Wathen station) are afraid of the State Government, and very much resent its interference with their affairs. They did not get much sympathy from me, however, for I told them plainly that God had permitted the State authorities to take possession of their country because they could not rule themselves. They were always fighting and killing one another... This they could not deny, and it seemed to touch their consciences, for I was reminded that I was not to preach till next day. ” (2)

On the other hand, counsels of subjection to the State authorities were tempered by the protective attitude of the missionaries towards the Africans in the vicinity of their stations. The Congolese turned to the missionary for the interpretation of State laws and the adaption of State demands (3), for advice on the assessment and payment of their taxes (4), for the regulation of their

(1) “ En notre qualité de missionnaire, il ne nous est possible d’user de force envers des indigènes, mais je voudrais à nouveau, Monsieur le Commissaire, vous demander de considérer la question d’une sentinelle, qui serait envoyée ici mensuellement par vous, possédant l’autorité nécessaire pour obliger les indigènes à construire des maisons convenables ”. ARMSTRONG, C. B. M. missionary, to the *Commissaire de District de l’Équateur. Courrier du Congo*, lettre 931 of 25 VII 04. A. G. R., V. E., 67 bis.

(2) CAMERON to BAYNES, 1 XI 89, in *M. H.*, March 1890.

(3) It was to the missionary that Africans could explain that if their village was to be moved on State orders, they must not be given for a new site that piece of forest which they had used as a cemetery and where the land could not therefore be disturbed ; the missionary would in turn explain the position to the administration. *Courrier du Congo*, letter 1868 of 27 IX 06, *Déplacement du village de Baringa*. A. G. R., V. E., 68 bis.

(4) “ Monsieur MALFEYT informe le Gouverneur-Général qu’il vient de recevoir la visite de Monsieur GRENFELL ayant principalement pour objet de lui faire part que les opérations de recensement des populations à Bolobo ont semé une grande inquiétude parmi les indigènes de cette région... Plusieurs chefs sont venus exposer ces craintes à Monsieur Grenfell sachant, disaient-ils, que ce missionnaire entretient de bons rapports avec le Gouvernement, et peut ainsi intercéder pour eux. Si le régime, qu’on va instaurer ne leur laisse plus aucune tranquillité, ils s’enfuiront tous, disent-ils, en territoire français ”. *Courrier du Congo*, letter 1018 of 24 VII 04. A. G. R., V. E., 67 bis.

social life in conformity with the new authority which had appeared among them (1). The missionary could often intercede successfully with the administration when State demands pressed with undue weight upon the Africans; thus his prestige among the people increased. He was the interpreter of the new way of life which was inevitably forcing itself upon them; a missionary who had been ignored when he came alone, was sought out when the Africans realized that he could be a useful mediator with the all-powerful State (2). On one occasion MR<sup>S</sup> GRENFELL effected a reconciliation between the people of Bolobo and the State authorities, after the outbreak of a local riot, and received the present of a large pig in token of the gratitude of the villagers (3). As a C.B.M. missionary remarked, his friendly relations with the State officials meant that there were "frequent opportunities for indirectly benefiting the natives by speaking a word in their favour as occasion offers" (4). The common position of the missionary as a State registrar must often have given the Africans the impression that he himself was endowed with secular authority (5).

(1) GRENFELL organised the Africans who had gathered round the mission at Bolobo into a self-governing community, which agreed to obey the Congo State laws, and to forbid polygamy and the sale of spirits. B. M. S. Report, 1900.

(2) "A few weeks later, NFUMU NGUMA, chief of another large town, and also the over-chief of this district sent us a goat and requested us to visit his town and become *his* friends. Hitherto, he has been almost unfriendly. I visited his town about four years ago, but he has not been on our station since he came to collect tribute from the Bishop when we first settled here. He has always given us to understand that he desired no intercourse whatever with foreigners, but the plundering of his town by the Welle-Mobangi Expedition has convinced him that he can no longer ignore the existence of Bula Matadi, so he wishes to secure our favour, and, in fact, to engage us as his advisers". BURR to WELCH, Kimpoko, 20 IV 91, in *The African*, August 1891.

(3) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 21 IV 94. B. M. S.

(4) *R. B.*, Nov. 1893.

(5) It was often the missionary, not the State agent, who dealt directly with the Africans. One of BENTLEY's letters noted that: "The chiefs of one district want to make some new excellent laws, and want to know how far the State would approve and back them. I have to write to the *Commissaire de District*. Some have to report deaths and I have to register them in the State books as Registrar". BENTLEY to BAYNES, 6 III 1900. B. M. S.

He gained a prestige of which King LEOPOLD'S Commission of Enquiry of 1904-5 deemed that the State might well be jealous :

“ Sometimes, also, in the regions where Evangelical missions are established, the black, rather than address himself to the magistrate — his natural protector — is accustomed, when he has a complaint against a factor, a *chef de poste* or a *chef de zone*, to go and confide in the missionary, who listens, assists him to the best of his ability, and becomes the recipient of all the complaints of a district. Hence the remarkable authority of the missionaries in some parts of the country. They acquire ascendancy not only over the natives subjected to their religious teaching, but over all the villages whose griefs they hear. The missionary becomes, for the natives of a district, the sole representative of equity and justice. He adds to the ascendancy acquired by his religious zeal the prestige which, in the interests of the State, should belong to the magistrate.” (1)

Such criticism had the greater weight since the evangelical missionary to whom it applied was also a foreign missionary. Misunderstanding of his intentions could easily arise from the mere fact that he was a foreigner, from his different language and customs, and the Belgian officials in the Congo were particularly sensitive. When the Governor-General visited Wathen in 1891, he saw the BENTLEYS' cook wearing a red coat, and immediately suggested that the missionaries were trying to inculcate a taste for things English, and in particular for the red-coated soldier. Mrs BENTLEY had to explain quickly that the coat had been cut from an old travelling blanket, and was made with no such intention (2). But even the Protestant evangelists were known as the “ Ingelesa ” by the people (3), and an American observer could write of the English missionaries at a later date :

(1) G. W. MACALPINE, Abstract of the report of the commission of enquiry into the administration of the Congo Free State, London 1906, pp. 73-4.

(2) Mrs. BENTLEY'S unpublished autobiography, p. 410. B. P.

(3) KERVYN to the *Gouverneur-General*, March 1904. M. des C., M. 92 (582) B. M. S.

“ They naturally carry with them into their stations the English mode of life, traditions, atmosphere. Although the currency of the Congo Free State is reckoned in francs and centimes, they talk all business and quote all prices in shillings and pence ; in making out an account everything is calculated in English money, and it is with a certain air of gentle remonstrance that they will convert the total, at the request of their debtor, into Belgian or Congo currency. Their importations are all English ; they take their afternoon tea ; they look with mild but sure superiority upon all differing methods around them. Few of them really talk French, the official language of the country ; still fewer write it with any ease or correctness. ” (1)

It was understandable that the State officials should object to foreign influence of this kind, and should feel that the Protestant missionaries did not fit in to the pattern of life which they hoped to create in the Congo (2). Some of the missions therefore made efforts to stress their sympathy with Belgium. The temperance work at Wathen was linked with the Belgian section of the International Society of the Blue Cross (3), rather than with an English association. The B.M.S. held a memorial service for the Queen of the Belgians at Matadi in 1902 (4). The slides provided for the magic lantern which accompanied missionaries on itineration from Wathen showed scriptural subjects, but there was also a slide showing a picture of the King of the Belgians (5). The Wathen school-house, too, contained a portrait of LEOPOLD II (6).

Many of the missionaries also made a determined effort to overcome the language difficulty. As early as

(1) F. STARR, *The truth about the Congo*, Chicago, 1907, p. 49.

(2) “ Les missions protestantes ne se jalouent nullement entre elles, mais vivent en état de confraternité et se rendent de mutuels services : elles entretiennent de bonnes relations avec l'État, mais regrettent, je pense, dans leur for intérieur que le Congo ne soit pas une colonie anglo-saxonne. Nous ne pouvons rien espérer d'elles ”. JANSSENS to the *Administrateur-Général*, 25 VIII 89. M. des C., M. 108 (585).

(3) B. M. S. Report, 1901.

(4) FORFEITT to BAYNES, 13 X 02. B. M. S.

(5) *M. H.*, August 1890.

(6) *Ibid.*, August 1896.

1886 GRENFELL had announced his intention of spending a part of his furlough in France for language study <sup>(1)</sup>, for even then he realized the missionaries needed to speak and understand French easily, in view of the increasing number of French-speaking officials in the service of the Congo State. BENTLEY urged that English should never be taught in mission schools and that French should be used at table, for this was the only way to ease the position when "everywhere on the State stations the chief topic of conversation is the *English* influence of English missionaries" <sup>(2)</sup>. In 1897 the B.M.S. Committee decided that missionaries were not to be sent out to the Congo if they did not possess a colloquial knowledge of French <sup>(3)</sup>. At Wathen the scholars were given a weekly French lesson in 1891 <sup>(4)</sup>; this practice was begun on the upper river at Lukolela two years later <sup>(5)</sup>. At Bolobo the printing-press did a fair amount of work in French <sup>(6)</sup>. But the language problem was not an easy one to solve, and not all missionaries were as careful as GRENFELL and BENTLEY to conform with the wishes of the administration. French was neither being taught nor spoken by the American Presbyterians in 1899 <sup>(7)</sup>, while as late as 1906 a C.B.M. missionary stated that he had been misunderstood, and complained that the judicial officier to whom he had spoken did not understand English <sup>(8)</sup>.

But although the missionaries might support the civil government as the Divine remedy for the evils of Congo

(1) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 26 VII 86. B. M. S.

(2) CAMERON to BENTLEY, 18 VII 93, quoting what had been said to him by an Irish doctor in State service. Enclosed in BENTLEY to BAYNES, 20 VII 93. B. M. S.

(3) B. M. S. Minutes, 21 VII 97.

(4) B. M. S. Report, 1891.

(5) *Ibid.*, 1893.

(6) *Ibid.*, 1891.

(7) Report of VAN BREDAEL for the Lualaba-Kasai district, 31 XII 99. M. des C., M. 103 (586).

(8) *Courrier du Congo*, letter 1874 of 24 IX 06. A. G. R., V. E., 68 bis.

society, and although they might endeavour to improve their knowledge of French and the quality of their teaching of the official language of the State, they were at the same time very anxious to preserve their independence and individuality as missionaries. When BENTLEY, left without instructions from home, was considering whether or not to hand over the *Peace* to the Emin Relief Expedition, he explained to STANLEY that the chief difficulty was that the missionaries wanted to preserve the solely *missionary* character of the steamer before the upper river tribes. He feared that armed Zanzibaris on board would create an unfavourable impression <sup>(1)</sup>. The forcible seizure of the *Henry Reed* — although the *Peace* was more or less willingly loaned to Stanley — showed what might occur again; BENTLEY accordingly requested the British Consul at Loanda to register the *Peace*, so that the mission would be in a position to claim the protection of the British Government if the steamer were seized again by Europeans <sup>(2)</sup>. This seemed to be the only way of preserving the independence of the society. But since the jurisdiction of the Consul at Loanda extended only to Portuguese territory, all he could do was to refer the matter to the Foreign Office.

There was a second reason for requiring the registration of the *Peace*. By a decree of 30th April 1887 <sup>(3)</sup> private vessels on the upper Congo were ordered to hoist the State flag; only if a steamer was registered with the government of her owners could she fly her national flag. It was not until the spring of 1888 that the first British Consul to the Congo State was appointed, but meanwhile the Board of Trade issued a provisional pass for the *Peace*, and this was accepted by the Congo govern-

(1) BENTLEY to STANLEY, 15 IV 87, in B. M. S. Minutes, 20 VII 87.

(2) BENTLEY to NEWTON, 15 VII 87, in Newton to F. O., 16 IX 87. F. O. 84/1845.

(3) *Bulletin officiel de l'État Indépendant du Congo*, Brussels, June 1887, pp. 75-6.

ment (1). For the missionaries the question of the registration of the *Peace* and the right to fly the British flag was no empty one. As BENTLEY pointed out, the upper river tribes understood quite well the meaning of a flag, and at a time when the State was trying to create the impression that it owned all the steamers on the Congo, it was very necessary for the *Peace* to preserve her character as a mission boat (2). In 1890 the *Peace* was requisitioned by the State to carry men and goods to the Kasai for the Arab campaign, and the British flag was hauled down. A legal adviser consulted by the B.M.S. gave his opinion that the Congo State was bound by the Berlin Act and therefore was not an independent State with full sovereign powers, so that it had no legal right to requisition the steamer. He declared that if the State really asserted this right, the Society should appeal to the Foreign Office to take a stand on the Berlin Act (3). However, since the *Peace* had been returned to the missionaries, and the British flag replaced and saluted, and since the Committee considered it to be "very important that the present friendly relations between the B.M.S. and the Congo government should not be disturbed", the Society decided to let the matter rest (4). It was to be raised again more than ten years later, during the period of growing tension between Protestant missions and the government, when the State authorities tried unsuccessfully to prevent mission steamers from flying the British flag (5).

Any suggestion that the Congo State was not a sove-

(1) F. O. to Lord VIVIAN, 16 IV 88; Lord VIVIAN to F. O., 26 IV 88 F. O. 84/1895.

(2) BENTLEY to BAYNES, 12 VI 88, B. M. S.

(3) Opinion of F. H. JEUNE, Q. C., 3 XII 90, in B. M. S. Minutes, 16 XII 90. When the *Henry Reed* had been seized in 1887, the American Baptists had not hesitated to approach the State Department on the question.

(4) B. M. S. Minutes, 17 II 91, B. M. S.

(5) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 11 XII 02, B. M. S. Western sub-committee minutes, 22 IX 03.

reign State was extremely galling to the Congo authorities, and the fact that Protestant missionaries were willing to make an appeal to a foreign Power rendered them suspect. They were seen as the representatives of an imperialist Britain. On the eastern borders of the State they were felt to be particularly dangerous (1). Their relations with the British Consul were known to be close; GRENFELL was even a British Pro-Consul. The State authorities could hardly know that the Foreign Office had refused to make GRENFELL a Consular Agent on the grounds that his loyalty to the B.M.S. might conflict with his loyalty to the Crown (2). The missionaries corresponded freely with the British Consul; the Consul applied to them for information about conditions in the interior; he used their steamers if he wished to visit the upper river. Eventually the presence of numbers of British missionaries in the Congo led the British Consul at Loanda to insist that he could not deal adequately with the Congo State, and that a Vice-Consulate should be erected at Boma (3). This was done, and the Vice-Consul then acted for American citizens as well as for British subjects (4).

(1) A *chef de zone* in the Katanga wrote in reference to the desire of the Plymouth Brethren to plant another post near the frontier; "Notre voisinage avec les possessions anglaises me rend absolument contraire à permettre aux missionnaires anglais, nos plus dangereux ennemis, de s'établir à la frontière. Ces messieurs prêtent facilement la main à tout ce qui peut être une source d'ennuis pour l'État". 3 XI 97. M. des C., M. 102 (585).

(2) Consul PICKERSGILL advised that GRENFELL should be appointed Consular Agent; he had just previously been appointed British Pro-Consul for the upper Congo to facilitate the registration of the second B. M. S. steamer, the *Goodwill*. The Foreign Office comment, however, was that: "... Mr. GRENFELL is all that Mr. PICKERSGILL describes — a good traveller — a keen observer — and a sensible writer; but his allegiance is to the Baptists, and this allegiance might conflict with his duty to the Crown. The Baptist headquarters and many of their missionaries are bigoted and obstinate. We had difficulties with them about the Germans in the Cameroons... It is not advisable to make a missionary a consular agent". PICKERSGILL to F. O. 3 VIII 93, and note. F. O. 63/1252.

(3) CASEMENT to F. O., 26 XII 98. F. O. 63/1352.

(4) CASEMENT to F. O., 14 V 01, and note. F. O. 10/751.



But if its relations with the British Consul were close, and if it was at times prepared to appeal to the British Government, the B.M.S. was tactful in its dealings with Brussels. More than any other foreign missionary society, it stood well with the King of the Belgians. Its leading missionaries had given considerable service to the State. BENTLEY and GRENFELL had both been decorated by Leopold II — the one for his linguistic and the other for his exploratory work. The B.M.S. was the only non-Catholic mission to receive a State subsidy ; this was given specifically for the medical work of the Society. A tradition of co-operation with the State had existed ever since the early years when the Society had received so much help from STANLEY in the lower Congo, and had come out so strongly on the side of the State in the period of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty negotiations. It had almost acquired a vested interest in supporting the State. Other Protestant missions, too, paid their respects at Brussels. LAPSLEY, of the American Presbyterian Mission, set aside his practice of strict Sunday observance so that he might have an audience with the King of the Belgians (1), and found LEOPOLD cordial and interested in his work (2). Bishop TAYLOR had a friendly interview with the King in 1886 (3). But Brussels had closer and more sustained contacts with the B.M.S. than with any other foreign missionary society. This was due not only to the frequency with which Baynes and some of the

(1) " Before leaving, the King sent me word he would receive Mr. LAPSLEY... on Sunday at 11.45. The young man demurred to me he had never gone aside from his Sunday work on that day (he had previously, on THYS fixing on Sunday to see him as the only day he had free, declined to go). I told him that he never had such a pulpit and such a congregation as he would have, before the King on the morrow, that his opportunity had arrived to lay broad and deep the foundation for the work of his mission, and that it was his duty to avail himself of it. And he, finally, concluded that it was, and that he would go ". SANFORD to MACKINNON, 22 III 90. Mackinnon Papers, S. O. A. S.

(2) WHARTON, p. 15.

(3) W. TAYLOR, William Taylor of California, Bishop of Africa, an autobiography, revised, with a preface by C. G. Moore, London, 1897, p. 397.

reign State was extremely galling to the Congo authorities, and the fact that Protestant missionaries were willing to make an appeal to a foreign Power rendered them suspect. They were seen as the representatives of an imperialist Britain. On the eastern borders of the State they were felt to be particularly dangerous <sup>(1)</sup>. Their relations with the British Consul were known to be close; GRENFELL was even a British Pro-Consul. The State authorities could hardly know that the Foreign Office had refused to make GRENFELL a Consular Agent on the grounds that his loyalty to the B.M.S. might conflict with his loyalty to the Crown <sup>(2)</sup>. The missionaries corresponded freely with the British Consul; the Consul applied to them for information about conditions in the interior; he used their steamers if he wished to visit the upper river. Eventually the presence of numbers of British missionaries in the Congo led the British Consul at Loanda to insist that he could not deal adequately with the Congo State, and that a Vice-Consulate should be erected at Boma <sup>(3)</sup>. This was done, and the Vice-Consul then acted for American citizens as well as for British subjects <sup>(4)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> A *chef de zone* in the Katanga wrote in reference to the desire of the Plymouth Brethren to plant another post near the frontier; "Notre voisinage avec les possessions anglaises me rend absolument contraire à permettre aux missionnaires anglais, nos plus dangereux ennemis, de s'établir à la frontière. Ces messieurs prêtent facilement la main à tout ce qui peut être une source d'ennuis pour l'État". 3 XI 97. M. des C., M. 102 (585).

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<sup>(3)</sup> CASEMENT to F. O., 26 XII 98. F. O. 63/1352.

<sup>(4)</sup> CASEMENT to F. O., 14 V 01, and note. F. O. 10/751.

even the most evangelical missionaries were forced to take over some of these functions, and it was naturally irritating for the State authorities that it was foreigners who were doing so, foreigners who often enough showed no signs of adapting themselves to Belgian habits and speech, and were somewhat tactless in their dealings with the representatives of the State. There is no evidence that the Protestant missionaries ever tried to work for the establishment of British rule in the Congo basin — neither the Baptists in the lower Congo nor the Plymouth Brethren in the Katanga did so, although both had an excellent opportunity. But it was not surprising that LEOPOLD was suspicious of their aims, and fearful that the British Government might try to draw some political advantage from their presence in the Congo. The Berlin Act had given an international flavour to the Congo Independent State; the King was a little unsure of his position, and saw the foreign missionaries in the Congo as a hindrance to his plans for imprinting a Belgian character upon the State.

## CHAPTER THREE

### MISSIONARY METHODS, 1885-1908

The missionary who went to Congo to enable "a hundred millions of benighted men and women to be taught about the Saviour who died for them" (1) found on arrival that he had to do a great deal more than teach. He went prepared to exercise spiritual authority, but he soon found that temporal authority also came within his sphere. It was the Plymouth Brethren in the Katanga who, perhaps more than any other group of missionaries in the Congo, shrank from wielding such power. But even they saw no way of escape. As one of them, Dan CRAWFORD, declared:

"Many a little Protestant Pope in the lonely bush is forced by his self-imposed isolation to be prophet, priest and king rolled into one — really a very big duck he, in his own private pond... Quite seriously he is forced to be a bit of a policeman, muddled up in matters not even remotely in his sphere." (2)

The missionary was an independent power in the midst of tribal jealousies; it was essential for him to show that his message was not limited by the boundaries of the clan among which he settled, but was for all who would listen (3). Except in Bunkeya he could not fit

(1) GUINNESS, p. 523.

(2) CRAWFORD, pp. 324-5.

(3) "...from that time we were regarded by all the towns of the district as belonging to no one place, but to all of them, as impartial in our judgements and just in our dealings with all alike". J. WEEKS, *Among Congo cannibals*, London, 1913, p. 71.

his life into the pattern of African rule, for this was too restricted, too unstable. The plot of ground which he had purchased from the local chief with his brass rods, his cloth, empty bottles, cutlery, mirrors, nails, tin plates, beads and cowrie shells <sup>(1)</sup> was recognized as the seat of an independent authority. At first his jurisdiction was limited to the few porters and workmen he had brought with him, and to the small group of slave children whom he had ransomed out of pity for their plight. Gradually it extended as little groups of Africans came to gather round his settlement <sup>(2)</sup>; there were liberated slaves or others who had lost their clan identity <sup>(3)</sup>, fugitives from justice <sup>(4)</sup>, and young men eager to learn new skills.

The people did not only look to the missionary for protection <sup>(5)</sup>, but they also made demands on his wisdom. The missionary was the "settler of quarrels, disputes, contentions" <sup>(6)</sup>. The local palavers were brought

(1) BENTLEY, II, p. 214; WEEKS, p. 39.

(2) A very marked influx of population took place at Luebo, centred on the American Presbyterian mission. In 1891 LAPSLEY brought about twenty men with him, ten years later there were several thousand around the mission, and by 1911 the population numbered at least ten thousand. At first the missionaries had ransomed slaves (less than a hundred) but these thousands of Africans came to settle freely, attracted by the protection and material advantages offered by residence near the station. To some extent the population was a migratory one; the people settled there for a few years, and then moved on.

(3) "Around this mission station... there gathered the flotsam and jetsam of that part of Central Africa, lost Lundas, Lubans and Lambas, who had been torn from their homes by MSIDI's war bands, and other uncertain elements of more than a score of tribes... Lufoi developed into a Katanga Cave of Adullam". D. CAMPBELL, *Blazing trails in Bantuland*, London, n. d., p. 69.

(4) "Murderers, too, made it a city of refuge; Arabs, fleeing for their lives from avenging Belgians, halted, or hid in Luanza's rabbit warrens; and slavers, escaping from State prisons where they were undergoing terms of imprisonment for their misdeeds, headed for Luanza... It was difficult to know whether to give up a murderer, hand over a slaver, or deliver up an escaped slave". *Ibid.*, pp. 81-2.

(5) "They beseech us not to leave the country, lest they all be killed". CRAWFORD, 22 XII 98, in *E. S.*, June 1899.

(6) *The Kasai Herald*, of the American Presbyterian Congo Mission, Luebo Jan. 1908, p. 6.

to him to resolve (1), and he had perforce to give judgement on questions which CRAWFORD, at any rate, could dismiss as "utterly irrelevant to your calling as a herald of the Cross" (2). This gave the missionary a recognized position in African society (3). He might try not to usurp the authority of the chief in making his judgements (4), but the very existence of "palaver sheds" where he gave anything up to six hours a day in "hearing palavers" (5) left no doubt of the attitude of the people towards his authority.

Whether he wished it or not, he was given the position of a chief. When SUMMERS of Bishop TAYLOR'S Mission died among the Bena Lulua in 1888, his funeral resembled that of a King (6). The Plymouth Brethren in the Katanga were very eager to protest against their elevation, but they did so in vain :

"We would prefer to live with our boys, get labour from the villages, and go to the villages with the Gospel, rather than have people settling around us. We tell them again and again we are not chiefs, but although we seek to live humbly and make no pretensions

(1) "Brother GILCHRIST seems to have a good many palavers to settle. First a woman comes running to him for protection, crying out that she is to be sold as a slave... Then a man has been tied up through some misunderstanding. Another is accused of stealing a wife, and his fellow-townsmen are highly indignant; though any one of them would do the same! Again a man rushes in out of breath saying that the chief of his town, who is ill, has been pulled out of his house and cruelly treated by another more powerful chief. And so they go on, day after day". RANDALL, in *R. B.*, Nov. 1894.

(2) *Diary*, 20 I 93, *E. S.*, Nov. 1893.

(3) "TSIMBALANGA (one of the Scheut Fathers at Lusambo) est le grand arbitre impartial. Il devint ainsi célèbre à plusieurs lieues à la ronde et acquit sur toute la contrée une puissance inégalée". DIEU, p. 133.

(4) MORRISON urged caution; "Palavers offer us the opportunity of showing our interest in the natives and of demonstrating the Biblical principles of right and justice. But all this has to be done cautiously. Don't usurp the authority of the chief or let him get the impression you are trying to do so. This requires diplomacy. You are to teach the chief as far as possible". T. C. VINSON, William McCutchen Morrison, *Twenty years in Central Africa*, Richmond, 1921, p. 139.

(5) These were a feature of the American Presbyterian mission; Motte MARTIN'S shed was especially famous. BEDINGER, p. 49.

(6) *Miss.*, April 1892.

before them, the very fact of our being white makes them look upon us as great men." (1)

But although the Plymouth Brethren shrank from the responsibility of temporal authority, they found that when it was thrust upon them their message bore more fruit than before. Bunkeya provides the one example in the Congo State of missionaries going to the chief's court, and fitting into the existing pattern of life there, just as MACKAY had done in Buganda (2). The Brethren were welcome, since they added to MSIRI's prestige, provided him with private secretaries (3), and generally acted as his "white slaves". But owing to the King's uncertain temper the atmosphere of the court was one of constant tension and fear (4), and the time spent there showed little positive result. It was not until after MSIRI's death that the missionaries were really free for the work of evangelization (5). They were very ready to welcome their independence; they were not, however, so anxious to accept the responsibilities which it brought. In MSIRI's time "chief was chief, and missionary was missionary", but after his death it was to the missionaries that men turned for some kind of stable rule, and in their changed position CRAWFORD saw "new danger, as well as new privilege" (6).

Like the groups of free adherents who insisted on attaching themselves to the missionary as the one fixed centre in a disorganized society, freed slaves also forced upon him a position of temporal authority. As ARNOT remarked:

(1) GEORGE, Mwena, 22 XII 01, in *E. S.*, May 1902.

(2) OLIVER, p. 74.

(3) SWAN, 31 X 89, in *E. S.*, Jan. 1891; TILSLEY, p. 176.

(4) "The chief continues his ghastly work of putting his people to death... I might mention scores upon scores of cases; every few days these executions take place". SWAN, 17 V 89, in *E. S.*, Feb. 1890.

(5) "Only since MSIRI's death has this vast country been really open to us... before we were hedged in by MSIRI's veto". *E. S.*, July 1893.

(6) Diary, 23 VII 94, in *E. S.*, Feb. 1895.

“One can redeem a grown-up person and let him go, but this cannot be done with a child whose parents are enslaved; the owner of the mother might take him at once and sell him again. Of course, alone, I cannot look after more than a very few, and that settles the question so far.” (1)

In point of fact it was exceedingly difficult to redeem an adult and “let him go”. Some provision had to be made for a freed slave, or he would be liable to be reclaimed by his old master. It was very hard to convince him that he was really “free”, when to leave the protection of the mission would mean a possible return to slavery. The missionary was merely a new master — a master often no more welcome than any other (2).

However, the problem which the freed slave presented to the missionary was not usually one of jurisdiction; this responsibility was accepted often enough without objection. The missionary was concerned rather — when it occurred to him at all — to weigh the benefit to the individual redeemed against the fact that he was providing a market for slaves. The B.M.S. decided from the first that slaves were not to be bought, and few exceptions were made (3). But the B.M.S. missionaries refused to ransom slaves not because they wished to be free from temporal authority, but because they feared to encourage those who supplied the slaves. Indeed, by gathering children into boarding schools, and by willingly accepting freed slave children handed over to their care by State offi-

(1) ARNOT, Garanganze, pp. 214-15.

(2) “In our little mud Mission House we have a number of redeemed slaves around us, but they are nearly all a bad lot... rug up a man from the roots of his being — home, kinsmen and liberty — then transplant him, as a captive chattel, and verily, not even the fostering care of a rescuing Missionary can soften the grudge out of him... these rescue Missionaries are only reckoned *the — last — therefore — the worst* link in the long chain of captivity”. CRAWFORD, p. 219.

(3) In her unpublished autobiography, Mrs BENTLEY, cites the case of a girl redeemed at the request of one of the mission boys, and that of a boy ransomed on the understanding that he would work for the mission to refund his purchase price., pp. 155, 434. B. P.



cial, they sought the kind of jurisdiction which was forced upon other missionaries who redeemed children out of pity, and then found themselves obliged to look after them.

But for many missions slave redemption presented no moral problem. The L. I. M. embarked on a policy of redeeming slave children, and concentrated on their training until such time as the local population should more readily accept missionary teaching. Pressing appeals were made to the supporters of the mission to provide the five pounds needed to redeem a child, and funds were sent in with enthusiasm <sup>(1)</sup>. The first American Baptist delegation to Congo, however, recommended in 1885 that this redemption of slave children should cease. Some missions used freed slaves as workmen. When LAPSLEY and SHEPPARD arrived in the Kasai, they availed themselves of a State law whereby slaves could be ransomed by Europeans, and then controlled for seven years. Rather doubtful about the implications which could be drawn from this proceeding, they were careful to pay these redeemed slaves the wages for which a free man worked — six handkerchiefs a month and their rations — and to assure missionary supporters in America that these men received far better treatment than they would have done from their African masters <sup>(2)</sup>. To provide wives for them it was necessary to redeem slave women, and as the local Bakete children were slow to attend school, slave children were also procured. In two years there was a little community of about eighty Africans living on the station <sup>(3)</sup>. But feeling that they were there chiefly to influence free tribal society, the missionaries strictly limited the size of the colony <sup>(4)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> GUINNESS, p. 314.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Miss.*, April 1892.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Ibid.*, March 1894.

<sup>(4)</sup> When later in 1894 the Presbyterian missionaries were told that they should have had a licence to liberate slaves, and that they were not in future to receive fugitive slaves, this was quite agreeable to them, for in any case they had on the station all they could care for, and soon would have had to refuse more. Within a

Catholic missionaries welcomed the opportunity of slave redemption. They were not at all unwilling to exercise the temporal authority which a freed slave colony entailed ; indeed, they were glad to do so. Free Churchmen began their work by endeavouring to obtain a definite and personal acceptance of Christianity on the part of the individual ; they expected that a group of converted individuals would then form a church. The attitude of the Catholic missionaries was different ; they concentrated not upon the individual, but upon the group. For them the Church was not only a local gathered group, but existed over and above the individual converts who were gathered into her membership. A conception of the Church as the guide and protector of her people, the dispenser of the sacraments, led them to aim at building up a Christian community in the midst of a pagan society. For such a *chrétienté*, freed slaves were the obvious recruits. It mattered little that these could in no sense be called converts at first ; they would be bound by the rules of the mission station, and live at least in outward conformity with Christian standards. Slave redemption seemed an excellent way of peopling a *chrétienté* <sup>(1)</sup>, and temporal authority was an advantage, rather than an irksome necessity. Economically, the *chrétienté* became self-supporting, and politically, jealous of any interference from outside. It was prepared to defend itself by force <sup>(2)</sup>. With little exaggeration it might well be called a "state within a state" <sup>(3)</sup>.

few days the State sent them another eighteen children and two women, which made their total of children forty-four, and they declared that no more could be accepted. *Miss.*, Nov. 1894.

<sup>(1)</sup> Finding no slave children to be redeemed at Nouvelle Anvers in 1890, VAN RONSLÉ went up to the Falls especially to fetch some ; he did not try to secure local children, DIEU, p. 148.

<sup>(2)</sup> CAMBIER defended Luluabourg by force during the Batetela revolt. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-3.

<sup>(3)</sup> This was one of the phrases used by the Socialist leader VANDERVELDE during his campaign in 1911-12 against the Catholic missions in Congo.

The convenient supply of slave children could not last for ever. The State — however limited its resources — was waging a determined war on the Arab slave-trade, and there were fewer opportunities for slave redemption. But there was another way of securing recruits for a *chrétienté*, for the State declared itself willing to entrust missions with the care of the orphan children over whom it claimed jurisdiction <sup>(1)</sup>. Orphanages — *colonies scolaires* — became the distinguishing mark of the Catholic stations. Protestant missions did not often take advantage of this law. As the British consul PICKERSGILL reported after his voyage up the Congo in 1897, they “ preferred to devote themselves to their own parishioners ” <sup>(2)</sup>. King LEOPOLD’S Commission of Enquiry of 1904-5 noted the mission of the Disciples of Christ at Bolenge as the one exception among the Protestants, but it only cared for a small number of abandoned children <sup>(3)</sup>. It was not until 1906 that the American Baptists applied for the right of tutelage over nearly five hundred orphans whom they proposed to gather together into an agricultural and industrial colony at Madimba <sup>(4)</sup>. This application did not, however, indicate a change of policy on the part of the Protestant

(1) By a decree of 12th July 1890, children liberated from slave caravans, together with abandoned children and orphans, were declared to be under State tutelage. The State set up several colonies for them, notably at Boma and Moanda, where military training and technical instruction were given. The number of children was so large, however, that a decree of 4th March 1892 allowed philanthropic and religious associations to gather some of them into colonies. A proclamation of the Governor-General of 3rd August 1892 laid down the conditions on which this could be done : children were to be supported free of charge to the State, and technical instruction was to be given on the same lines as that in State colonies, although military training could in some cases be replaced by manual work. State training ended when the children reached fourteen years of age, but the orphans remained under State tutelage until they were twenty-five years old. This right of tutelage was given to the religious associations which set up *colonies scolaires*.

(2) Pickersgill Report, London, 1898, p. 11.

(3) MACALPINE, p. 62.

(4) Letter 1388 of 16 VII 06. A. G. R., V. E. 68 (i).

missions, for it was merely the product of special circumstances in the lower Congo <sup>(1)</sup>.

The strict time-table of the *colonie scolaire* left room for few idle moments. On the Jesuit station at Kimuenza in 1893 the mission bell wakened the children at 5.30; after the recitation of the Pater, Ave, and Credo they breakfasted, and passed immediately to two hours of military drill. After a period of manual work until 10, the roll was called and the children spent an hour in school. Then after a bath and a meal, the catechism was taught at 1.30, and was succeeded by the morning's activities in reverse order — school, manual work, and drill. A third meal preceded evening prayers and bed <sup>(2)</sup>. Military exercises were included only when special arrangements had been made with the government; otherwise they were replaced by increased manual work. Variations in timing were slight; at Kisantu in 1906 the children were present at Mass, from 6.15 to 8.30 they worked at a trade, from 8.30 to 9.45 they worked in the fields, and from 10 to 11.45 school was held. At 2 came the catechism and school, at 4.30 field work, and at 5.45 evening prayers <sup>(3)</sup>.

The *colonie scolaire* developed naturally into the *chrétienté*. The population of the latter was numbered in hundreds, and indeed often passed the thousand mark. The Scheut Fathers began their work at Lulua-bourg with three hundred freed slaves; in 1893 there

(1) The whole question was raised at the Protestant General Conference at Leopoldville in the autumn of 1907. HARVEY, of the American Baptists, made it clear that he did not like the State law, nor desire jurisdiction over children who, according to African tradition, were well cared-for by their uncles or other relatives, and could quite easily attend village schools. But since the Jesuits in the lower Congo took orphans from Protestant villages for their *colonies scolaires*, the American Baptists and the Swedish mission applied for permission to establish orphanages so that they could keep these children. G. C. R., 1907, p. 163.

(2) DENIS, pp. 58-9.

(3) *Au Congo et aux Indes: Les Jésuites belges aux missions*, Brussels, 1906, p. 65.

was a population of over five hundred, and four years later of sixteen hundred (1). At Ibembo and Amadi the Premonstratensians were caring for sixteen hundred abandoned children in 1905 (2), while a year later the Jesuit colony at Kisantu was said to vary in size between three hundred and a thousand inhabitants (3). The need to provide an adequate food supply for such numbers meant that Catholics became large landowners; there is a striking contrast in size between the land concessions made by the State to Catholic missions, and those made to Protestants. The former were granted hundreds of hectares at a time, while the latter worked in units (4). The *colonie scolaire* was an enclosed community. The missionaries had realized that special care must be given to girls, and congregations of women had gone out to take charge of them (5). Marriages could thus be arranged within the community, and some of the problems which faced Protestant missions were avoided — there were no difficulties with polygamous converts, and no cases of the marriage of Christian boys with pagan girls (6).

It was an absolute jurisdiction which Catholic missions exercised over the children in their care, and it seldom came to an end when their pupils reached the

(1) DIEU, pp. 91, 98.

(2) GASPARD, p. 65.

(3) *Au Congo et aux Indes*, p. 47.

(4) In August 1897 a concession of four hundred hectares of land suitable for growing coffee was made to the Scheut Fathers, while on the same day a plot of four hectares twenty-five acres was sold to the B. M. S. at Yakusu. *Mouvement Géographique*, 26 IX 97. The example could be many times multiplied.

(5) In 1891 CAMBIER asked for some sisters to look after the girls among the freed slave children at Luluabourg; in 1894 the Jesuits requested similar help. VAN STRAËLEN, pp. 24, 32. By 1908 six congregations of women were represented in Congo.

(6) The C. B. M. noted this as a considerable advantage, and themselves examined the possibility of ransoming girls, and bringing them up on the station. C. B. M. Minutes, 29 XI 94. It was very difficult to obtain free girls to train, for their guardians feared to lose their marriage value.

age of twenty-five. Either because their subjects had no knowledge of their legal right to leave at that age, or because they preferred to stay, there were few departures from the *chrétienté*. The life was a comfortable one. The food supply was more plentiful and regular than in the normal African village, and although hard work might be required, the material advantages gained by living in a *chrétienté* made it appear worthwhile. There was a deliberate attempt to make the Christian community life materially attractive, and Jesuit missionaries, at any rate, thought it to be important for young Catholics to live in greater comfort than their pagan neighbours <sup>(1)</sup>. In any case, most of the children had been removed from their tribal environment at an early age, so if they left the *chrétienté* they had nowhere else to go.

“Protestants do not get the same ascendancy over the people as we do”, declared a Catholic in 1898 <sup>(2)</sup>. They did not try to. The children gathered together on their stations were not so completely cut off from their tribal background, and from the natural jurisdiction of their clan. At the same time, a Christian village would often grow up by the side of the station. The little group of freed slave children which surrounded the missionary in the early days would want to marry and settle down; boys brought up on the station would return as workmen; extreme cases of persecution would drive Christians to seek protection near the mission <sup>(3)</sup>. The village

<sup>(1)</sup> *Au Congo et aux Indes*, p. 35.

<sup>(2)</sup> VAN STRAELEN, p. 56.

<sup>(3)</sup> The B. M. S. colony at Bolobo, founded by GRENFELL, originated with the freed slaves and refugees who had been with the missionaries for some time, and had become Christians. The Governor-General had established them in their holdings there after they had promised to give up slavery, polygamy, fetishism, and the liquor trade. They were taught the duties of citizenship by the mission. G. C. R. 1902, reprinted in *Congo Mission News*, Leopoldville, Oct. 1952, p. 22. The colony at Wathen began with five settlers, of whom three were Christians. BENTLEY intended it to be an African town, not a mission town. An especially

became a pattern which the missionary hoped would be copied by the African villages around. There was no hereditary chief, but the mission would appoint a headman — perhaps the chief carpenter or bricklayer of the station — while quarrels were brought to the missionaries for settlement. Apart from Christian villages, there were the half-pagan towns of free adherents which gathered round a mission station in a search for a stabilized existence. They had to be organized and disciplined. CRAWFORD protested too much the lack of organization and the freedom from rules in his well-planned town at Luanza :

“ You know, of course, that our mode of life here is simply that of a heathen town : Gospel Hall in the middle and no attempt at white-washing the negro... The Lord has saved us from any pinched and hidebound rules here ”. (1)

The description hardly fitted his careful distribution of civic duties, and the detailed regulations which he laid down for housing and sanitation.

Law and order had to be maintained both in the *chrétienté* and in the villages dependent upon the Protestant mission. The missionary made the laws, while he was both judge and policeman. In the *chrétienté*, of course, his authority was absolute ; occasionally Africans were kept there against their will, chained and beaten with the *chicotte* (2) if they tried to escape (3). The brutality of the punishments inflicted in the *chrétientés* caused a considerable stir when reports were brought to Europe (4). Africans were not kept by force

severe persecution of Christians in the neighbourhood later drove a considerable number of them to build near the mission. H. M. BENTLEY, p. 298 ; G. C. R. 1909, p. 80.

(1) TILSLEY, p. 494.

(2) The *chicotte* was a whip made from hippopotamus hide, its thongs twisted and sun-dried. It could inflict severe bodily harm.

(3) MACALPINE, p. 62.

(4) F. CATTIER, *Étude sur la situation de l'État Indépendant du Congo*, Brussels, 1906, pp. 279-80.

on the Protestant station or in its dependent village, but if they elected to remain there, they had to obey the rules of the mission. The missionary regarded himself as justified in meting out corporal punishment when he was acting "magisterially" (1), and there can have been few missions which escaped the exercise of such authority. The C.B.M. was one of the most evangelical societies, with comparatively small stations, yet in 1902 its Council in London — while convinced that with one exception, its missionaries had not seriously abused their power — considered it necessary to forbid the use of the chicotte (2). Work did not come easily to the Africans, and the missionary might sometimes seem a hard taskmaster; he might even be likened to Pharaoh by the boys in his brickyard (3). But on the whole rebellion was not so likely nor so serious on a Protestant station; a missionary might be faced with a strike of boys demanding pay for allowing him the privilege of teaching them (4), but not by a strike of women refusing to perform their allotted work and thus upsetting the whole economy of the mission (5).

It was actually within the *chrétienté*, the Christian colony, or the village where the missionary stood in the position of chief, that his social and economic influence could most plainly be seen. A new form of social solidarity was created in the Christian community life, whether this was expressed in the daily sharing of a common programme of learning, work, and worship, directed by the mission (6), or whether the links which bound station

(1) G. C. R. 1904, p. 12.

(2) C. B. M. Minutes, 4 XII 02.

(3) G. C. R. 1909, p. 31.

(4) *M. H.*, I VIII 91.

(5) *Au Congo et aux Indes*, pp. 47-50.

(6) Examples have already been given of the time-table of a Jesuit *chrétienté*. The programme of a Protestant station usually included manual work in the mornings, and school work in the afternoons. Mrs. SNYDER noted the Luebo time-table in 1893: roll-call and service at 6.30, then all were allotted their work



and village were looser, not including economic dependence on the station, but springing from a common faith <sup>(1)</sup>. Here the family, not the clan, became the social unit <sup>(2)</sup>. Polygamy lost its significance, for the number of his wives was no longer the only mark of a man's wealth, nor the sole source of his support. The missionary saw that the building up of a Christian home life was one of his most important tasks ; thus he realised the importance of training girls as well as boys <sup>(3)</sup>. Missionary influence changed the status of women in society. There was the salutary example of the missionary's own home, and Africans were certainly impressed by the position of his wife, however incomprehensible this might at first appear <sup>(4)</sup>. For Christian Africans a woman was no longer a possession to be purchased <sup>(5)</sup> ; her new

for the morning, while in the afternoon the children attended school. The day ended as it had begun, with prayers. *Miss.*, March 1894.

<sup>(1)</sup> A question put by the Belgian Socialist leader VANDERVELDE to WHITEHEAD, B. M. S. missionary at Bolobo, and the answer : " — Combien y a-t-il d'habitants à la Colonie ? — Trois cents environ. Je ne connais pas le chiffre exact car cela ne nous regarde pas. Ils font eux-mêmes leurs affaires, vivent de leurs propres ressources, n'ont d'autres liens avec nous que l'amitié et la communauté de foi ". E. VANDERVELDE, *Les derniers jours de l'État du Congo*, Mons-Paris, 1909, p. 91.

<sup>(2)</sup> This development was encouraged by the housing arrangements made by the missionaries. At Luanza, for example, rectangular huts replaced the traditional circular ones, and were divided into two or three rooms, so that children could sleep at home, rather than in the old communal dormitories. TILSLEY, p. 360.

<sup>(3)</sup> In 1894 VAN HENXTHOVEN asked the help of the *Sœurs de Notre-Dame de Namur* : ' Il faut de toute urgence créer des colonies scolaires pour jeunes filles afin d'assurer la persévérance des convertis par la fondation de foyers chrétiens '. DENIS, p. 59.

<sup>(4)</sup> " It was a most bewildering thing to these people to see a woman sit at table and eat with her husband as his equal, respected, cared for, and honoured... We used to take our meals under a shady tree... my wife sometimes carved, and sometimes I did, the result being that they became quite confused as to which was lord and master, and as to which had the right to divide the food, and what proportion fell to each... sometimes they remarked ; ' You know how to marry '..." From BENTLEY'S description of an iteration, in BENTLEY, II, pp. 331-2.

<sup>(5)</sup> In tribal society payment for wives was made either in slaves or in goods. Often a Christian was allowed to pay marriage money, although he might not receive it. Missionaries usually tried to break down the custom of paying a bride price ; in 1911 the General Conference wrote to the Colonial Minister : ' Nous

freedom was evident when she dared refuse a marriage forced on her against her will (1), and her ceaseless toil was lightened when men were taught by precept and example that manual labour was not beneath them.

Life became more stable and more comfortable. Africans no longer lived in fear of the slave raider and the sorcerer, while the adoption of settled agriculture meant that a migratory existence was no longer necessary and it became worthwhile to build permanent homes. Grass huts were replaced by more commodious houses of wattle and daub (2), beaten earth (3), even of brick (4), and separated by wide roads, lined with plants and trees (5). Windows, doors, and furniture appeared (6). New tools were introduced — “saws, hammers, planes, hoes, axes, sewing machines, cloth, needles and thread, and a score of things necessary now to their life, but undreamed of before” (7). New trades were taught — brick-making, carpentry, printing, shoe-making. Children learned to read and write and count. More clothes were worn, so instruction was given in tailoring, mending, and laundry work. Cleanliness was rated next to godliness, and soon washing became as much a habit of the new life as any

sommes très désireux de voir fixer dans chaque district un prix maximum à taux raisonnable, en attendant la suppression complète de ce mode de mariage’. This question, like so many others, was settled more easily when converts were cut off from their tribal background. G. C. R. 1904, p. 19; 1911, p. 101.

(1) A girl taught at Yakusu was sold to several different men one after the other, but refused to marry anybody who could not read and write like herself. In each case the money had to be returned. Such an attitude was not uncommon. JOHNSTON, I, p. 244; G. C. R. 1906, p. 77.

(2) TILSLEY, p. 360.

(3) DENIS, p. 105.

(4) G. C. R. 1902, in *C. M. N.*, Oct. 1952, p. 21.

(5) Bananas, paw-paws, and shade-trees at Luanza, and pineapples ‘which grow as readily as weeds’ at Wathen. TILSLEY, p. 360; BENTLEY, II, p. 321.

(6) DIEU, p. 92.

(7) E. N. DYE, *Bolenge. A story of Gospel triumphs on the Congo*, Cincinnati, 1910, p. 84.

other (1). Sanitation was introduced (2), and some form of medical and dental treatment was provided.

A spectacular advance was made in agriculture and horticulture. Catholic missions relied on their own produce to feed their large numbers of dependents. This had already been proved successful in French Congo by AUGOUARD, who had founded a large agricultural establishment at Brazzaville, and was continuing to plant similar stations up the Ubangi (3). His methods were copied in the Congo State. At Kisantu in 1906 about a hundred and eighteen hectares were under cultivation by the pupils; cassava was produced in large quantities, but besides this, rubber was grown and sold (4) Brother GILLET's garden was especially celebrated for its European vegetables and its fruit trees (5). In 1908 Kisantu possessed a herd of nearly five hundred head (6), while in 1896 the station had owned eight hundred fowls, and over five hundred sheep, goats and pigs (7). Agricultural work was not undertaken on Protestant stations on so large a scale, although at Wathen plantations surrounded the station for nearly a square mile, and here cassava, ground-nuts, sweet potatoes, yams, coffee and a variety of other plants were grown (8). Citrus fruits were introduced and flourished at Luebo (9)

(1) "When a girl has come to live with us, her first experience was to make the acquaintance of scissors and soap, the former being necessary to remove the masses of hair matted with palm oil, camwood, and dirt".

"A 5 h. 1/2, lever au son du clairon. Tous se nettoient, dans deux cuves d'eau, la figure et les mains, et leur toilette est finie... Avant de dîner, bain pour toute l'École". From the time-table at Kimuenza in 1893.

Mrs. CLARK, A. B. M. U., G. C. R. 1906, p. 74; DENIS, p. 58.

(2) TILSLEY, p. 361.

(3) DE WITTE, pp. 40-52.

(4) *Au Congo et aux Indes*, pp. 45, 49, 52.

(5) DENIS, pp. 66-7.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 107.

(7) *Mouvement Géographique*, 4 VII 97.

(8) BENTLEY, II, p. 323.

(9) WHARTON, p. 74.

and at Bolenge <sup>(1)</sup>, while B.M.S. stations were especially noted for their introduction of European vegetables, since Suttons of Reading had made a gift of seeds to B.M.S. missionaries in all parts of the world <sup>(2)</sup>, and with careful attention these produced well in the Congo.

European visitors were pleasantly impressed by the results achieved. "Eminently civilised and very refreshing to see" was Joseph CONRAD's comment on a B.M.S. station in 1890 <sup>(3)</sup>. Frederick STARR regarded the houses of the missionaries as the finest European dwellings in the Congo <sup>(4)</sup>. Lord MOUNTMORRES found excellent buildings at Bolobo early in 1905; he noted a chapel, a hospital, school buildings, workshops, a printing-office and a brickyard, all set in the midst of highly cultivated plantations and gardens. "The whole... has a general air of comfort and prosperity, which is very pleasing" <sup>(5)</sup>.

But the very comfort and prosperity were warning signs of isolation:

"Note this curious new word 'Station' we begin to use in Africa... this is the thing that anchors the Missionary... an isolated estate some hundreds of yards or acres square on which the Missionary lives as magnate of the district... it forces the preacher to be as stationary as his station: the native must come to the Missionary, and not the Apostolic contrary." <sup>(6)</sup>

The station life was lived apart from tribal society, and there was a danger that the missionary, absorbed in its regular routine, should be left with no time to bring his influence to bear upon a wider circle. But the mission station had to become a centre of evangelistic

<sup>(1)</sup> DYE, p. 21.

<sup>(2)</sup> *M. H.*, 1 VII 90.

<sup>(3)</sup> G. J. AUBRY, *Joseph Conrad in the Congo*, London, 1926, p. 56.

<sup>(4)</sup> F. STARR, *The Truth about the Congo*, London, 1907, p. 47.

<sup>(5)</sup> W. G. B. DE MONTMORENCY, *The Congo Independent State*, a report on a voyage of enquiry, London, 1906, pp. 108-9.

<sup>(6)</sup> CRAWFORD, p. 418.

activity, rather than the symbol of a civilization and a religion that had no bearing upon African life, and was merely the "white man's palaver". Where this was not achieved, the missionary failed to produce lasting results. The difficulties in overcoming his isolation were especially great in the case of colonies of freed slaves, for where children were drawn from the districts surrounding the station with the consent of their chiefs or parents, they were not so completely out off from their tribal background (1). The B.M.S. had been able to learn from past errors; its colony of West Indians and freed slaves had already proved a failure in the Cameroons (2). When the Disciples of Christ went to Bolenge in 1890, they found Christianity far from flourishing there; for this they blamed the methods of their predecessors of the L.I.M., who had set up a freed slave colony and had organized it into a local church on the Free Church pattern, but had not in this way succeeded in building up stable Christian living, so that the Christians fell back into pagan practices when the missionary's influence was removed (3). In any case, the physical and moral qualities of the freed slave were poor (4). Three hundred of the slaves who had been redeemed at Luluabourg died during the first two years of their settlement there (5).

(1) At Monsembe it became the custom to take boys on the station for twenty-month periods only, so that they could return to their villages and spread the new teaching they had received. *M. H.*, May 1900. Where Catholic missions took children from local towns, they were sometimes able to go home after Mass on Sundays, returning on Monday evening, or alternatively three times a year, at Easter, in September, and in January. This had the effect of spreading the message to a wider area. DIEU, p. 166; *Au Congo et aux Indes*, p. 81.

(2) JOHNSTON, I, p. 37.

(3) DYE, pp. 62-3.

(4) A Scheut Father wrote of the freed slaves at Nouvelle Anvers in 1896: "Depuis trois ans... je me suis épuisé à les instruire et à les moraliser; aussitôt formés, ils ont quitté l'école et échappé au contact immédiat des Pères, la plupart ont failli dans leur conduite". The only answer was found to be to install them in villages under the close supervision of the missionaries. DIEU, pp. 191-2.

(5) DIEU, p. 93.

Yet in the existing conditions of tribal life, the missionary had no choice but to separate individual Africans from their background. The first period was of necessity one of isolation; the missionary could get converts in no other way. His earliest converts were the personal boys who had made their home with him, helped him in his language struggles, and lived in close daily contact with him over a long period of time <sup>(1)</sup>. It would be hard to overestimate the power of the group over the individual in African tribal society. While he still exercised his full membership of the clan, there were obligations incumbent upon the individual which were incompatible with Christian teaching. He was expected to take over the wives of a deceased brother <sup>(2)</sup>; in illness it was his duty to apply to the all-powerful witch-doctor; he showed a lack of respect for the memory of his deceased relatives if he allowed them to go down into the grave unaccompanied by slaves <sup>(3)</sup>.

Segregation was the necessary prelude to conversion. But though essential at the beginning, the stage of isolation had to be passed through as quickly as possible. Beyond the limited area influenced by the missionary was a society untouched by, and indifferent to, his message. A visitor described GRENFELL'S station at Bolobo as "a model of what a missionary colony can be". But he added:

"Each station, be it ever so successful, is but an oasis in an enormous desert; a small green patch amid a howling wilderness." <sup>(4)</sup>

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<sup>(1)</sup> The case of NLEMVO is a typical one. He became attached to BENTLEY as a small boy; the latter found him useful in his work on the Kikongo language and took him to England in 1884. He was baptized in 1888; this was the first baptism at BENTLEY'S station of Wathen.

<sup>(2)</sup> H. SUTTON SMITH, *Yakusu, the very heart of Africa*, London, 1912, p. 276.

<sup>(3)</sup> BENTLEY, II, p. 231.

<sup>(4)</sup> G. BURROWS. *The curse of Central Africa*, London, 1903, p. 31.

It was obvious that the Christian message would fail to make an impact upon pagan African society if presented there by isolated European missionaries alone. Even an evangelical like Crawford had been forced into the orthodox pattern of missionary work. When ARNOT visited Luanza in 1907 he noted :

“ Mr. CRAWFORD decided that from being a wandering, cave and swamp missionary, he had better be a resident missionary... now there are (at Luanza) an inner circle of baptized believers... and a large company of professing Christians... a day school... several village schools... streets of comfortable, two-roomed cottages, all over the plateau ”. (1)

The change which had come over CRAWFORD'S missionary policy was certainly a noteworthy one. He had begun by preaching directly to the Africans, and by sharing their life as far as he could. He had disliked and mistrusted the formation of the “ station Christian ” who “ makes the most astounding Pharisee ” (2). Yet he himself finished by organizing the life of a residential station.

It was partly the pressure of circumstances which caused him to settle down, for, in the chaotic conditions of life in the Katanga after MSIRI'S death, detribalised hosts crowded around him and insisted upon staying. But it was chiefly his visits to Livingstonia which reconciled him to the idea of station life ; he went there first in 1896, and again, for a longer period, in 1903-4. Here, on the western shore of Lake Nyasa, he found the residential mission at its best ; not only did it raise the standard of life of the limited number of Africans who came to dwell within its boundaries, but it was the centre of a whole series of outposts which brought Christianity to the people within the setting of their village

(1) *E. S.*, Feb. 1908.

(2) TILSLEY, p. 492.

life <sup>(1)</sup>. The system impressed CRAWFORD immensely. He began to realize that the missionary who gave up a wandering life among the people in order to found a Christian colony was not renouncing his influence upon pagan society ; rather, he was creating a training centre for African evangelists who would be far more successful than he in penetrating tribal life. It was by means of African evangelists that Christianity would be carried into the villages. The work which LAWS had built up at Livingstonia was a revelation to CRAWFORD, and he returned to Luanza to put into practice what he had learned. From that time the Bible-school — his equivalent of the outpost — had its place in his programme. He began to see that the passing visit of a missionary was not enough ; only settled teaching in African villages could produce permanent results. The four hundred outposts around Livingstonia were outstandingly successful in their evangelism <sup>(2)</sup>.

The experience of the Baptist missionaries was akin to that of CRAWFORD. " We had first to find out where the people were, and then to take the Gospel to them " <sup>(3)</sup>, stated BENTLEY. That was the aim of the B.M.S. as it planted one station after another along the main river <sup>(4)</sup>. But in fact the mission-station had to draw the people to itself, rather than to go out to them. The difficulties of making any impression on tribal society in the early period were manifold. Fire could wipe out a station where the houses were built of wood, bamboo, or grass, and point the need for more solid buildings <sup>(5)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> OLIVER, pp. 62-3, 65.

<sup>(2)</sup> TILSLEY, pp. 473-82.

<sup>(3)</sup> BENTLEY, II, p. 127.

<sup>(4)</sup> For example, when Lukolela was chosen in 1884 as the first site for a B. M. S. station on the upper river, it was because GRENFELL estimated the population there at about five thousand — the densest so far found. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>(5)</sup> At Stanley Pool a fire started because of the carelessness of the local inhabitants in their annual grass burning, and caused the destruction of the B. M. S. Arthington station in 1886. COMBER stated the need for brick, iron, or stone houses. *M. H.*, September 1886.



Yet permanent structures were useless so long as the Africans retained their traditional methods of cultivation and merely scratched the soil and passed on. There were other reasons which might cause the total abandonment of a station. Sleeping sickness could carry off whole populations <sup>(1)</sup>, or the pressure of European taxation could cause a flight over the river into French Congo <sup>(2)</sup>. A station might find itself left without supplies, and be reduced to near-starvation level <sup>(3)</sup>. A mission could be destroyed by a tribe in revolt <sup>(4)</sup>, or at least rendered uninhabitable for a time <sup>(5)</sup>. The station could not "go to the people" and remain for long in action. Yet some means had to be found to bring Christian influence to bear upon tribal society. For CRAWFORD, as has been seen, that means was the Bible-school:

"A Bible-school in the village will be like the change from everybody's having to go to the well for water, to its being turned on in every house." <sup>(6)</sup>

A Bible-school presupposed a teacher, and teachers had to be trained. A training school for African evangelists was the focal point of each mission that realised that Africa would be converted not by Europeans but by Africans. For the first step in the training of evangelists was the removal of children from their tribal background in order that they might be given an intensive course of instruction. The home committees, eager to report

<sup>(1)</sup> DENIS, pp. 74-5; GRENFELL to BAYNES, 2 II 04. B. M. S.

<sup>(2)</sup> This happened at Lukolela in 1895. The white missionaries evacuated the station, although an African evangelist, LUSALA, was left there. B. M. S. Minutes, 19 XI 95.

<sup>(3)</sup> The requisitioning of the B. M. S. steamer, the *Peace*, had this effect on the B. M. S. upper river stations.

<sup>(4)</sup> The Presbyterian mission at Ibanj was destroyed in the Bakuba revolt. *Miss.*, Feb. 1905.

<sup>(5)</sup> CAMBIER fled from Luluabourg during the Batetela revolt in 1895. DIEU, p. 100.

<sup>(6)</sup> TILSLEY, p. 482.

conversions, were not anxious to see too much time spent in school work (1); missionary supporters at home seldom realized its importance (2). Catholic missions found adults incapable of learning, and therefore directed their main efforts towards the children (3), while Protestant missionaries, although horrified at such an idea (4), discovered in practice that their first converts were young men who had come to live with them (5). Those who attended day schools were irregular, lacked perseverance, and soon forgot what they had learned (6). It was the children who were in constant contact with the mission who were able to assimilate the new teaching first, and who were "more ready to admit authority and let proof follow in experience" (7). In any case it was only the young station-trained converts who had enough versatility and knowledge to be sent out as teachers. There were, of course, obvious dangers that because of their training itself, their prospective usefulness would be impaired. They were of little use in removing the "endless negro suspicion that God is an Englishman" (8) when they wore trousers and were

(1) "...it is not necessary to educate before you preach... direct preaching... has a better and more permanent effect than devoting so much time and attention to school teaching, and to looking after boys in school". BAYNES to BENTLEY 31 I 88. B. M. S.

(2) Sir Charles WATHEN, of Bristol, after whom the B. M. S. Wathen station was named, was an exception. It was he who provided the funds to build the Wathen school and the dormitories for the boarders. For his views see *M. H.*, Oct. 1890.

(3) *Au Congo et aux Indes*, p. 23.

(4) "We do not believe in working chiefly for the children". A. SIMS, quoted in the *Baptist Missionary Magazine*, Boston, Jan. 1887.

(5) In 1899 the twenty-six church members at Bolobo had been station trained, while "the preaching in the towns has not as yet borne fruit". BENTLEY, II, p. 239.

In 1904 Grace CRAWFORD noted that of the nine young people professing conversion at Luanza, only one had not passed through the school. *E. S.*, May 1904.

(6) *M. H.*, Oct. 1891, May 1900.

(7) SUTTON SMITH, in *M. H.*, March 1902.

(8) CRAWFORD, p. 215.

considered as black white-men <sup>(1)</sup>. Mission training could easily create a caste feeling which separated them from their fellows <sup>(2)</sup>. As one boy noted on his first visit to a C.B.M. school :

“ I found all ages in the school. Some were much younger than I was, and some were beginning to be adults. Most of these were in the beginning classes and had not made much progress in reading. Others could read very well. This group had a lot of bumptiousness about them. They exalted themselves because of the wisdom they had received in the school. They did not respect their native teachers very much. They thought they were different from other people because they knew ‘ book ’. I wondered if knowing ‘ book ’ would make me act as they did. Their actions were quite the opposite of some of the teachings of our folklore. ” <sup>(3)</sup>

Not all the boys trained on the station, of course, became evangelists. Some would drift back to their villages with a smattering of education and earn their living in traditional fashion or by the new crafts which they had learned while in contact with the mission. These prepared the way for a trained teacher ; from the villages to which they returned would come an appeal for more knowledge. Others would remain on the station and become mission printers ; others again would enter State service as clerks and railway-men, and through them the new teaching was spread abroad. But the ultimate aim of station training was a direct evangelistic outreach

<sup>(1)</sup> NLEMVO, the B. M. S. convert who had visited England, wore trousers when he went out to preach in the villages ; this so frightened the inhabitants, however, that he decided to abandon the practice. *M. H.*, August 1888.

<sup>(2)</sup> “ It is considered *infra dig* for one of our boys to carry even his own blanket on the road and he will always get one of the carriers to carry it for him. He is a ‘ mission boy ’ not a carrier. The senior boys, as they marry, build houses outside the native town, near the station, and form a ‘ mission town ’ — already a curse to the coast missions ”. LEWIS to BAYNES, 30 IX 90. B. M. S.

The formation of a mission town was regarded by several missionaries as a dangerous step to be avoided, since the witness of African converts would be removed from tribal society.

<sup>(3)</sup> H. SMITH, Wanga Yoana of the village of Yuli, written by Wanga, Indianapolis, 1948, p. 48.

into pagan society, and "the best, we hope, will become teachers, pastors, and evangelists" (1).

As soon as they could, Protestant missionaries very carefully selected the boys whom they brought to the station to train. In the beginning this had been impossible — chiefs regarded it as a concession to hand over children at all, unless they were paid to do so (2). However, a promise to teach them and feed the boys usually produced one or two from a village, even if they were given up rather unwillingly (3). But as the advantages of education became apparent, as contacts between Africans and Europeans increased, and as it became obvious that it was the missionary, with his new teaching, who could best fit the younger generation for the new ways that were being forced upon it, chiefs began to vie with each other for the privilege of sending their children to his school. The missionary could select children from a wide area (4), choose the most promising (5), and concentrate his efforts upon them, and upon "strategic children" such as the sons of chiefs (6). There was a certain amount of selection, too, within the *chrétientés* set up by Catholic missions; the more intelligent children were chosen to be the future catechists, and the time which they spent in manual labour was reduced in order that they might receive special training (7).

Children had been gathered together into the mission school so that later, teachers might be sent out to the villages. When this was done, there was a complete change in the itinerating work of the missionary. In the

(1) *M. H.*, Oct. 1890.

(2) H. SMITH, *Fifty years in Congo*, Indianapolis, 1949, p. 19.

(3) J. TRITTON, *Rise and progress of the work on the Congo River*, London, 1884, p. 50.

(4) At Yakusu, in 1902, there were 180 scholars from eight different tribes.

(5) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 3 IX 98. B. M. S.

(6) BEDINGER, p. 54.

(7) *Au Congo et aux Indes*, p. 65.

early days, he had gone out from his station into the villages, leaving the waterways and tramping inland for several days or even a month at a time, accompanied by the score of men whom he needed to carry his tent, his camp bed and stores, besides his "purse", which might include fifty pounds of salt for a week's journey (1). He would gain an idea of the language divisions around his station, and a knowledge of the district — its geography, the peculiar customs of its people, the hostile and the friendly towns — and he would gather together a few children to return to the station with him. At the same time he preached the Gospel message where it had never before been heard. Building on a rather vague and shadowy belief in a remote, but supreme Creator (2), he proclaimed "le culte du vrai Dieu qui a créé le ciel et la terre" (3). He explained as simply as he could that God was good, that He was concerned with the lives of men, that He had sent His only Son to earth to live and die and save men. His message might seem illogical to his hearers (4), it might appear to have little to do with them, while their readiness to take hold of non-essentials rather than the heart of his message was a constant cause of distress to the missionary (5). Yet at least he was sowing the seed during these "tournees de prédication" as the Jesuits called them. But later when there was a teacher-evangelist in the village, the missionary left his station not to sow the seed but

(1) *M. H.*, April 1903.

(2) JOHNSTON, II, pp. 632-6.

(3) DENIS, p. 61.

(4) BENTLEY found it hard to convince the sceptical MANGÉBA of the goodness of God, by trying 'to explain the resurrection and the home in heaven' when the latter objected that God, if good, would not be constantly be killing people by death. BENTLEY, II, pp. 73-4.

(5) Missionaries observed that Africans were often willing to accept the idea that no work should be done on a Sunday, and that it was always so much easier to impose forms and observances than to convince the African of his own sin and need. *M. H.*, March 1890.

to water it and to strengthen the young plants. He went to visit and encourage the evangelist, to inspect his school, to examine candidates for baptism, to baptize those catechumens who had passed through their long period of probation, and to give communion to those who might have been waiting months for it.

It was in the Kasai that the system of native evangelism and missionary visitation won its most striking successes. There were special reasons why Luebo should be an ideal centre. It was set in the midst of the largest single linguistic group in the Congo, for the language of the Baluba-Lulua was understood by two million people (1). The foresight of one of the leading Presbyterians, William MORRISON, caused him to ignore the dialect of the unresponsive Bakete, which had at first been studied by the American missionaries, while he produced Scripture paraphrases, a catechism, and finally a dictionary and grammar in the widely understood Tshiluba-Lulua (2). It was also fortunate that there was a dense population in the neighbourhood. In 1904 there were as many as forty out-stations within a four-mile radius of Luebo, and a few others which were further away (3). Luebo and Ibanj became training centres from which increasing numbers of evangelists were sent out to the villages, and the outward movement spread in everwidening circles. In 1904 the African evangelists could all read and write, the church membership stood at nearly three thousand, and many more villages were pleading for evangelists and teachers (4). In 1906 two missionaries spent their whole time in visiting the out-stations (5). By 1911 there were over seven thousand

(1) BEDINGER, p. 32.

(2) WHARTON, p. 61.

(3) *Miss.*, May 1905.

(4) *Ibid.*, August 1904, Sept. 1904.

(5) BEDINGER, p. 83.

church members (1). The Scheut Fathers also found conditions in the Kasai favourable to rapid expansion, by comparison with the other districts where they worked (2).

A somewhat similar system of evangelism was used by other missions which had to face greater difficulties through language differences and scattered population. On the lower river, in 1902, two of the fifteen out-stations at Wathen were at a distance of between sixty and seventy miles from the central mission (3). Naturally the missionaries could not often visit them. In 1904 the number of outposts had increased to over a hundred (4). On the middle river, the Disciples of Christ had over fifty outposts round Bolenge in 1908 (5). At the Falls there were thirty outstations in 1904 (6). On all sides villages were clamouring for teachers, and on the whole there was as much eagerness to teach as there was to learn. The C.B.M. found that an evangelistic and teaching movement started spontaneously amongst the Africans in 1894 (7), and the American Baptists were delighted by the enthusiasm of their converts (8).

This was an African movement of evangelism and education; the missionary directed it, but its impulse sprang from below. As MANGBAKA of Bopoto described it:

“ One day I said to the boys in my school, ‘ Get up and let us go to the villages round about us, and tell of the death of JESUS and the life of JESUS. ’

“ They agreed to what I had said. I got a canoe, and we and the

(1) WHARTON, p. 81.

(2) DIEU, p. 147.

(3) *M. H.*, May 1902.

(4) B. M. S. Minutes, 17 V 04.

(5) A. F. HENSEY, *A master-builder on the Congo*, Chicago, 1916, p. 56.

(6) SUTTON SMITH, p. 235.

(7) *R. B.*, Jan, 1895.

(8) “ In readiness for self-help and voluntary evangelistic service the converts of the Congo Mission are unsurpassed by those in any mission which has been under the care of the Union, and in this lies a large hope for the rapid and economical and effective spread of the gospel through the interior regions of Africa ”. A. B. M. U. Report, 1898.

chief of the town and some of the boys who are following Jesus went off to another village. The village where we went to teach, no man of JESUS had yet been there. When they saw me with books in my hand they asked, 'Where did those things come from that you are holding?' I told them that the books I was holding came with a new message to them. They called everyone together, and they gathered round me. The people of that village of Bobila were very many.

"One man asked me where the books came from, and I answered that the books came from the white man's country: they looked inside... and asked more questions. Then I chose the chapter about the death of the Messiah; I read it to them, and explained that CHRIST would come again and choose all the good people.

"They were very much astonished, and said: 'We have never seen such a thing before.' Then I took the ABC book and taught them, and when they saw that they rejoiced very much. All the days I stayed with them were school days... Then I went to another village, and told them about JESUS, who was truly our Lord, and that he said, 'Go and tell about my death in all places, as I told you at first; go and spread it abroad.'" (1)

Literacy and conversion went hand in hand as African evangelists carried Christianity into the villages. Christianity had come to the Africans with revolutionary force; it had liberated the individual from the pressure of a fear-filled society, and had brought a freedom and a joy that had to be shared. Education was preparing him to fit in to the new pattern of society which the white man was creating in the Congo. The Christian was conscious of his new powers, of his new status. As WANGA YOANE recorded:

"I was very happy on that day of my baptism. It was with great joy that I became a Christian. In the first place, I knew the date of my baptism. I did not know when I was born, because neither my father nor my mother nor any of my family could read or write, therefore they kept no record. I myself could now read and write. I put the date of my new day away in my memory, and I wrote it down. I thought about it every day, and I called that day 'The time of being born again'". (2)

(1) *M. H.*, Dec. 1906.

(2) SMITH, Wanga Yoane, p. 78.



The teacher-evangelist in the village might seem to the European pitifully ill-equipped for his task. But to his own people he was a leader — and the only leader who could carry them through the inevitable period of transition from tribal society regulated by custom and taboos to the new form of society which Europeans were imposing upon them, a society which introduced them to the mysteries of taxation and hygiene, railways and mines. It was the missionaries, and perhaps to a greater extent the teacher-evangelists whom they met in the villages, who were to provide a link between the new pattern of life and the old. The personal knowledge of the evangelist was slight ; he could read and write and manage simple arithmetic — sometimes not even that. His material equipment was meagre ; there was the tumble-down grass hut which served as schoolroom and chapel, some Scripture paraphrases and reading books, and a few slates <sup>(1)</sup>. His training period had been short in view of all he was expected to accomplish. But he was able to base his teaching on local customs and proverbs as the white man could never do <sup>(2)</sup>. He possessed an inborn gift for story-telling, and could hold his listeners enthralled as he moved step by step to his climax. He could use emotional expression in a way which won their immediate response. He was himself an example to the children who sat at his feet of the heights to which they could rise. And where he was established, material conditions of life improved <sup>(3)</sup> and church membership increased by leaps and bounds.

The outreach of Protestant missions into tribal society made use of the individual evangelist, sometimes accom-

<sup>(1)</sup> P. LERRIGO, *Rock breakers. Kingdom building in Kongo land*, Philadelphia, 1922, p. 133.

<sup>(2)</sup> Examples can be found in DYE, pp. 120-1.

<sup>(3)</sup> “ Bible schools mean a new type of long-street hamlet, with neat little square houses... and in general, better sanitation ”. CRAWFORD, in *E. S.*, May 1906.

panied by his wife. But Catholic missions often used the group. It was VAN HENCXTHOVEN's eagerness to bring an effective influence to bear upon tribal society, that inspired him to evolve a system which afterwards became the pattern for all Catholic missions in Congo. VAN HENCXTHOVEN had several times volunteered for missionary work in India, but it was not until the Belgian Jesuits were given the task of evangelizing the Kwango in 1892, that he was chosen to lead the first group of missionaries (1). Energetic and capable, he was very soon able to organize agricultural and educational work among the abandoned children at Kimuenza who had been handed over to the Jesuits by the State. However, he was quick to realize that the strong orientation of the colony towards the military requirements of the State authorities meant that it would never become an evangelistic centre for the neighbourhood. So in 1893, he took with him a nucleus of scholars from Kimuenza and moved to a point on the future railway line from the coast to the Pool, intending to found such a centre at Kisantu. An important feature of the new colony was the effort which he made to include local children in it. VAN HENCXTHOVEN was not in the least satisfied with a well-organized and prosperous station, while vast areas of untouched ground stretched out on all sides. On the one hand he realized the need for the individual to be cut off from the temptations and the pressure of tribal society and to receive the strength which came from living in a Christian group, yet on the other hand he was conscious of the danger of confining the influence of the mission within the borders of the *chrétienté*. His answer was the creation of the *ferme-chapelle* system (2).

A group was detached from the central mission, and sent out to settle near an African village. It was left by

(1) E. LAVEILLE, *L'Évangile au centre de l'Afrique*, Louvain, 1926, p. 83.

(2) DENIS, pp. 62-4.

the missionary under the charge of one or more catechists, and like the mother-colony it engaged in agricultural and pastoral work and educated abandoned children, who might number as many as forty. The catechism was taught in the neighbouring villages, and surplus produce was sold there ; the aim was continual contact without the dangers of complete absorption in normal tribal life. Often the young men remained in the *ferme-chapelle* after their marriage, and so a Christian village grew up by the side of the older village. The missionary made a visit of inspection whenever he could (1).

The system initiated by VAN HENCXTHOVEN spread with great rapidity. In 1902 the Jesuits in the Kwango possessed two hundred and fifty *ferme-chapelles*, with over five thousand children (2). The method was taken up by the Sacred Heart priests at the Falls in 1901 (3), and by the Scheut Fathers in 1904 (4). There was far less danger of the complete isolation of the *ferme-chapelle* from African tribal life than there was in the case of the *chrétienté*. The *ferme-chapelle* system implied a recognition, as did the Protestant system of planting teacher-evangelists in the villages, that Christianity in Congo had to be spread by Africans. Both the outpost and the *ferme-chapelle* gave a positive direction to the younger Africans who were searching for a way of adapting themselves to the new form of life being introduced into the Congo by Europeans, and who realized that for this the traditional tribal teaching was completely inadequate. As the Bakuba chief DOMBI said, when he asked for education for his children and advised his eldest son to

(1) *Ibid.* ; *Au Congo et aux Indes*, pp. 99-106.

(2) DENIS, p. 65.

(3) R. P. JEANROY, *Notice sur la Mission des Falls fondée et dirigée par les Prêtres du Sacré-Cœur de Jésus*, Brussels, 1904, p. 11.

(4) DIEU, p. 136.

marry only one wife, it was of no use to think of resisting the new way of life, for "wherever the rivers flowed, the white man's steamers came" (1).

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It was largely through the by-products of evangelism — the educational, medical and industrial work of the missions — that missionaries did so much to help Africans to adapt themselves to the changing conditions of life attendant upon European penetration of the Congo. As early as 1887 COMBER, reporting on the B.M.S. station at Ngombe, had pointed to a three-fold division in the work. The missionaries preached, taught, and trained boys in school, they dispensed medicines, and they undertook the industrial labour necessary for the foundation of a mission (2). At that time there were about twenty boarders in the Ngombe school and half a dozen patients in a small temporary hospital, while the industrial work was confined to what was necessary to erect the few simple buildings which made up the station. It was the day of small things; rudimentary educational, medical and industrial work was the handmaid of evangelism. COMBER'S own division makes it clear that he regarded evangelistic and educational work as one and the same thing. Medical attention was the only possible answer to the witch-doctor (3), and to the Africans' query about what they were to do when they were ill if they had burned their fetishes (4). The construction of the mission station itself required a certain amount of industrial training.

(1) *Miss.*, June, 1899.

(2) *M. H.*, May 1887.

(3) "We trust that, in time, our treatments meeting with success, may be able to overthrow the practices of the witch-doctor". Mrs. KIRBY, Bopoto, in *M. H.*, March 1904.

(4) GUINNESS, p. 190.

The witch-doctor was the most influential individual in African tribal society. The power of the chief had a visible basis in the number of the men he could call upon to fight for him ; that of the witch-doctor was more elusive and therefore more terrifying ; his influence lay in the invisible world of the spirits which surrounded men and played their part for good or for ill in their lives from the moment of birth to that of death. In tribal life the witch-doctor fulfilled a double function, for he was both priest and physician. It was natural that an attack on his priestly powers should be preceded by the undermining of his medical reputation. For this purpose the missionary could work wonders. He could interpret the unintelligible gestures of a new slave, and calm her with a stomach powder <sup>(1)</sup>. He could hand out remedies from his medicine chest which proved far more efficacious than all the rites of the witch-doctor. He could point to the trypanosome which caused the dreaded sleeping-sickness through his microscope, and impress a village with his superior knowledge, until he was besieged on all sides by Africans who wanted to have their blood examined <sup>(2)</sup>. He could connect lock-jaw with a rusty knife <sup>(3)</sup>. It was not surprising that he won a reputation for being a new kind of witch-doctor himself <sup>(4)</sup>. His varied functions were proof enough that he could conveniently usurp the place which his rival had held in African society <sup>(5)</sup>.

At first Africans could not grasp the scientific principles which lay behind the white man's use of medicine,

<sup>(1)</sup> WEEKS, p. 18.

<sup>(2)</sup> DYE, p. 69.

<sup>(3)</sup> A. F. HENSEY, *My children of the forest*, New York, 1924, p. 61.

<sup>(4)</sup> " Vous ai-je dit comment on m'appelle ici ? C'est NGANGA-BOUKA, ce qui veut dire le médecin-sorcier. Me voilà baptisé... ". DIEU, p. 72.

<sup>(5)</sup> It was said of SHEPPARD at Ibanj that ' he is minister, physician, dentist, lawyer, and usually has one of these cases every day, sometimes all four at once '. *Miss.*, Nov. 1903.

but they could see the effectiveness of the methods he employed. Thus they became willing to accept the missionary's condition that they should remove their fetishes before he could treat them <sup>(1)</sup>. The missionary was regarded as a witch-doctor, but his influence in the spirit world was accounted greater than his rival's. Like the apostles, he discovered with joy that even the devils were subject to him. He could exorcize a demon supposedly implanted in a sick man through the witch-doctor's curse, by simultaneously administering blistering and santonine, and accurately predicting their effects <sup>(2)</sup>. But in time he could do far more. Gradually the people among whom he had settled began to realize that the diseases which they had formerly attributed to evil spirits, were in fact due to natural causes. The witch-doctor became afraid to state that every death that occurred was the result of witchcraft <sup>(3)</sup>. The mother began to understand that it was her own responsibility, not that of the spirit world, if her six months' old baby had stomach ache after eating peanuts and maize ; she began to realize that infection could be passed on, and that dirty water bred disease <sup>(4)</sup>. Medicine brought a new freedom from the fear of the unknown, and led the individual to accept a personal responsibility for his own welfare.

For the most part it was the unqualified missionary who won the battle against the witch-doctor ; there were very few doctors or even trained nurses to be found among Congo missionaries during the first thirty years. Sidney COMBER went out for the B.M.S. in 1882, and Sidney WEBB in 1892, but both died after very short periods of work, and no other doctor was sent out by

<sup>(1)</sup> *M. H.*, Dec. 1886.

<sup>(2)</sup> DYE, p. 64.

<sup>(3)</sup> JOHNSTON, I, p. 245.

<sup>(4)</sup> G. C. R., 1911, p. 99.

the society until 1907. In that year there was only one qualified medical missionary on the whole of the upper river (1). Luebo was sixteen years without a doctor, until L. J. COPPEDGE went out in 1906 (2). Doctors were forced to use the same scanty equipment which sufficed the lay missionary. At Luebo Dr COPPEDGE carried out operations in a thatched roofed dispensary ; sometimes he was forced to stop in the middle to carry out artificial respiration, or even to dress the wound. Then he would allow the patient to rally, and continue the operation on the following day (3). Dr JAGGARD, the pioneer surgeon of the Disciples' Mission, undertook major operations on the dining-room table and sterilized his instruments at the kitchen stove (4). It was not until 1912 that the first permanent hospital was built ; it was the B.M.S. hospital at Bolobo (5).

Medically unqualified missionaries often asked for travelling doctors in the Congo (6) but it was they themselves who continued to bear the brunt of the medical work. Catholic missionaries began to take courses in tropical medicine, the Scheut Fathers at Leopoldville (7), and the Jesuits before they left Belgium (8). Mission resources were inadequate, however, to do more than touch the fringe of a problem like that of sleeping-sickness, which in the early years of the twentieth century was causing widespread depopulation. Little could be done once the disease had taken a hold, and missionaries began to try prevention rather than cure. But it took time to educate Africans in the principles of hygiene and

(1) This was Dr. DYE of the Disciples of Christ, at Bolenge.

(2) BEDINGER, p. 73.

(3) WHARTON, p. 76.

(4) G. W. CARPENTER, *Highways for God in Congo*, Leopoldville, 1952, p. 46.

(5) A. STONELAKE, *Congo past and present*, London, 1937, p. 117.

(6) William FORFEIT, in *M. H.*, Feb. 1904.

(7) DIEU, p. 117.

(8) DENIS, p. 78.

the practice of isolating the sick, and they felt it necessary to call in the aid of the State. CAMBIER returned to Belgium in 1910, and persuaded the colonial authorities to take an interest in the people he had isolated on an island in the Lulua, where they were cared for without risk of infection to others. When he went back to the Congo in the autumn he was accompanied by a State doctor, who settled at Luluabourg <sup>(1)</sup>. In 1911 Protestant missions considered whether they should unite to build a hospital intended to combat sleeping-sickness, but the task was too great for their resources. They felt that this was not a burden which could be shouldered by the missionary societies alone <sup>(2)</sup>. But a period was beginning in which the missions were to show increasing concern for the physical well-being of the Africans as an end in itself, not directly linked with the success or failure of evangelism. Medical care was becoming more than just an effective aid to the preaching of the gospel.

In the same way the early educational work of the missions was very closely connected with evangelism. Instruction was given to the little group of freed slave children who made their home with the missionary, the nucleus of the mission school, in order to fit them to become the evangelists of the future. In the early days, before they could go out with the Scriptures in their hands, the evangelists gave their message from memory <sup>(3)</sup>. But on the whole the Protestant missionaries in the Congo tended to be literalists; they insisted upon the Word as the written word, and were doubtful whether the content of the Book could be separated from its form. So the teacher-evangelists were taught to read as soon as possible; they took the Scriptures with them when they visited the villages, and taught others to

<sup>(1)</sup> DIEU, p. 117.

<sup>(2)</sup> G. C. R. 1911, p. 39.

<sup>(3)</sup> SMITH, p. 24.



read them as they had themselves been taught. For the African evangelist the Book was the final authority. When an evangelist of the Disciples' mission was preaching one day at Longa, he read a certain prophecy from the Apocalypse. His hearers were spellbound, and he read it for a second time to an audience breathless with interest. Then he commented, "Brethren, this is what the Book of God says. I wasn't there!" (1). There were obvious dangers in inculcating an implicit belief in the words of Scripture when these were not understood. But the missionaries were convinced that the Word was their most powerful weapon both in evangelism and in the battle against all those deep-rooted customs and superstitions which tended to drag the convert back into pagan practices, and that the Word was the most effective means of building up Christian character. They realized that illiterate Christians would never be capable of producing and supporting their own pastors, teachers, and leaders. Hence the movement for literacy and for translation. LANE, one of the Brethren in the Katanga, began to teach English so that the people would have access to the Scriptures before they were translated into their own tongue (2). This was unusual; it was far more common for the missionary to apply himself immediately to translation. The infinite patience with which he set himself to reduce to writing a dialect which might be used by only a few thousand Africans showed that he never intended a European language to be the vehicle of evangelization, as it was of government. But in view of the later enthusiasm of the Africans for learning a European tongue, this policy might well have been one which would "save labour" (3), as LANE had predicted.

The linguistic achievements of the missionary were

(1) HENSEY, *My children of the forest*, p. 88.

(2) Swan's diary, 24 XI 90, in *E. S.*, Nov. 1891.

(3) *Ibid.*

impressive. He began by collecting lists of words from the group of curious small boys who gathered round him, or perhaps engaged one of them as his assistant for a salary of sevenpence halfpenny a month (1). Gradually he worked out the syntax, and after much labour prepared a dictionary and grammar for publication in Europe. Concurrently the Scriptures were being translated. The B.M.S. met with a wide variety of languages, since its line of stations stretched from the Kikongo of the lower river to the Kiswahili of the Falls, and BENTLEY, WHITEHEAD, STAPLETON and the rest did valuable pioneer linguistic work. Some of the missions had only one language to master, since they covered a more limited area; the WESTCOTT brothers puzzled out the grammatical rules of the Bene Inkongo (2), and MORRISON'S Tshiluba-Lulua grammar sufficed for the whole district worked by the American Presbyterians (3). SNYDER had produced a primer in Buteke (4), but Tshiluba-Lulua was spoken over a far wider district, and the mission owed a great deal to MORRISON'S foresight. Inter-tribal contacts were becoming more common, and Dan CRAWFORD rightly urged the use of a *lingua franca* where one existed (5), although he himself had mastered a dozen African languages (6).

“If we live little local lives in the matter of a pet dialect, time will

(1) H. M. BENTLEY, W. Holman Bentley, *The life and labours of a Congo pioneer*, London, 1907, p. 198.

(2) HOLE, p. 9.

(3) WHARTON, p. 54.

(4) BEDINGER, p. 51.

(5) On the upper river Bangala was becoming the official government language at the turn of the century, and the B. M. S. had to decide whether to use it or not. Some missionaries objected on the grounds that it was merely a jargon made up from all kinds of sources, and incapable of becoming the vehicle of religious ideas, although sufficient for the purposes of the trader. In fact its use became so common that the mission could not ignore it. Other missions became concerned in the question, and in 1911 it was decided to take joint action in the preparation of a Bangala grammar. G. C. R. 1911, pp. 72-80.

(6) TILSLEY, p. 456.

punish us, and that speedily, for all the minor lingos must go under." (1)

But if the Scriptures were to be given to the Africans in their own tongues, they must be taught to read them. The missionary was conscious of the allied importance of translation and education :

"Whites cannot go everywhere to preach the Word — but can scatter it far and wide... by a policy of translations and schools... We need men with distinct linguistic ability, and men who, like Bishop TUCKER (the Anglican Bishop of Uganda) are 'mad on schools'." (2)

Even a man like CRAWFORD, who had begun by stressing the importance of direct preaching, and who always denounced the "tendency to believe that an adept reader will be an adept Christian", came to the conclusion that "the great initial lack in Africa is a reading population. Schools are a serious need..." (3). Gradually a system of education was built up, starting from the little mission schools for the training of evangelists. In these (4), as in the *colonies scolaires* and the *fermes écoles chapelles* (5), children were taught reading, writing and simple arithmetic. This knowledge was spread to the villages by the evangelist, who was also the teacher. He was everywhere welcome, for by the end of the century there was a widespread desire to learn to read. A new epoch had begun, the "literature era", and even old men were making the attempt to learn their letters (6). A village would prepare a school of sun-dried bricks in its eagerness to receive a teacher (7); once the

(1) *E. S.*, Sep. 1899.

(2) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 4 V 02. B. M. S.

(3) Dan CRAWFORD, 4 I 03, in *E. S.*, May 1903.

(4) *E. S.*, March 1889.

(5) DENIS, p. 109.

(6) Dan CRAWFORD, 27 XII 99, in *E. S.*, June 1900.

(7) *E. S.*, July 1903.

movement towards literacy had begun, the idea spread that not to know how to read was to be left behind <sup>(1)</sup>; the superiority of the white man and the Arab was attributed to the fact that they could read, and education was at a premium <sup>(2)</sup>.

With the spread of a system of village schools in the charge of African evangelists, missionaries in charge of the station schools could concentrate on more advanced education, accepting only those children who had learned as much as the village evangelist could teach them <sup>(3)</sup>. Station schools which provided an education for those destined to become pastors and teachers became inadequate in their turn, and the next step forward was the creation of special schools designed to cover wide areas. An example is the Kongo Evangelical Training Institution, which was opened at Kimpese in 1908; this was an experimental college run jointly by the English and American Baptists <sup>(4)</sup>. It was the first attempt at constructing a system of higher education, and the missionaries hoped that it would train leaders who would be capable of taking their people forward to a position of less complete dependence upon the European missionary <sup>(5)</sup>.

Industrial training was a very important branch of the educational work of the missions. This was partly due to the immediate needs and capabilities of the people:

‘ Je n’ai pas ici l’occasion d’expliquer Démosthène, Cicéron, ou

(1) STAPLETON to BAYNES, 1 I 04. B. M. S.

(2) JOHNSTON, I, p. 328.

(3) Thus at Wathen in 1899 there were 476 children at the out-schools and 120 scholars at the station school; most of these had begun their education at the outstations. By 1901 the numbers of boarders had increased to 263. The amount of intellectual training provided for scholars who came able to read and write, was an hour and a half of school teaching in the morning, two hours in the afternoon, and an hour’s preparation to be done in their free time. Many of these would go back to the villages as teacher-evangelists. *M. H.*, May 1900.

(4) CARPENTER, p. 56.

(5) G. C. R. 1909, p. 89.

Bossuet ; j'ai dû enseigner à mes gamins à faire des sauces, à préparer les mets élémentaires, à faire la lessive, à peindre, à construire... ' (1)

But essentially industrial training grew out of the organization of the mission station itself ; like medical and educational work it had its origin in the immediate and pressing task of evangelism. The missionary found himself occupied with tasks very different from those which he had expected when he landed in the Congo (2). There were two ways in which he could free himself, in part at least, from some of the secular work involved in running a mission station. The missions could appoint "lay helpers", who were either secured casually on the field for a short-term period (3), or who, as technical missionaries, were appointed in the same way as those candidates who had received theological training (4). The Swedish mission sent out a trained artisan for each station ; he was not necessarily regarded by the society as a missionary, although he might help in evangelistic work (5). The other way to free the theologically trained missionary for his main task of evangelism was to teach the boys on the station to undertake the work of erecting

(1) Fr. LIAGRE, S. J., quoted *B. C. B.*, I, col. 599.

(2) ' Qu'ai-je fait depuis... notre arrivée ici ? J'ai été bûcheron, charpentier, menuisier, maçon, forgeron, chasseur, terrassier, encadreur, etc... mais missionnaire missionnant, point '. CAMBIER, 23 I 89, DIEU, pp. 69-70.

" Unfortunately, in Africa the missionary must be everything and do everything at once — lexicographer, publisher, printer, book-keeper, storekeeper, trader, physician, mechanic, farmer, gardener, theologian, teacher, singer and, if he is so unfortunate as not to have a wife, he must be cook and housekeeper. And all this more or less to the neglect of his high office, which he came to fill — that of preacher ". MORRISON, in VINSON, p. 57.

(3) We have made an appointment for Mr. Roger CASEMENT to help us for three or four months... he will do the planting, transport, building, correspondence ". BENTLEY to BAYNES, 29 XI 88. B. M. S.

(4) J. LAWSON FORFEIT was accepted by the B. M. S. as a " business manager in charge of books, stores, accounts and transit ". *M. H.*, June 1889.

The C. B. M. advertised their need for a carpenter-joiner and engineer. *R. B.*, Dec. 1900.

(5) G. C. R. 1902, in *C. M. N.*, Oct. 1952, p. 21.

the mission buildings and keeping them under repair <sup>(1)</sup>, running the mission steamer and the mission press <sup>(2)</sup>, and cultivating the mission land. It was very often practical expediency, quite as much as a desire to inculcate a love of labour, which led the missionary to develop industrial training.

The creation of an industrial department on a mission station was supported by theory also. Work was a means of strengthening Christian character <sup>(3)</sup>, and of reducing the alarming number of church members under discipline <sup>(4)</sup>. SUTTON SMITH believed that the Lokele youth would be no better for an ability to read and write, unless they were also given manual training to develop character <sup>(5)</sup>, while CRAWFORD approved of the "robust type of pick-and-shovel Christian" who was the product of an industrial department <sup>(6)</sup>. There were other considerations also. Large numbers of children on a station

<sup>(1)</sup> Brick-making was one of the earliest trades taught, and coast labour was gradually replaced by skilled workmen trained on the station. When the needs of the mission itself were satisfied, bricks which the schoolboys had made were sold to outsiders. BENTLEY, II, p. 237; GRENFELL to BAYNES, 3 X 94. B. M. S.

<sup>(2)</sup> The B. M. S. was presented with a press by Josiah WADE of Halifax; this was set up at Lukolela in 1891. Progress was rapid, for four years later two of the native boys were able to display their skill at the Antwerp Exhibition to such effect that Belgian socialists became alarmed at the prospect of a threat to the livelihood of Europeans. BENTLEY, II, p. 249; JOHNSTON, II, p. 248.

<sup>(3)</sup> "It is as important for the missionary's chief purpose as it is for the country that habits of industry should be formed... Those who have experience of mission work in Africa recognise how difficult it is for church members to maintain consistent lives, unless the old idleness is exchanged for habits of industry..." GRENFELL to Dr. DENNIS, 28 V 95, in G. HAWKER, *The Life of George Grenfell, Congo missionary and explorer*, London, 1909, p. 395.

<sup>(4)</sup> "After the Gospel there is certainly nothing more important than that these people should be taught the dignity of labour and the advantages of industry. We are all of us growingly impressed with the necessity that our church members should become active members of their respective communities if they are to keep out of trouble — it is mainly those who have no regular occupation that are the source of our solicitude. To train the minds of our young people without teaching them to work with their hands will only lead to disaster". GRENFELL to BAYNES, 30 I 06. B. M. S.

<sup>(5)</sup> SUTTON SMITH, p. 273.

<sup>(6)</sup> CRAWFORD, p. 205.

could not be supported exclusively from mission funds. But when taught to make articles which Africans or Europeans would buy, they could help to pay for their keep <sup>(1)</sup>. The boarding-school system was in fairly general use ; the children would work for half the day and attend school in the afternoons <sup>(2)</sup>. If African Christians were to support their own African evangelists, and thus to prepare for the day when Christianity in the Congo should be self-propagating, they had to be trained to supply the increasing European demand for labour in order to earn the money to do so <sup>(3)</sup>. Industrial training was necessary to supply a means of livelihood to men who, before the coming of the missionary, had found this in their wives and their slaves <sup>(4)</sup>, and to freed slave boys who had been brought up on a mission station and had no family to which to return <sup>(5)</sup>. The prestige of a teacher-evangelist in a village was greater if he had received industrial training ; not only would he be able to support himself, at least in part <sup>(6)</sup>, but he would attract the interest of the Africans by his higher standard of living, and would be able to teach the villagers themselves to attain to it <sup>(7)</sup>. Industrial training on the one hand provided labour for the European <sup>(8)</sup>, on the other it raised the general conditions of tribal life <sup>(9)</sup>. Missions

<sup>(1)</sup> *Miss.*, August 1907.

<sup>(2)</sup> LERRIGO, p. 42 ; Dye, p. 72.

<sup>(3)</sup> G. C. R. 1902, in *C. M. N.*, Oct. 1952, p. 20.

<sup>(4)</sup> DYE, p. 78.

<sup>(5)</sup> G. C. R. 1902, in *C. M. N.*, Oct. 1952, p. 21.

<sup>(6)</sup> G. C. R. 1906, p. 61.

<sup>(7)</sup> G. C. R. 1909, p. 68.

<sup>(8)</sup> Mrs BENTLEY returned to Wathen in 1888 equipped with a telegraphic apparatus, with the idea that boys trained in telegraphy would find employment when the lower Congo railway appeared. This led to a complete misunderstanding of the aims of a mission station : "L'établissement de Wathen a pour objet de former des employés pour les établissements européens". Although Wathen hoped to produce telegraphists, it was expected that its best pupils would become evangelists. H. M. BENTLEY, p. 347 ; BENTLEY, II, p. 394 ; *Congo Illustré*, 19 XI 93 ; *M. H.*, Oct. 1890.

<sup>(9)</sup> "Our near neighbours have built... much larger houses than their fathers..."

came to regard the latter as the more valuable of the two :

“ Tentative industrial work in Africa has been along the wrong lines... it was an error to train exotic carpenters and joiners who deserted their own tribe and went far afield. The need is to confront the tribe as a whole and house it on sane, simple lines... in two or three roomed cottages. ” (1)

There was no doubt that by European standards the African was lazy (2) ; this was scarcely surprising when the climate was kind, food was abundant, and the needs of the people were few. The European trader felt that the missionary should be his ally in encouraging the Africans to work (3), and the administration, too, judged the achievement of the missionary on the basis of his success in forming skilled workmen (4). On this count the results of the Catholic missions were more impressive than those of the Protestants. A facile generalization was that the Catholics taught trades, while the Protestants preached sermons (5). This was not altogether borne out by the facts, however. Certainly agriculture, and to a lesser extent industry, played a more essential part in the large-scale community life which the Catho-

the boys whom we have taught carpentry propose, when they have built their own houses and the station is finished, to set up a shed and supply the growing demand of the natives for boxes, tables, chairs, etc. ” STONELAKE, Monsembe, in *M. H.*, Sep. 1901.

(1) *E. S.*, March 1909.

(2) “ Last Sunday... I gave them all ten commandments. About ‘ Thou shalt not kill ’ they maintained an unbroken silence, but about the fourth they were enthusiastic, and twice during the week they have sent to me to come and call the people together to make a law that they shall have a rest day like the white man — an extra rest day, in fact, for every fourth day is market day ”. GRENFELL to BAYNES, 25 III 90. B. M. S.

(3) “ We want the missionaries on the coast to show the people how to make money and to be useful ”. JONES to MOREL, 14 VIII 02. Morel Papers.

(4) “ I regard it as especially important now, that we should bring to prominence the technical side of our work... Much of our acceptance with the Congo authorities in past years I attribute to the value they set on our industrial methods ”. GRENFELL to BAYNES 10 II 05. B. M. S.

(5) *Journal de Bruxelles*, 29 IV 97.



lics built up than it did in the work of the smaller Protestant mission-stations. The Catholic missions recruited lay-brothers who could be placed in charge of the secular work of the *chrétientés*, and who could provide industrial education for the young Africans who lived there. The Protestants, on the other hand, recruited few European artisans, and had considerable difficulty in finding suitable men. But they, too, were forced to undertake the teaching of crafts "as the need arose" (1). They did give industrial training, although it might not be given for its own sake; when the C.B.M. decided to add an industrial department to the mission, the Council explicitly stated that it "had not in view primarily the education and civilization of the natives", but the smooth running of the mission, and the health of the missionaries, who would be supplied with fresh vegetables (2). GRENFELL explained the difference in attitude between the Catholic and Protestant missionaries:

"We both recognise the very intimate connection between work and Christianity, but while they put work among the causes, we put it as one of the many effects." (3)

Certainly, both for Catholics and Protestants, work was one of the necessary ingredients of Christian community life.

\* \* \*

Within the Christian community, the *chrétienté* or its Protestant equivalent, the young African Christian was protected from the influence of his pagan background. The practice of Christian morality was made easier for him by the fact that he had entered into a new society, which was so constructed as to remove him,

(1) Mrs BENTLEY's unpublished autobiography, p. 438. B. P.

(2) *R. B.*, June 1895.

(3) *M. H.*, June 1887.

so far as possible, from the temptation to slip back into his former habits of life. But as we have seen, through the efforts of the African evangelists sent out by the missionaries, or working on their own initiative, Christianity was also beginning to penetrate pagan society. A little group of converts in a village, however, had none of the cohesion which belonged to these Christians who were members of a *chrétienté* or who were gathered into a mission colony. It was far harder for them to break free from the traditions of tribal life when they were not under the direct supervision of the missionary.

Pagan beliefs had had a cohesive effect in African society ; they had bound the tribe together in a social solidarity which no rebel from within was likely to be able to break. Their tribal limitations, of course, were their weakness, and the cause of the comparative ease with which they faded away once European government had proved itself to be wider than tribal boundaries. Belief came the more readily since European influence was already beginning to break down the tribal unity. While pagan beliefs had given a social solidarity within tribal limits, the *chrétienté* too could provide social solidarity based on Christian principles and practice. But the impact of Christianity upon Africans in tribal society was different from the direct experience of Christian community life. Within the community an African could still act as a member of a group ; he was still subjected to a group morality, however different its basis. But as a Christian isolated with one or two others in the midst of village life, he had to act as an individual ; he was cut off from the supports and safeguards of communal living. It was difficult to practise Christian morality in the conditions of African tribal life ; a man would inherit wives from a deceased relative and be unwilling to give up his claims, he would cling to his old fetishes in an attempt to have the best of both worlds, the old and

the new, or he would be overcome by a liking for palm-wine and be unable to practise self-discipline <sup>(1)</sup>. It was comparatively easy to profess belief, but it was far harder to accept the individual responsibility which followed. Africans who might willingly accept the gift of salvation, found it a very different matter to live a saved life.

This was obvious as soon as large numbers of Africans received baptism. An early example is that of Banza Manteke, where a mass movement occurred in 1884 after years of patient preaching by Henry RICHARDS, one of the pioneers of the L.I.M. For six years he had, as he put it, preached the Law, in order to give the Africans a sense of sin. But it seemed to him that his work was a failure ; he decided to preach the Gospel — and what is more, to live it, even to the point of obeying literally the command to “ give to every man that asks of you ” <sup>(2)</sup>. It was not long before the Africans had claimed all his possessions. But the turning-point had come ; not only were his goods freely given back to him, but hundreds of Africans asked for baptism <sup>(3)</sup>. Banza Manteke ranked as “ the first Christian parish in the Congo, with over six hundred Christians <sup>(4)</sup>. The change in the town was remarkable. Visitors met bands of African evangelists setting out on their own initiative, unknown to the missionary ; they found that the people had burned their idols, and that they were “ earnest to all the outward observances of Christianity ” <sup>(5)</sup>. But RICHARDS left for England, and in his absence many of the Christians found themselves unable to conform to the standards of Christian morality which they had been

<sup>(1)</sup> It seemed to be generally agreed by converts as well as by missionaries that Africans could not drink moderately ; they therefore had to abstain altogether. G. C. R. 1906, p. 20.

<sup>(2)</sup> Luke VI, 30.

<sup>(3)</sup> H. RICHARDS, *The Pentecost on the Congo*, Boston, 1906.

<sup>(4)</sup> GUINNESS, p. 420.

<sup>(5)</sup> GRENFELL, in *M. H.*, June 1887.

given. On RICHARDS' return the local church was disbanded, and reformed with a membership of three hundred (1). There were other cases of disbanding a church altogether (2), and it was a normal situation for large numbers of church members to be under discipline at a time. It was not easy for a missionary to build up a pattern of stable Christian living in the Congo.

The local church which could in extreme necessity be disbanded and reformed, was the "gathered community" of the Free Church tradition. All the Protestant missionaries in the Congo were Free Churchmen; the Presbyterians in the Kasai came from America, not from Scotland, and the westward expansion of the Anglican Church over the border from Uganda was to provide an exception only in a later period. For Free Church missionaries, a church was the local community of Christians standing over against the world, the two or three gathered in the name of Christ who could claim His presence amongst them (3); it belonged in their view to the invisible Church of all baptized believers, but was itself an independent, self-governing Christian community. When in a certain place a small number of Africans had professed faith, and received baptism, the missionary formed them into a church which, under his direction, chose its own officers, exercised its own discipline, and accepted responsibility for its own finances. The missionary realized that these young churches might have to remain in leading strings for a long period, but he consciously worked towards the day when African Christians would form a self-propagating, self-supporting and self-governing community.

Catholic missionaries, on the other hand, had no intention of preparing African Christians to hold the

(1) G. C. R., 1902, in *C. M. N.*, Oct. 1952.

(2) SUTTON SMITH, p. 265.

(3) Matt., XVIII, 20.

faith in independence ; there would finally be African provinces of the Church but no autonomous African Church. By their baptism African converts like all other Roman Catholics were entering into the fellowship of the universal Church, and they would accept its teaching authority and jurisdiction. When Catholic missionaries had succeeded in building up a local Christian community, they believed that they had planted the Church rather than they had formed a church ; they were extending the boundaries of the visible Church rather than creating a local church as a visible manifestation of the invisible fellowship of all believers. While they were eager to train African priests as soon as this was possible, and looked forward to the day when African Bishops would be consecrated, Catholic missionaries were certainly not thinking in terms of self-propagation, self-support and self-government for African Christians. Government was to come from above, and since questions of discipline and finance were reserved for the clergy to settle, Catholic missionaries, unlike the Free Church missionaries, escaped the problems involved in training the African laity to accept responsibility in these fields.

Baptist missionaries in the Congo did not intend to plant the Baptist Church there, but hoped to nurture the young churches formed by African converts until the day when these would become independent of their aid ; at the same time they did what they could to see that these churches would conform in doctrine and practice to the traditions of their parent bodies. Some of the missionaries in the Congo belonged to denominations of more recent origin, which had at first intended to instruct Christians more accurately in the way of the Lord, rather than to bring non-Christians to a knowledge of the faith. We have already seen how this was true of the Plymouth Brethren in the Katanga ; it applies equally to the Disciples of Christ and also to the Christian

and Missionary Alliance, whose founder had always made a theoretical distinction between an Alliance branch and an independent church, although even in America these were often identical (1). But in the Congo these newer denominations held a conception of a church as the local gathered community which was similar to that of the older Free Churches.

It was most important for the missionary to nurture the life of these young churches, but he could not exercise the same close supervision that he could in the case of the Christian colony. In practice it was inevitable that there should be a good deal of informality in the organization of the village churches. There were periodic training courses for the evangelist (2), but it was hardly surprising that when he was removed from the immediate oversight of the missionary, all kinds of abnormalities should accompany his work. Some evangelists even rebaptized backsliders, unknown to the missionary (3). Gradually rules had to be formulated for the guidance of the young churches. African converts were in a very different position from that of Christians in the west. In Europe the law of the Church was backed up by the law of the State, except in the case of marriage, and Christian morality had become an accepted conventional code. But the African convert who remained in the midst of tribal life, away from the rarefied atmosphere of the *chrétienté*, had none of these aids to Christian living. To begin with, it was essential to have a prolonged catechumenate before baptism. The new converts

(1) THOMPSON, p. 135.

(2) In 1901 Wathen was running a series of three-monthly courses for teachers and evangelists. Out of one hundred men under training, all between sixteen and thirty years of age, seventy could read and write. Some of the topics treated were homilectics, Bible study, phases of Romanism, and theology, while marriage, polygamy and other social problems were discussed. JOHN BELL, in *M. H.*, Sep. 1901.

(3) G. C. R., 1906, p. 23.

had none of the background of the African whom PHILIP had met and baptized between Jerusalem and Gaza (1); the missionaries realized that they needed to arrange a long period of instruction and testing, although many of them regretted this necessity, feeling that baptism should follow quickly upon a profession of faith (2).

It was inevitable that the first stage of the life of the young churches in the Congo was to be a legalistic one. The missionary found that it was premature to offer undiluted Christian liberty to people who had no conception of the Law, for such liberty merely degenerated into licence. It was difficult to impress upon minds only one stage removed from paganism the idea of the righteousness and the holiness of God; the Africans were far readier to approach Him as an easy-going Father. Thus the missionary often regarded him as in need of "the Law as a schoolmaster to bring him to Christ" (3). Africans had no knowledge of how to discipline themselves, or to practise self-control; the missionary had to admit that Christians who were willing to face danger and death for their faith could not be trusted with their week's rations, or everything would be eaten within two or three days (4). The same lack was apparent in more serious matters. Individual self-discipline had not been needed in a society guided by tribal traditions and taboos, a society which hedged the individual round by restrictions on his conduct, restrictions that were clearly defined and accepted as promoting the general well-being of the tribe. The missionary found that equally stringent rules had to be made for the conduct of the church member.

These rules varied from place to place and from miss-

(1) Acts, VIII, 26-39.

(2) "To tell a person to wait for baptism is disagreeable to me, and contrary to all the traditions of my training, but here it is absolutely necessary". FARIS, 1 VI 1900, in *M. I.*, Oct. 1900.

(3) Gal., III, 24.

(4) G. C. R., 1906, p. 82.

ion to mission. An example can be taken from Wathen, where a set of rules was drawn up in 1890 <sup>(1)</sup>, about a year after the formation of a little church of eight members <sup>(2)</sup>. There was a constitutional clause ; all deacons were to end their office at the close of the year, and new elections were then to be held. All the other regulations, however, dealt with the conduct of the church members. The Sabbath was to be respected ; church members were to receive Christian marriage ; polygamists could join the church but could not hold office, while a church member was not to take a second wife ; a Christian could pay a bride-price if this were demanded, but he was not to buy slaves (with the exception of a wife) ; he was not to sell slaves or relatives, nor to keep slaves against their will. These Wathen regulations attempted to establish the minimum standard of conduct required of a church member. Details varied from place to place ; some missions, for example, would not allow the payment of a bride-price. But whatever the requirements, they were sufficient to mark out the Christian, by his conduct, as very different from his pagan neighbours.

Missions were divided over the question of polygamy and church membership. During the movement of mass conversion at Banza Manteke many polygamists were admitted, but polygamy gradually died out because of the high death-rate among church members. Later, when another period of revivalist fervour swept through the district, it was the local church itself, not the missionaries, which decided against admitting polygamists into its fellowship <sup>(3)</sup>. Often it was the missionary who made decisions of this kind ; he was consciously working towards the day when the Church in Congo should he

<sup>(1)</sup> H. M. BENTLEY, pp. 257-9.

<sup>(2)</sup> BENTLEY, II, p. 324.

<sup>(3)</sup> G. C. R., 1906, p. 107. This also happened in the case of forbidding the drinking of palm wine altogether. G. C. R., 1906, p. 84.



self-supporting, self-governing and self-propagating, but he was prepared to urge self-support long before he would allow self-government <sup>(1)</sup>. The Swedish Mission stopped admitting polygamists into membership according to its earlier custom, when it was found that men waited to profess conversion until they could acquire one or two additional wives <sup>(2)</sup>. This was a majority ruling in 1902, although about a third of the missionaries were in disagreement with the policy <sup>(3)</sup>. The American Presbyterians were in doubt on the whole subject <sup>(4)</sup>, and there was a general difference of opinion among Protestant missionaries. The majority, however, seemed to favour the exclusion of polygamists for the sake of the purity of the Church <sup>(5)</sup>. It is the outstanding example of the difficulties involved in establishing young churches in the midst of a pagan society ; some missionaries saw a compromise of principle involved in receiving polygamists into membership, while others felt that it would be a failure in Christian charity either to force them to cast off their wives with all the attendant misery this would cause, or to exclude them from the society of the Church for a sin which had been committed in ignorance. Catholic missionaries did not decide such questions on the spot, but in accordance with the decrees of the Propaganda they refused to baptize polygamists unless these kept only one wife and made suitable provision for the others. They were always very conscious that baptism admitted African converts into the fellowship of the universal Church ; for them there could be no question of an African Church with a lower standard in its marriage requirements — even temporarily — than that which was everywhere accepted by the Church.

<sup>(1)</sup> G. C. R., 1907, p. 86 ; *M. I.*, Nov. 1903.

<sup>(2)</sup> G. C. R., 1906, p. 22.

<sup>(3)</sup> G. C. R., 1902, in *C. M. N.*, Oct. 1952, p. 15.

<sup>(4)</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>(5)</sup> G. C. R., 1906, p. 108.

In a period of compromise and doubt, it was inevitable that there should be a lack of uniformity among the Protestant missions over the standards to be required of the Christian (1). Such problems were brought for discussion to the general conference (2) of Protestant missionaries (3), and thus an effort was made to achieve a united approach. The great importance of careful instruction and strict discipline in building up stable churches was generally recognized, for backsliding was a depressing problem common to all missions. Unprotected by the conventions of a Christian society, it was easy for African converts to be drawn into taking part in tribal dancing and the immorality which the missionary regarded as its necessary corollary, to begin drinking palm wine again, to accept the wives whom they had inherited according to tribal custom and relapse into polygamy, to be reinfected by the fear of spirits which still held their neighbours in its grip and thus return to the practice of fetishism (4). The roll of church membership was continually being brought up to date. In some places there were weekly meetings for public confession (5). The means of discipline used in the Congo churches were exclusion from communion (6), suspension (7), and expulsion (8). Sometimes as many as a hundred mem-

(1) At neighbouring stations there might be opposite practices; one might allow church members to purchase wives with slaves, the other might not. G. C. R., 1907, p. 46.

(2) Cf. *infra*, p. 236.

(3) Many examples have been given. Two of the questions discussed at the 1911 Conference were whether a Christian who engaged in the drink traffic should be allowed to remain a church member, and whether a Christian should be allowed to buy a wife.

(4) From the list of pagan practices which were taken up again by the Banza Manteke church members. G. C. R., 1902, p. 12.

(5) HENSEY, *My children of the forest*, p. 89.

(6) DYE, p. 160.

(7) At Wathen members were seldom expelled unless they had been first suspended, except in grave cases like the taking of a second wife, and refusal to put her away. G. C. R., 1906, p. 69.

(8) The Swedish Mission expelled a church member if he returned to drinking palm wine, or if he took a second wife. G. C. R., 1906, p. 22.

bers might be expelled at a time <sup>(1)</sup>. Disbanding and reforming a church happened only in extreme cases of difficulty, when a large proportion of the membership was involved in some outstanding case of backsliding.

Although he insisted upon certain standards of conduct from church members, the missionary did not go into tribal society with the intention of breaking up its traditional pattern. He encouraged a reverence for the customs of the tribe except in so far as these were incompatible with Christian morality, for he believed that he would do considerable harm if he struck at the roots of traditional authority before the Africans would accept a new authority in its place. Whatever the missionary's conscious intention, his activity did of course encourage the break-up of tribal society, although European government hastened this at a pace which would never have occurred under missionary influence alone. An interesting example of the missionary attitude can be seen from the way in which the Baptist missionaries at Yakusu developed their policy towards the traditional *lilwa* ceremony. They were first confronted with this initiation rite in 1900, and realized very little of what it involved. They would not allow the Lokele boys under mission influence to mock at a custom which was revered by their elders, and they did not forbid them to join in the ceremony, although they told them that they were not obliged to do so. For about eight weeks the villages were almost deserted by the men; occasionally the acolytes appeared, chanting words which were incomprehensible to the uninitiated, and wearing leopard skin costumes. Two years later there were preparations for the next *lilwa*. The situation had changed; no Christians were as yet baptized, but a number of boys were

<sup>(1)</sup> This happened at Banza Manteke in 1908, owing to the revival of the secret society "nkimba" among the Christian Africans. HARVEY to BARBOUR, 15 VI 08, A. B. M. U.

firmly attached to the missionaries, and the old men were alarmed at the success of the new teaching. When the boys asked for advice, the missionaries were uncertain of what they should say. They argued that secrecy did not necessarily mean corruption, and hoped that in time the influence of Christianity would cause the movement to die a natural death. They therefore threw the responsibility back on to the boys, telling them that if they knew the rite to be wrong, they were not to go and take part. This was not enough, and without exception the boys left the station.

In 1910 the same problem came up, but by this time there was a strong group of Lokele Christians around Yakusu. The missionary realized more of what was involved by the *lilwa* ceremony; he knew that the boys woke from a trance with a small wound in the abdomen or in the back through which they were told that their essential selves had been taken, and that for six or eight weeks they believed themselves to be living in a state of spirit possession before they returned to their villages as fully initiated members of the tribe. He felt the time had come to forbid the Christians to take part in the ceremony, telling them that to do so would hinder their growth in the new faith. But the *lilwa* ceremony took place, and almost all the Lokele Christians were involved in it. This was one of the extreme cases in which a church was disbanded and reformed. Finally a large proportion of the Christians declared their willingness to give up the custom altogether, although there were over a hundred and fifty who did not rejoin the church. Apart from a dozen cases of discipline for drinking, gambling, stealing and immorality, the refusal to give up the *lilwa* rite accounted for all of these (1). It was an indication of the difficulty which the church member experienced

(1) SUTTON SMITH, pp. 62-8, 216-17, 265-66.

in trying to free himself from the powerful influence of tribal customs which were incompatible with the practice of his new-born Christian faith.

It was from within a situation like this that the missionary had to accept responsibility for hastening or for retarding the development of self-government in the young churches of the Congo. The question of self-government was closely bound up with that of an African ministry, and the standards which were to be demanded of a man ordained as a pastor. Some felt that the standard set should not be too high, and that the very existence of a church made possible its own indigenous ministry :

“ In every church, of any size and whatever the degree of civilization of the people, are found good men, who prove by their conduct and work that they are worthy and able to fill the office of a pastor among their own people. To keep such men away from doing their work... would be to hinder the growth of the native church... they may make mistakes, but that must not hinder us from allowing them to bear the responsibilities which belong to them. ” (1)

This opinion of FREDERICKSON'S went too far for many of his colleagues, however. They hoped eventually for an African ministry, they were ready to increase the responsibilities of deacons and to delegate more work to them (2), they were eager to train evangelists as fully as possible (3), but they were anxious not to force the pace in a way which they considered would not make for the well-being of the African churches. It was very difficult to find suitable candidates for ordination from

(1) FREDERICKSON, A. B. M. U., G. C. R., 1906, pp. 49, 52.

(2) G. C. R., 1906, p. 71.

(3) HENSEY, urging the establishment of a Disciples' Bible college at Bolenge to train evangelists (it was founded in 1909) said : “ It may be a hundred years before the churches, born only yesterday out of the grossest heathendom, are ready for self-government. So be it — the longer the time it is going to take to bring to pass independent churches of Christ in Africa, the more imperative the need to establish this college at once ”. DYE, p. 179.

among first generation Christians, men of the stability of character necessary to direct the spiritual life of a Church only one stage removed from paganism. When backsliding was so common, missionaries could not guarantee in advance that any particular man would stand firm, however promising a start he might make. Catholic missionaries, in this question as in others, settled their policy with reference to the standards universally accepted by the Church. The future African priesthood was to be celibate, and candidates were to receive a theological training comparable to that given in Europe. The Jesuits made an early attempt to set up a junior seminary at Kimuenza in 1896 ; its founder Father LIAGRE started off hopefully with five hand-picked boys "intelligents et pieux", but when he died three years later the venture was felt to be premature and the idea was dropped until 1919 <sup>(1)</sup>.

Although their requirements were less exacting, Protestant missionaries were slow to ordain African pastors. They did, however, provide some training in leadership for their African converts. Baptist missions gave to the young churches the freedom and responsibility which belongs to the congregational system of Church government. As soon as a little church of four members was formed at Wathen in 1889, two deacons were elected ; one became the secretary, and the other both the treasurer of the church and the superintendent of its evangelistic effort <sup>(2)</sup>. In 1902 the first converts attached themselves to the Disciples' mission ; in 1903 a church of twenty-four was organized at Bolenge, and at once the members elected three deacons <sup>(3)</sup>. In the Free Church system the diaconate was not a stepping stone to the priesthood ; the elected deacons did not receive ordina-

<sup>(1)</sup> DENIS, p. 116.

<sup>(2)</sup> H. M. BENTLEY, p. 260.

<sup>(3)</sup> SMITH, p. 23.

tion, but they were responsible for approving candidates for baptism, for the discipline imposed upon church members, and for the finances of the local church. In practice it was very much like the system of congregational councils established by the C.M.S. in East Africa (1). Among the Presbyterians MORRISON was the leader of the movement towards self-government in the Luebo church. Impressed with the need to make African Christians accept responsibility, he formed a Christian Endeavour society in 1900, and by 1907 the church was able to elect five elders and six deacons (2). This marked "the beginning of turning over to the native Christians the management of the internal affairs of the native church" (3).

If self-government was a long way ahead, the missionaries realized that they could prepare the way by encouraging the Congo churches to support the work of African evangelists. While all the material resources for propagating the faith in the Congo came from abroad, the African churches were bound to remain completely dependent upon the missions. In East Africa it was Bishop TUCKER of the C.M.S. who first refused to commission evangelists who were not supported by the Church (4); almost from the beginning this course was followed by the English Baptists working in the Congo. The American Baptists and the Swedish missionaries paid their evangelists from mission funds, but they clearly regarded this as a temporary measure (5). The policy gave quick results, but it discouraged the local church from accepting responsibility for the evangelistic work in its own area.

On the whole missionaries in the Congo realized the

(1) OLIVER, pp. 219-20.

(2) WHARTON, p. 80.

(3) *Kasai Herald*, Jan. 1908.

(4) OLIVER, p. 220.

(5) G. C. R., 1902, in C. M. N., Oct. 1952, pp. 13-14.

danger of identifying the mission with the Church; they believed that they were there to build up the African churches, which like all others should be missionary churches. Thus the evangelist was not to be the representative of the mission, but of the local church <sup>(1)</sup>. If he were regarded as a mission worker, then the mission would pay his salary, as it did that of the African teachers employed on the station, but if he were regarded as the emissary of the African church, his support would naturally be provided locally. As soon as the little church at Wathen was formed in 1889, it was decided that the church itself was to support its own evangelistic work <sup>(2)</sup>. Even when a B.M.S. subscriber specifically offered to pay the expenses of an African evangelist, the offer was refused <sup>(3)</sup>. As the 1897 B.M.S. regulations stated:

“The committee is altogether averse to the payment from funds not raised in Congo of native teachers and evangelists. Systematic giving by the local church should be urged, and only when the funds of the local church warrant it, should an out-station be founded, and as the church increases its gifts more out-stations should be established.”

In 1904 the church at Wathen was supporting all its thirty-eight evangelists <sup>(4)</sup>. The American Presbyterians encouraged the tithing system <sup>(5)</sup>, and only for a limited period would they assist the Luebo church to support African evangelists from mission funds <sup>(6)</sup>. The Disciples of Christ followed the same course <sup>(7)</sup>, and the Bolenge church was supporting forty-six evangelists in 1908.

<sup>(1)</sup> On one occasion it was thought that the number of evangelists sent out from Bolenge would have to be reduced because of lack of funds. So “a special meeting was called, for it was not the missionaries' business, but the business of the church”. DYE, p. 158.

<sup>(2)</sup> BENTLEY to BAYNES, 31 I 98. B. M. S.

<sup>(3)</sup> H. M. BENTLEY, pp. 272-3.

<sup>(4)</sup> *M. H.*, May 1904.

<sup>(5)</sup> *G. C. R.*, 1902, p. 14.

<sup>(6)</sup> *Kasai Herald*, Jan. 1903.

<sup>(7)</sup> SMITH, p. 23.



If the Congo churches were slow in moving towards independence, they did at least learn some self-reliance in beginning to accept responsibility for the evangelization of their own localities.

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It was only at considerable cost that the missions built up in the Congo the system of Christian colonies and mission outposts that has been described, that they undertook educational, medical and industrial enterprises, and that they nurtured the life of the young African churches which were the first-fruits of their labours. The initial expense of organizing a party to open up a mission in the region had been very high, and it was always costly to round the lower river cataracts with loads of equipment, both in the earlier period of human portage <sup>(1)</sup>, and in the later period of the railway <sup>(2)</sup>. A steamer was a necessity for a mission which worked on the upper river, since State transport could not be relied upon <sup>(3)</sup>, while the pressure of State taxation was found to be a heavy burden <sup>(4)</sup>.

(1) Stephens estimated that it cost thirty pounds to transport one ton of goods to Stanley Pool. This was in 1894, before the missions had been able to make use of the railway. B. M. S. Minutes, 19 I 95.

(2) BENTLEY, II, p. 320.

(3) The B. M. S. and the C. B. M. realized this when they started upper river work; the American Presbyterians in the Kasai tried at first to rely upon State transport, but they found this most unsatisfactory. The *Missionary* of February 1899 contained a report from MORRISON saying that Luebo had almost no flour, sugar, lard and butter, and that with no prospect of regular communications with Stanley Pool by State transport, he regarded a mission steamer as a necessity.

(4) "It is not only the case that we are hardly treated in the matter of internal taxation, but it is the same with import duties. At the present moment, I am trying to convince the customs authorities that a carpenter's plane is an industrial tool, and that tools and accessories for the printing press rightly come under the head of machinery, which by the *published* regulations are declared exempt from import duty. Do you realise that we are forced to pay duty on medicines used in the treatment of natives, and that if a missionary working party in England kindly makes shorts and other garments for Congo school children, such garments must pay import tax?" FORFEIT to BAYNES, 14 III 96. B. M. S.

It is hardly surprising that when the B.M.S. reported on its financial position for the previous year in the spring of 1888, the Society had to state that undoubtedly the large deficit was due principally to its Congo mission (1). The American Disciples of Christ decided to start a Congo mission in 1884, but the pioneer missionary who got as far as England was recalled when he reported that STANLEY'S estimate of the cost of planting a mission station was fifty thousand dollars, while ten thousand dollars would be required each year to maintain it (2). Even as late as 1911 the American Presbyterian Church at home was protesting at the enormous expenses of its work in Congo, and wondering whether the expenditure there was worthwhile, so that the harassed missionaries were driven to argue that the actual cost of a convert in dollars and cents was less in Congo than in any other field (3).

There were three main ways in which the finances of Congo missions were organized. Self-supporting missions arrived, but proved a complete failure in the Congo. The normal missionary society disposed of considerable sums of money; its missionaries received regular, if small, salaries, and the remainder of its funds provided the material equipment of the mission. Somewhere between the two systems came the loosely organized mission which sent out its missionaries, and then left them with no guaranteed means of support, but forwarded supplies from time to time in somewhat haphazard fashion, as money was received at head-quarters. Bishop TAYLOR'S mission, the Baptist Missionary Society, and the Plymouth Brethren mission in the Katanga represent these three types of financial organization.

Bishop TAYLOR'S mission was the outstanding example

(1) *M. H.*, May 1888.

(2) SMITH, p. 3.

(3) WHARTON, p. 83.

in the Congo of a society that hoped to run itself as a profit-making concern that would become independent of foreign funds at a very early stage. Other missions, too, had hoped that the evangelization of the Congo could be achieved cheaply, and with some measure of self-support. This was the original idea of the L.I.M. (1), and of the young men sent out from New York by Mr SIMPSON's Tabernacle in 1885 with the idea that they should establish a faith-healing mission (2). But the L.I.M. found its financial basis completely inadequate, and it was largely its lack of resources which persuaded it to hand over its work to the American Baptists (3). Of SIMPSON's group, one died, one joined the American Baptists, and the others returned home. The American consul feared a similar fate for the second group which arrived in 1889, and inquired gloomily what he was to do when the members of the mission came to him destitute and expected him to pay their passages home (4). This did not in fact happen, but the missionaries were able to remain in the Congo only at the price of giving more attention (5) to agriculture than to evangelism (5).

(1) One of the principles of the L. I. M. constitution declared : " That it is the aim of this mission to introduce into the vast Congo Valley as many Christian evangelists as possible, and as it is believed that land and native labour can be secured at small cost, the agents of the mission shall be men willing to avail themselves of these advantages, and resolved to be as little burdensome as possible to the funds of the mission. No salaries are guaranteed, but the committee, as far as the means of doing so are placed in their hands, will supply the missionaries with such needful things as cannot be produced in the country ". GUINNESS, p. 180.

(2) BENTLEY, II, pp. 416-7.

(3) GUINNESS, p. 393.

(4) TAUNT to the State Department, 5 VIII 89. S.D., Congo records, Boma, I/12.

(5) " Elle (la mission) compte actuellement plus de trente missionnaires qui sont répartis dans la région comprise entre Gangila (non loin de Vivi) et les chutes de Loango. Ils tirent un excellent parti du sol du Congo ; c'est ainsi que M. Hunter REID a pu m'affirmer lui-même que chacun de ses missionnaires ne dépensait que trois livres par an pour achats de vivres d'Europe. C'est évidemment un très beau résultat. Il ne peut être atteint que par des personnes dont la principale préoccupation est de s'occuper de cultures ". WAHIS to the *Secrétaire d'État*, 10 III 96. M. des C., M. 100 (586).

Bishop TAYLOR, however, saw no reason why he should not apply in the Congo, as he had done in South America and in India, a system which was certainly irregular in the missionary tradition of the American Methodist Episcopal Church, but which he had found to give practical results. His missionaries supported themselves by whatever means they could ; he merely provided transport and housing for them <sup>(1)</sup>. In India they had found English-speaking churches ready to welcome them to their ministry and therefore to support them. In South America there was limited scope for the same kind of work among small English-speaking communities, but the majority of Bishop TAYLOR'S missionaries there organized schools which won the favour of the upper-class Spanish and Portuguese-speaking people. Their teaching supported them, and also provided an opportunity for evangelistic work <sup>(2)</sup>.

When William TAYLOR was elected missionary Bishop for Africa by the general conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church meeting at Philadelphia in the spring of 1884, he had little idea of the difficulty of adapting his missionary methods to the conditions of Angola or the West coast, but above all to those of the Congo. Here the teaching of English had no market value, so it seemed to him that his missionaries could reasonably support themselves by agricultural work. On his prospecting visit to the lower Congo in the spring of 1886, he showed a serene disregard for the advice of the missionaries already established in the field <sup>(3)</sup>, and eventually landed a party of nearly fifty men, women and children. They bought two deserted State stations at Vivi and Isangila, and made a serious attempt at agricultural work. Especially at Kimpoko, on an island in Stanley

<sup>(1)</sup> DAVIES, p. 121.

<sup>(2)</sup> Bishop Taylor's self-supporting missions in South Central Africa, 1885, p. 5.

<sup>(3)</sup> Mrs. BENTLEY'S unpublished autobiography, p. 183, B. P.

Pool, they found good soil <sup>(1)</sup> and made a hopeful beginning. Here they dug an irrigating ditch a mile in length, and by 1889 ten acres were under cultivation <sup>(2)</sup>.

They found that they could not support themselves by agricultural labour alone, however, and ran into debt, although for a while they managed to live by shooting hippopotami and selling the meat to Africans and to traders. The one lucrative pursuit for Europeans in the Congo was the ivory and rubber trade ; this, however, the missionaries refused to take up <sup>(3)</sup>. Many died as a result of the privations to which they were subjected, and many others returned to America ; this was hardly surprising, since as the Bishop said " the work had to be run mainly along the lines of human impossibilities " <sup>(4)</sup>. Business arrangements were remarkable by their absence <sup>(5)</sup>, there was little time for the work of evangelism, and a great deal of suffering was caused by the attempt to use a missionary method which it was impracticable to apply to pioneer work in the Congo. Its failure proved that a Congo mission could not be conducted cheaply, and that it was useless to begin work without adequate financial resources.

It was the task of the home organizations of the missions to disseminate missionary propaganda, and thus to stimulate giving. Their most potent weapons were to be found in the missionary magazines which made their way into English and American homes, and in the missionaries on furlough who brought vivid reports of their own experiences to the meetings which they addressed.

(1) " Kimpoko is an excellent site for agricultural operations — if any place is suitable for their experiment, they have got it... But I feel sorrowful foreboding... GRENFELL to BAYNES 26 XI 88. B. M. S.

(2) Bushop Taylor's Report, 1889, p. 17.

(3) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 28 V 88. B. M. S.

(4) Bishop Taylor's Report, 1889, p. 16.

(5) For example when a large number of bales of cloth arrived at Banana for Bishop TAYLOR's mission in 1888, no bills of lading were produced, and so they had to be returned to England. GRENFELL to BAYNES, 26 XI 88, B. M. S.

The task was perhaps easier in England, which had been remarkably stirred by the opening up of Central Africa, than it was in America where the negro was a more common phenomenon (1). There was a ready response in England, for STANLEY'S journey across the African continent had captured the imagination. Englishmen had played a large part in the early exploration of the Congo and in the establishment of the Independent State, while later the fact that the Emin Pacha relief expedition took the Congo route stimulated English interest. After the turn of the century, GUINNESS was not above using the excitement aroused in England by tales of the Congo atrocities for the profit of C.B.M. funds (2). A good number of English Free Churchmen were interested both in trade and in missionary work (3), and these gave considerable financial support to the Congo missions. Continental Catholic societies did not have the same kind of backing (4), and were inclined to envy their Protestant rivals the "enormous sums" (5) of money which they had at their disposal in Congo.

The very fact that losses by death were so heavy in the early days of missionary work in the Congo, proved

(1) The American Presbyterians pointed out that "the highest and purest considerations" sent them to Congo, since "to the people of the Southern States there can be no romance in a mission to Africa. We know the African well: we have him everywhere among us". They urged that "all comparative valuation of souls... is antagonistic to the spirit of the Gospel... It is no higher service to evangelise the Chinese or the Japanese than to Christianise the Zulus or the Bailundas". *Miss.*, March 1890.

(2) FOX-BOURNE to MOREL, 29 XII 03; MOREL to STEAD, 31 XII 03. Morel Papers.

(3) GUINNESS, p. 179.

(4) "L'Anglais considère l'extension de sa religion non seulement comme une chose méritoire devant Dieu, mais encore comme une affaire très profitable à l'accroissement de son influence et de son commerce. La propagation de la foi est une entreprise religieuse et nationale à la fois. A côté du croyant fervent, on voit l'homme d'affaires — qui dans nos pays ignore les missionnaires — soutenir vivement leurs sociétés et leur prêter le concours de son expérience et même de sa bourse". VAN STRAELEN, 1898, p. 50.

(5) P. CARRIE, quoted in DE WITTE, p. 71.

to be a stimulus to interest at home. The B.M.S. had six deaths to record during the first part of 1887 alone <sup>(1)</sup>, while four men had died within three months during 1885 <sup>(2)</sup>. This was a challenge to examine more carefully the conditions necessary for health on the Congo ; it was a challenge to provide better housing conditions ; it was also accepted as a challenge to send more men to the Congo. Of course there were those who were ready to condemn what appeared to be a complete waste of life, but generally this was not the effect produced in England by the news that more missionaries had died. Instead, letters poured in to the Baptist Mission House to urge the Society to new efforts in the Congo, subscriptions were doubled, and volunteers pressed forward to replace those who had fallen. The Committee successfully urged subscribers that these new men ought not to be held back because of lack of funds <sup>(3)</sup>. Interest was heightened by the very obstacles which had to be overcome by a pioneer mission in that part of Central Africa to which STANLEY'S voyage had done so much to attract the attention of Englishmen. There was no doubt that the Congo mission had captured the imagination. When Arthington station was burned down in 1886, the sum of four thousand pounds necessary to replace it was collected within two months, and altogether the Committee's appeal for the means to rebuild the post brought in six thousand pounds <sup>(4)</sup>. Personal links were forged when young converts were brought to England or America <sup>(5)</sup>, when groups of students adopted a missionary

<sup>(1)</sup> FULLERTON, p. 53.

<sup>(2)</sup> BENTLEY, II, pp. 105-6.

<sup>(3)</sup> *M. H.*, June 1887.

<sup>(4)</sup> BENTLEY, II, p. 131.

<sup>(5)</sup> This was often done in the early days to help missionaries on furlough with translation work. For this purpose MORRISON took KACHUNGA to America in 1903, and BENTLEY took NLEMVO to England. The practice seems general ; WESTCOTT took SELENGE to England in 1900, MCKITTRICK took BOMPOLE. VINSON, p. 45 ; BENTLEY, I, p. 242 ; HOLE, p. 10 ; GUINNESS, p. 476.

and provided his salary (1), and when Sunday-schools adopted one particular child, and each year provided the five pounds necessary to keep him on a mission station (2).

For the evangelization of Africa in the nineteenth century was a popular movement. Whereas the expansion of European states was on the whole due to the initiative of their governing classes, the expansion of the missions was much more broadly based in the home constituency. The man-in-the-street knew more of missionary expansion than he did of national expansion in Africa, and he had far more influence upon it. The Arthingtons were rare; the missionary societies drew their main support from thousands of small subscribers. It was these who provided the large sums necessary for missionary advance in the Congo. The B.M.S. spent £16,000 from a special Congo fund (started with ARTHINGTON'S thousand) between 1878 and 1884, when the Congo mission was placed on the ordinary budget. In 1884 £8,000 out of a total B.M.S. budget of £80,000 was spent on the Congo mission. By 1908 expenditure had risen by degrees to £17,000 out of a total budget of £100,000 (3). (In this period the Society generally spent more in India and less in China than it did in the Congo). The expenditure of the American Presbyterians rose far more sharply; it went from \$5,000 in 1891 to nearly \$40,000 in 1908 (when \$40,000 was being spent in Brazil and \$60,000 in China) (4). The Disciples who spent \$6,000 on the Congo mission in 1901 were spending over \$20,000 in 1908, and this sum was doubled by 1910 (5). The American Baptists saw their expenditure rising from \$22,000 in 1886 to \$110,000 in 1894. Then

(1) *Missionary Intelligencer* (D. C. C. M.) April 1897.

(2) *M. H.*, June 87.

(3) From B. M. S. annual reports.

(4) From annual reports in the *Missionary*.

(5) From annual reports in the *Missionary Intelligencer*.



came a period of retrenchment, for the society was heavily in debt, and by 1908 the annual expenditure stood at a little over \$40,000 (1).

The high cost of Congo missions had a considerable effect upon their organization in the field. It affected personnel; negroes from the Southern States and from Jamaica were employed partly because it was obvious that their health would be better in the Congo than that of white missionaries, and they would not be so great a liability financially to the societies which sent them out (2). It also affected the supervision of the missions, since in general the more a mission depended upon European funds the closer was the control exercised over it from Europe. This was, however, partly balanced by the fact that at least in the early days the distance from England and the difficulties of communication with the Congo meant that the missionaries in the field had to be left to make their own decisions. At times the home committee was reduced to expressing its hopes, rather than being able to issue its orders (3). As the work grew, a local committee of management in the field became essential to the smooth running of the mission, the C.B.M. suffered a great deal from the fact that the home Council tried to arrange the details of its work from a distance of six thousand miles (5). But a man like Dan CRAWFORD was completely free from control from

(1) From A. B. M. U. annual reports.

(2) The policy of the American Presbyterians from the foundation of the mission was to use coloured men from the Southern States, and at times these outnumbered the white missionaries. No other society had so large a proportion of coloured men, but the B. M. S. used Jamaicans, the C. B. M. also started to employ West Indians at a later date, and a few West Indians came to join the Brethren mission in the Katanga.

(3) "I do not know what Mr. GRENFELL's plans are for the future, but I do hope that, for a while at any rate, we shall be able to do less exploring work... I hope the *Peace* will not go forth upon any of these long journeys..." BAYNES to BENTLEY, 31 I 88. B. M. S.

(4) H. M. BENTLEY, p. 358; *M. H.*, Dec. 1896.

(5) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 3 IX 98. B. M. S.

home, since he went out with no society behind him to which he could apply for additional funds (1).

He was inclined to criticize his fellow missionaries who had a higher standard of living (2). The Brethren in the Katanga were anxious not to trade upon their prestige as Europeans, and so kept as close as possible to the living standards of the people among whom they worked. They were horrified by the idea that the white missionary should offer material advantages to all who would accept his teaching. As a result of this attitude, however, MSIRI despised them for their lack of resources (3), and they were accused of having some personal interest in settling at Bunkeya (4).

It was difficult to strike a balance. If the missionary received more from the Africans than he gave, he was regarded as an "eater-up of the people" (5). Bishop TAYLOR'S mission was unpopular just because it offered no material advantages (6). On the other hand, there was the danger that the teaching of the missionary might be accepted for the sake of these alone. Usually the very poverty of the missionary by European standards appeared as incredible wealth to the people among whom he settled. The mission was "a source of cotton cloth, looking-glasses, knives, and brass wire, practically inexhaustible" (7). The missionary was under no

(1) TILSLEY, p. 43.

(2) "CHRIST'S cause in Africa is too often wounded in the house of its friends, but never so grievously as when a Missionary of the Cross beats easily all his fellow-Europeans in this matter of first-class get up. The best houses, best furniture, best eating, all at the Mission." CRAWFORD, p. 217.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 211.

(4) "Many of the natives scarcely know our object in living among them (after five years)... the great majority seem to think we have some personal interest in living among them". SWAN, 1890, in ARNOT, Bihe and Garanganze, p. 72.

(5) *Miss.*, April 1891.

(6) "Ils n'aiment pas les étrangers qui s'installent au milieu d'eux sans richesses et dont le voisinage ne leur procure aucun avantage tangible immédiat". LIEBRECHTS, Souvenirs, p. 250.

(7) BENTLEY, II, p. 133.

illusions as to the reason he was so often welcomed (1), but he realized that he could profit from an easy popularity at first. Sometimes it was his deliberate policy to offer tangible benefits. The Jesuits explained why so much attention was paid to the material side of their mission ; it was because the Africans had one standard of judgment only, that of material progress (2).

Finally, it can be said that the high cost of Congo evangelism bore some relation to the movement of the Protestant missions towards a united approach to their problems. The pressure for common action was to a large extent utilitarian in its origin. Time and again economy was the reason brought forward for some proposal for united activity (3). The most obvious field for experiment was that of transport. As early as 1888 a young pioneer missionary who was travelling up-river alone on his way to the Sudan, put forward a plan for a joint Christian transport agency on the Congo (4). This was too startling an idea to meet with immediate assent, however. But it was in the field of transport that the first moves towards co-operation were made. All the societies who used the Congo route into the interior needed a transport base at Stanley Pool, and it was obvious that the presence of several transport agents there, each of them representing a different mission,

(1) "Of course there was no anxious desire for the Gospel on the part of these wild cannibals of Bopoto ; they expected that material advantages would accrue from our settlement among them, and so they invited us". *Ibid.*, II, p. 209.

(2) *Au Congo et aux Indes*, p. 35.

(3) It was to effect a saving in men and money that the transport work at Stanley Pool was unified ; if orphanages were to be established it was felt best for reasons of efficiency and economy for the missions to join together and have a really good one ; it was to save labour and expense that the suggestion for unifying printing and translating work was put forward, and in 1911 it was pointed out that united transport would save one thousand pounds a year. G. C. R., 1902, in *C. M. N.* Oct. 1952, p. 21 ; G. C. R., 1907, pp. 149, 152 ; G. C. R. 1911, p. 61.

(4) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 23 I 89, enclosing a suggestion for surmounting the Congo transport difficulty, by Wilmot BROOKE, 22 VI 88. B. M. S.

involved a waste of time and money. Finally a personal arrangement was made whereby the C.B.M. agent acted for the rest (1). Although the General Conference of 1902 discussed the idea of an official amalgamation of all transport work, no definite plan was formed, and the subject was still under consideration in 1911 (2).

The 1902 conference at Leopoldville was the first of a series of General Conferences which drew representatives from most of the Protestant missionary societies working in the Congo. These conferences provided a meeting-ground for missionaries of the various denominations, where they could consider joint projects, discuss their common problems, and speak with one voice on social conditions or on matters of common interest. They were usually called at two-yearly intervals, until in 1911 a Continuation Committee replaced the temporary one which had previously organized the General Conferences, following the proposal of the World Missionary Conference which had met at Edinburgh the year before (3). The Committee had no executive powers (4), but it was an expression of the belief of the Congo Protestant missions in their essential unity, a unity which could be obscured, but not denied, by their differences of organization and practice. The co-operation between the missions which had sprung partly from immediate financial pressure had been raised to a new level.

It was not until later years that the force of the Ecumenical Movement was felt in the Congo. In 1924 the Congo Continuation Committee became the Congo Protestant Council, a responsible body which within four years was supporting a full-time secretary. Ten

(1) G. C. R., 1902, in *C. M. N.* Oct. 1952, p. 21.

(2) G. C. R., 1911, pp. 92-94.

(3) CARPENTER, p. 35.

(4) STONELAKE, p. 61.

years later the Protestant churches in the Congo took a common name, the Church of Christ in Congo, and enjoyed a common membership, so that a Christian who moved from one area to another could present a membership certificate and be accepted on the testimony of the church from which he had come <sup>(1)</sup>. In the beginning when communications were difficult, when one mission was several days' journey from the next, Protestant disunity had not presented a serious problem to the missions, nor had their consideration of the nature of the Church been stimulated as it necessarily was in the period which opened with the Edinburgh Conference in 1910. Roman Catholic missions were regarded as enemies, and bitterness was increased by the fact that they appeared to possess an unfair advantage in the favourable treatment which they received from the administration. Apart from this rivalry, denominational relationships were scarcely a question of importance in the period when the missions were, at widely separated points, building up Christian colonies and slowly permeating African tribal life by means of African evangelists and teachers. It was not until the time when communications became easier, when the spheres of effective influence of the missions began to converge, when increasing numbers of the smaller Protestant denominations sent missionaries to the Congo, and when a speedy process of urbanization drew together African Christians from all parts of the Congo, that the missions were forced to examine their divisions in the light of their witness to the one CHRIST and the one Church.

(1) CARPENTER, p. 41.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE ANTI-CONGOLESE CAMPAIGN AND THE MISSIONS, 1890-1908

By 1890 LEOPOLD'S Congo enterprise had swallowed up the King's personal fortune, and the State which he had acquired with such difficulty was threatening to ruin him. In addition to the burden of the everyday expenses of the administration there was a costly and urgent programme to be undertaken; vast areas of territory remained to be occupied and pacified, the Arab advance down the Congo had yet to be halted, and if the State was ever to achieve a sound economy a railway had to be constructed to link Matadi with Stanley Pool. In face of these tasks, State revenues were pitifully small. They were provided almost entirely by export duties, for direct taxation would have discouraged European settlement, and the Berlin Act had forbidden the imposition of import duties within the conventional basin of the Congo. In any case, very few Europeans had settled in the State, and they could not be expected to provide revenue sufficient for the administration of the territory.

The King had always believed that a colony should be a profitable enterprise <sup>(1)</sup>. When in 1890 he was faced by the fact that the Congo State could not even maintain itself, he saw only one course open to him; he decided that the State must undertake commerce

(1) J. STENGERS, *La place de Léopold II dans l'histoire de la colonisation, La Nouvelle Cléo*, IX, 1950, p. 527.

on its own account — and must create a monopoly. Even before 1890 State officials had been connected with the ivory trade and while European traders on the Congo had disliked their rivalry, missionaries had criticized them for abusing their authority <sup>(1)</sup>. But after 1890, LEOPOLD deliberately set out to create a State monopoly. A secret decree of September 1891 reserved the ivory and rubber of the Aruwimi and Ubangi-Uele basins to the exclusive exploitation of the State. At the same time the King encouraged the Englishman Colonel NORTH and the brothers DE BROWNE DE TIEGE to found a new group of commercial companies at Antwerp, and to these the Congo State gave large concessions of land <sup>(2)</sup>. Thus the Leopoldian system was established in embryo ; the exploitation of the vacant lands <sup>(3)</sup> of the State was reserved to the State itself, either directly or through concessionary companies. A decree of October 1892 was more explicit ; certain lands — to be known as the *domaine privé* of the State — were reserved to State exploitation alone. They covered a considerable area, including the basins of the Bomu-Uele, the Mongalla-Itimbiri-Aruwimi, the Lopori-Maringa and the Busira-Juapa. The State intended to obtain the labour essential for the exploitation of these lands both by imposing a tax in labour and by inducing Africans to work for remuneration <sup>(4)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> GRENFELL reported that State officials were carrying out slave raids and ransoming women and children for ivory, and added: "A matter causing heartburning among the ivory buyers on the river is the money interest that State officers have in the collection of ivory — whether as fines or by purchase... at present much ivory falls into the hands of the State. It seems to me to be a great mistake to give officers who possess almost absolute power a pecuniary interest in the collection of the principal product of the country — I know it has been a fruitful source of trouble, and it cannot fail to be in future". GRENFELL to BAYNES, 23 VI 90. B. M. S.

<sup>(2)</sup> A. STENMANS, *La reprise du Congo par la Belgique*, Brussels, 1949, pp. 135-6.

<sup>(3)</sup> In 1885 the State had claimed all 'vacant lands', while the Africans were to keep their rights over the lands they occupied.

<sup>(4)</sup> KEITH, p. 123.

The King's policy resulted in a marked improvement in the financial position of the Congo State, an improvement which began in 1892, was very noticeable in 1896, and thereafter steadily continued. The exploitation of the *domaine privé* accounted in large part for the growing prosperity. A secret decree of March 1896 added to it the *domaine de la Couronne*, a large expanse of territory around Lake LEOPOLD II which thus became the personal property of the King, to be exploited for the benefit of the public works he had undertaken in Belgium <sup>(1)</sup>. But the new prosperity of the Congo State was unfortunately accompanied by many abuses — abuses which stemmed from the leopoldian system itself. The agents of the concessionary companies tended to be men who hoped to make a quick fortune in the Congo. Left alone in their *secteurs* with almost unlimited power, they had no hesitation in applying extreme methods for the sake of increasing production. They assumed the rights which belonged to an administrative authority, while ignoring its duties ; they made use of armed force in the collection of rubber and gave considerable power to armed African soldiers ; thus they initiated a widespread series of local tyrannies. The State agents were also commercial agents and their primary interest lay not in securing a stable administration, but in the collection of rubber. The system itself engendered abuses.

We have already seen that GRENFELL had criticized the interest of State officials in the ivory trade as early as 1890 ; in the same year another B.M.S. missionary on the upper river had noted with distress that State soldiers were burning African towns, and were seizing slaves to secure the ivory monopoly to the State <sup>(2)</sup>. An American visitor to the Congo publicly criticized the

<sup>(1)</sup> DE LICHTERVELDE, p. 323ff ; KEITH, p. 122.

<sup>(2)</sup> Diary of W. L. FORFEITT of Upoto ; entries under July, September and December, 1890. S. P.



administration, declaring that the Congo State engaged in trade and that while it taxed other traders it exempted itself from all financial burdens. He claimed that this policy was a violation of the Berlin Act (1). At a meeting of the Aboriginies' Protection Society in December 1890 GUINNESS mentioned that according to missionary reports cruelties were practised upon Africans in the Congo State (2). In 1891 the May number of the *Regions Beyond* referred to the burning of African towns, while the B.M.S. Report of the same year remarked that the Congo regime was bearing heavily upon Europeans and Africans alike.

The uneasiness of the missionaries rapidly increased as they began to see the results of LEOPOLD'S efforts to secure a commercial monopoly for the State. In November 1893 the *Regions Beyond* again referred to the burning of African towns by State officials, while from the Swedish missionaries and from the American Baptists in the lower Congo there came rumours of African revolts because State agents were ill-treating the people (3). In the face of this situation missionaries were not inclined to be silent, and as early as 1895 GRENFELL reported that they had been told to mind their own business :

“ Had the English Consul arrived... he would have had ‘ lively times ’ to report — perhaps it is as well for the reputation of the State that he has not come. In the zone occupied by the missionaries things do not always go satisfactorily to the non-official mind, and some of the missionaries have been told very emphatically that ‘ preaching the gospel and teaching ’ is their vocation, and that the administration of the country is not for them to meddle with. In the zone beyond the missionaries the country is largely held by small military posts a few

(1) G. W. WILLIAMS, A report upon the Congo-state and country to President of the United States America, 1890.

(2) *The Aboriginies' Friend*, London, April, 1891.

(3) K. T. ANDERSSON, 15 III 94, in Svenska Missions-Forbundet under 75 ar, Stockholm, 1953 ; A. B. M. U. Report, July 1894.

miles apart, and here, where the Sierra Leone, Houssa, Manyema and Congolese sergeants and corporals are comparatively free to do as they like, troubles and difficulties breed apace." (1)

Some of the B.M.S. missionaries on the upper river grew restive. They saw State soldiers raiding innocent villages, they noted rapid depopulation in several areas, and they realised that their own work was becoming increasingly difficult in these unsettled conditions. STAPLETON voiced their growing dissatisfaction in a letter to the Secretary, after he had come across an outstanding case of the burning of a village at Monsembe, a case in which a European State agent had taken a responsible part :

"Without offering any opinion as to the benevolent intentions of the King of the Belgians, it is certain that mission work is next to impossible under the misgovernment of the officers out here. We have endeavoured as much as possible to teach the people the duty of submission to the State but what has one to say to their plea that they never know what the State expects of them ? They are continually subject to raids by passing canoes of State work people under a Zanzibari, without possibility of redress... It is becoming a grave question with me and... with others also how long we can reconcile silence on the question of the infamous wrongs to which these people are subject, with our conscientious view of our duty towards them as missionaries... In my judgment the State would not have dared to have committed many of the outrages that disgrace its name in the face of the moral pressure the B.M.S. from an independent standpoint could have brought to bear. We should have been more successful in the past if as a society we had identified ourselves with the cause of the native whom we were sent to evangelize, even at the expense both at home and on the field of the loss of the friendship of the State." (2)

But the Committee was certainly not prepared to embark upon public criticism of the Congo administration, and thus to risk a deterioration in its relationship

(1) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 25 II 95. B. M. S.

(2) STAPLETON to BAYNES, 14 VI 95. B. M. S.

with the State. The B.M.S. had received special favours from the Congo government, and was dependent upon the State for the grant of new sites for mission stations ; it had lost something of its independent position. So the Committee decided to appeal to the King, and when BAYNES visited Brussels he found VAN EETVELDE very ready to inquire into the Monsembe affair (1). But missionary work in the Congo was becoming increasingly difficult. At the end of the year the Committee regretfully decided to abandon the B.M.S. station at Lukolela, since almost all the inhabitants of the neighbourhood had fled across the river into French territory. Although it placed the responsibility for this state of affairs at the door of the local State officials (2), the Committee refrained from drawing the attention of the public to Congo conditions.

The C.B.M. Council took a similar course. At a meeting held late in November Grattan GUINNESS brought up the question of maladministration in the Congo, and gave details of the effects of the rubber traffic on the peoples of the upper Congo. For the moment the Council postponed a decision, but finally agreed that " it would probably be more effective not to make the matter known through the press, but to appeal direct to the King of the Belgians, who controls the laws that bring about such desolation and the wholesale slaughter of human

(1) " M. BAYNES des missions anglaises, est venu m'entretenir d'un nouvel acte de brutalité commis dans le district des Bangalas... J'ai promis une enquête et la révocation du blanc si les faits sont établis. Beaucoup de nos agents sont des hommes brutaux et je crois que des exemples sont nécessaires ". VAN EETVELDE to LEOPOLD II, 3 X 95. A. R. S. C., *Correspondance Léopold II-Van Eetvelde*.

(2) " The Committee cannot make these recommendations without placing on record their sincere regret that by the high handed action of the officers and soldiers of the Congo Free State the population of the Lukolela district has been drawn across the frontier into French territory, and they earnestly trust that the strong representations of their Secretary recently made to the Government Officials of the Congo State in Brussels in relation to this matter may do something to prevent the repetition of such conduct on the part of the State officials and the forces under their command. " B. M. S. Minutes, 19 XI 95.

lives for the purpose of procuring rubber" (1). Like the B.M.S., the C.B.M. feared to offend the State authorities by public criticism of the Congo regime.

The American missionaries, on the other hand, were not so cautious. Their links with the Congo administration were not so close as were those of the B.M.S., and from the other side of the Atlantic they were not so fearful of giving offence at Brussels. Whereas the B.M.S. had appealed directly to Brussels without approaching the Foreign Office, the American Baptists worked through the State Department (2), and it was from an American Baptist who had lived for some years at Equatorville that the English public learned something of the situation in the Congo. In a Reuter interview late in 1895, J. B. MURPHY gave a graphic description of the methods of rubber collection in the State. He spoke of the force used by African soldiers to compel the people to bring rubber, of the way in which the Africans were shot or their hands cut off if they failed to bring an adequate quantity, and of the uselessness of appealing for redress to the administrative authorities in the Congo (3). True, MURPHY stood alone. As STANLEY observed, there were "over six hundred missionaries in Congo... Are all the rest of these missionaries paid by the State to keep silence"? (4) But MURPHY's story caused no little stir in England, especially as it came at a time when feeling had been aroused against the Congo State by the STOKES affair (5). In Belgium too, critics of the King's policy in the Congo made use of MURPHY's ac-

(1) C. B. M. Minutes, 29 XI 95.

(2) Copy, VAN EETVELDE to the American Minister at Brussels, 4 VIII 95. M. des C. M. 87 (579).

(3) *Times*, etc., 18 XI 95.

(4) *African Review*, 23 XI 95.

(5) An English trader, STOKES, had been executed in the eastern part of the Congo State by a Belgian officer LOTHAIRE, without his right of appeal to Boma being recognised. R. CAMBIER, *L'affaire Stokes*, *Revue belge de Philologie et d'Histoire*, XXX, I, Brussels, 1952, pp. 109-34.

count of the methods employed by the State agents in enforcing the collection of rubber <sup>(1)</sup>. The last weeks of 1895 were difficult ones for the Congo administration.

GRENFELL attributed the State's difficulties to its financial position. As he wrote home :

"About the explosion against the Congo Government — one can only wonder that it has been so long delayed. The difficulty of *proving* anything serious probably explains it... The Congo Government... cannot invest a body of men with almost absolute power, and expect them to levy taxes sufficient to contribute seriously towards paying expenses of the administration, and at the same time keep clear of the the difficulties in which it now finds itself... It is mainly a question of money — a million of square miles of territory cannot be satisfactorily administered for the mere bagatelle represented by the Congo budget... I feel I must at the same time be fair and give the government credit for having done an immensity of good, and for having opened up a wider tract of country than has ever been accomplished by any other power, except with far greater resources and in a much longer time." <sup>(2)</sup>

He was shocked to discover something of the extent of the maladministration in the Congo :

"... Mr. GILCHRIST of the C. B. M... has recently been up the Maringa river and seen the results of the monopoly granted to the Anglo-Belgian Rubber Company... and says he is prepared to prove many acts of outrage and cruelty... I have seen on my way down the river letters from Mr. SJÖBLOM of the A.B.M.U. addressed to the editors of the *Times* and the *Christian World* which would make a terrible noise if they were published. I did not believe things were so bad, but I cannot doubt Mr. SJÖBLOM's circumstantial evidence... if a cruel and unscrupulous Commissaire de District can do (such things) in one place, others may arise to do them elsewhere... Men of Baron DHANIS' type I fear are too costly luxuries for our impecunious State — men who develop the resources of the country are at a premium, men who can lead expeditions or administer districts at a profit." <sup>(3)</sup>

The B.M.S. Committee, however, carefully refrained

<sup>(1)</sup> *Annales parlementaires*, 25 XI 95.

<sup>(2)</sup> GRENFELL TO BAYNES, 23 I 96. B. M. S.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Ibid.*, 20 III 96.

from any public statement on the Congo situation, for it was waiting to see the result which would follow from the Congo Government enquiry into the Monsemebe affair (1). Encouraged both by the Belgian Minister in London (2) and by VAN EETVELDE (3), Hugh Gilzean REID — who, as we have seen, had close links with the B.M.S. (4) — came forward as a defender of the Congo State. The C.B.M., on the other hand, now seemed half inclined to support the American Baptist missionaries who were beginning to speak out about conditions in the Equatorville region (5). In 1891 criticism of the Congo régime had probably reached only a limited group of missionary supporters, but in 1896 even the cautious comments of the *Regions Beyond* were quickly noted by critics of the Congo State. They were soon quoted by Sir Charles DILKE, who, as the negotiator of the unratified Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1884, was eager to point out how mistaken had been the English commercial and philanthropic opinion which contributed to its failure (6). The Congo State was most reluctant to have public attention drawn to its affairs in this way, and the Governor-General hoped to make this clear to the foreign missionaries whom he met during his tour of the upper Congo (7). Yet so far the English missions

(1) B. M. S. Minutes, 16 VI 96.

(2) An article of his published in the *North Eastern Daily Gazette* of 14th April 1896 was sent to the *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères* with the comment : « C'est un personnage qui jouit ici d'une certaine influence et je crois qu'il est utile de l'encourager dans ses bonnes dispositions envers nous ». A. WHETNALL to DE FAVEREAU, 22 IV 96. Min. des Af. Ét. 1<sup>re</sup> série II. 492.

(3) A. G. R., V. E. 19.

(4) *Supra*, p. 162.

(5) « An official enquiry is being made as to allegations against the Free State administration at Equatorville. We want more, however, than investigation ; the crying need is for redress. But the question is, how to obtain this without a public exposé ? » *R. B.*, May 1896.

(6) *Cosmopolis*, July 1896, pp. 25-6.

(7) « Je m'occuperai autant que possible aussi des missionnaires anglais et américains et tâcherai de leur faire mieux comprendre leurs devoirs vis-à-vis du Gouvernement et la ligne de conduite qu'ils ont à suivre quand ils ont des

had been very restrained. The *Regions Beyond* had generalized about Congo conditions, but had given no atrocity stories to the public, and the Council continued this policy. When in June it heard further details from the Swedish missionary SJÖBLOM, who had received his training under the direction of Grattan GUINNESS in London <sup>(1)</sup> and had then worked with the American Baptists on the upper Congo, it was to the Congo Government in Brussels that the Council addressed its complaints <sup>(2)</sup>. GUINNESS followed BAYNES' example in paying a personal visit to Brussels.

SJÖBLOM, however, intended to make an appeal to the public. He had reached the Congo late in 1892 and was in Europe on his first furlough, after several years of personal experience of the rubber régime and of its effects both upon African living and upon the progress of missionary work. In the autumn of 1896 he wrote to the Stockholm press strongly attacking the Congo administration. He interested a Swedish deputy in Congo conditions, alarmed the Congo State consul in Sweden, and called forth from VAN EETVELDE a refutation of his statements which was published in Swedish <sup>(3)</sup>. French translations of SJÖBLOM's story appeared in Paris and Switzerland, and finally reached the Brussels press.

LEOPOLD II acted at once. In September 1896 he appointed a 'Commission for the Protection of the Natives' as an answer to the English and Scandinavian criticism of the Congo State régime. Catholic and Protestant missionaries were to sit together on this Commission to which the King appointed Monsignor VAN RONS-LÉ, Apostolic Vicar of the Congo State, Father VAN HENX-THOVEN, Superior of the Jesuit Mission at Leopoldville,

griefs à faire valoir contre nos agents». WAHIS to VAN EETVELDE, 1 VI 96. A. G. R., V. E. 39.

(1) A. SVÄRD, *Vit man i svard land*, Stockholm, 1942, p. 29.

(2) C. B. M. Minutes, 24 VI 96.

(3) SVÄRD, pp. 75-6.

Father DE CLEENE of the Scheut Fathers, GRENFELL and BENTLEY of the B.M.S., and SIMS of the American Baptist Mission (1). The Commissioners were to inform the Governor-General of any acts of violence which came to their personal notice, and to advise the Government on measures to be taken against the slave trade. Each member of the Commission was to have the right to communicate directly with the Governor-General (2). At the same time LEOPOLD appointed a State Inspector; the King intended to give any real authority to the Inspector rather than to the Commission (3), for the chief function of this body was apparently to impress the critics of the State régime. The King's move was not without effect. The British press gave a warm welcome to the appointment of the Commission, and the general opinion seemed to be that since English Protestants were represented on it, its appointment would be effective in checking abuses (4). Five weeks later a Belgian observer in London reported that since the publication of the decree, English press attacks on the Congo State

(1) SIMS had worked under the L. I. M. in the early years of Congo missions. Like GRENFELL, he was very conscious of the difficulties of the State, and had advised against the publication of atrocity stories. SIMS to DUNCAN, 10 VI 96. A. B. M. U.

(2) A few months before this, missionaries had been told that their communications to the Governor should be made through the *Commissaire de District*.

(3) "En nommant l'Inspecteur de l'État chargé de veiller à l'application de nos règlements il faudra définir ses attributions, y mettre ce que je retranche à la commission. Le Gouvernement ne peut pas abdiquer ses devoirs entre les mains d'une sorte de commission théocratique et philanthropique. Nous ne devons pas créer de confusions dans les attributions rendre le Gouvernement encore plus difficile et cela sans satisfaire nos adversaires qui ne désarmeront que lorsqu'ils auront abattu l'État". LEOPOLD II to VAN EETVELDE, 17 IX 96. A. G. R., V. E. 33.

(4) "The Commissioners, several of whom are Englishmen, are not likely to fail in their duty to the natives". *Globe*, 21 IX 96. "The British missionaries who have seats on this commission are pretty certain to see that its work is rendered efficient". *Scarboro' Post*, 22 IX 96.

"It... depends on the way in which the Commissioners do their work... But as they consist of members of rival religious bodies, it is probable that apart from their zeal in the cause of humanity, they will mutually keep each other up to the mark in order to prove their care for the welfare of the natives". *Graphic*, 26 IX 96.



had completely finished (1). The appointment of the Commission had provided a breathing space for the Congo State, and VAN EETVELDE was determined to take advantage of it (2).

But not all reactions were as hopeful as those of the English press. Neither the Belgian critics of the King's policy (3) nor the Aboriginies' Protection Society (4) had much faith in the constitution and powers of the Commission. The C.B.M. Council regretted that a C.B.M. missionary had not been appointed, someone able to represent districts where there was much to complain of from the administration of the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company (5). The choice of the members of the Commission certainly seemed an extraordinary one; they were all posted at stations far removed from the areas from which atrocity stories had come. Even GRENFELL, based on Bolobo, was two hundred miles away. GRENFELL's first reaction to the news of his appointment to the Commission was not a hopeful one; he felt that the Commission could have little authority (6) and that its appointment was merely a quick answer to the criticisms which had been directed against the State (7). The British consul shared his opinion (8).

(1) DE BENHAM to DE FAVEREAU, 30 X 96. Congo, 1<sup>re</sup> serie, II, 539.

(2) "La campagne contre le Congo et ses horreurs a pris fin, mais elle renaîtra si nous ne sévissions pas désormais contre ceux qui transgressent les lois de l'humanité à l'égard des noirs.... Notre magistrature n'a plus de fautes à commettre, si nous voulons éviter l'établissement de la justice consulaire". VAN EETVELDE to WAHIS, 5 XI 96. A. G. R., V. E. 39.

(3) Georges LORAND, in *La Réforme*, 22 IX 96.

(4) Cf. its resolutions to Lord SALISBURY and VAN EETVELDE, 12 XII 96.

(5) C. B. M. Minutes, 24 IX 96.

(6) "If the authorities are really in earnest about rectifying abuses, they can do it without a commission of missionaries, and if they are not in earnest, it will require a commission with a very different constitution to produce any practical result". GRENFELL to BAYNES, 25 XI 96. B. M. S.

(7) "What better way to allay the excitement than the appointment of a commission of missionaries? And what step could be taken that would interfere less with the powers that be out here?" GRENFELL to BENTLEY, 7 XII 96. B. M. S.

(8) "He (the British Consul Pickersgill) thinks the Committee is a very artful

So far it had not been the English missionaries who had been responsible for bringing the Congo question before the British public. MURPHY belonged to the American Baptists, and neither the B.M.S. nor the C.B.M. had supported SJÖBLÖM'S public criticisms of the Congo régime. Yet it was the "English missionaries" whom the Governor-General thought of as the chief critics of the Congo State, when he wrote from the Kasongo:

'La région où je me trouve pourrait s'appeler le pays de l'horreur. S'il y avait ici des missionnaires anglais, ils feraient une belle moisson pour leurs journaux. Je vous signale quelques agents qui ont été condamnés, mais que d'autres ont la réputation d'avoir tué des masses de gens pour des raisons petites.' (1)

But the three English missionaries had agreed to serve on the Commission for the Protection of the Natives, and English interest in Congo affairs seemed to be dying down. When the Belgian Minister in London inquired what reply had been given to the Aboriginies' Protection Society's memorial in December, he was told that the Foreign Minister had confined himself to a hope that the appointment of the Commission would have the desired effect (2). DILKE, backed up by the Aboriginies' Protection Society, brought the Congo question before the Commons in April 1897, when he called upon the Government to ask for a new conference of the Powers which had met at Berlin in 1885. The Government made no move, however, and DILKE'S plan was not followed up. It was not until 1903 that the Congo question was again raised in the Commons.

Neither DILKE nor FOX-BOURNE, the secretary of the Aboriginies' Protection Society, had been supported

game... it throws responsibility on our shoulders and gives us no power... The Consul says we should not accept such a farcical position". BENTLEY to BAYNES, 7 I 97, B. M. S.

(1) WAHIS to VAN EETVELDE, 2 IX 96. A. G. R., V. E. 37.

(2) F. O. to Sir F. PLUNKETT, 30 I 97, F. O. 10/731.

by the B.M.S. and the C.B.M. when they made their attacks upon the Congo State. While FOX-BOURNE'S associates included influential Anglicans who were interested in missionary work in other parts of Africa, he had few contacts with the leading members of the B.M.S. DILKE had even fewer, and retained unhappy memories of the missionary opposition to his Anglo-Portuguese treaty. GUINNESS allowed an occasional reference to the Congo situation to creep into the *Regions Beyond* (1), and in the spring of 1897 he introduced SJÖBLOM to FOX-BOURNE with the idea that the Swedish missionary should address a meeting of the Aboriginies' Protection Society to which the press would not be admitted, but he refused altogether to support the publication of SJÖBLOM'S evidence. Whereas SJÖBLOM made a public statement on Congo conditions (2), English missionaries seemed to stand aside from the controversy altogether, or else to allow their names to be used in defence of the State. Governor General WAHIS freely quoted GRENFELL as a supporter of the administration, and VAN EETVELDE declared that men like SJÖBLOM should not be confused with certain B.M.S. missionaries who took no part in denouncing the State (3). Gilzean REID was active on behalf of the State defence (4), and constantly put forward the plea that the Baptist missionaries in the Congo had no complaints to make of the administration.

At last the British Government began to take an interest in what its consul could find out from these same

(1) A. C. B. M. missionary on itineration wrote: "It is very pathetic to hear the question often asked in the districts worked by the Rubber Company: 'Has the Saviour you tell us of any power to save us from the rubber trouble?'" *R. B.*, April 1897.

(2) *Times*, 14 V 97.

(3) *L'Étoile Belge*, 21 V 97.

(4) "One by one from SALUSBURY and MURPHY to that Danish 'missionary' so-called, I have destroyed them and even stopped the hostile criticism in our Parliament. The need never ceases for action". Gilzean REID to VAN EETVELDE 6 XII 97. *A. G. R.*, V. E. 19.

missionaries. According to the Swedish Minister in Brussels, SJÖBLOM was not highly thought of by his fellow Swedes on the Congo (1). PICKERSGILL talked with him, became convinced that he was dealing with a truthful man, although one likely to "injure a good cause by the uncompromising manner of his advocacy", and found it hardly strange that "a fervid Scandinavian of more zeal than culture and more religion than knowledge of the world, should rank low in the estimation of his fellow-countrymen in the service of the Congo State". He talked too with BANKS, an Englishman working with the American Baptists, and with two C.B.M. missionaries. One was RANDALL of Lulanga, who although "of a milder disposition" than BANKS also produced evidence of cruelties, and the other, CLARK of the Equator district, a "clear-headed, genial-hearted Scotchman" who did the same. All four had been interrogated by the Governor-General, and PICKERSGILL was critical of their treatment "... not as informers acting for the public good, but accusers influenced by private motives." He was confident that so long as the administration kept up its demands for rubber, the atrocities would continue (2). These demands seemed unlikely to cease. The missionaries noted with alarm that LOTHAIRE (the State agent responsible for the execution of the Englishman STOKES without a trial) had been appointed to develop the rubber resources of the Ubangi (3), and that the *Commissaire de District* from the Equator who was partially responsible for the atrocities of which SJÖBLOM had written, had been transferred to Bangala (4). There appeared to be no attempt on the part of the State to change the type of European agents which it employed.

(1) Sir F. PLUNKETT to F. O., 16 V 97. F. O. 10/731.

(2) Remarks by Mr. PICKERSGILL, received 2 VI 97. F. O. 10/731.

(3) BEEDHAM to STAPLETON, 20 IX 97. S. P.

(4) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 25 XI 97. B. M. S.

Relations between the Protestant missionaries and the State officials had become strained. Some of the missionaries used unfortunate terms in formulating their complaints that the Africans were taxed to excess; GRENFELL found it necessary to apologise to the Governor-General for the tone of a letter sent by the B.M.S. missionary Weeks to his local *commissaire de district* (1), and stressed to Weeks the importance of using conventional terms when approaching the State authorities (2). GRENFELL even suggested that the B.M.S. Committee might check the correspondence of its missionaries on the subject of the Congo administration (3). Sometimes State officials were ordered by their superiors to cease visiting Protestant missionaries (4), and these missionaries were openly treated with contempt by African soldiers in State employ (5). What was regarded as unnecessary interference on the part of the missionaries was intensely disliked by the State officials (6), who complained that in the neighbourhood of the Protestant missions the Africans refused to pay their taxes (7). The administration was anxious that the influence of the English missionaries should spread no farther into the interior of the Congo State than it had already done (8).

(1) WEEKS to the *Commissaire de District* of Bangala. 6 XI 97, Tervueren, 50.47.136.

(2) GRENFELL to WEEKS, 31 I 98, in GRENFELL to BAYNES, 1 II 98. B. M. S.

(3) "Would it be 'unconstitutional' for you to formulate a request to the brethren that they should refrain from criticising the administration of the State save in such letters as they may pass through your hands or through the Committee? It is so easy to take a false step, and with so many avowed enemies we must walk warily". GRENFELL to BAYNES, 21 II 98. B. M. S.

(4) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 17 IV 98. B. M. S.

(5) Diary of W. L. FORFEIT, 23-6 X 98. S. P.

(6) "Occupez-vous de vos prêches, mais de vos prêches seulement; je suis persuadé que les gens de N'Ganda se seraient montrés plus dociles s'ils n'avaient pas cru que votre présence parmi eux pouvait en partie les dispenser de remplir leurs devoirs envers l'État". Copy FIEVEZ to MURPHY and SJÖBLOM, 20 XII 94, in FUCHS to the *Secrétaire d'État*, 25 I 95. M. des C., M. 87 (579).

(7) *Ibid.*; copy SARRAZYN to WAHIS, 25 II 97. M. des C., M. 87 (579).

(8) "J'attache en effet une grande importance à ce que les régions où les

But Protestant missionaries were already scattered over the State territory at widely separated points. The next group to report trouble lived in quite a different area, the Kasai, and were members of the American Presbyterian mission. In 1898 a State officer arrived at Luebo and in spite of the protests of the missionaries allowed his African soldiers to pillage the surrounding African towns, announced his intention of moving several thousands of Baluba to the State post at Luluabourg to supply forced labour, and imposed a very heavy taxation in food. A great deal of the trouble in the Kasai came from the use which the State made of cannibal Zappo-Zap <sup>(1)</sup> soldiers for the collection of this tax. In 1890 LE MARINEL had settled large numbers of Zappo-Zaps near Luluabourg ; they had been given a privileged position as allies and agents of the State, but had remained practically uncontrolled by the European officials. In the summer of 1897 the American Presbyterian missionary SHEPPARD visited one of their camps, and found evidence that the Zappo-Zaps were slave-raiding on behalf of the State, committing atrocities upon the Africans, and practising cannibalism. At the request of the missionaries there was a State inquiry into the situation, but it left the responsible European officials unpunished.

Then MORRISON decided on a wider appeal. In October 1899 he wrote directly to LEOPOLD II to report on the conditions around Luebo, but no improvement resulted. The American Presbyterian Board therefore backed his opinion that publicity must be given to the situation in the Kasai ; early in the following year the *Missionary* contained a full statement of what SHEPPARD had seen <sup>(2)</sup>,

missions protestantes n'ont pas encore pénétré restent, dans la mesure du possible, soustraites à leur influence". Draft VAN EETVELDE to WAHIS, 2 VIII 97. M. des C., M. 103 (586).

(1) Also known as the Basonge, a recently formed, warlike group.

(2) *Miss.*, Feb. 1900.

and commented that the Congo State had violated the Berlin Act. Previously the magazine had contained complaints that the State would not grant fresh concessions of land to the missionaries (1), but these had caused no interest outside the limited group of supporters of the Congo mission. SHEPPARD'S story, however, immediately attracted widespread interest. MORRISON'S charges against the State were repeated in the *New York Independent* in February, and it was not long before the story reached England. A question was asked in the Commons (2), and FOX-BOURNE took up the matter (3).

Congo affairs were again having repercussions in Belgium. In the *Chambre* LORAND reproached Belgian Catholic missionaries for keeping silence about what they must have seen and heard around their stations. A Catholic deputy, COLFS, came to their defence, saying that they would speak out if they could — but they feared lest their mission work should suffer and the name of Belgium be brought to shame (4). In the same manner FOX-BOURNE reproached BENTLEY for writing a book (5) which did not mention the way in which Africans were treated under the State regime, but described the cordial relations which existed between the missionaries and the government (6). LEOPOLD, of course, was doing what he could to keep both Catholic and Protestant missionaries from making public their complaints (7),

(1) *Ibid.*, Jan., Dec. 1899.

(2) 27 II 1900. The reply merely stated that any representations by Americans would naturally be made through their own government, and the matter was not pursued.

(3) *A. F.*, April 1900.

(4) *Annales Parlementaires*, 26 IV 1900.

(5) W. H. BENTLEY, *Pioneering on the Congo*, 2 vol., London, 1900.

(6) *A. F.*, Aug. 1900.

(7) At an interview in 1900 with Bishop AUGOUARD of French Congo, in which they spoke of abuses in the Congo administration, and of the need for choosing State agents with care, LEOPOLD II begged him "de signaler *directement* les faits délictueux qui se produisaient dans l'État Indépendant, *sans recourir à la presse, ce qui est toujours désagréable*". DE WITTE, *Monseigneur Augouard*, p.71.

and many of BENTLEY'S fellow-missionaries must have followed a course similar to his, and thus won the approval of the administration (1). Like the Belgian Catholic missionaries in the Congo, English Protestants had so far made no public criticism of the State regime, and yet they were accused by the Belgian press of being English spies working in the Congo on behalf of their country (2). It is true that the main attack on the Congo State had come from England, but it had been made by the Aboriginies' Protection Society (3), and not by English missionaries.

FOX-BOURNE had not been in contact with English missionaries from the Congo; his information on the missionary side had come from MURPHY, SJÖBLOM, MORRISON and SHEPPARD. GUINNESS had refused to support the publication of SJÖBLOM'S evidence, and FOX-BOURNE'S one meeting with a B.M.S. missionary had served to convince him that he could hope for little support from this society (4). Men like GRENFELL, BENTLEY and BAYNES, who had met LEOPOLD personally, were convinced that he had embarked upon his Congo

(1) This was true of some of the American, as well as of the English missionaries. WAHIS sent to Brussels a complaint made by FARIS, of the Disciples' mission, about the activities of the *Société Anonyme Belge* in the Busira basin. He added with approval that: "Le missionnaire dont il s'agit n'est du reste en aucune façon hostile au Gouvernement de l'État du Congo. Il m'a déclaré que ce qu'il exposait n'avait été dit par lui à personne et qu'il s'abstiendrait d'en parler à l'avenir". 19 X 1900. Aus den Archiven des belgischen Kolonialministeriums, Berlin, 1918, note, p. 8.

(2) *Le Patriote*, 18 X 1900.

(3) LORAND tried to make this attack more Belgian in character. He suggested to FOX-BOURNE that it would be useful to start a Belgian branch of the Aboriginies' Protection Society, since this "would not be exposed to the stupid reproach of foreign interference in Belgian affairs". LORAND to FOX-BOURNE, 4 IV 1901. Rhodes House, MSS. Brit. Emp., S. 22, G. 261.

(4) "It is absurd (for FOX-BOURNE) to say that I asked the A. P. S. not to protest. It was not connected with the B. M. S., and could not prejudice the B. M. S. with the Congo Government... He had been reading a paper to the Young Men's Improvement Society at Clapham Downs Chapel in 1898... against the way in which aboriginies are treated by governments in Africa... I said he should look at the other side". BENTLEY to MACALPINE, 20 XI 05. B. M. S.



enterprise with the highest ideals before him, and with the welfare of his African subjects at heart. In allotting the blame for the conditions in the Congo, the B.M.S. made a distinction between the central Congo government in Brussels, and the actions of some of its subordinate officials in the field, a distinction which was rare among critics of the Congo State in England <sup>(1)</sup>. The older missionaries, who had experienced conditions of life in the Congo in 1879, realised how much their work had owed to the advent of a European government, and to the comparative peace and security, law and order, and ease of communication which this brought with it. Those who worked lower down the river, like GRENFELL and BENTLEY, could scarcely realise the conditions which existed in the rubber districts. Upper river missionaries like STAPLETON and WEEKS reluctantly supported the policy of their committee, and the same was true of the C.B.M. missionaries. So — in spite of Belgian complaints that English missionaries were hostile towards the State, and were trying to spread British influence in the Congo — it was not, prior to 1900, these missionaries who had been responsible for drawing the attention of the English public to the Congo situation.

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It was the work of Edmund Dene MOREL to bring to birth in England a unified and highly organized movement to crystallize the varied elements of dissatisfaction with the existing administration of the Congo State.

<sup>(1)</sup> " Il (M. BAYNES) me parle des accusations dirigées contre l'État du Congo. Rappelle que la Société n'a jamais appuyé de son autorité ces accusations ; elle sépare d'ailleurs l'État de ses agents en Afrique. (Il) ne peut dissimuler qu'elle finira par être isolée en Angleterre, ou toutes les autres associations qui s'occupent des choses d'Afrique condamnent indifféremment l'administration supérieure et les agents du Congo. A supplié l'État d'agir vigoureusement si réellement des délits se commettent ". Note in the writing of DE CUVELIER on an interview with BAYNES, 3 V 1900. M. des C. M. 92 (582).

It was his energy which aroused and marshalled English public opinion until this stirred the British Government to action by its intensity, and it was his enthusiasm which caused the movement to spread to the United States, and to a lesser degree to Europe. Without his efforts, there would still have been agitation in England against the Congo régime — we have seen that this had already arisen spasmodically since 1890 — but on the humanitarian side it would have remained one amongst many of FOX-BOURNE'S concerns, and FOX-BOURNE alone was unlikely to move the British Government to action. Until 1900 the Congo Government had tried to dismiss the agitation as though it were based only upon the complaints of discharged agents and upon the jealousy of English missionaries and traders who were eager to pursue their own interests in the Congo. The strength of feeling aroused by MOREL'S campaign made such an attitude impossible. It was not until 1904 that MOREL founded the Congo Reform Association, but during the first three years of the century he was making preparations for the great campaign which was to come.

In 1900 MOREL was twenty-seven. Born of a French father and an English mother, he had ten years earlier broken his connections with France and taken a position as clerk in the Liverpool office of ELDER DEMPSTER. At once West Africa claimed his interest, and soon he became an acknowledged expert on West African affairs <sup>(1)</sup>. His attention was also drawn to the Congo. Since 1890 the office had been responsible for running a steamer service between Antwerp and the Congo, and MOREL was placed in charge of the Congo department. Thus he visited Brussels and Antwerp frequently, came into contact with the Congo State authorities, and was soon deeply interested in Congo affairs. His first campaign, however, was concerned not with the Congo

(1) F. S. Cocks, E. D. Morel, the man and his work, London, 1920, pp. 23-6.

State, but with French West Africa, and was organized among the British Chambers of Commerce. MOREL prevailed upon them to take collective action in urging the Foreign Office to secure the free entry of British goods into French West Africa, and the Anglo-French Convention of 1898 was the outcome.

MOREL was an idealist. His campaign had been undertaken not only for the benefit of English trade, but also because of MOREL'S conviction that only a free trade policy would bring prosperity to West Africa, and equally, that free trade would contribute to international peace. So it was with the Congo. Like others, MOREL had heard rumours from time to time that all was not well in the Congo State. His position in the Congo department of ELDER DEMPSTER had aroused his interest in the subject, and he read the charges which had been made against the State by MURPHY, SJÖBLOM, MORRISON, DILKE, FOX-BOURNE, and HINDE <sup>(1)</sup>, together with government publications — the White Book on the STOKES case, and PICKERSGILL'S Consular Report of 1898. Then MOREL'S business training led him to undertake an original line of inquiry; he began to study the Congo States's trade statistics. When he found that exports far exceeded imports, and that in any case a large proportion of the imports were not trade goods, he came to the conclusion that Africans were getting almost nothing in return for the vast quantities of ivory and rubber which were leaving the Congo, nor in return for their labour in collecting these products. He discovered, too, that much of the rubber and ivory shipped from the Congo by the ELDER DEMPSTER line was not included in the returns made public by the Congo Government,

(1) S. L. HINDE, *The fall of the Congo Arabs*, London, 1897. This gave an account of the author's experiences during the Congo State campaign to check Arab advance down the river. It was largely on the evidence given in this book that DILKE based his statements to the Commons in 1897.

that large quantities of firearms were being imported into the Congo, and that the *concessionnaire* companies were making large profits. Gradually MOREL worked out his thesis; the Congo State had dispossessed the Africans of their rights in the land and its fruits, and had even required their labour in collecting these fruits, for a pitifully small return. It was MOREL's conviction that specific atrocities inevitably sprang from this initial dispossession, from this concentration of ownership in the hands of the State — virtually in those of LEOPOLD II, King of the Belgians.

MOREL went with these conclusions to his employer, Sir Alfred JONES. After an interview with LEOPOLD, however, JONES returned from Brussels convinced that the King's intentions were of the highest order, and declared that he must be given time in which to reform the Congo administration. But MOREL was persuaded that the whole system was at fault, and that the ultimate responsibility for conditions in the Congo rested with LEOPOLD alone. It was in this belief that he wrote his unsigned articles on 'The Congo Scandal' for the *Speaker* in 1900. Soon MOREL decided to become a full-time journalist; he took a small house at Hawarden, and gave himself up to the study of colonial policies in West Africa. He condemned both the enforcement of the hut tax in Sierra Leone <sup>(1)</sup>, and the *concessionnaire* system in the French Congo <sup>(2)</sup>. But it was above all to the Congo Independent State that his thoughts were turning. Slowly his plans matured, and he continued to seek what evidence he could find about Congo conditions. Public criticism of the State was beginning to come from some of its ex-officials <sup>(3)</sup>. The missionaries

(1) The Sierra Leone Hut Tax disturbances: a reply to Mr. Stephen, by E. D. M., London, 1900.

(2) Cocks, p. 81.

(3) From an American, E. CANISIUS, in the *Anti-Slavery Reporter*, Oct.-Dec. 1901, and from an Englishman, Guy BURROWS, in the *Morning Post*, 4 I 02.

were silent, however, while Gilzean REID remained an enthusiastic defender of the Congo State, and declared himself ready to cite missionary evidence for his statements that all was well in the Congo (1).

In May 1902 an Aboriginies' Protection Society meeting at the Mansion House gave MOREL his first chance to make a public speech on the Congo question. Here he developed his thesis that the whole economic basis of the Congo State was unsound. It mattered little, he declared, how many specific cases of acts of cruelty could be collected, for the system itself rendered such acts inevitable, and those who wanted reform in the Congo should aim at the overthrow of the whole system. But as yet the Congo State authorities had little to fear from MOREL; he needed far wider support for his thesis than the Aboriginies' Protection Society could provide, for although, as Baron WHETNALL reported to Brussels, "this society contains among its members a certain number of persons of weight, such as Sir Charles DILKE, alone it is not likely to be taken seriously by the British Government" (2).

MOREL realized that the attitude of the English missionary societies which sent men to the Congo would be of great importance to him during the early stages of his work. He knew that only strong pressure from public opinion would move the British Government to take action on the Congo situation, as one of the signa-

(1) "I think that a calm, clear, and authoritative report should be at once prepared and sent to the Foreign Office, which, indeed, I promised some time ago! Were I helped from Brussels, the entirely independent information which I have received from the Baptist missionaries... could be worked in, and afterwards the report might be reproduced not in *one* but in *all* the leading journals, through one of the press agencies which I support". Gilzean REID to VAN EETVELDE, April 1902. A. G. R., V. E. 16.

(2) "... 'des fanatiques, des humanitaires', ainsi que me les a qualifiés un fonctionnaire anglais, qui ne laissent pas de causer parfois même au gouvernement britannique de sérieux ennuis dans ses colonies". WHETNALL to DE FAVE-REAU, 4 VI 02. Congo, 1<sup>re</sup> série, IV, 895.

tory Powers of the Berlin Act. MOREL's case against the Congo State, however, was based on facts and figures, tables of imports and exports, proofs of the vast profits which presumably went directly to King LEOPOLD, since they were unaccounted for in the published budget of the Congo State. But the line that MOREL had taken in addressing the Aboriginies' Protection Society would never appeal to the man-in-the-street. To reach the wider audience which he sought, MOREL needed to produce a stream of evidence showing how the Congo system worked out in practice — evidence of specific atrocities committed upon the Congo peoples by white agents or by the African sentries appointed by them. MOREL was unenthusiastic about Christian missionary work in Africa, and inclined to the view that Islam suited Africans better than Christianity. He realised how little weight many business men would attach to missionaries' stories, and that in some quarters the very mention of the source of his evidence would mean that he would be refused a hearing. He needed to approach such men of affairs with logic and economics. But for the general public he wanted concrete evidence of specific atrocities — and only the missionaries on the spot could provide him with this.

By the autumn of 1902 he had heard of one English missionary who might help him. A friend had shown him a letter which gave an account of the heavy taxation imposed by the Congo State upon Africans in the Bangala area, and the consequent depopulation there. This letter was written by John WEEKS of Monsembe, whom GRENFELL had earlier rebuked for the tone he used in writing to the Congo administration. At once MOREL was able to make good use of the letter by forwarding it in confidence to W. T. STEAD, the editor of the *Review of Reviews*. STEAD had approached Gilzean REID, amongst others, as a man likely to possess authoritative

information on Congo affairs, and MOREL was glad to have conclusive evidence with which to contradict Gilzean REID's statement that, according to the testimony of B.M.S. missionaries, the State was doing its utmost for the welfare of the Africans (1). But MOREL hoped for far more than this. He wanted to get such information into print, and he wanted more evidence of a similar nature.

It was natural that, in view of Gilzean REID's activity on behalf of the King, MOREL should distrust the B.M.S. GRENFELL and BENTLEY were constantly cited as favourable to the Congo régime by the defenders of the State, and it seemed unlikely that they would be willing to help him. It is true that in some ways GRENFELL shared the views of MOREL. He disliked the *concessionnaire* system, and, although he thought that the government might possibly be justified in its appropriation of land, he did not believe that it had the right to compel the Africans to collect the fruits of that land. He criticized the quality of the European administrators in the Congo, and the concentration of power in the hands of unscrupulous men. Unlike MOREL, however he blamed the oppressive taxation upon the State's lack of resources (2). He certainly did not share MOREL's conviction that LEOPOLD was personally responsible for the atrocities committed in the Congo, but he was sure that the King's intentions were above suspicion. Above all, he was averse to *public* criticism of the Congo régime, although privately he did not hesitate to point out to the Congo administration that all was not well. The fact that the Vice Governor-General was ready to admit this, and to profess himself grateful for information on unsatisfactory points, indicated, according to GRENFELL, "a promising attitude on the part of the

(1) MOREL to STEAD, 16 X 02. M. P.

(2) GRENFELL to Gilzean REID, 29 XII 02. B. M. S.

authorities" (1). At home BAYNES, utterly convinced after his personal contacts with the King that LEOPOLD'S aims were of the highest order, was only too ready to adopt such a view. MOREL claimed later (2) that indirectly he had tried to approach the B.M.S. leaders on the subject of Congo maladministration, but that he had met with no response. This was hardly surprising. At the time GRENFELL was very conscious that if the B.M.S. lost the friendship of the State, it would be impossible for the Society to extend its work to the north-east. BAYNES, too, feared to lose the favour of the Congo authorities; we have little evidence on which to base a judgement of his personality and opinions, but it is clear that he was strongly influenced by GRENFELL, by Gilzean REID, and by LEOPOLD.

But MOREL hoped far more from the C.B.M., and he decided to make a direct approach to the mission. He knew that GUINNESS had already been in contact with FOX-BOURNE, and that the C.B.M. missionaries, unlike most of the B.M.S. missionaries, worked in a rubber area. He was not surprised, therefore, when GUINNESS admitted to him that the mission possessed a great deal of information about acts of cruelty committed in the Congo (3).

GUINNESS promised to call a Council meeting which would decide whether or not it was expedient to pass this information on to MOREL; after much discussion, the Council decided that it was not. MOREL was told that in any case the C.B.M. could report nothing which equalled SjöBLOM'S evidence in its gravity. The members

(1) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 7 II 03. B. M. S.

(2) MOREL'S unpublished history of the C. R. A. M. P.

(3) Several extracts from the MOREL-GUINNESS correspondence of November-December 1902 are given in: R. SLADE, English missionaries and the beginning of the anti-Congolese campaign in England, *Revue belge de Philologie et d'histoire*, XXXIII, I, 1955, pp. 37-73. This also gives a more detailed account of the missionary attitude to the campaign throughout 1903 than appears here.



of the Council could hardly be expected to see how any good would result from MOREL'S agitation, or how he in his strange solitary enthusiasm for his self-imposed task could hope to initiate action which would change the policy of the Congo administration. But it was obvious to them that if the C.B.M. took part in a public agitation, its missionaries in the Congo would suffer. Such a policy seemed unjustifiable except in the assurance of a positive benefit to the Africans; with all MOREL'S enthusiasm it seemed unlikely that his rather indefinite programme could offer this.

The B.M.S. gave an even greater blow to MOREL'S hopes. On 1<sup>st</sup> January 1903 a eulogy of the Congo State from the pen of Gilzean REID appeared in the *Morning Post*; in the course of it he cited the leaders of the Baptist mission as his authorities for his picture of the satisfactory conditions in the State. A few days later the B.M.S. apparently accorded its official sanction to his attitude when — with the fullest publicity that Gilzean REID could arrange <sup>(1)</sup> — BAYNES presented an address of thanks to LEOPOLD for the reduction which the King had made in the direct and personal taxes paid by all religious, scientific and charitable institutions in the Congo. This reduction dated from the July of the preceding year. The B.M.S. declaration that the Society wished to express its thanks to the King “ very specially at this juncture ”, might well have appeared to refer to the recent attacks made on the Congo system, especially since it was followed by a hope that “ the peoples of the Congo Free State may realise increasingly the advantages of your enlightened rule ”.

(1) Later in January Gilzean REID urged the decoration of the journalist J. KARHAUSEN: “ M. KARHAUSEN has been thirty-six years on the Reuter Telegraphic Agency, and has often (as on the occasion of the B. M. S. delegation) made special efforts to serve the Free State ”. Gilzean REID to VAN EETVELDE, 14 I 03. A. G. R., V. E. 17.

This was a great disappointment for the Congo reformers. As STEAD wrote to MOREL: "What a field day King Leopold had yesterday! ... As long as he can entrench himself behind the Baptist missionaries, I am afraid that your protests and FOX-BOURNE'S will be more or less ineffective" (1). But whereas FOX-BOURNE soon made an open attack on the Baptist position (2), MOREL refused to do so. He could not understand the mission's attitude in view of WEEKS' letters, and he was only too well aware of the harm done by the publicity given to the address (3); above all, however, he wanted to secure united action on the Congo question, and he still hoped that he might win the co-operation of B.M.S. missionaries. When he discovered that WEEKS was in England on furlough, MOREL approached him personally. He failed to convince the missionary that it was his duty publicly to denounce the presentation of the address, but he managed to elicit several explanations of the B.M.S. action. Under the name of *Africanus* he then sent these to the *Morning Post*. Since the proposal to present an address to LEOPOLD had not been brought before the missionaries in the field, he declared that it could not represent their views; the Committee had merely intended to thank the King for

(1) STEAD to MOREL, 7 I 03. M. P.

(2) *Morning Post*, 9 I 03.

(3) "Since I came back here (Liverpool) I have been a sorrowful witness of the harm that deputation and address have done. It has been flung in my teeth in the Chamber of Commerce African Committee: it has been exploited and boomed in every imaginable way... An influential man... [said]: It is the cleverest thing King LEOPOLD ever did: a master-stroke: at one blow he has enlisted British nonconformity on his side". MOREL to WEEKS, 15 I 03.

"Put yourself in the shoes of the man in the street. That man has heard that the Congo State is the scene of terrible atrocities... suddenly he is confronted with two columns ... from Sir H. G. REID... praising up the State with highest terms... A few days afterwards... Sir H. G. REID presents a deputation of the society... to the King, and the King is given an address which seems to endorse his eulogies... doubt is bound to be cast in the public mind on criticisms of the Congo Free State." *Ibid.*, 19 I 03. M.P.

the reduction in taxation <sup>(1)</sup>, and not to state its approval of the Congo State's policy ; the timing was accidental, for had it not been for the death of the Queen of the Belgians the address would have been presented in the previous summer. He added that the missionaries " have to choose between the risk of being hampered in their work on the Congo if they made public what they know, and by their silence helping to perpetuate the gigantic evil which exists. The choice may be more difficult than outsiders perhaps realise, and yet... duty and compassion alike seem to urge... a courageous policy " <sup>(2)</sup>. With this exhortation he had for the moment to be content.

But MOREL was nothing if not persistent. He decided to apply to Roger CASEMENT, British consul at Boma, for the names of missionaries who might send him reports direct from the Congo <sup>(3)</sup>. At the same time he continued to press GUINNESS to come forward with C.B.M. information, and to work through STEAD to secure an *official* B.M.S. denial of the suggestion that the Society's intention in presenting its address to the King had been to affirm its approval of the Congo system. There was growing public interest in the Congo ques-

<sup>(1)</sup> As a useful bargaining point at the Brussels Conference, the C. I. S. had fixed a very high rate of direct and personal taxation for 1891, but declared that it would collect one third of this only, *if* it were allowed to levy import duties, and it did so. When the increased amount was charged in 1896, BAYNES visited Brussels and secured a return to the one third rate, which, owing to the protests of traders, applied to them as well as to religious bodies. In 1898 the period was again extended until 1901, and at the same time the Congo authorities offered a contribution of 2,500 francs to the B. M. S. as an expression of appreciation for the Society's medical work. In 1901 BAYNES' informal negotiations with VAN EETVELDE produced the suggestion that although it would be difficult to secure a further reduction in taxation, the King would be willing to grant a subsidy to the B. M. S. schools. From this point the B. M. S. records are silent on the question ; nothing is said about further negotiations leading to the announcement of the reduction by half announced in the *Bulletin Officiel* of May-June 1902, nor on the address of thanks presented to LEOPOLD II, until the explanation of this which was made in March 1903.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Africanus* to the Editor, *Morning Post*, 28 I 03.

<sup>(3)</sup> MOREL to WARD, 10 III 03. M. P.

tion ; FOX-BOURNE's book had appeared in January (1), and the Congo State intended to bring a libel action against Guy BURROWS for accusations of cruelty which he had made against three Congo State officers (2). In March DILKE raised the Congo question in the Commons, and there was a debate in the Belgian *Chambre* (3). Although the missionary societies themselves had displayed no official interest, nonconformist opinion expressed itself as being strongly in favour of the movement for Congo reform in the course of a meeting of the Free Church Council held at Brighton on March 12<sup>th</sup>. Here one of the notions adopted urged the British Government to take steps to end the Congo atrocities. The fact that the motion was strongly supported by Robert WHYTE, the representative in England of the American Presbyterians working in the Kasai, led to Belgian comments that it was now the turn of the "English missionaries" to join FOX-BOURNE and BURROWS in the campaign against the Congo State (4).

WHYTE was of course speaking for an American mission. But English missionaries could no longer remain impervious to the general atmosphere of criticism of the Congo system. Already B.M.S. supporters had begun to send protests to the Mission House because of the Society's policy of silence (5). The *Daily News* was critical of its attitude (6), and so was the *Baptist Times* (7).

(1) H. R. FOX-BOURNE, *Civilization in Congoland*, London, 1903.

(2) In his book : *The curse of Central Africa*, London, 1903.

(3) As usual, the Congo defence used GRENFELL's name, and the fact of the presentation of the B. M. S. address in January. *Annales parlementaires*, 18, 20 III 03.

(4) *Métropole*, 15 III 03.

(5) FOX-BOURNE to MOREL, 5 II 03. M. P.

(6) *Daily News*, 9 III 03.

(7) " We think... that in the name of humanity, to say nothing of Christianity, it is incumbent upon the society to take some official public action, not only to clear itself from all suspicion of a silence unworthy of its traditions, but to arouse public opinion on behalf of the Congo natives, so cruelly oppressed ". *Baptist Times*, 13 III 03.

It was essential for the mission to reply, and on March 19<sup>th</sup> a B.M.S. statement appeared in the press. This explained the timing of the presentation of the address of thanks to LEOPOLD, and also declared that since B.M.S. missionaries did not work in the districts where the cruelties were said to be inflicted, they could not give personal testimony about them. To the Congo reformers it seemed a weak defence, but MOREL again refused to take part in a public attack on the B.M.S. position, since he still hoped to create a united front for the cause of Congo reform. A fresh approach to the C.B.M. bore fruit; in April GUINNESS was finally persuaded to write an article on 'The Congo Scandal' (1) for the weekly paper — the *West African Mail* — which MOREL had started at the beginning of the month. This journal was intended to cover the commercial, political and industrial interests of West Africa, and also to devote considerable space to criticisms of the Congo State rule. An article based upon missionary evidence from the Congo was therefore of great value, although MOREL was not yet fully satisfied with the somewhat cautious tone taken by GUINNESS (2).

On the Baptist side, the Free Church Council meeting at Brighton had secured MOREL a noteworthy supporter in the person of Dr John CLIFFORD, a leading preacher well known for his enthusiasm for social reform (3). From this time forward he was to exercise considerable influence upon the B.M.S. by constantly urging the Society to take a bolder stand against oppression in the Congo (4). The *Baptist Times* pressed the Committee

(1) *W. A. M.*, 17 IV 03.

(2) "It is a great thing for him to have come forward, but he will have to say a good deal more yet". MOREL TO STEAD, 16 IV 03. M. P.

(3) J. MARCHANT, John Clifford, London, 1914.

(4) The first sign of this influence came on March 17<sup>th</sup>., only five days after the Brighton meeting. CLIFFORD was not usually present at B. M. S. Committee meetings, but at this one which produced the first official statement of the

to action (1), and in view of the approaching spring meetings of the Baptist Union and of the B.M.S., the Society felt it necessary to make its position clear to the denomination and to the public. Its second public statement was incorporated in BAYNES' report to the annual members' meeting (2). While it repeated its statement that the B.M.S. did not work in the rubber districts, it declared that the recent testimony of Robert WHYTE and Grattan GUINNESS justified an appeal for an inquiry into the system of the *concessionnaire* companies, which, in its opinion, were largely responsible for the Congo cruelties. The Congo State authorities should be asked to make this inquiry by the societies whose missionaries had been eye-witnesses of these cruelties, since whenever the B.M.S. had complained to Brussels, an investigation had been made and justice had been done. This appeal to the King should be supported by a memorial from all the missionary societies which worked in the Congo, but until the Congo Government had been given time to make its reply, the B.M.S. would take no further action.

Naturally MOREL was disappointed by the tone of the statement. He felt that at last he must publicly criticise (3) the suggestion of an appeal to a sovereign "whose personal authority alone directs this vast rubber producing machine" (4). John CLIFFORD, too, felt that

Society on the Congo question, his name appears among those of the honorary members of the Committee present.

(1) "The denomination will demand that its missionary society shall be absolutely clear from any suspicion of silence, indifference, or compromise. It will require the committee to deal with this matter in a straightforward and non-diplomatic manner... We have never liked the policy of allowing missionaries like Mr. BENTLEY and Mr. GRENFELL to be decorated by the government of the Congo Free State. Such relations... tend to prevent free speech". *B. T.*, 27 III 03.

(2) Held on 28 IV 03. In *B T. Supplement*, 1 V 03.

(3) "I have always wanted unanimity. But when I see your society playing consciously or unconsciously into the hands of the Congo State, by appealing to it, then I am bound to protest, because your society is damaging the cause we are fighting". MOREL to STEPHENS, ? V 03. M. P.

(4) MOREL to the Editor, *Daily News*, 5 V 03.

it was necessary for Baptists to go further, and introduced a resolution at the Baptist Union meeting on April 30<sup>th</sup>. This authorised the Baptist Union Council, together with other religious, missionary, and philanthropic organizations, to make a united appeal to the British Government to use its influence for the enforcement of the Berlin Act. The Baptist Union resolution stood out in sharp contrast to the B.M.S. statement. It was the suggestion that the Powers of Europe had the right, according to the Berlin Act, to interfere in the internal administration of the Congo State — in other words, that it was not a sovereign state — which was so distasteful to LEOPOLD II. The B.M.S. had been careful to ask for an inquiry from the King alone ; now CLIFFORD, like MOREL, had made it quite clear that he felt that this was not enough.

The same attitude was taken by MORRISON, the American Presbyterian missionary whose appeal to the King and report from the Kasai had received so much publicity in 1899. On May 5<sup>th</sup>, he addressed a public meeting which had been convened by the Aboriginies' Protection Society, and CLIFFORD took the chair. It was not LEOPOLD but the British Government which should be pressed to action, declared CLIFFORD ; accordingly FOX-BOURNE sent to the Foreign Office a full statement of MORRISON'S account of the effects of Congo maladministration on the Africans around Luebo between 1898 and 1902 (1). Slowly public opinion was becoming aroused. As a Belgian observer wrote : " For us his (MORRISON'S) opinions have no value, but they will excite the English public " (2). MOREL regarded the stimulation of this excitement as one of his main tasks in his unceasing efforts to move the Government to action. Missionary reports were useful, too, in Parliament. On

(1) *A. F.*, June 1903.

(2) *Métropole*, 8 V 03.

May 20<sup>th</sup> the Commons debated Herbert SAMUEL's motion that the British Government should confer with the signatory powers of the Berlin Act, with the idea of ending the abuses which existed in the Congo State. SAMUEL quoted at length from MORRISON's evidence during the debate, and MOREL also sent four letters from WEEKS for his use, although this B.M.S. evidence was to be quoted anonymously. The stock argument of the Congo State defence — the silence of British missionaries — was answered by DILKE and by Sir John GORST when they declared that these missionaries feared the results of speaking out. Finally the wording of the motion was modified, and it passed unanimously.

The B.M.S. attitude continued to be a disappointment to MOREL throughout the summer of 1903. WEEKS had introduced him to J. R. M. STEPHENS, another B.M.S. missionary home on furlough, whose evidence had also to be used anonymously. Morel was impatient that men who had seen Congo conditions for themselves should continue to be loyal to the policy of their Committee. He recorded that two B.M.S. missionaries had come to Liverpool, talked with him, then gone to London and "owing presumably to some occult influence, they have suddenly dropped entirely into oblivion so far as I am concerned" (1). He tried to impress upon individual missionaries that they had a personal responsibility to speak out, even although their action might conflict with the wishes of their Committee (2).

Had MOREL not, from the beginning, made a personal attack upon LEOPOLD II, the B.M.S. attitude to his campaign might perhaps have been different. The King's

(1) MOREL to STEPHENS, 16 IV 03. M. P.

(2) "You left me apparently determined to show your society they should act. Next... an appeal to LEOPOLD by the society whose men know that the system makes oppression inevitable... What arguments would your society have to go upon, if I published tomorrow WEEKS' letters to me? Do realise your responsibility". MOREL to STEPHENS, ? V 03. M. P.



charm was well-known, and many could be won over to his views by a personal interview (1). BAYNES and the older missionaries like GRENFELL and BENTLEY who had come into personal contact with LEOPOLD, were convinced of the King's philanthropic intentions. The B.M.S. had gained a great deal from its friendly relations with Brussels, and particularly at a time when the Society was hoping to expand eastwards along the Congo and the northern tributaries, it wished to do nothing which might prejudice its position with the State authorities. Thus, when the pressure of public opinion made it impossible to keep silence any longer, the Society insisted on an appeal to the King himself, and refused to demand the intervention of the British Government. From recent experience in the Cameroons the B.M.S. realised how difficult it was to move a Government to effective action (2). In 1903 they could hardly be expected to see that the nation-wide movement created by MOREL would finally lead to British intervention in the Congo question, or guess that reform in the Congo would be accomplished largely through pressure from outside.

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Although it took some time for the B.M.S. to realise it, the motion on Congo affairs which had been passed unanimously by the Commons in May 1903 marked a decisive stage in the anti-Congolese campaign. The motion had committed the British Government to action, and to the thesis that the Congo State was not a fully autonomous state, so that its ruler was answerable to the signatory Powers of the Berlin Act for the way in which his authority was exercised. The Congo reformers were

(1) G. STINGLHAMBER and P. DRESSE, *Léopold II au travail*, Bruxelles, 1945, p. 59.

(2) JOHNSTON, I, pp. 61-2.

conscious that without constant pressure from below the Foreign Office would let the matter drop (1). But it was to mean a great deal to the missionary societies that the British Government had taken its stand upon the Berlin Act. It was apparently in contravention of this Act that the Congo administration was showing favour to Belgian Catholic missions at the same time as it refused sites to enable the work of foreign Protestant missions to expand. GRENFELL certainly hoped that the British attitude would now make it easier to secure land (2). In 1903 the English missions were not yet prepared to appeal to the British Government to take action on the question of their sites in the Congo, but they themselves began to appeal to the Act in their negotiations with Brussels (3). It was the thin end of the wedge; finally it brought them into line with MOREL.

This was not the only way in which the action of the British Government had a decisive effect upon their attitude. In a circular note sent to the Powers on August 8<sup>th</sup>, the Government dealt with the question of the treatment of Africans in the Congo State, and also with that of restrictions on religious liberty there. At the same time the British consul at Boma, Roger CASEMENT, was sent to tour the interior of the Congo State, and to make a report on the conditions which he found there. CASEMENT was an Irishman of fanatical intensity, now as always the champion of the oppressed, and he was horrified at what he discovered as he travelled up-river in the American Baptists' *Henry Reed* in company with a C.B.M. missionary. It was CASEMENT'S story which finally convinced missionaries like GRENFELL of the full gravity of conditions in the interior. The immediate

(1) "As I told you, the real opinion of the Foreign Office is dead against us. They do not want to be snubbed and they are certain they will be". DILKE to MOREL, 20 VI 03. M. P.

(2) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 25 VII 03. B. M. S.

(3) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 31 VIII 03. B. M. S.

result of GRENFELL's meeting with CASEMENT as the consul travelled down river, was the missionary's resignation from his position on the Commission for the Protection of the Natives (1). He was profoundly shocked by all that the consul told him, and he wrote home: "After the interview (with CASEMENT) I almost decided to turn the *Peace* round so that I might go down country and... go directly to Brussels and represent matters to the King" (2). GRENFELL remained convinced, however, that LEOPOLD himself was not aware of, nor responsible for, the conditions of which CASEMENT had told (3).

It was CASEMENT's tour of the upper Congo, and his assurances that the British Government intended to act on the information he was collecting, that led many of the English missionaries to give public support to the cause of Congo reform. Naturally CASEMENT — who had been connected for a period with the B.M.S. as a lay worker — applied to the English missionaries for their help while he was conducting his investigations. He travelled as far as Bolobo in a steamer which belonged to the *Société Anonyme Belge*, but there he was able to transfer to the *Henry Reed* and consequently had far more freedom of movement. At Bolobo CASEMENT had only to note complaints about the *manner* of exacting taxation in labour, rather than its total pressure upon the Africans. But while he was there he wished to gain authoritative evidence of the ineffectiveness of the Commission for the Protection of the Natives, since the existence of this body was constantly put forward by the Congo defence as a guarantee of the good intentions of the State. GRENFELL was able to

(1) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 15 IX 03. B. M. S.

(2) *Ibid.*, 16 IX 03. B. M. S.

(3) "I cannot believe His Majesty is careless of the people so long as the rubber comes in, or I would have to join his accusers". GRENFELL to BAYNES, 4 VI 04. B. M. S.

provide such evidence, and CASEMENT was in no doubt as to its value <sup>(1)</sup>.

Passing further up the river with DANIELSON, his companion of the C.B.M., the consul arrived at the B.M.S. station of Lukolela. Here John WHITEHEAD criticized both the excessively heavy labour taxation, and also the ill-treatment of African witnesses who had been called upon to establish cases of cruelty on the part of State agents. He explained that this naturally made the missionaries very hesitant to lodge complaints. Then after making a critical survey of the rubber area of Lake Mantumba and of the system of taxation practised at Coquilhatville, the consul passed on to the Bongandanga sector of the area worked by the Anglo-Belgian India-rubber Company. Besides reporting some of the abuses which resulted from the Company's eagerness to procure rubber at all costs, CASEMENT commented on the insecurity of the C.B.M. missionaries who lived in the region and who were completely at the mercy of the A.B.I.R. officials. It was from the missionaries that he collected most of his atrocity stories. Throughout his report CASEMENT noted specific and striking cases of ill-treatment, rather than criticizing the system of administration in general terms.

During the period which elapsed between the sending of the British note and the publication of the CASEMENT report in February 1904, it was difficult for the mission executives to formulate their policy. They were doubtful of the result which would come from the sending of the note, and there was in fact a complete lack of response

(1) "The Foreign Office regard your statements about the impotency of the Commission as of 'great importance'... I beg you will consent to the publication of the remarks attributed to you in my despatch... I am sending a list of questions — no objection could be taken to your answering questions put by your consul... We want to show the powerlessness (of the Commission) — the fact that it could do nothing does not reflect on you and your colleagues". CASEMENT to GRENFELL, 22 X 03. B. M. S.

on the part of the Powers. They were experiencing the greatest difficulty in Brussels in their efforts to obtain new sites. After long negotiations the B.M.S. was offered a site at Yalembea, but on an impossible condition ; it was to be occupied during GRENFELL'S lifetime alone<sup>(1)</sup>. Owing to " the Anglophobe feeling in Belgium " GUINNESS had refrained from visiting Brussels himself to ask for new sites on behalf of the C.B.M., but he had accepted the offer of Sir Alfred JONES, the Congo State consul in Liverpool, to approach the King on behalf of the mission. The land requested had, however, been refused<sup>(2)</sup>.

In this situation the B.M.S. Committee continued its policy of taking no public action liable to offend the Congo authorities. Individual Baptist missionaries, however, were not so careful. WEEKS had returned to the Congo impatient for improvement, and considerably impressed by MOREL'S conviction that an informed public opinion might have an effect both upon the Congo Government and upon the Powers. But he would not appeal to public opinion without first using the normal channels of complaint, and in June he wrote to the *Commissaire de District* to describe the unfortunate effects of excessive taxation on the Bangala people. When a month had passed and he had received no reply, he sent a copy of his letter to the Governor-General. When he again met with no response, he sent copies of his letters to MOREL at the end of August, with permission to use them as he wished. MOREL was delighted at his first outstanding success in obtaining detailed missionary evidence, and by a " happy coincidence " <sup>(3)</sup> the publication of WEEKS' information <sup>(4)</sup> appeared at the

(1) WANGERMÉE to Lawson FORFEITT, 21 I 03. B. M. S.

(2) C. B. M. Minutes, 24 IX 03.

(3) Viewed thus by the *Morning Post* in an editorial, 24 X 03.

(4) *W. A. M.*, 23 X 03.

same time as the Congo State reply to the British note. The two together led to a severe criticism of the Congo administration in the British press (1). While the B.M.S. executive was displeased at WEEKS' initiative, the *Baptist Times* was enthusiastic (2).

Although the official attitude of the B.M.S. towards the Congo agitation remained the same, that of the C.B.M. had changed by the end of 1903. This was due to the tireless efforts of MOREL, who finally persuaded GUINNESS to co-operate fully with him (3). MOREL was most anxious to make use of the information which had been brought home by the C.B.M. missionary DANIELSON, CASEMENT'S companion during his tour of the upper Congo. The necessity for the pressure of public opinion was urgent, for it seemed that the Foreign Office desired it (4). DANIELSON'S story, together with the interest which the British Government had displayed in the Congo question, aroused the C.B.M. Council to action. At a meeting on November 26<sup>th</sup> it decided to publish a booklet of missionary evidence on conditions in the Congo State, and to arrange a series of mass meetings in leading cities to arouse public opinion. FOX-BOURNE had been doubtful whether GUINNESS' co-operation would be of much value in the cause of Congo

(1) "Cette publicité est le signal d'une recrudescence de congophobie dans toute la presse". Count de LALAING to DE FAVEREAU, 24 X 03. Congo, 1<sup>re</sup> série, V, 1334.

(2) "This series of letters comes very opportunely... We do not hope much from the powers, but letters like WEEKS' will keep public opinion in England alive, and knowing they are watched may impose some check on officials... We admire the courage with which Mr. WEEKS has spoken". *B. T.*, 30 X 03.

(3) "I had a long talk with Dr. Grattan GUINNESS in London and I now think the alliance established between us will be productive of good results to all concerned". MOREL to WHYTOCK, 10 XI 03. M. P.

(4) "Grattan GUINNESS of the Regions Beyond Mission has some terrible information. The Foreign Office seem to desire all the pressure from public opinion which they can get; in fact, between ourselves, FARNALL (who is the man in charge of these things at the Foreign Office, and who is rather pessimistic as to the amount of reports we are getting from Congo) said to me, "If you drop the Congo question, you may be certain that the Government will drop it." MOREL to WARD, 10 XI 03. M. P.

reform (1), but Morel was anxious to present a united front so far as possible and was therefore willing "to overlook individual peculiarities in the common cause" (2). A humanitarian campaign of this sort was not an isolated event in English history; it followed in the tradition of the older anti-slavery pressure, the agitation over the Bulgarian atrocities, and other movements of a similar kind. With concrete and striking evidence to put forward, it would not be a difficult matter to arouse the indignation of the English public.

MOREL hoped that GUINNESS' meetings might be run on non-religious lines, and persuaded STEAD to use his influence with GUINNESS to see what could be done. STEAD called a meeting, and it was finally arranged with GUINNESS' consent that they should "be carried on as atrocity meetings, without reference to any missionary society, and the money to go to the expenses of the meetings". They were "to be held under the auspices of the International Union (of which STEAD was secretary) and not identified with any party or sect" (3). When later GUINNESS changed his mind and proposed to announce the collection of funds on behalf of the C.B.M. at the meetings, MOREL withdrew all promise of support (4). The matter was finally settled, however, when John HOLT came forward with an offer to defray the expenses of the first meeting at the Philharmonic Hall, Liverpool, so that this could remain non-sectarian (5). MOREL was always to have difficulty in holding together his allies in the cause of Congo reform,

(1) "It seems to me his Congo Balolo Mission is all-in-all to him and Congo atrocities of small interest except in so far as they may bring in funds for his society... for this reason, I doubt whether he will effectively work with us". FOX-BOURNE to MOREL, 24 XI 03. M. P.

(2) MOREL to FOX-BOURNE, 23 XI 03. M. P.

(3) STEAD to MOREL, 17 XII 03. M. P.

(4) MOREL to IRVINE, 16 I 04. M. P.

(5) Telegram, MOREL to CASEMENT, 20 I 04; MOREL to GUINNESS, 20 I 04. M. P.

for they differed a great deal among themselves. As he impressed upon GUINNESS :

“ We want to convert not only the religious people, but hard-headed men of the world. Now nothing, rightly or wrongly, acts upon such men as a greater deterrent than the feeling that ‘ religious fervour ’ or missionary enthusiasm is the controlling motive. ” (1)

GUINNESS was to be a difficult ally, but MOREL was thankful that he had at last emerged on the side of Congo reform. The editorial of the January number of the *Regions Beyond* was very strongly on his side, and when further information on conditions in the Lulunga region came from Charles BOND, the mission made its first approach to the Foreign Office ” (2).

Thus by the beginning of 1904 it had publicly proclaimed its hostility to the Congo State system. Other individual B.M.S. missionaries joined WEEKS in taking the same stand. A. E. SCRIVENER, a B.M.S. missionary at Bolobo, sent MOREL the account of a journey he had made in the summer of 1903 from Bolobo to Lake Léopold II, which was situated in the centre of a rubber area. His story appeared (3) just before the opening of Parliament, and in time to quicken interest in the expected Casement Report ; it was therefore from MOREL’s point of view most opportune. Later in January an account of the “ Yandjali massacre ” witnessed by four missionaries, was published in the *West African Mail* (4). For a long time there had been criticism in Belgium of the “ English missionaries ” who were attacking the Congo State. It was only now, however, that English missionaries were making public their views about the conditions in the Congo. The subject of misgovernment was bound to come up at the General Conference of

(1) MOREL to GUINNESS, 5 II 04. M. P.

(2) C. B. M. Minutes, 26 I 04.

(3) *W. A. M.*, 8 I 04.

(4) *W. A. M.*, 29 I 04.



Protestant missions which was held at Stanley Pool early in 1904 ; the Conference drew up a memorial on the subject of oppressive taxation, and this was presented to LEOPOLD through the Governor-General (1). But the administration did not object so much to this form of complaint as to the *publicity* being given by missionaries to Congo conditions. Missionary magazines were collected in Brussels and were searched for references hostile to the State policy (2). The frequent questions asked in the Commons on the subject of missionary information must also have been noticed at Brussels.

The publication of the Casement Report in mid-February was an encouragement to those missionaries who had come forward publicly with their complaints, for their reports were now fully corroborated by a British consul, so they might well expect the Government to take official action. The Congo defence made the obvious charge that CASEMENT had so identified himself with the missionaries that he had lost his independence of judgement. The consul had foreseen that this would happen, and he had stressed his connection with the missionaries as little as possible ; his report, for example, mentioned the *Henry Reed* as " a small steamer which I had secured for my private use ". But the Congo defence

(1) G. C. R., 1904, pp. 42, 44.

(2) For example, a reference to rubber collection in the Christian and Missionary Alliance magazine of 13 II 04, to be found in the library of the *Ministère des Colonies*, Brussels, is heavily marked in blue pencil. In the same magazine of 9 IV 04 a report appeared on the recent British expedition to Tibet. A passing reference to ' hostile contact with the natives ' was ringed round in blue pencil, with the comment ' si c'était au Congo '.

(3) The *Notes on the Casement Report* which appeared from Brussels in March claimed that by his association with the English missionaries the consul would appear as the antagonist of the established authorities and the redresser of their wrongs, real or imaginary, and this impression would colour their statements. A typical observation is that of James HARRISON in a letter to the Editor, *Morning Post*, 25 VI 04 : " It is well-known to all natives on which side most of the Protestant and Baptist missionaries are, and to expect them to give contradictory evidence in such circumstances is attributing them with virtues unpossessed ".

certainly identified British missions with British politicians in unanimous hostility to the Congo State (1). This was consistently the attitude taken in the *Vérité sur le Congo* and in other pamphlets disseminated by the *Fédération pour la défense des intérêts belges à l'étranger*, a society formed at Brussels during the summer of 1903 (2) to answer the criticism directed against the administration of the Congo State.

The publication of the Casement Report was followed in March by the formation of MOREL'S Congo Reform Association. Since the avowed object of this Association was to move the British Government to action on the Congo question, the B.M.S. would have nothing to do with it. CLIFFORD, however, was from the first an enthusiastic member, with a place on the preliminary committee, while GUINNESS undertook to address a series of meetings held under the auspices of the Association. It was the C.B.M. which, to reinforce MOREL'S written propaganda, supplied him with photographs of mutilated children whose hands had been cut off by the rubber sentries (3); by contrast the B.M.S. Committee, much to MOREL'S displeasure (4), was urging its missionaries to complain first to the local officials, or secondly to the Governor-General through the accredited mission representative, or finally to Brussels through the home committee (5). BAYNES assured the Congo administration

(1) *Indépendance Belge*, 23 VI 04.

(2) STENMANS, p. 268.

(3) *W. A. M.*, 19 II 04, 26 II 04.

(4) "I am grieved to say that the Executive of your Society appears to be labouring under the same hypnotism as of yore. One of your missionaries we peremptorily instructed not to allow me to publish some matter he had forwarded to me for publication. I am striving for the sake of unity to hold my hand, but if this sort of thing goes on much longer I tell you candidly that I shall show up your Executive... If those of us at home who are giving our time to it throw it up in weariness, the British Government will retire... and... the whole thing will collapse, and... the result will be the expulsion of the Protestant missionaries". MOREL to WEEKS, 9 III 04. M. P.

(5) Charles WILLIAMS (chairman, B.M.S. Western committee) to the missionaries on the Congo, 16 II 04.

that the publicity given to the criticisms of SCRIVENER and WEEKS had not been approved by the Committee (1). It was a policy approved by GRENFELL, who feared that MOREL was only an "agent of the Liverpool and Manchester Chambers of Commerce" (2). At home BAYNES declined GUINNESS' suggestion that the two societies might take united action on the Congo question (3). Although a bolder policy was constantly urged on the Committee both by some of the missionaries in Congo (4) and by supporters of the society in England (5), BAYNES remained unmoved, and refused all overtures made by FOX-BOURNE in the spring of 1904 in the hope that the B.M.S. would take part in a conference which the Aboriginies' Protection Society was organising to discuss the Congo question (6).

But in spite of the Society's official attitude, MOREL continued to publish evidence supplied by WEEKS, SCRIVENER and FRAME (7). GUINNESS was attracting a good deal of attention by engaging in public debates with representatives of the Congo State — usually the Congo consuls in England — and the missions had become completely identified in the eyes of the State authorities with MOREL's campaign. This was hardly surprising in view of the reports sent to Brussels from the consuls in England (8); the missionaries became

(1) BAYNES to DE CUVELIER, 5 II 04. M. des C., M92 (582).

(2) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 4 VI 04. B. M. S.

(3) GUINNESS to BAYNES, 15 III 04, BAYNES to GUINNESS, 25 IV 04. B. M. S.

(4) WEEKS to Charles WILLIAMS, 5 IV 04, FRAME to BAYNES, 5 IV 04, SCRIVENER to BAYNES, 26 IV 04. B. M. S.

(5) Resolution of the Sheffield auxilliary of the B. M. S., 30 III 04.

(6) FOX-BOURNE to BAYNES, 28 IV, 20, 23, 26, V 04. BAYNES to FOX-BOURNE, 17, 20, 25 V 04. B. M. S.

(7) *Special Congo Supplement, W. A. M.*, May 1904.

(8) Charles SAROLEA reported from Aberdeen that it was especially in the theological faculty of the University, "où les missionnaires protestants ont une grande influence, que j'ai trouvé une hostilité très marquée"; SAROLEA to DE FAVEREAU, II III 04. Cong, 1<sup>re</sup> série, VI, 1517.

Edouard SÈVE reported of a recent Liverpool meeting that "il n'y avait pas

known as the "professionnels colporteurs de calomnies" (1). Their evidence continued to be produced in the Commons, and throughout 1904 new names began to appear in the *West African Mail* as responsible for missionary reports (2). It was only to be expected that in the field the missionaries should suffer in consequence, and that, in despair of starting new work in State territory, they should write that "the only districts open to us for promising work are those *outside* the Congo Free State" (3). VAN EETVELDE began to explore the possibility of the State attacking the English missions through their educational programme (4). The situation of C.B.M. missionaries in the A.B.I.R. area was particularly difficult. In some places children were forbidden to attend the mission school or the mission services, and mission food supplies were cut off. A friendly service like the carrying of mail was now refused by A.B.I.R. officials to C.B.M. missionaries (5), while the Africans

sur les onze cents personnes présentes dix qui soient intéressées dans le commerce d'Afrique et aucun chef de maisons très importantes, le reste du public éparpillé dans cette grande salle de la ' Philharmonic Hall ' qui peut contenir 2.500-3.000 personnes était presque exclusivement composé de coréligionnaires du D<sup>r</sup> GUINNESS, des ' non-conformists ' ". SÈVE to DE FAVEREAU, 24 III 04. Congo, 1<sup>re</sup> série, VI, 1546.

(1) *Petit Bleu*, 28 III 04.

(2) FROST, STANNARD and HARRIS in *S. C. S., W. A. M.* Aug. 1904, followed by JEFFREY in September, WHITESIDE in October, HARVEY in November.

(3) DODDS to BAYNES, 14 VI 04. B. M. S.

(4) "Celles-ci (les missions anglaises) malheureusement ont le droit, d'après l'acte de Berlin, d'avoir des édifices et de s'organiser sans restriction ni embarras. Toute tentative de l'État pour éluder ces dispositions, en fait, doit être menée avec tact et prudence, si l'on veut rester cantonné sur un terrain qui semble tenable. Mais je me demande si en matière d'enseignement, il n'y aurait pas de dispositions législatives à étudier en vue d'assurer le contrôle de l'État sur les écoles et d'empêcher qu'on y donne une instruction hostile à l'État, et destinée à miner son influence tout en proclamant la liberté d'enseignement et des religions, on pourrait peut-être exiger des maîtres un serment de fidélité aux lois et aux institutions, créer un inspectorat qui surveillerait l'enseignement et ferait partout pénétrer l'influence de l'État, et aussi prévoir, après enquête, l'interdiction d'enseigner à ceux qui violeraient la loi ou mineraient nos institutions. Je ne conseille pas une loi draconienne, mais une mesure de défense et un acte d'autorité". VAN EETVELDE to LEOPOLD II, 19 II 04. A. G. R., V. E. 35.

(5) *Courrier du Congo*, letter 880 of 4 IV 04. A. G. R., V. E. 67 bis.

began to fear for their treatment at the hands of the A.B.I.R. officials were they to provide paddlers or to patch a boat for the missionaries (1). The State authorities had great difficulty in trying to curb the hostility displayed by the A.B.I.R. agents (2), and the State sometimes refused new sites to the missions in order to avoid the spread of such hostility (3). MOREL put forward a plea for British consular jurisdiction in the Congo (4), and asked for how long the British people would tolerate the treatment of their countrymen there (5). Such an attitude on the part of MOREL was not likely to endear the English missionaries to the Brussels authorities, and nor were reports from Congo officials declaring that whether the missionaries intended it or not, their attitude was inclined to make the Africans restless, and unwilling to work either for the State or for the *concessionnaire* companies (6). The presence of missionaries in the Congo caused much inconvenience; near their stations, if nowhere else, the local officials had to watch closely to see that only strictly legal demands were made upon African labour (7). There was thus a constantly increasing tension between the missionaries and the officials both of the *concessionnaire* companies and of the State.

(1) *R. B.*, August 1904.

(2) *Courrier du Congo*, letter 880 of 4 VII 04. A. G. R., V. E. 67 bis.

(3) In forwarding a request for new sites the Governor General wrote: " Ces missionnaires ne viendraient que renforcer le nombre de surveillants occultes des agissements des délégués de l'Abir que les sociétés religieuses de confession protestante entretiennent déjà dans cette concession. Le peu de tact et la maladresse dont use M. LONGTAIN dans ses relations avec les missionnaires protestants étant de nature à entretenir et à aggraver leur hostilité, constituent de nouveaux motifs pour amener le Gouvernement à retarder leur installations sur le Haut Lopori et la Haute Maringa. " *Courrier du Congo*. Letter 877 of 6 VII 04. A. G. R., V. E. 67bis.

(4) *S. C. S., W. A. M.*, June 1904.

(5) *S. C. S., W. A. M.*, Sept. 1904.

(6) *Courrier du Congo*. Letter 1024 of 14 VIII 04. A. G. R., V. E. 67.

(7) *Ibid.*, letter 823 of 3 VI 04. A. G. R., V. E. 67.

LEOPOLD read the reports which came from the Congo with the utmost concern ; he realized that something must be done quickly in view of the growing stream of criticism of the Congo régime which was coming from abroad, and particularly from England. His hopes for the future of the State were still high. He therefore counselled humanity towards the Africans, and tact towards the English missionaries :

“ L'opinion en Europe est fortement montée contre l'État du Congo. Veuillez prescrire à nos agents de la manière la plus formelle la plus grande humanité envers les indigènes. Nous devons vouloir les améliorer aussi paternellement que possible, les amener au travail et à la paix.

Recommandez spécialement du tact dans les relations avec les missionnaires. Il ne faut certes pas les laisser enfreindre les lois, mais il ne faut pas être avec eux raides, exigeants, je dirai bêtement autoritaires.

Un état ne peut se maintenir s'il a l'opinion mondiale contre lui.

Nous devons, en surveillant de plus en plus la conduite, la tenue, l'esprit de nos agents, chercher à faire de l'État du Congo un état modèle. ” (1)

\* \* \*

As he saw that the anti-Congolese campaign was threatening to destroy his cherished work in the Congo, LEOPOLD redoubled his efforts to preserve it intact. Historians continue to be baffled by the precise nature of the King's interest in the Congo, and conclude that we do not yet know enough to pass judgement upon his actions. But although a great deal of work has yet to be done upon this aspect of the history of the Independent State, research has shown again and again that it was the King's will alone which shaped his Congo policy ; that he who was a constitutional monarch in Europe, was also an absolute despot in the Congo. One may question

(1) Draft of a letter to FUCHS, unsigned, but in the handwriting of LEOPOLD II, 10 XI 03. A. R. S. C., *Correspondance Léopold II-Van Eetvelde*.

how fully LEOPOLD ever realised the justification for the campaign against the Congo State, which certainly caused him the greatest distress. It is doubtful whether he was ever fully aware that the model state which he hoped to build in the Congo could never be set up by the system which he employed. The King who had sunk his personal fortune in the Congo in the early days of the State, was not prepared in the day of its prosperity to diminish its receipts.

Throughout the anti-Congolese campaign, therefore, the King endeavoured to defend the Congo system as it stood, and to carry out a reform within the system, rather than to overhaul it completely and to alter it drastically. The King became expert in making gestures which demonstrated his desire for reform and thus allayed dissatisfaction in Belgium and abroad ; thus he gained the time which, he believed, was all that was necessary to demonstrate to the world that reform could be carried out within the Congo system as it already existed. He had made a gesture of this kind when he had appointed the Commission for the Protection of the Natives in 1896 ; he made another when he appointed his Commission of Enquiry after the publication of the Casement Report.

A long correspondence between Great Britain and the Congo State preceded this step <sup>(1)</sup>, for LEOPOLD had at first suggested a commission in an effort to avoid the publication of the Casement Report. The King had threatened Sir Alfred JONES with the withdrawal of the contract enjoyed by his Antwerp line of steamers if he did not exert himself to the utmost to calm the English agitation against the Congo State, and then had given him a proposal to convey orally to the Foreign Office. If the Casement Report were suppressed, or even

(1) STENMANS, pp. 284-90.

withheld for a certain length of time, then the King would agree to the constitution of an international commission of investigation, whose members he would nominate himself <sup>(1)</sup>. On CASEMENT'S advice Lord LANSDOWNE refused the suggestion, for the consul expected that the Report would draw the Powers to concerted action. Since it did not in fact have this effect, all that the Foreign Office could do was to demand that the Commission of Enquiry promised by the Congo State in its *Notes on the Casement Report* should be an independent and impartial body, that its sittings should be held in public, and that "any persons, including missionaries of all denominations and nationalities" should be free to give evidence. It denied the Congo State thesis that CASEMENT had been unduly influenced by the English missionaries in the Congo, and that these were antagonistic to the government of the State <sup>(2)</sup>.

The three members of King LEOPOLD'S Commission of Enquiry were of Belgian, Italian and Swiss nationality, and were all trained lawyers; the appointment of such men as Edmond JANSSENS, Baron NISCO and Edmond DE SCHUMACHER gave promise of impartiality and caused general satisfaction. With them went two Belgian secretaries; one of these, Henri GRÉGOIRE, was chosen for his knowledge of English, since neither of the members of the Commission was sufficiently fluent in English to deal with the British and American missionaries who were expected to give evidence before the Commission <sup>(3)</sup>. MOREL had no faith whatsoever in the appointment of the Commission; he was convinced that it was an empty gesture, merely intended to

<sup>(1)</sup> CASEMENT to FOX-BOURNE, 15 X 04. R. H., MSS. Brit. Emp., S. 22, G. 261.

<sup>(2)</sup> The correspondence between Great Britain and the Congo State in 1904 was published in *Africa* No. 7, 1904, and *Africa* No. 1, 1905.

<sup>(3)</sup> J. STENGERS, *Le rôle de la Commission d'Enquête de 1904-5 au Congo*, *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire orientales et slaves*, X, *Mélanges Henri Grégoire*, Brussels, 1950, p. 712.



gain time for the King, and that the Commissioners themselves were employed to defend the Congo enterprise. In this sense he wrote to those Congo missionaries with whom he had been in contact, and urged them to send him copies of any evidence which they might lay before the Commissioners (1). It was not surprising that missionary preparations to collect evidence of recent date were regarded by the Congo authorities with suspicion, and that efforts were made to counteract them (2). At the same time there was an attempt to improve the situation of the missionaries; for example, a relaxation was made in the regulations in force at Baringa, by which the Africans had been forbidden to sell their produce to the missionaries. The regulations were changed just as the Commission reached Stanley Pool (3).

The Commissioners left Antwerp in September 1904 and returned in March 1905. Between October and February, while they were in the Congo, they showed the greatest energy and enthusiasm for their work. Following CASEMENT, they visited the main river as far as Stanleyville, besides branching off into the Lulanga and the A.B.I.R. territories (4), collecting evidence all the way. The Protestant missionaries whom they met were impressed by their evident sincerity, and by their desire to carry out, so far as possible, a full and free investigation (5). At Bwemba the Commissioners listened to BILLINGTON, who confirmed the accounts of the forced labour system in his neighbourhood which

(1) MOREL to SCRIVENER, FRAME, HARRIS, WEEKS, STANNARD, 7 IX 04. M. P.

(2) "SCRIVENER cherche manifestement à se documenter en vue d'étayer ses premières accusations ou pour en présenter de nouvelles aux membres de la Commission. Il faudrait circuler vous-même dans la région parcourue par SCRIVENER, s'il en est temps encore, de façon à contrecarrer adroitement ses projets". COSTERMANS to the *Commissaire de District*, Lake Leopold II, reported in *Courrier du Congo*, letter 1255 of 24 IX 04. A. G. R., V. E. 67bis.

(3) *R. B.*, Jan. 1905.

(4) STENMANS, pp. 290-291.

(5) GRENFELL to BAYNES, 22 XI 04. B. M. S.

he had sent to America, and at Bolobo to GRENFELL, who criticized the lack of judicial officers in the Congo to see that the State laws were enforced. Here, too, SCRIVENER gave a report of his journey into the *Domaine de la Couronne*, and brought a considerable number of African witnesses before the Commissioners. In the Lulanga GILCHRIST gave evidence about the depopulation of the area and attributed it to the excessive taxation, while in the A.B.I.R. region other C.B.M. missionaries — HARRIS, STANNARD, RUSKIN, GAMMAN and PADFIELD — gave their reports and produced African witnesses in support of their statements. WEEKS at Monsembe, FORFEITT at Upoto, and STAPLETON at Yakusu, were some of the other missionaries who gave evidence before the Commission.

MOREL was convinced that a Commission appointed and paid by LEOPOLD could not be expected to criticize the system of government in the Congo State. He wished to impress this idea upon public opinion in England, and he therefore found the welcome given to the Commissioners by the missionaries <sup>(1)</sup> somewhat embarrassing. SCRIVENER hoped that MOREL would find his fears unfounded, for “many of us here are counting a good deal on the Commission” <sup>(2)</sup>. From the A.B.I.R. territory HARRIS reported that the missionaries and the Commissioners were on the best of terms with each other, and were grouped together by the A.B.I.R. agents, who disliked both equally <sup>(3)</sup>. MOREL remained unconvinced. As he wrote to SCRIVENER: “We start from different bases: you believe in the efficacy of the Commission, I do not <sup>(4)</sup>”. It seemed to him that there was “an outward desire to be absolutely impartial, with...

<sup>(1)</sup> *R. B.*, March 1905.

<sup>(2)</sup> SCRIVENER to MOREL, 10 V 05. M. P.

<sup>(3)</sup> HARRIS to MOREL, 16 III 05. M. P.

<sup>(4)</sup> MOREL to SCRIVENER, 28 IV 05. M. P.

appreciation pushed to the point of laudation of the missionaries (the better to disarm their future criticism) and at bottom a desire to make the continuation of the Congo State *as at present constituted* possible" (1).

The Commissioners returned to Belgium in March, but their report was not published until November. Meanwhile public feeling in England was not allowed to die down. Beginning in March, MOREL published the evidence laid before the Commission by those missionaries who had agreed to report it to him. During the spring and summer there were demands from the Commons that the British Government should press for the speedy publication of the Report, and meetings organized by the Congo Reform Association kept public interest alive. But MOREL had still failed to unite the missionary interest behind him. The B.M.S. Committee was content to await the Report of the Commission of Enquiry before taking any public stand on the Congo question (2), and MOREL felt that he could do little more to move the Society (3). It was not until October (when the Report of the Commission was still withheld) that the B.M.S. Committee, pressed by its subscribers and at last following the consistent lead of the *Baptist Times* and the Baptist Union, made its first appeal to the British Government (4).

But if B.M.S. subscribers were continually asking why the Committee discouraged its missionaries from making public their grievances, and why it refused to appeal to the British Government to interfere in Congo affairs, the supporters of the Plymouth Brethren mission in the Katanga took up a very different position. In 1904 Dugald CAMPBELL, one of the Brethren, had sent home

(1) MOREL to HARRIS, 21 VIII 05. M. P.

(2) B. M. S. Report, March 1905; *M. H.*, May 1905.

(3) MOREL to HOPE-MORGAN, 23 VI 05. M. P.

(4) B. M. S. Minutes, 17 X 05.

for publication accounts of ivory raiding in the Katanga, and of the attendant burning of villages, mutilations and deaths (1). Unlike the Baptists, the Plymouth Brethren did not have the tradition of the Nonconformist conscience behind them, and supporters of the mission in England objected to CAMPBELL'S action on the grounds that such interference in the affairs of the civil government lay outside the legitimate sphere of the missionary of the Gospel (2). Even MOREL'S missionary allies in America seemed to be developing a hostile attitude, due to a remark in the *West African Mail* of February 1905 which gave the impression that MOREL believed Islam to be a religion better suited to West Africa than was Christianity (3). However, MOREL gained one steady missionary ally in 1905; John HARRIS of the C.B.M. had been one of his correspondents for some time, and HARRIS now returned to England to address a series of Congo atrocity meetings with great enthusiasm. These kept interest in the Congo question alive while the Report of the Commission of Enquiry was awaited.

The Report produced by his Commissioners was a severe disappointment to King LEOPOLD, for they could only confirm what CASEMENT and the missionaries had said. There must have been close contact between the State Government and the Commissioners between March and September, when their Report could no longer be withheld from publication; their criticisms were not altered nor suppressed, but in the final presentation of the Report they were softened so far as

(1) *A. F.*, March, Oct. 1904; *S. C. S.*, *W. A. M.*, Aug., Sep. 1904.

(2) "Our friends at home and one or two of our missionaries in the field have been so annoyed at our mixing up in the 'Congo controversy' that misunderstandings have been created and our work has suffered... As you doubtless know we are a very conservative people and averse to politics and public controversy and my speaking out has led to a lot of petty quibble amongst ourselves". CAMPBELL to FOX-BOURNE, 25 VII 05. *R. H.*, *MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 22, G. 261.*

(3) *Miss.*, March 1905.

possible (1). CASEMENT had cited precise cases of maladministration which had come to his knowledge; the Commission's Report was less striking, for it employed general terms and did not give specific examples. Thus it would come as less of a shock to the public, but the King realised that it must in any case make a profound impression. He therefore wished to prepare the way for its appearance, and this particularly in England, where already there was so much hostility to his Congo administration.

His first attempt was an approach to the Congo Reform Association in October 1905 through Sir Thomas BARCLAY, one of his defenders in the Congo controversy. But MOREL gave an unhesitating refusal to a request that the Association should submit to the King a scheme under which the Congo territories could be satisfactorily governed — presumably by improvements within the existing system (2). When in turn they were approached by Sir Hugh Gilzean REID, FOX-BOURNE and the Committee of the Aboriginies' Protection Society adopted a similar attitude (3). The King's third attempt was directed to the missionary interest, and at first seemed likely to be more successful. The A.B.I.R. system of government had been exposed by CASEMENT, and the King's own Commissioners had had nothing but criticism for it, while the C.B.M. missionaries in the region had become especially noted for their hostility to the administration. Their latest spokesman, John HARRIS, was causing a great stir in England during the summer of 1905; a continuous stream of petitions poured in to

(1) P. CHARLES, Rapport sur le dossier *Commission d'Enquête. Institut Royal Colonial Belge, Commission d'histoire du Congo*, No. 21, in *Bulletin de l'I.R.C.B.*, XXV, 1, 1954, p. 220.

(2) "Our indictment... is an indictment of that system itself, not of the agents... I personally will never be a party to committing the Congo Reform Association to any ... dealing with the Sovereign". MOREL to F. W. Fox, 20 X 05. M. P.

(3) MOREL to Herbert SAMUEL, 25 X 05. M. P.

the Foreign Office as a result of the series of meetings which he was addressing. MOREL was basing his plea for British consular jurisdiction in the Congo upon the need to defend the C.B.M. missionaries in the A.B.I.R. territory <sup>(1)</sup>. The Governor-General himself objected to the attitude of the A.B.I.R. officials towards the English missionaries <sup>(2)</sup>, and to their tactlessness which was bound to increase missionary hostility <sup>(3)</sup>. The missionary attitude was claimed to make the Africans disinclined to work for the Company <sup>(4)</sup>, while the visit of the royal Commissioners had only increased the tension <sup>(5)</sup>. So if LEOPOLD could win the C.B.M. missionaries in the A.B.I.R. territory over to his side, silence their criticism, and save the Company, it would be a triumph indeed.

It was through Sir Alfred JONES that the King approached the C.B.M. Council. LEOPOLD's plan was explained at a conference held on November 1<sup>st</sup> between Sir Alfred JONES, Sir Ralph MOORE and M<sup>r</sup> COTTON, and some of the members of the C.B.M. Council, reinforced by HARRIS and GILCHRIST. A British syndicate with an exclusive trading right was to take over the A.B.I.R. concession. It would pay 30 % of the profits from its rubber trade to the existing A.B.I.R. promoters, and 40 % to the State ; thus it would itself be left with 25 % of its rubber profits, and the total profits on any other form of trade. The Syndicate would not use forced labour, since the

<sup>(1)</sup> *S. C. S., W. A. M.*, June 1905. Report on a meeting of the C. R. A. Committee in the House of Commons, at which consular jurisdiction was advocated.

<sup>(2)</sup> ' Le Gouverneur-Général a écrit au Directeur de l'Abir, au sujet des lettres que ce dernier a adressées aux missionnaires de Baringa : ces lettres révèlent chez vous une méprise complète sur la véritable situation des missionnaires et sur les droits que vous croyez avoir sur les indigènes qui se trouvent dans les limites de la concession... le commerce est entièrement libre, les indigènes peuvent faire de leurs biens avec n'importe quelles personnes, les transactions qu'ils peuvent désirer '. *Courrier du Congo*, letter 823 of 3 VII 04. A. G. R., V. E. 67 bis.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Ibid.*, letter 877 of 6 VII 04. A. G. R., V. E. 67 bis.

<sup>(4)</sup> *Ibid.*, letter 950 of 22 VI 05. A. G. R., V. E. 68.

<sup>(5)</sup> *Ibid.*, letter 1020 of 24 VI 05. A. G. R., V. E. 68.

State, although not repealing its existing decrees relating to forced labour, would not take action to render them operative in the A.B.I.R. territory unless asked to do so by the syndicate. Thus direct taxation in labour would be abolished in the A.B.I.R. territory, but if trade did not prosper under these conditions the State and the syndicate could confer to decide on a form of direct taxation "not opposed to the system in the British colonies" (2). The C.B.M. Council was asked to cooperate with the new company to secure peaceful administration under a fresh régime. It was itself to be represented on the board of the Company.

If the C.B.M. had given the scheme a favourable reception, HARRIS' campaign of public lectures would have been brought to an end, and the Congo reform movement would have suffered a considerable set-back. Alarmed by the obvious attraction which the idea of the replacement of the A.B.I.R. Company by a British Company held for GUINNESS (3), MOREL did his utmost to persuade him not to countenance such a scheme. He pointed out that as the plan stood, any British company would be faced with the alternative either of meeting heavy deficits or of using forced labour, and that "if King LEOPOLD... can ensure the silence of the missionaries and tide over the present crisis by any preposterous

(1) The A. B. I. R. Company had been set up in 1892 under the new régime, and LEOPOLD II had succeeded in persuading an English business man, Colonel NORTH, to subscribe a large part of its capital. On the death of NORTH the English interest left the A. B. I. R. The Congo State itself held half of the shares of the Company.

Because of the public attention directed to the A. B. I. R. region by CASEMENT and the C. B. M. missionaries, MOREL had expected even before the Commission of Enquiry started its work, that the Congo government would concentrate on reform in this area alone.

(2) Notes used by Sir Alfred JONES, 1 XI 05, enclosed in GUINNESS to MOREL, 3 XI 05. M. P.

(3) "It seems to us... on the broadest lines, a wise suggestion to introduce into the very heart of the Free State a British monopoly which shall set an example of what can be accomplished by methods at once humane, liberal, firm and moderate". *A New Congo Policy*: enclosure in letter of GUINNESS to MOREL, 3 XI 05. M. P.

scheme of this kind — why, it would pay him to finance Sir Alfred Jones for no other purpose... They are trying to divorce the missionary element from the Reform Movement ” (1).

The C.B.M. answer was to be formulated at a Council meeting to be held on November 7<sup>th</sup>. MOREL urged that full publicity should be given to LEOPOLD'S proposals and to the reasons for the C.B.M. rejection of them, which he “ confidently anticipated ” (2). It was, however, to his great relief (3) that the Council finally decided to refuse to co-operate in the King's plan, and to “ maintain our opposition to the existing régime until through the entire territory of the Free State, the rights recognised by the Powers as the inalienable portion of the natives are secured ” (4). When Sir Alfred JONES publicly blamed the C.B.M. for its refusal to support LEOPOLD'S reform scheme, GUINNESS replied by publishing the proposals, and by pointing out how precarious was their basis (5). Thus instead of helping the Congo defence, the whole episode had only increased the suspicion with which the British public regarded the Congo State administration.

A similar result came from another effort made concurrently by LEOPOLD in an attempt to prepare the way for the Commissioners' Report. Both showed the importance which the King attached to the place of the missionary element in the Congo Reform movement. On November 3<sup>rd</sup>, the day before the Report was given to the Belgian press, the leading British journals received from the “ West African Missionary Association ” what purported to be a summary of this document, and many of them published it on the following day. When the

(1) MOREL to GUINNESS, 5 XI 05. M. P.

(2) Telegram, MOREL to GUINNESS, 7 XI 05. M. P.

(3) MOREL to W. A. CADBURY, 8 XI 05. M. P.

(4) GUINNESS to JONES, 8 XI 05. In *W. A. M.*, 24 XI 05.

(5) The GUINNESS-JONES correspondence appeared in the *W. A. M.*, 24 XI 05.



official text of the Report appeared, however, there was great surprise at the degree to which its statements had been toned down in the summary. Those connected with missionary work on the Congo had immediately been suspicious of a society of which they had never heard <sup>(1)</sup>, but the public had in general accepted the summary without suspicion. When the difference between the two reports was noticed, however, an enquiry was made ; The W.A.M.A. was found to be an association which had displayed no other activity apart from the publication of the summary, its members were a handful of Irishmen, and its headquarters were in Brussels <sup>(2)</sup>. The exposure caused a considerable stir in England <sup>(3)</sup>.

The effect of the long-awaited Report itself was different from that of the Casement Report. It has already been noted that the Commissioners grouped their remarks together under general headings, and presented no particular instances of maladministration. The evidence laid before the Commission was *not* included in the published Report. The missionary evidence which MOREL had published had already roused English opinion ; MOREL had prepared a French version for distribution in Belgium, but its effect was necessarily limited. Had the full evidence been made available with the Report, the Belgian public would probably have been more impressed than it was ; in Belgium the Report's greatest effect was produced among the politicians, scholars and lawyers who knew how to read it <sup>(4)</sup>. But in England it had finally brought the B.M.S. to the support of MOREL <sup>(5)</sup>. The Society wrote to the Foreign

(1) " Is it a bogus affair or a State agency ? " BENTLEY to BAYNES, 6 XI 05. B. M. S.

(2) *Daily Chronicle*, 10, 11, 14, 15 XI 05.

(3) STENGERS, *art. cit.*, pp. 719-20.

(4) *Ibid.*, pp. 722-3.

(5) " Your Committee have now entirely turned round. They have got a new secretary and they are co-operating with me ". MOREL to SCRIVENER, 15 XII 05. M. P.

Office asking for an English translation of the Report to be made <sup>(1)</sup>, and even produced one of their own for publication and distribution <sup>(2)</sup>. B.M.S. missionaries co-operated fully in the series of missionary comments on the Report which MOREL published, and at last MOREL hoped that the B.M.S. and the Congo Reform Association would be able to work together <sup>(3)</sup>. The Society's new secretary, C. E. WILSON, certainly had a fresh attitude towards Congo Reform ; he had never known BAYNES' close contacts with Brussels in an earlier period. MOREL had feared that even after the appearance of the Report the B.M.S. would continue its policy of appealing to the King <sup>(4)</sup>, but instead of this the Society was eager in urging the British Government to demand reform in the Congo.

The publication of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry did not only lead to a reversal of policy on the part of the B.M.S., it also brought about a change in the attitude of the Catholic missions in the Congo towards the State. The Report paid several tributes to the Protestant missionaries in the Congo, giving special praise to BENTLEY'S work at Wathen <sup>(5)</sup>. It analysed the "astounding influence" possessed by the Protestant missionary in some parts of the territory visited by the Commission, and showed how he had come to be regarded by the Africans as "the sole representative of equity and justice" in his region <sup>(6)</sup>. On the other hand, Catholic missions were criticized for the way in which they recruited their children, for their *ferme-chapelle* system,

(1) B. M. S. Minutes, 22 XI 05.

(2) Abstract of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Administration of the Congo Free State, by G. W. MACALPINE, Chairman of the Committee of the B. M. S. with notes and an introduction, London, 1906.

(3) MOREL to MACALPINE, 12 I 06. M. P.

(4) MOREL to HARRIS, 22 VIII 05. M. P.

(5) MACALPINE, p. 26.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 74.

and for their alleged cruelty. The Commissioners had spent far longer in listening to Protestant than to Catholic missionaries, and their bias seemed if anything anti-Catholic.

In the face of Congo conditions the difficulties of Catholic missions were even greater than those of a Protestant society like the B.M.S., which had special links with Brussels. For since the Catholic missions were Belgian, their relations with the administration were necessarily very close. The King had done his utmost to persuade them to undertake the evangelization of the Congo, and had given them special privileges — including good sites, help from State officials in their building operations, and grants of money — which they were reluctant to forfeit by any display of hostility towards the State. Again, as in the case of the B.M.S., their leaders had met the King, and were convinced that he was well-intentioned towards his Congo subjects. The silence of Catholic missionaries, like that of some of the outstanding Protestants such as GRENFELL and BENTLEY, had been one of the themes of the Congo State defence back in the 'nineties. This was equally true after the turn of the century, although we have already noted the remarks of COLFS in the *Chambre* during the debates in the spring of 1900 <sup>(1)</sup>.

But it was not until 1903, when GUINNESS had emerged on the side of Congo reform and when the *West African Mail* had begun to publish reports from Protestant missionaries, that LEOPOLD had seriously set himself to use Catholic influence in defence of the Congo State. In the summer he tried to enlist the sympathies of the Pope <sup>(2)</sup>,

<sup>(1)</sup> *Supra*, p. 255.

<sup>(2)</sup> ' Roi vous demande avant quitter Rome demander sympathies Pape pour État de Congo, attaqué avec violence par missions protestantes '. Telegram to Baron d'ERP, Belgian Minister to the Holy See, 16 VIII 03. Congo, 1<sup>re</sup> série, V, 1207.

with some success <sup>(1)</sup>. When the Casement Report contained so much evidence which had been gleaned from Protestant missionaries, and when these missionaries began to speak out more boldly against the State, the Congo defence endeavoured to persuade the Catholics of Great Britain and of the United States that the entire agitation was Protestant in origin, directed against a small Catholic country, Belgium, and that behind it lay political ambition. MOREL was fully conscious of the danger that the anti-Congolese agitation might become identified with Protestant interests <sup>(2)</sup>.

The Congo State had clearly realized that it was from the Protestant missionaries that it had most to fear <sup>(3)</sup>, and the answer to the problem appeared to be the extension of Catholic mission work <sup>(4)</sup>. It seems that this was the opinion of the King himself. It was explicitly stated in 1904 that it was at King LEOPOLD'S request — since

<sup>(1)</sup> *Infra*, p. 310.

<sup>(2)</sup> Speaking of the 'sectarian slant' of GUINNESS' meetings he wrote: "As it is the Roman Catholic priests in the Congo are calling upon the Congo State to expel the Protestant Missions from the Congo, and is this the moment to make the European public believe that one of the main springs of the movement of this country is dictated by sectarian considerations? It is a most lamentable mistake, and it is a selfish attitude to assume". MOREL to HOLT, 19 I'04. M. P.

<sup>(3)</sup> "...je ne saurais assez insister pour que l'autorité administrative évite plus encore dans le voisinage des missions protestantes que partout ailleurs, tout ce qui pourrait être taxé de procédés violents à l'égard des indigènes. Les missionnaires protestants sont assez portés — à tort — à considérer, comme leurs ressortissants, les habitants des villages qui les entourent, — moyen d'augmenter leur influence — et aussitôt qu'ils estiment qu'il leur est fait quelques préjudice, ils portent leur grief devant l'opinion internationale". Copy, DE CUVELIER to the Governor-General, 14 I 03. M. des C. M92 (582).

<sup>(4)</sup> "Je crois que le Gouvernement a tort de supporter aussi longtemps cette attitude. Puisque les missionnaires de la Lulanga négligent leur œuvre d'évangélisation pour se transformer en détectives et en agents politiques, pourquoi le Gouvernement ne confierait-il pas la mission religieuse à accomplir dans le bassin de ces rivières à des associations plus soucieuses de l'exercice de l'apostolat... Le Directeur de l'Abir, que M. MALFEYT a vu récemment, lui a dit, qu'à son avis, si les pères Trappistes s'installent à Basankusu, c'en est fait de l'influence des missionnaires de la C. B. M. M. COSTERMANS pense qu'il serait peut-être utile d'étendre le champ d'action des Trappistes au Congo". *Courrier du Congo*, Letter 1024 of 14 VIII 04. A. G. R., V. E. 67.

he wished to forestall the extension of the work of Lutheran missionaries — that the Premonstratensians were expanding the mission that they had begun a few years earlier in the Uele <sup>(1)</sup>. The B.M.S. was refused access to this area ostensibly on account of the troubled state of the district, and now even GRENFELL found it difficult not to accuse the King of bad faith <sup>(2)</sup>. It was not surprising that when the members of the C.B.M. Council heard that Catholics were coming to establish themselves in the proximity of C.B.M. stations, they considered it “to be King LEOPOLD’s answer to the reports of atrocities and maladministration sent home by our missionaries ” <sup>(3)</sup>.

But LEOPOLD II was not content merely to strengthen the existing Belgian Catholic missionary work in the Congo. In the summer of 1903 BÉTHUNE made the first approach to *English* Catholics on behalf of the King. He wrote to Cardinal VAUGHAN of the “sectes non conformistes, qui essaient de mettre leurs insuccès évangéliques sur le compte de crimes imaginaires du gouvernement et de ses agents ” <sup>(4)</sup>, and asked the Cardinal’s help in pointing out this aspect of the Congo question to English Catholics. Nearly a year later Francis BOURNE, his successor as Archbishop of Westminster, was urged by BÉTHUNE at Bruges to favour the King’s suggestion that English Catholic missionaries should be sent to the Congo. In the later nineteenth century St Joseph’s Missionary Society had been founded at Mill Hill in London, but drew its students largely from Holland <sup>(5)</sup>; it was this Society which LEOPOLD had chosen to carry

<sup>(1)</sup> *Mouvement des Missions Catholiques*, Feb. 1904.

<sup>(2)</sup> GRENFELL to BAYNES 18 IV 04. B. M. S.

<sup>(3)</sup> C. B. M. Minutes. 28 XI 04.

<sup>(4)</sup> BÉTHUNE to VAUGHAN, 15 VI 03. M. des C. M. 86 (578).

<sup>(5)</sup> LATOURETTE, IV, p. 55.

out his plan. The Rector of Mill Hill proved amenable (1), for LEOPOLD had offered to provide transport, buildings, and annual subsidies for his missionaries. Cardinal VANUTELLI, a former Apostolic Nuncio at Brussels, visited England in 1904 and hastened the departure of the missionaries. He expected their presence in Congo to be effective as a weapon against the critics of the State régime in England (2), and it certainly seemed that English Catholics, at least, were rallying to the defence of LEOPOLD. The *Tablet* praised the King's initiative as an expression of his faith in the rectitude of the Congo administration and of his desire that England should learn the truth from men "who speak the same language and are trained in the same traditions as his bitterest accusers" (3); the *Catholic Herald* contained the accusation that English Protestant missionaries in Congo were animated by political motives (4). Catholics had defended LEOPOLD in the Commons and DILKE was seriously concerned about this, even going so far as to suggest that it would be better for the Congo reformers to cease quoting from the evidence of Protestant missionaries altogether (5). MOREL was equally anxious that nothing should be said which would further alienate Catholics from the cause of Congo reform (6).

English Protestants immediately suspected that Catholic influence lay behind the episode of the West

(1) BOURNE to BÉTHUNE, 24 VI 04. M. des C. M. 86(578).

(2) "Le Cardinal est d'avis que le meilleur moyen de mettre fin aux calomnies des Missionnaires Protestants d'Angleterre est de leur opposer des Missionnaires Catholiques de la même nation". D'ERP to DE FAVEREAU, 23 XII 04. Congo, 1<sup>re</sup> série, VI, 1742.

(3) *Tablet*, 8 I 05.

(4) *Catholic Herald*, 14 IV 05.

(5) "I think that almost the sole endeavour at the present of EMMOTT and myself should be to try to show the Roman Catholics in the House of Commons that we are not the representatives of jealous or prejudiced opponents... hypocritical mouthpieces of Protestant feeling". DILKE to MOREL, 25 VII 05. M. P.

(6) MOREL to HARRIS, 19 IX 05. M. P.

African Missionary Association (1). But in fact there was little likelihood that the Catholic missions would have had anything to do with the defence of a Report which was so unfavourable to them. They protested at once against the partiality of the Commissioners and their Protestant bias (2), and demanded that the *Bulletin Officiel* of the State, in which the Report had appeared, should deny the charges which had been made against the methods of evangelism employed by the Catholic missions (3). Thus there arose in Belgium a conflict between the Catholics and the Congo State authorities. In February 1906 a work of Félicien CATTIER, Professor of Colonial Law at Brussels University, contained stringent criticisms of the Congo system (4); in passing CATTIER attacked Catholic missionaries for their silence. The missions were forced to take up a defensive position. Like that of the B.M.S. earlier, their plea was that Catholic missions had not been located in the regions of the worst abuses, in the A.B.I.R. territory, in the Mongalla, or around Lake Leopold II. It was suggested that the State had deliberately directed them elsewhere — an interesting suggestion, although unproven — and declared that the State could not have counted upon the silence of the Catholic missionaries had they found themselves in the presence of abuses comparable to those which had shocked the Protestants (5).

This was a new position; Catholic missions were beginning to feel it necessary to defend their silence, as did their supporters in the *Chambre*. Belgian missionary

(1) *Baptist Times*, 17 XI 05.

(2) *Mouvement des Missions Catholiques au Congo*, Nov.-Dec. 1905; an open letter to the members of the Commission of Enquiry, signed by the superiors of the Belgian Catholic missions, in *Missions Belges de la Compagnie de Jésus*, 1905, pp. 449-54.

(3) DENIS, p. 81.

(4) *Étude sur la situation de l'État Indépendant du Congo*, Brussels, 1906.

(5) *Mouvement des Missions Catholiques au Congo*, Feb. 1906.

periodicals not only attacked the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, but they also criticized the behaviour of State agents in the Congo (1). In the spring the Jesuit theologian Arthur VERMEERSCH joined the ranks of those who were attacking the Congo system (2), although at the same time he came to the defence of the Catholic missionaries in the Congo (3). But the main body of his work was a criticism of the Congo régime. The significance of this lay not so much in what was being said, but in who was saying it. For a Belgian Catholic priest to be the propounder of a thesis which would do justice to the English Congo reformers was indeed a serious matter for the Congo administration, which realised the mistake it had made in alienating Catholic sympathies. DE CUVELIER was quick to pay tribute to the work of the Catholic missions in the Congo, in an effort to repair the damage (4).

At the end of April LEOPOLD made approaches to the Apostolic Nuncio, and before May was out a convention had been signed between the Independent State and the Holy See, designed to favour the educational and evangelistic work of the Catholic missions. The missions were to receive large areas of Congo territory which they would own in perpetuity. In return they were to provide educational, industrial and agricultural training for the Africans, and were also to teach them French. In addition, they were to undertake special geographical, ethnogra-

(1) ' Et l'Humanité ! Demandez aux indigènes pourquoi ils désirent des fermes-chapelles, ce qui les attache aux missionnaires. C'est la peur du Bula-Matari... Les indigènes nous demandent des poules et des chèvres à élever. Pourquoi ? Pour que les gens de Bula-Matari ne puissent plus les voler... J'allais, il y a deux ans, dans un district où il n'y avait pas de missionnaires, mais partout des soldats, des boys. Les indigènes me pressaient de rester, de m'établir. Et pourquoi ? Pour nous défendre, disaient-ils, contre les mauvais agents ?'. P. BUTAYE, in *Missions belges de la Compagnie de Jésus*, 1906, pp. 181-2.

(2) La question congolaise, Brussels, 1906.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 27 ff.

(4) DE CUVELIER to VAN RONSLÉ, in *Mouvement des Missions catholiques au Congo*, Jan. 1906.



phical and linguistic work when the Congo Government required it. Everything possible was to be done to secure close co-operation and harmonious relations between the missionaries and the State agents (1). The brief period of hostility seemed to have come to an end. In June LEOPOLD wrote to praise the work of the Catholic missions, who in turn met the King's promise of reforms in the Congo with an eulogistic address (2). Meanwhile the Mill Hill missionaries had settled at Yumbi and Bokatata, and in December 1906 a second contingent embarked to join the pioneers (3). The local administration was urged to offer all the help it could to the Catholic missionaries, who continued to plant new stations in regions where the Protestants were refused entrance(4).

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LEOPOLD not only wished to enlist English Catholic opinion on the side of the Congo State; he also wanted to win the support of American Catholicism. It seemed that here his task would be even easier, for in the United States, unlike England, the anti-Congolese campaign

(1) The text is given in *Missions belges de la Compagnie de Jésus*, 1906, pp. 258-9.

(2) STENMANS, p. 325.

(3) *Mouvement Géographique*, 23 XII 06.

(4) " Le Préfet Apostolique de Stanley Falls me signale qu'à Bafuasende l'Autorité Administrative a mis un terrain à la disposition de la Mission, mais ne donne aucune aide matérielle quant à l'édification soit d'une maison pour les RR. PP. soit d'une Chapelle... Je vous prie de donner des ordres... pour que l'aide la plus large soit donnée aux RR. PP.... Les Missionnaires Catholiques sont nos plus fermes soutiens, et vous seriez fortement ennuyé si des confessions étrangères, et disons le mot 'hostiles' venaient s'établir dans votre secteur. Ils n'y ont déjà que trop pris pied, et c'est méconnaître les véritables désirs du Gouvernement que de laisser nos Missions sans aide... il faut extirper la croyance encore assez sottement répandue chez les sous-agents que les RR. PP. viennent les ennuyer. Celui qui ferait encore montre d'idées aussi arriérées serait considéré comme se souciant fort peu des intérêts du Gouvernement ou ne les comprenant pas ". Copy Albert SILLIE, *Commissaire de District*, Stanleyville, to Ganst PETERSON, *Chef de Secteur*, Bafuasende, 3 IV 06, in James A. SMITH to the State Dept., 21 III 08. S. D., 1906-10, 12053/20.

had been pioneered by the supporters of the Protestant missions. The English societies had appealed again and again to LEOPOLD, and had refrained from approaching the Foreign Office. It had appeared that some of the American societies might adopt a similar attitude towards the State (1); the American Baptists, however, had had no compunction in appealing to the State Department to make representations to Brussels as early as 1895 (2), while the Presbyterians did the same in 1900 (3). Although the Presbyterian Committee had issued instructions that its missionaries were not to go too far in criticizing the Congo regime (4), they had already published their complaints to the world, and had become identified with the critics of the Congo State. The Disciples of Christ had joined them in commenting upon the intense dislike of the Africans for the Congo State officials (5).

It was not surprising that the American missions were quicker to publicize their complaints about Congo conditions than the English societies were. Their links with Brussels were naturally not so close. There was the geographical factor, for the Atlantic was not so easily crossed as the Channel. The American missions had not been the allies of the State during the period of its struggle for recognition; the American Baptists had only taken

(1) In a letter thanking the King for his permission allowing them to operate their new boat on the upper Congo, the Presbyterian Committee wrote: 'We would also assure Your Majesty that any interference with the political affairs of the Congo Free State by any of our missionaries would not be tolerated by us, nor thought of by them, their only aim being to work for the spiritual and moral elevation of the African people'. Presbyterian Mission Minutes, 8 VI 97.

(2) *Supra*, p. 241.

(3) Presbyterian Mission Minutes, 13 III 1900; 10 IV 1900.

(4) Its missionaries were to be very careful in making representations or publishing complaints "to observe all proper deference to 'the powers that be' and to avoid anything that might give any color to a charge of doing or saying things inconsistent with its purely spiritual and non-political authority". Presbyterian Mission Minutes, 9 I 1900.

(5) *M. J.*, Oct. 1900.

over the work of the L.I.M. when this struggle was all but complete. The Presbyterians had received a warm welcome in Brussels when their pioneer missionaries had set out, but LAPSLEY, the missionary who had met the King personally, had died after only two years in the field. It is noteworthy that the only missionary to urge the American Baptist Board to be cautious in its criticism of the Congo administration was an Englishman, who had served under the L.I.M. in the days before the recognition of the State; his attitude closely resembled GRENFELL'S (1). From their personal links with Brussels, and from a clearer conception of the difficulties of colonial administration in Central Africa, English missionaries were far more likely than the Americans to be cautious in their attitude towards the State.

FOX-BOURNE had realized in 1902 that he had the full backing of the American Presbyterians in the Kasai for any campaign which he undertook in the hope of achieving an improvement in Congo conditions (2). Thus it was the American missionary MORRISON, on his return to the United States by way of Europe in 1903, who was the pioneer of missionary agitation in England at a time when GUINNESS was still cautious, and the B.M.S. was silent. MORRISON publicly expressed his hope that the B.M.S. would change its policy and would expose the abuses which it knew to exist in the Congo (3). Once back in the United States, he interrupted his linguistic work in order to arouse the American mission boards (4) and their supporters to a sense of their res-

(1) SIMS to DUNCAN, 10 VI 96. A. B. M. U.

(2) MORRISON to the Aboriginies' Protection Society, 7 X 02; VASS to the same, 3 XI 02. R. H., MSS. Brit. Emp., S. 22, G. 261.

(3) In the course of his address to a meeting called by the Aboriginies' Protection Society and held on May 5th., 1903. Cf. *supra*, p. 271.

(4) He did not confine his attention to the Presbyterians. For instance, he called on the Christian and Missionary Alliance, and the result was a paragraph on Congo conditions in their magazine in June, followed by another in July. He also

possibility towards the Congo peoples. MORRISON'S efforts soon attracted the notice of the Belgian Minister at Washington, who at once did his utmost to secure the publication of articles favourable to the Congo administration in the American press (1). Like MOREL, MORRISON had attributed responsibility for the Congo conditions directly to LEOPOLD II, and it was not long before the King himself began to display some anxiety about the state of American opinion, and summoned the Brussels correspondent of the *New York American* to Laeken for an interview. The Belgian consuls in the United States became enthusiastic in their defence of the Congo State (2).

Naturally MORRISON began by addressing himself chiefly to Protestant groups, and it was not surprising that his own denomination should be the first to respond with official action. In May 1903 the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church appointed a small committee to present a report on conditions in the Congo to the Secretary of State, HAY (3), and in November it met President ROOSEVELT (4). By the following spring, the movement had grown. Unlike BAYNES, Dr Thomas BARBOUR, the secretary of the American Baptist mission, was ready to take a warm interest in the agitation; in March he called to Washington a conference of the American missionary societies — Disciples of Christ, Presbyterians and Baptists — at work in the Congo. This conference renewed the representations to HAY and ROOSEVELT which the Presbyterians had made in

approached the Baptists, whose board sent out a circular letter with a list of questions about State demands for labour, military service, etc., to all its Congo missionaries.

(1) MONCHEUR to DE FAVEREAU, 14 VI 03. Congo, 1<sup>re</sup> série, IV, 1092.

(2) A. T. LEFTURICH, Consul at Baltimore, to DE FAVEREAU, 13 X 03, 6 XI 03. Congo, 1<sup>re</sup> série, V, 1315, 1347; Letter to the editor by MALI, Consul at New York, in *New York Sun*, 26 XI 03.

(3) VINSON, p. 52.

(4) *W. A. M.*, 13 XI 03.

the preceding year. In April J. T. MORGAN of Alabama presented their memorial to Congress (1). MORGAN was a Methodist, a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and law partner of LAPSLEY, the father of the pioneer Presbyterian missionary. SANFORD, as well as LAPSLEY, had aroused his interest in the Congo State (2). He was a strong character, who often led rather than followed public opinion, and his support lent considerable weight to the cause of Congo reform. The memorial which he presented to Congress appealed to the American Government to intervene actively in Congo affairs. But although the Secretary of State and the President had expressed their "sympathetic interest" (3), the Government had no intention of committing itself at this stage. As HAY admitted to Baron MONCHEUR when the Belgian Minister visited him to refute the missionary charges, the United States was not one of the signatory Powers of the Berlin Act, and therefore her title to interfere in Congo affairs was a most doubtful one (4).

Throughout 1904 the Belgian Minister at Washington did his best to counteract the anti-Congolese movement (5). MOREL himself was to visit the United States and to speak on the Congo question at the Boston Peace Conference in October, and MONCHEUR was anxious to forestall him (6). So far the agitation in the United

(1) Conference of missionaries, representatives of American organizations conducting missionary work in the Congo: Memorial concerning conditions in the Independent State of the Congo, praying that Congress investigate existing conditions in the Congo State, and take steps to ameliorate and correct the evils from which that State is suffering; presented 19th April 1904, Washington, 1904.

(2) P. McSTALLWORTH, *The United States and the Congo question, 1884-1914*, unpublished thesis, Ohio State University, 1954, pp. 17-8.

(3) *Miss.*, April 1904.

(4) *Petit Bleu*, 30 III 04.

(5) MONCHEUR to DE FAVEREAU, 22 V 04. Congo, 1<sup>e</sup> série, VI, 1610.

(6) MONCHEUR sent to Brussels the text of an article which he wished to have printed in the *North American Review*, and wrote: "Si vous n'avez pas objection à cette publication il serait important qu'elle pût coïncider avec l'agitation contre

States had been tinged with a specifically missionary character <sup>(1)</sup>, and MOREL was eager to broaden its basis. As in England, however, he was to find the Catholics hostile to his campaign. Cardinal GIBBONS had been approached by some of the King's defenders before the Boston Peace Conference and although he was unable to attend the Conference himself, he sent a message to the effect that the King's side of the story should be heard <sup>(2)</sup>. He was quickly thanked by MONCHEUR on behalf of LEOPOLD <sup>(3)</sup> and some weeks later he received Papal approval of his attitude <sup>(4)</sup>. The Cardinal intended to do his utmost to assist the King's defenders <sup>(5)</sup>, for

le Congo que les missionnaires américains veulent provoquer à une conférence qu'ils veulent réunir en octobre à Boston". MONCHEUR to DE FAVEREAU, 8 VIII 04. Congo, 1<sup>re</sup> série, VI, 1687.

<sup>(1)</sup> "The story of missionary atrocities is perhaps the only thing that would arouse the attention of the general public in America to the enormity of the King of the Belgians' crime in the Congo, but newspaper men who are rather cynical in regard to atrocity tales have been misled, it seems to me, in thinking that this is the only evidence against the present government in the Congo, and the only ground upon which an appeal might be made to the Powers". Robert PARK to FOX-BOURNE, 10 IX 04. R. H., MSS. Brit. Emp., S. 22, G. 261.

<sup>(2)</sup> GIBBONS to Cardinal GOTTI, 16 XII 04. Gibbons Papers, Baltimore, 101/U. 3.

<sup>(3)</sup> MONCHEUR to GIBBONS, 12 X 04 G. P., 101/P. 5.

<sup>(4)</sup> "Probe novit summus Pontifex ea omnia, quae exagitata fuerunt contra Gubernium Status Congi Independentis seu Belgici, per aliquos missionarios protestantes anglicos, in eum finem ut publica opinio in praedictum Gubernium commoveretur, sub praetextu quod religionem progressumque civilem non faveat, re quidem vera quia missionarios catholicos ibidem summo favore prosequi studet. Haec autem contra praedictum Gubernium actio introduci Senatui nunc in istos Federatos Status, duce quodam haeretico missionario nomine MORRISON, ut, si fieri possit, civiles auctoritates et populus adducantur ad partes adversariorum Congici Gubernii. Sed e contra relatum fuit Sanctitati Suae quanto zelo ac opportunitate Eminentia Tua defensiones sumpserit veritatis in negotio hoc: praesertim per litteras, quas dedisti ad Praesidem Congressus pacis apud Boston. Pro hac vero sollicitudine Eminentiae Tuae SS. mus. Pater valde gratulatus est, voluitque ut Tibi significaretur animum sibi esse ut pro posse cures suadere Episcopis cleroque istius Reipublicae, ne omittant refutare calumnias de quibus est sermo, veritatem mendaciis opponendo ac fideles contra versutias haeticorum ministrorum cautos efficiendo. Haec cum Eminentia Tua communicare debuit". Cardinal GOTTI to GIBBONS, 24 XI 04. G. P., 101/S. 2.

<sup>(5)</sup> "Les représentants de S. M le Roi LÉOPOLD II examinent en ce moment une proposition qui leur a été faite confidentiellement par la Fédération des Sociétés Catholiques d'Amérique. Il s'agirait de faire présenter au Congrès des

it seemed to him that a small Catholic country, Belgium, was being unfairly attacked, presumably in the interests of the Protestant missions in the Congo. He had probably given little study to the question, but relied for the facts of the case upon the statements of King LEOPOLD and upon the quotations from Catholic missionaries which were freely used by the Congo State defence (1).

The Protestant missions continued to take the lead in the Congo reform campaign. In November an American branch of the Congo Reform Association was formed in Boston, where the headquarters of the Baptist mission were located; the preliminary meeting had been called by BARBOUR, the mission secretary. In reply came the formation of the « Belgian Protective Association of America » early in 1905 (2). Although individual missionaries like SIMS among the Baptists (3) and FARIS (4) of the Disciples' mission might be cautious, the mission boards themselves were determined upon bold action. BARBOUR, in particular, worked hard to form local groups of the Congo Reform Association and spent

États-Unis, par un sénateur sympathique à la Fédération, un mémoire qui rencontrerait les griefs accumulés dans le mémoire au nom des missionnaires protestants par le Sénateur MORGAN. A cette occasion encore j'ai offert aux représentants de S. M. le Roi LÉOPOLD II de mettre à leur disposition l'influence que me donnent mes bonnes relations avec plusieurs membres du Sénat Américain ». GIBBONS to Cardinal GOTTI, 16 XII 04. G. P., 101/U. 3.

(1) J. Tracy ELLIS, *The life of James Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore*, 2 vol., Milwaukee, 1952, II, p. 319.

(2) STENMANS, p. 293.

(3) SIMS wrote, " I trust you will see the wisdom of confining your efforts to getting land leases — and as it were ' minding one's own business ' concerning the political questions, for if we do not *we are certain* to be turned out — expelled as a body from this country... Dr. GUINNESS has gone too far. It is a decidedly unfriendly act to conduct a campaign... in a foreign country ", but BARBOUR's reply was a request that SIMS should resign from the Commission for the Protection of the Natives. SIMS to BARBOUR, 29 VIII 04; BARBOUR to SIMS, 1 XI 04. A. B. M. U.

(4) FARIS specifically stated that the depopulation around Bolenge which he reported was not due to excessive taxation, but to sleeping sickness, and claimed that the Disciples' relations with the Government were harmonious. He did complain, however, of the State's refusal of new sites to the mission.

a great deal of time on the campaign <sup>(1)</sup> ; later MOREL was to call him « the life and soul of the American Congo Reform Association » <sup>(2)</sup>. The Presbyterians, too, kept in close contact with MOREL and contributed generously towards the Association's expenses <sup>(3)</sup>. The missionary societies gave a warm welcome to John HARRIS and his wife when they arrived to tour the United States on behalf of the Congo Reform Association in the spring of 1906. As a result of their meetings, large numbers of petitions urging Government intervention in Congo affairs poured into Congress <sup>(4)</sup> ; partly because of this pressure and partly because the American Congo Reform Association was stressing the uncertainty of the position of American missionaries in the Congo <sup>(5)</sup>, Clarence Rill SLOCUM was appointed the United States Consul General to the Congo State, with his residence at Boma. Naturally the American missionaries gave him a warm welcome <sup>(6)</sup>.

LEOPOLD had always believed that the goodwill of the United States was of great importance for his work in the Congo. He had been careful to ensure effective propaganda in America by working through the Belgian Minister at Washington, through Professor NERINX of Louvain, the publicist Henry WACK and the Californian lawyer Henry KOWALSKY, besides WHITELY, Congo consul at Baltimore, and various Belgian consuls — LEFTURICH at Baltimore, HENROTIN at Chicago, and MALI at New York. Then in October 1906 the King made a new move, when he encouraged the formation of the American Congo Company <sup>(7)</sup> in an attempt to win the

<sup>(1)</sup> *Baptist Missionary Magazine*, Boston, Jan. 1905.

<sup>(2)</sup> *O. O., C. R. A.*, March 1908.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Presbyterian Mission Minutes*, 8 I 07.

<sup>(4)</sup> *O. O., C. R. A.*, April 1906.

<sup>(5)</sup> MOREL to DANIELS, 7 V 06. M. P.

<sup>(6)</sup> MORRISON to SLOCUM, 21 I 07. S. D., 1906-10, 2456.

<sup>(7)</sup> STENMANS, p. 329.



support of American capitalists for the Congo State (1). Yet in spite of the King's efforts, the reform campaign had gained ground by the end of the year. In December Senator LODGE introduced a resolution assuring President ROOSEVELT of Senate approval of all measures he might judge it necessary to take for the amelioration of conditions in the Congo; large numbers of petitions, mainly from Free Church groups, poured into Congress to support Government intervention (2). It was not surprising that American Catholics thought that the Congo campaign had a Protestant bias (3), and held aloof from it, or else rushed to the defence of King LEOPOLD. When GUINNESS was touring the United States on behalf of the Congo Reform Association, he attacked the attitude of Cardinal GIBBONS in the course of an address delivered in a Presbyterian church in Baltimore. Two Free Church ministers at once defended the Cardinal — a very popular figure in Baltimore — on the grounds of his ignorance of Congo conditions (4); the Cardinal himself, however again defended his attitude on the grounds of missionary testimony and of his judgement that the agitation was animated partly by religious and commercial jealousy, and was an unfair attack upon

(1) Its first expedition to the Congo was led by Samuel VERNER, a former American Presbyterian missionary who had been asked to leave the society, and whom LEOPOLD had used in his propaganda campaign in the United States. VERNER's book *Pioneering in the Congo*, published in 1903, had praised the Congo administration, and VERNER continued to support the King in the press, to the great regret of his former colleagues and of MOREL.

(2) Nearly two volumes of petitions received in December 1906, are to be found in the State Department papers, 1906-10. Minor file, Kongo.

(3) The missionaries and the American Consul realized the danger of this. In 1908 the latter wrote: "The Protestant missions have wisely recognized the inadvisability of introducing into the question of Congo Reform the difficult question of the differences between the missions of opposing denominations, and I have advised them in spite of all provocations to refrain from sending home any reports which could be construed as an attack upon their Catholic colleagues". SMITH to the State Department, 8 V 08. S. D. 1906-10, 12053/22-3.

(4) A. WILL, *Life of Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore*, 2 vol., New York, 1922, p. 952.

Belgium (1). Thomas F. RYAN, one of the promoters of the new American Congo Company, was a Catholic, and had written hopefully to the Cardinal about the Congo question after he had paid a visit to Brussels (2). It was not long before the Cardinal again received the thanks of the King for his support (3), and was decorated with the *Grande Croix de l'Ordre de la Couronne*.

The missionary element was undoubtedly far more prominent in the American Congo campaign than it was in England. Whereas in England the missionary societies had to be aroused by MOREL, in the United States they themselves had taken the lead in the agitation. At the time of the Boston Peace Conference they were very active; as KOWALSKY reported to the King, "the missionaries... had delegations of women from New England, ministers, petitioners, letters to Congressmen, and every kind of influence brought to bear on Senator MORGAN" (4). They made similar efforts at the time of the Lodge resolution, when their agitation was opposed with equal vigour by the Catholics (5). WHITELEY was to claim the American Catholics as the chief supporters of the Congo defence against the campaign of the Protestant missionaries (6), while Charles ROEMART of the Belgian Consulate in New York lamented the weakness of the Catholics in the Senate (7); they were unable to prevent the passage of the Lodge resolution, although it was amended to a form less offen-

(1) Typed statement of Cardinal GIBBONS, 15 XII 06. G. P.

(2) RYAN to GIBBONS, 2 XI 06. G. P., 104/G. 7.

(3) LEOPOLD II to GIBBONS, 8 I 07. G. P., 105/A. 6.

(4) KOWALSKY sold his correspondence with LEOPOLD II to the *New York American* in Dec. 1906; it also appeared in the *O. O., C. R. A.*, Jan. 1907.

(5) *New York Herald*, 7 I 07.

(6) From WHITELEY's memorandum on his position as a Congo agent in the United States, dated 27th. Nov. 1908, in *Aus den Archiven des belgischen Kolonialministeriums*, Berlin, 1918, p. 37.

(7) ROEMART to HELLEPUTTE, 19 II 07. A. G. R., Schollaert-Helleputte papers, 501.

sive to the Congo State Government. This resolution made it clear that LEOPOLD could no longer rely upon American neutrality, and thus it had a considerable effect upon the King's policy towards the annexation of the Congo State by Belgium (1).

The situation in England was different ; the missionaries had been slow to come forward in the beginning, although they had finally identified themselves with MOREL and their first-hand evidence had been of the greatest value to him. But as the Congo reform campaign gathered strength in England, the missionary element in it became relatively less important. After the Report of LEOPOLD'S Commission of Enquiry had appeared, it became clearer that annexation could only be a matter of time, even if the King continued to oppose it. In spite of official governmental support for LEOPOLD II, this was the feeling of the Belgian *Chambre* early in 1906 (2). The British Government declared itself dissatisfied with the report of the Commission, and throughout the spring of 1906 pressed for publication of the evidence which had been laid before the Commissioners. Sir Arthur HARDINGE replaced Sir Constantine PHIPPS as British Minister in Brussels, and proved himself far less complaisant than his predecessor had been. During the summer the thesis of the " Belgian solution " made its appearance in England (3), and by the end of the year Sir Edward GREY had taken a stand which pledged England to definite action (4).

As the position of the Government hardened it was natural that the missionary attitude should become less important in the Congo reform campaign. MOREL was no longer forced to rely solely upon the evidence of

(1) J. STENGERS, Quand Léopold II s'est-il rallié à l'annexion du Congo par la Belgique ? *Bulletin de l'I. R. C. B.*, XXIII, 3, 1952, pp. 792-4.

(2) STENMANS, pp. 313-9.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 341.

(4) STENGERS, *art. cit.*, pp. 788-9.

the missionaries ; he was to concentrate increasingly upon a direct attack on the Congo system, and from the beginning of 1906 he could quote from the studies of a Belgian lawyer and a Belgian Jesuit who both condemned it, and was no longer confined to the report of a British consul who had been accused of allowing himself to be over-influenced by Protestant missionaries. Thus missionary evidence came to occupy a subordinate place in the Congo campaign, and although MOREL was still able to make good use of it, he no longer came as a suppliant to the missionary societies.

They had now become his willing allies. Men like GRENFELL had retracted from their original position <sup>(1)</sup>. The delegates to the General Conference which met at Leopoldville in January 1906 had openly arranged a special session to discuss the political situation. In 1902 at the first missionary conference they had ignored the subject ; in 1904 they had appealed to the King ; now their appeal was made to humanity <sup>(2)</sup>. It was issued through the Congo Reform Association, and was sent by MOREL to all the signatory Powers of the Berlin Act. Although missionary evidence had lost its unique importance, it was still valuable to the Congo Reform movement, and MOREL continued to urge missionaries to travel around their districts and to send him information about conditions in the interior ; he was especially eager for those missionaries who worked outside the A.B.I.R. area to do so, for the Congo State had begun to focus attention upon the A.B.I.R. region, claiming that elsewhere conditions were better <sup>(3)</sup>. Missionary reports still appeared in the Official Organ of the Congo Reform

<sup>(1)</sup> Herbert SAMUEL had written to GRENFELL in the summer of 1905 pointing out that his name was still being used by the Congo State defence, and obtained in reply a statement which made this impossible for the future. SAMUEL to MOREL, 5 I 06. M. P.

<sup>(2)</sup> G. C. R., 1906, pp. 57-9.

<sup>(3)</sup> MOREL to SCRIVENER, 18 I 06. M. P.

Association, and the missionary attitude continued to play its part in MOREL's campaign (1). The C.B.M. Council allowed John HARRIS and his wife to spend all their time in working for the Congo Reform Association, so that MOREL could use their evidence in public meetings.

It was hardly surprising that LEOPOLD should look for an excuse to harrass the missionaries in an effort to rid the Congo State of so troublesome a group (2). During 1905 there had been efforts to bring legal proceedings against the missionaries (3). Then early in February 1906 the King issued a decree which fixed a term of five years' penal servitude (or a fine) as the penalty for any calumnious denunciation of a State official. It seemed obvious that this decree was directed against the missionaries; before long the first prosecution was in progress when Edgar STANNARD, C.B.M. missionary at Baringa, was accused by Commandant HAGSTROM, an executive official of the A.B.I.R. Company, of misrepresentation in reports furnished by STANNARD to MOREL (4). The Stannard trial came at a time when it would be of the greatest help to the King if he could

(1) In March 1906 he outlined his immediate programme under four heads: Parliamentary action; deputations from varied groups to the Foreign Secretary; a joint B. M. S.-C. B. M. deputation exclusively concerned with the rights of missions to purchase sites; propaganda within nonconformist groups to arouse agitation and encourage the raising of funds for the Congo campaign. MOREL to F. B. MEYER, 20 III 06. M. P.

(2) After referring to what he claimed was an infringement of the Berlin Act in the Lado enclave, LEOPOLD wrote: "Si les Anglais violent l'Acte de Berlin, ils nous dégagent des obligations de cet acte et ne pensez-vous pas que nous devrions expulser les missionnaires anglais qui excitent les populations contre nos autorités?" Copy, LEOPOLD II to VAN EETVELDE, 26 II 06. A. G. R., V. E. 35.

(3) "J'estime quant à moi qu'il faut classer ce dossier sans suite... Comprenant tout l'intérêt politique que le Gouvernement pourrait tirer de poursuites exercées contre le R. CLARCK, j'ai examiné dans ce but le dossier ci-joint, mais je n'ai pu malgré toute ma bonne volonté en tirer d'autres combinaisons. Au contraire, j'estime que des poursuites dans un cas semblable feraient plus de tort que de bien à l'État". *Procureur d'État WALEFFE* to the Governor General, 22 VII 05. M. des C., M. 87 (579).

(4) *O. O., C. R. A.*, Oct. 1905, Jan. 1906.

terrorize and silence the missionaries. The Commission of Reforms which he had appointed when the Report of the Commission of Enquiry was published would soon be due to make its own report, and this seemed an opportunity to end the anti-Congolese campaign by a triumphant gesture of reform from LEOPOLD himself. It was at this period that the King was making every possible effort to conciliate the Catholic missionaries.

The Stannard case at once attracted the attention of the English public. The British vice-consul, ARMSTRONG, was instructed by the Foreign Office to attend and to report on the trial. MOREL pointed out the insecurity of English missionaries in the Congo (1); he raised the question of consular jurisdiction, and the Foreign Office declared itself ready to consider the establishment of a British consular court in the Congo should ARMSTRONG'S report justify this step (2). ARMSTRONG, however, appeared to be won over by the eloquence of the State officials, and to be unimpressed by STANNARD'S defence (3). The trial ended in a conviction for STANNARD and the question of consular jurisdiction was dropped. The proceedings were greeted as a great triumph by the Congo defence, and the administration advised further proceedings against STANNARD (4), who had left the

(1) In letters to the Foreign Office, in the *O. O., C. R. A.*, and in his speech at Pembroke Chapel, Liverpool, delivered on 12th April 1906, and published in pamphlet form by the Liverpool auxilliary of the C. R. A. — The Stannard Case, Sep. 1906.

(2) Foreign Office to MOREL, 18 IV 06. M. P.

(3) *Courrier du Congo*, letter 1300 of 5 VII 06; report of an interview between *Procureur d'État* WALEFFE and ARMSTRONG, 15 VI 06, *Courrier du Congo*, letter 1301 of 7 VII 06. A. G. R., V. E., 68 bis.

(4) " En effet, la condamnation prononcée à charge de STANNARD à la suite de la plainte Hagstrom est évidemment de nature à produire une certaine sensation mais en réalité il ne s'agissait en cette affaire que d'une question plutôt personnelle, tandis que si une nouvelle condamnation était prononcée contre lui à raison de la propagande qu'il a faite parmi les populations indigènes contre les pouvoirs établis, en les incitant à la révolte ouverte contre les autorités de l'État, le rôle néfaste de STANNARD serait établi et l'effet politique d'une condamnation de ce chef serait autrement considérable que celui résultant de la condamnation

Congo after arranging for his appeal to be heard a year later. In order to be able to leave the State he had paid his fine, in spite of MOREL's hopes that he would refuse to do so (1). His attitude disappointed both MOREL and HARRIS, for once in England he refused to join publicly in the anti-Congolese campaign, fearing to prejudice his appeal and to make it impossible for him to return to his work in the Congo (2). The HARRISES had virtually accepted for themselves this consequence of their activities, and they could not understand STANNARD's attitude. But the episode had made many of STANNARD's fellow missionaries more cautious; in December MOREL complained that since the trial, several upper Congo missionaries who earlier had written to him regularly, had been smitten dumb (3).

The English attitude during the summer of 1906 had a direct bearing upon the annexation of the Congo State by Belgium in 1908. It was clear from the way in which the Commons debated the reforms decreed by LEOPOLD II, that the House was thoroughly suspicious of and hostile to any plan put forward by the King. A personal approach made by LEOPOLD to the Foreign Secretary was repulsed (4). Naturally MOREL himself was ready to denounce the reforms as illusory, and declared that missionary testimony would be forthcoming to prove the truth of his statements (5). By this time the home authorities of the missions were wholeheartedly behind him, and joined with him in his denunciation of the King's reform schemes (6). In response to an ap-

encourue dans le procès Hagstrom ". *Courrier du Congo*, letter 1497 of 30 VII 06. A. G. R., V. E., 68 bis.

(1) Telegram, MOREL to WILKES, 10/12 VIII 06. M. P.

(2) HARRIS to MOREL, 22 VIII 06. M. P.

(3) MOREL to HARVEY, 17 XII 06. M. P.

(4) Copy Sir Edward GREY to LEOPOLD II, 30 VII 06. A. G. R., *Papiers Van den Heuvel*.

(5) *O. O., C. R. A.*, June 1906.

(6) *B. M. S. Minutes*, 20 VI 06; *R. B.*, July 1906.

peal from MOREL (1) individual Baptist churches, too, joined eagerly in the Congo protest meetings which were being held all over the country (2). MOREL addressed the Baptist Union in October (3), and the B.M.S. itself began to organize demonstrations (4). Thus the missionary societies lent all their weight to the Congo agitation which culminated in November with a national deputation to Sir Edward GREY, and with the publication of MOREL'S *Red Rubber*.

Throughout 1907 the Congo agitation was strong both in the United States and in England; in July negotiations for the annexation of the Congo State by Belgium were begun. The mission continued to support MOREL'S campaign, but missionary effort also concentrated upon the question of sites for new stations; the B.M.S. had been unsuccessful at Brussels and began the year by appealing to the Foreign Office to secure the Society's rights under the Berlin Act (5). In April MOREL published a summary of the B.M.S. correspondence with Sir Edward GREY (6), and early in May the question of mission sites was raised in the Commons. The C.B.M., too, appealed to the Foreign Office, which promised to transmit its request for a new site to the Congo State authorities (7). An approach to Brussels through the Foreign Office, with a view to obtaining specific sites, was a new venture from which the two societies hoped

(1) MOREL to the Editor, *B. T.*, 24 VIII 06.

(2) A list of resolutions passed at these meetings shows that a great many came from Baptist churches, and from groups of supporters of the *B. M. S. O. O., C. R. A.*, Dec. 1906.

(3) Afterwards J. H. SHAKESPEARE wrote: "It was ... evident after your ... speech that our people are tired of being held back by interested parties, and the striking reception which they gave you indicated their willingness to engage in the strife in such a way as to be worthy of their Baptist traditions. I think, therefore, you may now reckon upon our fighting forces". SHAKESPEARE to MOREL, 8 X 06. M. P.

(4) MACALPINE to HARRIS, 19 X 06. M. P.

(5) WILSON to Sir Edward GREY, 12 I 07, in *B. M. S. Minutes*, 16 I 07.

(6) *O. O., C. R. A.*, April 1907.

(7) *C. B. M. Minutes*, 7 V 07.



a great deal; they suggested that the C.M.S. might also add its weight to their efforts (1). The Anglicans had been looking towards the Congo from Uganda as early as 1890, but it was not until the turn of the century that they had made a definite attempt to cross the border. However, the State officials had been determined to repulse what they regarded as English political influence (2). In 1904 the Society appealed to the Foreign Office, but was merely referred to the State authorities (3), and it was not until the end of 1907 that the C.M.S. decided to repeat the appeal. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office approach on behalf of the B.M.S. and the C.B.M. had led LEOPOLD to consult legal advisers on the exact meaning of the obligation, laid upon him by the Berlin Act, to "protect and favour" religious missions in the Congo. The Belgian lawyers, as he had hoped, declared that this did not mean that he was bound to sell land to the missions (4); the Brussels authorities, by referring the whole question of sites to the local administration, pursued their usual policy of delay (5).

Meanwhile MOREL continued to publish missionary evidence from the Congo to show that LEOPOLD's reform decrees of 1906 were without effect there. So long as current reports came from missionaries of the abuses of the State sentry system (6), of excessive taxation (7), of the chaining of women as hostages (8), and of the continuing strain of forced labour (9), English interest

(1) WILSON to C. M. S., 21 V 07. C. M. S., 1907/133.

(2) *Courrier du Congo*, 1328, *Rapports politiques Haut-Ituri, mars-juin 1904*, A. G. R., V. E., 67 bis.

(3) F. O. to BAYLIS, 24 V 04. C. M. S., 1904/117.

(4) Cf. their statements in *Congo*, 1936, 1, pp. 161-86, and *La Belgique Judiciaire*, 1914, 6, cols. 161-75.

(5) F. O. to WILSON, 19 VIII 07, in B. M. S. Minutes, 17 IX 07.

(6) From Charles PADFIELD, C. B. M., Baringa, in *O. O., C. R. A.*, April 1907.

(7) From George JEFFREY, C. B. M., Ikau, *ibid.*, April, Aug., 1907.

(8) From Kenred SMITH, B. M. S., Upoto, *ibid.*, May, 1907.

(9) From Charles DODDS, B. M. S., Upoto, *ibid.*, May, June, Sep. 1907.

in the Congo question was not likely to fade. In 1907 the General Missionary Conference mentioned a "slight improvement", but its appeal for complete and adequate reform was as strong as that of the year before <sup>(1)</sup>. The report made by the B.M.S. missionary Cassie MURDOCH after an investigation in the *Domaine de la Couronne* came at a crucial point in the annexation negotiations, and stimulated the English demand for full guarantees that the leopoldian system would be overthrown <sup>(2)</sup>. In November the Congo Reform Association decided to prolong its existence until such guarantees had been obtained. At the same time an "appeal to the nation" to support the Government in its pressure upon the Congo State and upon Belgium, appeared in the press <sup>(3)</sup>. It was signed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and by large numbers of Protestant religious leaders, besides prominent members of the Congo Reform Association, Members of Parliament and missionaries. Throughout the annexation negotiations MOREL endeavoured to keep what he saw as the crucial question — the rights of the Africans in the land and its products — to the foreground. In Belgium this aspect was overlaid by the King's determination to reserve for himself the *Fondation de la Couronne*, and the reluctance of the Belgian *Parlement* to annex the Congo State under this condition. It was not until March that the King gave in <sup>(4)</sup>. Naturally the missionaries were vitally interested in the negotiations, and supported MOREL in his efforts to show that conditions in the Congo were still unsatisfactory <sup>(5)</sup>. The missions were anxious to secure for them-

(1) Resolution of 19 X 07, in G. C. R., 1907, p. 198.

(2) *Times*, 26 X 07; *O. O., C. R. A.*, Nov. 1907.

(3) 7 XI 07.

(4) STENMANS, p. 395.

(5) Evidence of S. GILCHRIST, C. B. M. Lolanga, in *O. O., C. R. A.*, March 1908; C. BOND, C. B. M. Lolanga, in *O. O., C. R. A.*, May 1908; W. KIRBY, B. M. S. Yalembe, in *O. O., C. R. A.*, June 1908; C. DODDS, B. M. S. Upoto, in *O. O., C. R. A.*, June 1908.

selves the right to purchase land, and quite clearly made their appeal to the British and American governments (1). In March 1908 the British and American Ministers at Brussels arranged to deliver simultaneous notes to the Congo Government on the question of mission sites (2), but no satisfaction had been received before the annexation of the Congo State by Belgium became an accomplished fact.

It was in September 1908 that the terms of Belgian annexation and of the Colonial Charter were finally settled (3). It might seem that since annexation had placed the Congo basin under a European government instead of the autocratic rule of a single monarch, the aim of the Congo reformers had been achieved. It was still true, however, that no guarantees of an effective change in the Congo system had been secured from the Belgian Government. Similarly, the missionary societies had received no assurances that they would be given new sites for the extension of their work in the Congo. It could not, therefore, be expected that the complaints of the Congo reformers and of the missions would be altogether silenced by Belgian annexation ; their attitude to it will be examined later.

English Catholics, like their American brethren, had remained to the end hostile to the Congo reform campaign (4). Catholics had taken no part in an agitation which was presented to them as an attack upon a Catholic country in the interests of the Protestant missions working in the Congo. It is clear, however, that some of the Catholic missionaries themselves regarded the situation in a different light. With the annexation negotiations in progress, one of the Jesuits wrote :

(1) Africa No. 2, 1908 ; WILSON to ROOT, 10 II 08. S. D., 1906-10, 12053/6.

(2) Telegram, WILSON to ROOT, 11 III 08 ; telegram ROOT to WILSON, 12 III 08. S. D., 1906-10, 12053/9.

(3) STENMANS, p. 451.

(4) *Tablet*, 19 I 07 ; *Catholic Times*, 26 IV 07, 1 XI 07.

‘ Ah, l’État du Congo! Qui nous en délivrera. Je ne souhaite nullement que la Belgique le reprenne — c’est une mauvaise affaire qui coûterait annuellement des millions, mais il faut du changement. De l’avis du R. P. Supérieur nous serions cent fois mieux sous un régime anglais protestant. ’ (1)

From Kisantu came a letter in the same strain :

‘ Je ne puis me défendre de l’idée que c’est du côté de la protestante Angleterre que nous viendra pour nos missions catholiques la liberté apostolique à laquelle nous avons droit et qu’on nous a fait espérer sans nous l’accorder. Ce serait certes pour le parti catholique une faute irréparable s’il se résignait à voter n’importe quoi sans le concours des autres partis... Je regrette les difficultés et les embarras qui vous forcent au silence. ’ (2)

The position of the Belgian Catholic missionaries was in many ways an even more difficult one than that of the English Protestants. Their work had been encouraged and supported by King LEOPOLD, but this very fact restricted their freedom of speech, and their policy was one of private representation rather than public exposure.

Throughout the campaign the English missionaries had laid themselves open to the charge that they were the vehicles of English political influence in the Congo ; it was an accusation constantly repeated by the Congo State defence. It appears to be unsupported by trustworthy evidence, but there is little doubt that many of the State agents, and possibly many of the Belgian Catholic missionaries, believed it implicitly. In the ’nineties a Belgian visitor could produce as “ symbolically exact ” this description of the work of the English missionaries in the Congo :

‘ Il s’agit de préparer les nègres à la conquête indirecte par les idées et le commerce anglais... Ils... colportent des cartes de la Terre où

(1) A. BRIELMAN, S. J. to A. VERMEERSCH, S. J., Sanda, 14 I 08. A. G. R., *Papiers Schollaert-Helleputte*.

(2) J. BANKAERT, S. J. to A. VERMEERSCH, S. J., Kisantu, 22 I 08. *Ibid.*

une teinte rouge, presque universelle, marque la soi-disant domination de l'Angleterre, tandis que quelques petits points noirs désignent les territoires mesquins des autres nations. Au dos, un portrait de la vieille reine... Des 'clercs' noirs... expliquent qu'il n'y a qu'une vraie langue, l'anglais, et que les autres sont des patois; qu'il n'y a qu'un drapeau, le britannique, et que les autres sont des mouchoirs dont la vraie destination est de rester en poche." (1)

It was natural that the irritation caused by the reluctance of the English missionaries to adapt themselves fully to the way of life and the language of the Belgians should be intensified during the period of the anti-Congolese campaign, when in any case the Protestant missionaries came to be regarded as the enemies of the Congo State. Relations between officials and missionaries were often strained. In the few years immediately preceding Belgian annexation the missionaries had certainly come to believe that nothing but a drastic change of régime could save the Congo. In 1907 an American traveller mentioned a significant incident, for the attitude of the Protestant missionary household in which he stayed had by this time become a representative one:

"The first time that I attended family prayers in a missionary home I waited with some interest to hear the petition in favour of the government. When it came it assumed this form: 'O Lord, stay the hand of the oppressor. Pity and aid the oppressed and overburdened. Prevent cruelty from destroying its victims. Interfere with the wicked and designing schemes of the oppressor.' A dozen such expressions and petitions were uttered, but no request for divine wisdom and enlightenment for the rulers. It can easily be conceived that, where godly and pious men cherish such sentiments towards representatives of the State, the feelings of State officials towards missionaries are little likely to be completely friendly." (2)

All the more so since the presence of missionaries in his sector greatly increased the difficulties of a State

(1) E. PICARD, *En Congolie*, Brussels, 1896, p. 157.

(2) F. STARR, *The truth about the Congo*. London, 1907, p. 62.

official. De Cuvelier had made several criticisms of the subversive attitude of the English missionaries in the course of his correspondence with the Foreign Office on the subject of their rights to purchase land. However often the missionary might tell the Congolese that they should fear God, honour the King and pay their taxes (1), his obvious sympathy with the Africans when too great a burden was thrust upon them increased their discontent.

During the anti-Congolese campaign the missionaries were, of course, charged over and over again with self-interest ; the State had refused to allow them new sites for the extension of their work, and often enough the Congo defence declared that it was bitterness at this refusal that caused the missionaries to attack the State administration, making use of humanitarian arguments and of any others they could produce. Undoubtedly the State refusal of new sites was a factor in the situation which cannot be ignored, but it never had the importance attributed to it by the defenders of the Congo system. Because of their very proximity to the evils under which the Africans suffered some of the missionaries may have exaggerated them ; some may have become incapable of discrimination in their complaints, seeing the situation only in extremes of black and white. But on the whole the missionaries faithfully reported to the public what they had themselves seen ; they were convinced that this course alone could lead to an improvement in the conditions of African life, since insistent appeals to the Congo government itself had failed to produce results. Thus, after their early years of hesitation, their attitude allowed them to contribute largely to the Congo reform movement and so, indirectly, to the annexation of the Congo State by Belgium in 1908.

(1) The Christian and Missionary Alliance magazine, 27 I 06.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE SETTLEMENT OF 1908 AND THE MISSIONS

GRENFELL had rejoiced at the prospect of the Congo becoming a Belgian colony as early as 1895 <sup>(1)</sup>, when the unstable financial basis of the Independent State might well have led to annexation <sup>(2)</sup>. He had held consistently to his opinion, and two years before the 'Belgian solution' had become as widely acceptable in English parliamentary circles as it did during the summer of 1906 <sup>(3)</sup>, he had seen no other condition on which the State would prosper <sup>(4)</sup>. But when annexation finally became an accepted fact, the immediate reaction of the English-speaking missions was one of caution. Missionaries realised that annexation alone would not automatically change conditions in the Congo; it might involve only a change of master without securing a reversal of the system of government. Certainly the period of the atrocities was over; missionaries were not finding the same kind of cases as those they had reported in the earlier years of the century. However, they were still of the opinion that the pressure of taxation was far too heavy a burden upon the Africans, and they hoped that after annexation Belgium would drastically revise the Congo system.

<sup>(1)</sup> GRENFELL to BAYNES, 25 II 95. B. M. S.; GRENFELL to PICKERSGILL, 7 III 95, in PICKERSGILL to F. O., 17 IV 95. F. O. 63/1296.

<sup>(2)</sup> STENMANS, p. 172 ff.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 341.

<sup>(4)</sup> GRENFELL to BAYNES, 17 VII 04. B. M. S.

They were hopeful, but not over-confident. By 1908 the missions had almost completely identified themselves with the policy of the Congo Reform Association. Lawson FORFEITT, who had previously filled the office of B.M.S. legal representative in the Congo State, was a member of the executive committee; Grattan GUINNESS, director of the C.B.M., had held a similar position for a much longer period. In the United States we have seen that the link between the Congo missions and the American branch of the Association was even closer. Missionaries were therefore likely to give their full support to the Congo Reform Association as it continued to demand what MOREL regarded as the essential basis for a reform of the Congo system — a recognition of the right of the Africans to their land and to its produce, and their right to trade and to labour in their own interests <sup>(1)</sup>. When the terms of annexation were found to give no guarantees of such recognition, the Congo Reform Association of the United States immediately telegraphed a protest to the Secretary of State, and urged the State Department to secure a promise from the Belgian government to the effect that forced labour and the concessionary system should be abolished and free trade introduced <sup>(2)</sup>. In England, too, the Association determined to continue its fight, and condemned those who were satisfied with a partial victory and were prepared, without guarantee of reform, to “give Belgium a chance” <sup>(3)</sup>.

In view of this attitude, it was hardly surprising that the missions refused to act on the advice of the British consul at Boma when he suggested that the legal representatives of the Protestant missions in the Congo should present an address to the Governor-General, to inform him of their satisfaction at the transfer of the

<sup>(1)</sup> *O. O., C. R. A.*, July 1908.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 1908.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Ibid.*, Sep., Oct., Nov. 1908.



Congo State to Belgium, and of their high expectations from the Belgian government. Such a step was regarded as premature both by the B.M.S. Committee in London <sup>(1)</sup> and by the C.B.M. Council <sup>(2)</sup>. WILSON had already informed Sir Edward GREY that although the B.M.S. was anxious for the Foreign Office to consider the effect of annexation upon the interests of the British missions in the Congo, the Society was even more concerned about "the question of the reform of the Congo abuses and the relief of the oppressed natives from the system under which they are suffering to-day" <sup>(3)</sup>. MOREL's new policy was to use all the influence of the Congo Reform Association against British recognition of Belgian annexation until suitable guarantees of a change of policy in the Congo had been received. It seemed that he would be able to rely upon the firm support of the missionary societies.

There were sufficient grounds for caution. The Colonial Law had taken over the existing Congo legislation as valid, and more than half the members of the Colonial Council which it had created were to be appointed by LEOPOLD II. (It should be noted, however, that he was to act in his constitutional capacity of the King of the Belgians, and no longer with personal responsibility for the government of the Congo). The Belgian Government had declared that the new colony must not be deprived of its resources. Both the B.M.S. and the C.B.M. rejoiced that the Congo Independent State had been superseded; the B.M.S. regarded annexation as "the substitution of a civilized government on the Congo for the despotic rule of an irresponsible Autocracy" <sup>(4)</sup>, while the C.B.M. saw it as "the first decisive victory

<sup>(1)</sup> B. M. S., Minutes, 18 XI 08.

<sup>(2)</sup> C. B. M. Minutes, 15 XII 08.

<sup>(3)</sup> WILSON to Sir Edward GREY, 4 IX 08. B. M. S.

<sup>(4)</sup> Resolution sent to Sir Edward GREY, in B. M. S. Minutes, 18 XI 08.

in an unfinished campaign" (1). But neither society anticipated immediate relief. Indeed, the C.B.M. feared that "the piratical principles underlying all the Congo abuses were still to be maintained under the Belgian flag" (2), and the B.M.S. Committee, like the Congo Reform Association, urged the Foreign Office to withhold recognition of annexation until the rights of the Africans were restored, and free trade established (3). Both societies played their part in more general expressions of support for the refusal of immediate recognition (4). There was only one indication of the change of attitude which was later to remove the C.B.M. from its place among the enthusiasts for Congo reform; although the society assured MOREL of its continued moral support, it withdrew its financial contribution to the funds of the Congo Reform Association (5). At the same time John HARRIS, who continued to act as organising secretary of the Association, severed his connection with the mission so that it was no longer responsible for his salary (6).

Missionary reports from the Congo about the conditions which existed there under the Belgian administration showed that at first there were few signs of improvement (7). Food taxation remained a heavy burden

(1) *R. B.*, Dec. 1908.

(2) *Ibid.*, Oct. 1908.

(3) Resolution sent to Sir Edward GREY, in B. M. S. Minutes, 18 IX 08.

(4) GUINNESS for the C. B. M., and MACALPINE as chairman of the B. M. S., signed a letter from Anglican and Free Church leaders, Members of Parliament, civic authorities and Chambers of Commerce, which appeared in the *Times* of 23rd Dec. 1908. It expressed satisfaction with the Foreign Secretary's reply to the Belgian Government's memorandum on the Congo question, and insisted that the native rights in the land and its produce must be guaranteed.

(5) C. B. M. Minutes, 12 I 09.

(6) *Ibid.*, 17 XII 08.

(7) There was little difference in reports coming from various districts. Of the twelve missionary statements of maladministration sent by MOREL to the Foreign Office between December 1908 and October 1909, six were from areas under the direct control of the administration, four from the district controlled by the Kasai Company, and two from the A. B. I. R. region.

which was unequally distributed (1), while the punishments inflicted if the quota was short bore a resemblance to those which had characterised the Congo State (2). There was no reduction in the amount of food demanded by the administration when it chanced that other work was suddenly required from the Africans, so that at times the people were reduced to buying food to pay their taxes (3). Forced labour continued and missionaries' reports of specific reprisals were treated with scant attention (4). The sentry system still existed to enforce the collection of rubber (5), while the administration seemed to make no attempt to limit its demands to the forty hours' work due to it by law (6). When the General Conference of Protestant Missions met in September 1909 — its first meeting since Belgian annexation had been proclaimed — it concerned itself with the question of forced labour, and made its opinion clear in a resolution to the colonial authorities (7). As one missionary remarked: Annexation may be pro-

(1) John HOWELL, B. M. S. missionary at Kinshassa, gave an example of two villages with a total adult population of ninety-nine, which were expected to produce 10,560 kwanga (bread puddings) annually. This quota involved incessant labour for the community. *O. O., C. R. A.*, Jan. 1909.

(2) John WHITEHEAD, B. M. S. missionary at Lukolela, told of a raid which had broken up a school in the charge of a teacher-evangelist. Although he personally had paid his taxes, the teacher was put in chains, along with twenty-five others. *O. O., C. R. A.*, April 1909.

(3) H. M. WHITESIDE, a. C. B. M. missionary in the Lulanga, told how the government suddenly decreed that his neighbourhood was to make 5,000 thatching mats; this involved 500 days' work for the community. There was no reduction in the weekly food tax, so that the people were forced to buy food, for already it took half their time to provide the amount required by the government. *O. O., C. R. A.*, June 1909.

(4) Evidence from the correspondence of MORRISON with the Governor-General, the director of the Kasai Company, the local *chef de secteur*, etc., in *O. O., C. R. A.*, Jan. 1909.

(5) From the report of JEFFREY, C. B. M. missionary in the A. B. I. R. territory, in *O. O., C. R. A.*, April 1909.

(6) VASS, of the American Presbyterian mission in the Kasai, at the annual meeting of the Anti-Slavery Society, 2 IV 09, in the *Anti-Slavery Reporter*, March-May 1909.

(7) *G. C. R.*, 1909, p. 13.

claimed, but the natives will not believe it until forced labour is abolished" (1). It was, of course, hardly surprising that little difference could be noticed immediately in Congo conditions. Naturally the Belgian government had to take over many of the Congo State officials, and in any case it was impossible to change the whole system in a day.

So the evidence which came to missionary headquarters from the Congo was of the kind to strengthen missionary support for the reform movement. The members of the B.M.S. Committee decided to invite MOREL to meet them, to "show their practical sympathy with the Congo Reform Association" (2), and as a result of the meeting he was able to persuade them to draw up and publish an official statement in support of the Association's plea for the recognition of African rights in the soil and its produce (3). They were also to make an effort to secure united representations by English religious leaders on the Congo question (4). MOREL was still anxious to obtain all the missionary evidence he could get (5). Although he himself distrusted the professions of the Belgian colonial authorities, many did not, and he was faced with a general slackening of interest in Congo reform as a result of Belgian annexation. In this situation, he saw exact and up-to-date accounts of maladministration as one of his chief weapons, both with the public and with the Foreign Office. As he wrote to one missionary:

"Nothing can be more valuable at present than information from

(1) JEFFREY, C. B. M., in *O. O., C. R. A.*, April 1909.

(2) B. M. S. Minutes, 16 II 09.

(3) By July Lawson FORFEITT had prepared a pamphlet, *The Congo question and the B. M. S.*; this was sent to Sir Edward GREY and also distributed to the public.

(4) B. M. S. Minutes, 17 III 09; MOREL to MACALPINE, 17 III 09. M. P.

(5) MOREL to WILKES, 9 II 09. M. P.

the Congo as to what is going on now. A great game of bluff is being played by the Congo Government." (1)

MOREL was not concerned only with England. In the spring of 1909 he paid a visit to France and Switzerland on behalf of the Congo Reform Association (2), but the result was disappointing (3). He leaned more and more to the opinion that the American attitude would be a deciding factor in the movement (4) — for the American government, like the British, had as yet refused to recognize Belgian annexation. American missionaries, who in the early stages of his campaign had been far more outspoken than the British, continued to support him. Early in 1909 a spate of petitions which urged the government to defer recognition of Belgian annexation, showed that the missionary societies and the individual churches influenced by them strongly supported the Association's policy (5), while MORRISON continued to send a stream of evidence from the Kasai (6).

The Kasai was the region chosen for a British consular tour in the summer of 1908; THESIGER had left Leopoldville in July and had produced his report in September. There were several parallels between his tour and that of CASEMENT. The defenders of the Kasai Company stressed his connection with the missionaries — this time the American Presbyterians — just as in 1903 the State defence had emphasized the links between CASEMENT and the C.B.M. in the A.B.I.R. territory (7). Like

(1) MOREL to WHITESIDE, 26 V 09. M. P.

(2) COCKS, pp. 129-30.

(3) "Nothing is to be hoped for from Germany or France... it is impossible to engineer a movement on the continent... like yours... and ours... the key... is with you". MOREL to DANIELS, secretary of the American C. R. A., 15 IV 09. M. P.

(4) *Ibid.*, 5 V 09, 21 V 09. M. P.

(5) S. D., 1906-10, 9600; 1806/499, 501, 503, 504, 512 (int. al.).

(6) O. O., C. R. A., Jan. 1909, Jan. 1910.

(7) *Tribune Congolaise*, 28 X 08.

CASEMENT before him, THESIGER used a mission steamer, travelling up the river on the American mission's *Lapsley* <sup>(1)</sup>. The consul was highly critical of the methods used by the Kasai Company in enforcing the collection of rubber; they were "unjustifiable and illegal". The administration made no attempt to bring positive benefits to the people, he declared, and the only civilizing influence came from the missionaries, who were hampered in every way, and were refused permission to extend their work <sup>(2)</sup>. The effect produced by the Thesiger report was not, of course, so striking as that made earlier by CASEMENT'S report. While THESIGER spoke of the burden of taxation, he brought back no stories of specific atrocities. However, his report was not of the kind to encourage the British government to recognize Belgian annexation immediately, especially when missionary evidence from all parts of Congo showed that there was still much room for improvement.

The B.M.S. continued to pass on to the Foreign Office and to MOREL any relevant information that it received from the Congo, but MOREL'S relations with the C.B.M. became less satisfactory to him during the summer of 1909. The members of the C.B.M. Council were annoyed at a reference made by MOREL in June to the way in which the mission was accepting sites from the Belgian government <sup>(3)</sup>. They had seen the increased friendliness of the colonial authorities to their society as a sign that the Belgian government really intended to make a change for the better in the system of administration in the Congo <sup>(4)</sup>, whereas MOREL had regarded it as a

(1) MOREL had urged upon the Foreign Office the necessity for supplying the British consul with an independent means of transport. MOREL to Sir Edward GREY, 14 VII 08, 25 VIII 08. M. P.

(2) Thesiger report, 14 IX 08, in Africa No. I, 1909.

(3) C. B. M., Minutes, 13 VII 09; O. O., C. R. A., June 1909.

(4) WILKES to MOREL, 10 VIII 09. M. P.

bribe to obtain their silence <sup>(1)</sup>. For a time the matter blew over <sup>(2)</sup>, but after annexation MOREL could never count on the support of the C.B.M. to the same extent as he could on that of the B.M.S. To some degree this may have been due to the difference in treatment which the two missions were receiving from the colonial authorities ; the C.B.M. was given new sites, and the B. M. S. was not <sup>(3)</sup>. It was also due to another factor. The changes laid down by the Belgian reform scheme, planned by the Colonial Minister RENKIN at the end of 1909, took effect at different times in different parts of the Congo. By this scheme taxation was to be reduced, it was to be commuted to a money payment, and free trade was to be introduced in the Congo basin. These reforms, however, were to be carried out in three stages, and the third was not accomplished until 1912. Wherever these changes were brought in there was an immediate improvement in the condition of the people ; the C.B.M. Council, whose missionaries had noted this, came to the opinion that it was not advisable to continue to draw attention to the lack of reform in some districts, when it was clear that the improved conditions were gradually spreading over the whole Congo basin <sup>(4)</sup>. But upper river reports from B.M.S. missionaries showed that the rubber régime was still in full force in the unopened districts of the northern tributaries, and the society continued to send such reports to the Foreign Office <sup>(5)</sup>, and to insist that reform should be fully carried out before British recognition was given to Belgian annexation. By the end of

(1) " The Belgian Government is doing its utmost to undermine the British movement for a radical alteration of this fundamental iniquity by throwing sops to the British missionary societies, and other traditional manoeuvres ". MOREL to WILKES, 25 VIII 09. M. P.

(2) C. B. M. Minutes, 5 X 09.

(3) " The B. M. S. are still kept out of their stations, and are getting cross... The Congo Balolo Mission people are dumb ". MOREL to HARRIS, 23 V 11. M. P.

(4) C. B. M. Minutes, 4 X 10.

(5) B. M. S. Minutes, 16 XI 10 ; 22 III 11 ; 21 IV 11.

1911 GUINNESS, on the other hand, was claimed as a convert to the Belgian cause <sup>(1)</sup>, and MOREL had given up hope of any further help from the C.B.M. <sup>(2)</sup>.

The B.M.S., which had been slower than the C.B.M. in lending its weight to the campaign for Congo reform, was also slower in withdrawing its support. It took seriously the advice of the Belgian Socialist VANDERVELDE that it should continue its representations to the British government; VANDERVELDE was convinced that it was only pressure from outside which would force the Belgian colonial authorities to action <sup>(3)</sup>. It was the B.M.S. which took the lead at a preliminary conference of Anglican and Free Church leaders, called to arrange a united Christian demonstration on the Congo question. MOREL himself had suggested the idea, but was very anxious not to be personally concerned in organising the demonstration <sup>(4)</sup>. It was preceded by a Congo exhibition held in mid-September in London; the B.M.S. was joined by the American Baptists, by the Swedish mission, and also by the C.B.M. MOREL was one of the speakers and the missionary societies clearly identified themselves with the movement for Congo reform, a fact that was quickly noted in the Belgian press, which saw the missionaries as hostile to Belgium <sup>(5)</sup>, and presented a highly coloured account of the way in which religious feeling entered into the campaign:

<sup>(1)</sup> *Journal du Congo*, 23 XII 11.

<sup>(2)</sup> "I take it... that your enquiry is a personal one... the reason I did not send a Memorial to the Congo Balolo Mission was... that Dr. GUINNESS has been going about the country saying that everything was for the best ... in the Congo, and I therefore... concluded that the mission was no longer in sympathy with our point of view. He has not attended any of our meetings for a year... I never hear from... your missionaries." MOREL to WILKES, 24 VI 12. M. P.

<sup>(3)</sup> LAWSON FORFEIT's report on a visit to Brussels, 6 IV 09, in B. M. S. Minutes, 23 IV 09.

<sup>(4)</sup> "This thing should not... be engineered by me... The co-operation of all elements of the Reformed Church is much more likely to be effective if there is no outside intermediary concerned". MOREL to MACALPINE, 14 IV 09. M. P.

<sup>(5)</sup> *Petit Bleu*, 27 IX 09.



“ Le but principal de l'exposition est de fomentier l'opposition congolaise... L'idée religieuse pénètre toutes les manifestations anti-congolaises. A l'exposition les séances s'ouvrent par des cantiques et des prières ; les discours sont empreints d'un grand mysticisme, et ils finissent souvent par un appel pressant, fait aux clergymen pour qu'ils prêchent dans les églises la sainte croisade anticongolaise. ” (1)

Religious feeling in England was certainly aroused. The autumn assemblies of the B.M.S. and the Baptist Union both sent resolutions to the Foreign Office, and in the November the united Anglican and Free Church demonstration was held in the Albert Hall, with the Archbishop of Canterbury in the chair. This “ protest of Christian England ” (2) was taken seriously in Brussels, and there were demands that Belgium should speedily apply the Renkin reform programme in order to remove the motives for such action (3). Whenever B.M.S. representatives visited the Foreign Office to discuss the question of mission sites they also brought up the question of Congo reform (4), and for several months the chief aim of the Congo Reform Association was to draw the attention of the public and of Parliament to flaws in the Belgian reform scheme, and to resist the attempt of the Foreign Office to drop the question (5).

There were hopeful signs of progress, however. Even if the Belgian colonial authorities intended to keep large areas of the Congo from enjoying free trade for over two years, and had not admitted African land rights, the change of monarch meant a reversal of the royal policy towards the colony. ALBERT I was determined to use his influence to see that the wealth taken from the Congo was put back into the country for the benefit of the

(1) *Bien Public*, 22 IX 09.

(2) *O. O., C. R. A.*, Jan. 1910.

(3) *Le Matin*, 23 XI 09.

(4) LAWSON FORFEIT to MOREL, 4 III 10. M. P.

(5) *O. O., C. R. A.*, May 1910.

Africans. If the Congo Reform Association was far from regarding the Congo question as closed, it could hardly fail to realise that the position had changed since the days of the Independent State. It continued only to ask that Belgian annexation should not be recognized until the reform scheme had been extended to the whole Congo territory, and until British consular reports showed that the reforms established by law were applied in practice. So the Congo situation was far more hopeful when the first international missionary conference met at Edinburgh in 1910. Even so, the commission set up to consider the relations between missions and governments was faced by a delicate task when it dealt with the Belgian Congo, and at least one of the delegates at Edinburgh thought that it went too far <sup>(1)</sup>. It was its insistence upon the right of the Powers to intervene in the Congo <sup>(2)</sup> which was particularly galling to the Belgian colonial authorities, just as a similar assumption had previously irritated LEOPOLD II.

Gradually the government of the United States drifted into *de facto* recognition of Belgian annexation without having made a formal pronouncement on the question <sup>(3)</sup> — a course which had been envisaged early in 1910 <sup>(4)</sup>. The American missionary societies had continued to support the policy of the Congo Reform Association <sup>(5)</sup>, but their influence had declined. In England the HARRISES were hoping to delay recognition

(1) " Finding VII is so closely connected with international political affairs that it does not fall under the judgement of a missionary conference. By meddling with international politics, as it is proposed under finding 7, it is my sincere persuasion that the missionary world... would suffer a real loss ". H. VAN NES, Netherlands Missionary Society. World Missionary Conference 1910, Report of Commission VII, Missions and governments, p. 181.

(2) " The Commission note with pleasure the utterances of the new King of the Belgians on the subject of the improvement of the condition of the Congo, and trust that the Powers will find His Majesty able and willing to carry out the reforms which it is their duty to see effected ". *Ibid.*, pp. 70-1.

(3) WILSON to JOHNSON, 13 XI 11. S. D., 855a, 00/897.

(4) Note of ADEE, 1 II 10. S. D., 855a. 00/680/2.

(5) *Miss.*, May 1911.

by the tour of investigation which they proposed to undertake in the Congo. They had resigned from their position in the Association and had accepted the invitation of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society to become its organizing secretaries. Their object in their Congo tour was to study the extent to which the Belgian reform scheme had been successful. In Belgium the proposed tour was regarded as an expedition of inquiry organized by the "English missionaries" to force the Foreign Office against its will to delay recognition <sup>(1)</sup>, but in fact neither the C.B.M. nor the B.M.S. were enthusiastic about the idea. HARRIS had approached both societies with a request that their missionaries would assist him by giving him the fullest possible information on any signs of maladministration, and this appeal was carefully considered. But the C.B.M. Council regarded the timing of the visit as inopportune; it was questioning the sincerity of the Belgian colonial authorities before they had had sufficient time to effect a complete reform <sup>(2)</sup>. Some members of the B.M.S. Committee, on the other hand, felt that if the HARRISES went into the districts from which Protestant missions were excluded, and where the reform decrees were not yet in force, they might do some good. But in the areas where there were B.M.S. missionaries, the Committee was satisfied with the procedure they followed when they noticed cases of maladministration; they reported them both to the nearest Belgian official, to the field secretary at Matadi, and to the General Secretary in London <sup>(3)</sup>. On the whole the Committee regarded the proposed tour as inadvisable <sup>(4)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> *Journal de Liège*, 9 II 11.

<sup>(2)</sup> C. B. M. Minutes, 10 I 11.

<sup>(3)</sup> After annexation individual missionaries were not to send complaints directly to the press; the responsibility for such a step was to rest with the home committee. This ruling was reaffirmed in November 1911. B. M. S. Minutes, 22 XI 11.

<sup>(4)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 11 II 11.

Evidence which came in to MOREL was contradictory. It was clear that in the regions where the Congo was opened to free trade and where the reforms had been enforced, there was great improvement. A considerable stir was caused, however, by the reports of a prospecting journey made early in 1911 by DAVIES and PALMER, two B.M.S. missionaries at work at Yalamba. They had travelled up the Aruwimi to Bamalia, across country and down the Lulu river, and thus had covered quite new ground in a region where the reform decrees were not to be enforced until 1912. They had found the rubber system in full force in this opened territory; taxation was still paid in rubber, and the nominal forty hours' labour a month worked out in practice as six or eight months' labour a year. The B.M.S. Committee sent their reports, as usual, to the Foreign Office, to RENKIN and to MOREL. Questions were asked in the Belgian Chamber <sup>(1)</sup>, and RENKIN ordered an inquiry to be made <sup>(2)</sup>. The British consul MACKIE was sent to tour the region, and the B.M.S. urged the Foreign Office to publish his report <sup>(3)</sup>; when it appeared, it fully confirmed the missionaries' statements <sup>(4)</sup>.

As considerable delay was involved when missionary reports had to pass through the hands of the mission secretary and the Foreign Office before they came back to the British consul at Boma, MACKIE suggested that he should himself be advised directly of complaints. The Foreign Office agreed, and notified the societies concerned accordingly <sup>(5)</sup>. It was only when the consul was able to carry out an immediate investigation that he

<sup>(1)</sup> *Annales Parlementaires*, 23 V 11.

<sup>(2)</sup> RENKIN to WILSON, 25 IV 11, in B. M. S. Minutes, 16 V 11.

<sup>(3)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 19 VII 11, 19 IX 11.

<sup>(4)</sup> Africa No. 2, 1911.

<sup>(5)</sup> F. O. to the Secretary, Anti-Slavery and Aboriginies' Protection Society, 24 VII 11. R. H., MSS. Brit. Emp., S. 22, G. 264; F. O. to WILSON, 24 VII 11, in B. M. S. Minutes, 19 IX 11.

could produce a satisfactory report. Naturally this course was distasteful to the Belgian colonial authorities ; it was annoying to have the British consul touring the interior without notice and putting forward suggestions that forced labour should be abolished altogether during 1911, when the reform programme had fixed the final stage for 1912. Especially was this so when he was backed by British pressure at Brussels (1). But such tours continued ; acting-consul ARMSTRONG visited the Uele, vice-consul THURSTAN the Kasai (2), and in 1912 vice-consul CAMPBELL toured the Katanga, consul LAMONT the Aruwimi and Uele (3), and vice-consul CASTENS the Kasai (4).

So the long controversy dragged on, and British recognition was still withheld. But the United States had already recognized Belgian annexation, and it seemed likely that the Foreign Office might follow suit when the third section of the Congo came under the reform law in July 1912. MOREL wrote at length to the B.M.S. to point out this possibility, and to remind the society that the reform scheme remained a revocable, and not a permanent concession. In this unsatisfactory state of affairs British recognition of annexation would mean that the Congo Reform movement would have lost its last effective weapon. He begged for a united effort :

“ I think if we can all hang together on this fundamental issue we are likely to prevent the recognition in July, and possibly stir the Foreign Office up sufficiently to put pressure upon the Belgian Government to give us those legitimate and moderate guarantees which our responsibilities under treaty justify us in demanding. ” (5)

(1) CAMPBELL's memorandum on the treatment of the natives and the question of free trade, 25 X 10 ; Sir Arthur HARDINGE to F. O., 24 XI 10, *int. al. Africa* No. 2, 1911.

(2) *Africa* No. 2, 1911.

(3) *Africa* No. 1, 1913.

(4) *Africa* No. 3, 1913.

(5) MOREL to WILSON, 12 III 12, in B. M. S. Minutes, 20 III 12.

Accordingly the B.M.S. Committee sent a resolution to the Foreign Office, in which it urged that recognition should be withheld until the Congo reforms had been made permanent and irrevocable <sup>(1)</sup>. By this time it had become clear that the Belgian colonial authorities were doing their utmost to improve conditions in the Congo, with a great measure of success. Missionary reports presented a very different picture from those of a few years before, and the B.M.S. might well have withdrawn from a movement which was becoming somewhat absurd. It is, of course, always more difficult to pull out of an agitation with dignity than it is to commit oneself to it in the first place. The last months of the Congo reform movement were rather dreary ones. The Belgian colonial authorities stated in reply to British pressure that they had no intention of reverting to the old system <sup>(2)</sup>, but this assurance was not definite enough for the Congo Reform Association. Even when the system established by LEOPOLD II had been abolished throughout the whole of the Congo territory in July, the Association continued to function in an attempt to ensure that the reforms were given a permanent basis, and to be certain from consular reports that they were always applied in practice <sup>(3)</sup>.

The HARRISES had returned from the Congo early in 1912 to report that conditions were vastly improved. They had certain criticisms to make; many of the colonial officials were men of the old régime, forced labour was still in existence in government plantations, and in the interior where coinage had not yet penetrated, taxation had still to be paid in rubber <sup>(4)</sup>. So far as they could see, the chief danger for the future was that after British

<sup>(1)</sup> B. M. S. to F. O., 22 III 12, in *Africa* No. 1, 1913.

<sup>(2)</sup> Hansard's Parliamentary debates, fifth series, vol. XLI, col. 961.

<sup>(3)</sup> *O. O., C. R. A.*, Aug. 1912.

<sup>(4)</sup> J. H. HARRIS, *Present conditions in the Congo*, London, 1912.

recognition there would be no guarantees that the improvement would continue. The executive committee of the Congo Reform Association, together with delegates from the Anti-Slavery Society and from the B.M.S., met in May 1912 to discuss the Harris report, and as a result a lengthy memorial on the usual lines was sent to Sir Edward GREY <sup>(1)</sup>. The C.B.M. took no part in this meeting, for it had long since abandoned the cause of Congo reform.

The B.M.S. remained to the end a firm supporter of the Congo Reform Association; as late as January 1913 it was continuing to urge that recognition should be delayed <sup>(2)</sup>. But during 1912 the refusal of British recognition of the Belgian annexation of the Congo State was affected by the European situation. Great Britain began to fear that if Belgium were attacked, she might collaborate with Germany rather than ask for British protection. From the British point of view this would have been disastrous, and it was clear that recognition of Belgian annexation would remove one of the chief causes of the existing friction. The Belgian government had given no guarantees of a permanent and irrevocable reform in the Congo, but the military question was urgent <sup>(3)</sup>.

In any case there was a certain unreality in the continued pressure of the Congo Reform Association, for virtually all that it had been fighting for had in fact been obtained. It became clear that British recognition could not be delayed for much longer, and the Association decided to retire gracefully. At an executive committee meeting in April, it decided that "in view of the immense improvement, it was no longer justified in opposing

<sup>(1)</sup> O. O., C. R. A., Aug. 1912.

<sup>(2)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 22 I 13.

<sup>(3)</sup> M. E. THOMAS, Anglo-Belgian military relations and the Congo question, *Journal of Modern History*, June 1954, p. 164.

the recognition of annexation" (1). A week later the B.M.S. followed its lead; Lawson FORFEITT visited the Foreign Office and gave the B.M.S. blessing to British recognition (2). The military situation was becoming critical and the Foreign Office was only too glad to hurry the matter; the Commons, however, were given their promised opportunity of a debate before the final step was taken. The debate was arranged for the end of May, and in June the British Government formally recognized the Belgian annexation of the Congo (3). In July the final meeting of the Congo Reform Association was held in an atmosphere of self-congratulation; many warm tributes were paid to the work of MOREL, and representatives of the B.M.S. took part (4).

The British recognition of annexation and the dissolution of the Congo Reform Association marked the end of a period which had been a difficult one for the English-speaking missions in the Congo. They had found themselves forced into political activity in a way which they deeply regretted. They had desired to stand well with the administrative authorities, first with those of the Congo Independent State and then with the Belgian colonial government, and to avoid all occasion for the charge that they were political agents. At the same time they had seen that the leopoldian system of government led to results which were disastrous both for African living conditions and for the extension of their own work. After a period of hesitation and of sharp differences of opinion, they had thrown in their lot with the Congo Reform Association. The pressure of the Association had been instrumental in hastening Belgian annexation of the Congo State, and the Association had not been dissolved

(1) *O. O., C. R. A.*, July 1913.

(2) *B. M. S. Minutes*, 21 V 13.

(3) STENMANS, p. 457.

(4) *O. O., C. R. A.*, July 1913.



until the Belgian colonial authorities had given an effective demonstration of their intention of carrying through a reversal of the old system. At Edinburgh in 1910 the Protestant missionary world had insisted that this must be done, and later gladly recognized that a real reform was being carried out <sup>(1)</sup>.

The Congo basin was not the only part of Africa where missionaries were noting abuse of power on the part of European governments; British rule was not exempt from such criticism. But in the Congo there were special difficulties, for the scale of the abuse was exceptional and in addition, protests had to be addressed to a foreign power. Missionaries approached the governments of Great Britain and the United States only when they believed that they had proved the futility of appeals to the Congo government itself. It was an unusual missionary policy born of a peculiar situation. Results justified it, but the tensions which it produced were to affect relations between the Belgian authorities and the English-speaking missionaries for many years. The missionaries were a foreign group, somewhat suspect until their loyalty to the colony was proved. They had inherited a tradition of interference in the affairs of the administration. But in 1913 the period of the greatest friction between the missions and the government in Congo was over, and a new beginning had been made.

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Because they were at work in the territory of a foreign Power, the English missionaries in the Congo believed that it was most important for them to build up a friendly relationship with the Belgian Protestants, in an effort

<sup>(1)</sup> In its general surveys for 1912, 1913 and 1914, the *International Review of Missions* noted an increasing measure of effective reform being introduced into the Congo by the Belgian Colonial Government.

to show that they were well disposed towards Belgium herself. It was BENTLEY who first tried to interest Belgian Protestants in the Congo. They formed a very small group in a predominantly Catholic or agnostic population, but BENTLEY felt it to be "very important that the powers-that-be should know that the Belgian Protestants are interested in our work" (1). He and his wife had paid a visit to Belgium as early as 1893, and had tried to arouse the interest of the Protestants in Congo missions (2); it was his idea, also, that the temperance society at Wathen should be linked with a Belgian group (3).

The subject of the Congo aroused very little interest in Belgium, however, for the Congo State was regarded as LEOPOLD'S affair, and his alone. It was not until Belgian annexation became a political issue that there was any widespread concern. During the period of the anti-Congolese campaign, the wildest accusations of self-interest or of political interest had been flung at the foreign Protestant missionaries in the Congo, so that Belgians became aware of their existence, but usually knew almost nothing of their work. In this situation some of the Belgian Protestants felt it incumbent upon them to explain and to defend to their fellow-citizens the position of the foreign Protestant missionaries in the Congo State. Their spokesman was Henri ANET, a pastor of the *Église Chrétienne Missionnaire Belge* — a Free Church which had no connection with the State. ANET himself had very little knowledge of the Congo missions, but he wrote to the B.M.S. asking for information, and summarized it in a French pamphlet (4) which was circulated amongst Belgian Protestants, while a copy was

(1) BENTLEY to BAYNES, 21 VI 98. B. M. S.

(2) Kennedy ANET to LAWSON FORFEITT, 5 IV 09. in B. M. S. Minutes, 23 IV 09.

(3) BENTLEY, II, p. 400.

(4) H. ANET, *A propos du Congo : que faut-il penser des missionnaires protestants ?* Brussels, 1907.

sent to all members of the Chamber and of the Senate (1). ANET defended the attitude of the foreign missionaries towards the State authorities, besides giving a good many details about the history and the work of the Protestant missions. It was the first time that much of this information had appeared in French. The Belgian Protestants kept up their interest in the Congo missions, once it had been aroused. Naturally their chief links continued to be with the B.M.S.; in the autumn of 1908 two B.M.S. missionaries visited Belgium to describe the methods and the aims of Protestant missions. They drew large and varied audiences to their talks, which usually included a description of the abuses of the system of government in the Congo State; many copies of Anet's pamphlet were sold (2), and other literature about the Congo Protestant missions was translated into French (3).

It was not only the *Église Chrétienne Missionnaire Belge* that was showing an interest in the Congo missions, for Paul ROCHEDIEU, the president of the Synod of Evangelical Churches of Belgium — whose ministers accepted State salaries, unlike those of the *Église Chrétienne Missionnaire* — wrote to ask Henri ANET for details of the Protestant missionary work in the Congo in order that he might present these to the Colonial Minister. His enquiries were welcomed (4), and ANET, perhaps acting on ROCHEDIEU's advice, suggested that the two Belgian Protestant groups should join with representatives of the English Protestant missions in an address to RENKIN, expressing their loyalty to the colonial authorities, and asking for freedom of action for the

(1) G. C. R., 1911, p. 41.

(2) *M. H.*, Dec. 1908, Jan. 1909.

(3) Matula, le Congolais: a translation of J. BELL, A miracle of modern missions; or the story of Matula a Congo convert. London, 1903.

(4) "I am glad to see that our brethren of the State Church are willing to take sides with the Protestant missionaries in the Congo; till now they have been very prudent and silent". H. ANET to Lawson FORFEITT, 25 XI 08. B. M. S.

missions. Since the B.M.S. had adopted an attitude of extreme caution towards Belgian annexation, the Society regarded such a step as premature <sup>(1)</sup>. The Committee was, however, very ready to welcome any approach made by the Belgian Protestants, and gladly considered and accepted the offer of Henri LAMBOTTE, of Liège, to serve as a missionary in the Congo <sup>(2)</sup>. Liège had a special connection with the quickening of Belgian Protestant interest in the Congo ; in April ANET preached a stirring sermon there at the congress of the *Association Chrétienne Belge d'Étudiants* <sup>(3)</sup>, and later in 1909 a pastor of the town published a short history of Protestant missions in the Congo, the first to be written in French <sup>(4)</sup>.

The Belgian colonial authorities saw the growing interest of Belgian Protestants in the Congo as a possible means of reducing the number of foreign missionaries in the colony. The English missionaries were still a group of which they were suspicious <sup>(5)</sup>, for their presence in the Congo was regarded as a continuing pretext for interference there by the British government. The British memorandum of November 1908 had asked the Belgian government for an assurance that equal facilities would be given to the missionaries of all denominations <sup>(6)</sup>, while Sir Edward GREY had declared that the question of mission sites in the Congo was one of the first subjects to which the attention of the Belgian

<sup>(1)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 15 XII 08.

<sup>(2)</sup> *Ibid.*, 16 II 09, 18 V 09.

<sup>(3)</sup> H. ANET, *Notre responsabilité envers les indigènes du Congo belge*, Liège, 1909.

<sup>(4)</sup> J. RAMBAUD, *Au Congo pour Christ*, Liège, 1909.

<sup>(5)</sup> " M. Henri ANET told me M. OLIVIER had said to him some time ago that the government was suspicious of our idea of completing a chain of stations across the continent by linking with the Uganda mission of the C. M. S. and would not agree to our opening new stations with that object ". Lawson FORFEIT's report of a visit to Brussels, 11 I 11. B. M. S.

<sup>(6)</sup> British memorandum of 1 XI 08, in *Africa* No. 5, 1908.

government would be drawn <sup>(1)</sup>. Belgium had found it necessary to produce a conciliatory answer <sup>(2)</sup>, and the colonial authorities saw that if Belgian Protestants could replace the English missionaries in the Congo, there would be far less chance of foreign interference there. But this was not a simple matter. Whereas the Baptist mission in the Cameroons had handed over its work to a German society when the Cameroons became German territory <sup>(3)</sup>, it was impossible to follow a similar course in the Congo because of the comparatively tiny proportion of Protestants in Belgium. The small Protestant group could hardly be expected to take over work which was occupying nine British, American and Swedish missionary societies, nor to push forward into the unevangelized regions of the Congo basin.

The proposal which was contained in a lengthy memorial presented to the Colonial Minister by ROCHEDIEU in March 1909 was therefore somewhat breathtaking <sup>(4)</sup>. It began by setting out some of those facts and figures about Protestant missionary effort which Henri ANET had obtained for ROCHEDIEU, stressing in particular the large proportion of Americans and Swedes among the missionaries; this provided a defence against the common attack that the Protestant missionaries were the vanguard of English influence in the Congo. After an attempt to analyse the reasons for the tensions between Protestant missions and the Congo State, the memorial went on to make positive proposals to the Minister. Since the Protestant missions in the Congo had their headquarters in London, Stockholm, Nashville and

<sup>(1)</sup> In reply to a question of Sir Gilbert PARKER, Hansard's Parliamentary debates, fourth series, vol. CXCVI, col. 40 (10 XI 08).

<sup>(2)</sup> Memorial communicated by the Belgian minister, 15 III 09, in Africa No. 2, 1909.

<sup>(3)</sup> JOHNSTON, I, pp. 61-2.

<sup>(4)</sup> Memorial presented by ROCHEDIEU to the Colonial Minister, enclosed in ROCHEDIEU to B. M. S., 9 III 09, in B. M. S. Minutes, 17 III 09.

Boston, and since their diversity, their distance from Brussels, and the language difficulty made it almost impossible for them to establish direct relations with the Belgian government, they needed a general agent who could represent them all at the capital. The Memorial suggested that the Synod of the Evangelical Churches of Belgium should be appointed as such an agent ; as cordial relations existed between Belgian and foreign Protestants " it was not to be doubted that the associations of English, American and Swedish missionaries will joyfully consent to place their interests in the hands of the Synod of Belgium... The Protestant missions established on the Congo would no longer recognize any other intermediary between them and the Colonial Government on all questions which cannot receive a satisfactory solution in Africa ".

The second proposal contained in the memorial was even more surprising. A Belgian Protestant missionary society was to be formed, and Belgian Protestant missionaries were gradually to replace American and English missionaries. It was expected, however, that the supporters of the English and American missions would continue to pay to the Belgian society half the sums which they were then devoting to Congo missions in 1908 ; the other necessary resources would come both from Belgian charity and from State subsidies. It was assumed that the State would be willing to subsidize a Belgian Protestant mission on the pattern of the subsidies given to Catholic missions, since its medical, educational, and social work would be undertaken by Belgian nationals. Naturally there would be a time-lag before Belgian Protestants could take over the whole of the work of the foreign missions ; at first they would send only four or five missionaries a year, but this would be the beginning of a complete and far-reaching change in the personnel undertaking Protestant missionary work in the Congo.

The memorial was so close to the desires of the Belgian colonial authorities that it was hard to believe that it had not been suggested by them. Lawson FORFEITT later judged ROCHEDIEU to be a "willing tool of M. RENKIN" (1) — a typical State churchman eager to stand well with the civil authorities, and to identify the Synod with the interest in Congo missionary work that had already sprung up among Protestants in Belgium. It was with a good deal of surprise and with some dismay that the B.M.S. Committee received a copy of the memorial from ROCHEDIEU, together with a covering letter suggesting that it should send a representative to Brussels. This representative was to sign a declaration which would authorize the Colonial Minister to accept the Synod of Evangelical Churches as the Society's intermediary with the Belgian government.

While it was unwilling to appear suspicious of the advances made by the Belgian Protestants, the B.M.S. Committee saw at least three grave objections to the scheme. If it agreed with the proposal it would necessarily weaken the protest of the British government against the continuation of the Congo system, by recognizing Belgian annexation before the British government had done so. The Synod did not stand in the same independent relationship to the Belgian authorities as did the B.M.S., while the *Église Chrétienne Missionnaire Belge*, the first to show an interest in the B.M.S. and in Congo missionary work, had evidently not been consulted (2). A "suitable reply of a non-committal character" was therefore sent to ROCHEDIEU, while the Foreign Office was informed of the proposal. ROCHEDIEU had stated that the British Minister at Brussels, Sir Arthur HARDINGE, had cordially approved his sugges-

(1) Report of Lawson FORFEITT on a visit to Brussels with the A. B. M. U. representatives, 3 V 09. B. M. S.

(2) B. M. S. Minutes, 17 III 09.

tion, and the B.M.S. wanted to know if this were so (1). It appeared, however, that he had merely expressed in a general way his sympathy with any efforts designed to facilitate good relations between the Belgian government and the English Protestant missions (2). The Society also verified the fact that the *Église Chrétienne Missionnaire Belge* had not been approached; the Synod's proposal was a completely independent one, and the *Église Missionnaire* saw several dangers in the scheme, and in any case doubted the ability of Belgian Protestantism to produce annually four or five missionaries for the Congo (3).

The C.B.M. attitude towards the memorial was similar to that of the B.M.S. It too found the transfer of mission stations and money to a state-subsidised society impossible, and the Council believed that Belgian Protestants had neither the experience, the means, nor the necessary independence to carry on the existing work of the foreign missions (4). Some members saw political pressure behind the proposals (5), and indeed it is clear that LEOPOLD himself was interested in the attempt to replace foreign missionaries by Belgians, and was kept closely informed of the negotiations by RENKIN (6). Possibly he hoped for a success comparable with that

(1) WILSON to Sir Edward GREY, 2 IV 09, in B. M. S. Minutes, 23 IV 09.

(2) Report of Lawson FORFEIT on visit to Brussels, 6 IV 09, in B. M. S. Minutes 23 IV 09.

(3) Kennedy ANET to Lawson FORFEIT, 5 IV 09, in B. M. S. Minutes, 23 IV 09.

(4) C. B. M. Minutes, 6 IV 09.

(5) "The petition of the President of the Synod of the Evangelical Churches of Belgium... is... one of the cheekiest proposals I have ever known, and most clearly I think it was a political move. I may add that the Baptists have written a letter of their own, just on our lines". James IRVINE to HARRIS, 10 IV 09. R. H., MSS. Brit. Emp., S. 22, G. 263.

(6) "Les négociations continuent avec les protestants. La formule que j'avais soumise à l'agrément du Roi et qu'Il a approuvée est acceptée par le représentant du synode belge. Les délégués étrangers arriveront la semaine prochaine à Bruxelles. J'espère pouvoir terminer cette affaire avant mon départ". RENKIN to LEOPOLD II, 7 IV 09. A. G. R., *Papiers Schollaert-Helleputte*, 1.



which he had won over twenty years before, when he had secured the replacement of French missionary congregations in the Congo by Belgian Catholics.

There was a considerable stir in the circles interested in Congo Reform when the memorial was made public. In mid-April the *Morning Post* contained news of the proposals; this led MOREL to send off a series of excited telegrams. He approached the B.M.S. and the C.B.M. direct <sup>(1)</sup>, and also several nonconformists — SCOTT LIDGETT, John CLIFFORD and Sir George WHITE — who might be expected to influence the missionary societies towards rejection of the Belgian scheme <sup>(2)</sup>. He even wired the American Congo Reform Association in an attempt to unite the American Societies with the British missions against the proposals. In a press interview on the same day he made it clear that he regarded the whole plan as a political move directly inspired by the Belgian Government, an attempt to remove British and American missionaries from the Congo because their presence there made the continuation of the Congo system more difficult <sup>(3)</sup>. In letters to the press he set out similar ideas <sup>(4)</sup>. The missionary societies also made their position clear when they were interviewed by press representatives; the B.M.S. stated that it had in no way committed itself to the Belgian scheme, while the C.B.M. declared that it had no intention of withdrawing from the Congo <sup>(5)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> "Surely... complete rejection Belgian proposals. Acceptance would mean abandonment natives. Whole thing is astute political move". Telegrams MOREL to MACALPINE, MOREL to GUINNESS, 19 IV 09. M. P.

<sup>(2)</sup> "See *Morning Post* today... Deplorable if British Missionary Societies fall into trap proposed. Whole thing is... Astute political move to get rid of and muddle British missionaries... Use... influence prevent so disastrous a bargain" Telegram MOREL to Sir George WHITE, a9 IV 09, and in a shortened version to CLIFFORD and SCOTT LIDGETT, M. P.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Nottingham Guardian*, 20 IV 09.

<sup>(4)</sup> MOREL to the Editor, *Daily News*, 22 IV 09, 27 IV 09; *Morning Post*, 15 V 09.

<sup>(5)</sup> *Ibid.*, 22 IV 09.

The American missionaries also needed to take their stand for or against the Belgian scheme, so two representatives of the American Baptists were sent to join LAWSON FORFEITT on a visit to Brussels. They interviewed MOREL at the end of April, and found him disappointed that the British missionary societies had not repudiated the Belgian proposals with an indignant manifesto of protest. The Americans themselves approved of the attitude of their co-religionists, however, as "wiser, more charitable and more statesmanlike". On the following day there was a general gathering at the Baptist Mission House of representatives of the B.M.S., the C.B.M., the American Presbyterians <sup>(1)</sup>, the Disciples of Christ <sup>(2)</sup>, and the American Baptists. None of the societies, with the possible exception of the Disciples' Mission, was prepared to accept the proposal that the Synod should be its representative in Belgium, nor to agree with the suggestion that its missionaries should gradually be replaced by Belgian missionaries subsidised by the Belgian government <sup>(3)</sup>. If the missions found it necessary to have a mouthpiece in Brussels, they decided that this should be a consultative committee, rather than a single Belgian representative. It was with this general backing behind it that the delegation of British and American Baptists travelled to Brussels.

They found that it was not ROCHEDIEU himself, but a young lawyer, OLIVIER, who had evidently drawn up the memorial, in agreement with the Colonial Minister. OLIVIER, rather than ROCHEDIEU, often took the lead in the negotiations, trying to persuade the missionaries that it would be in their own interests to have a perman-

(1) Represented by WHYTE, the agent in England of the American Presbyterian Congo Mission.

(2) Represented by HENSEY, a missionary who had retired after three years in the field.

(3) Report of the A. B. M. U. representatives to BARBOUR, 1 V 09, in B. M. S. Minutes, 18 V 09.

ent representative in Brussels. The delegation discovered that ROCHEDIEU had complained to the British Minister about MOREL's attacks, had told him that the American and Swedish missions had agreed to the Belgian plan, and had suggested that the British refusal to cooperate lent colour to the idea that political motives were influencing the English societies. His facts were wrong, however; it was only the Disciples' Mission which was in doubt over a reply to the Belgian proposals, and the other American missions were united in their opposition. The American Minister had heard nothing of ROCHEDIEU's memorial, but both he and Sir Arthur HARDINGE favoured the idea of a consultative committee, rather than a single Belgian representative, to act in Brussels on behalf of the foreign missions in the Congo. No positive result came from the negotiations; ROCHEDIEU resolutely opposed the idea of a committee, while the missionary societies with equal firmness refused to accept a Belgian representative <sup>(1)</sup>. GUINNESS visited Brussels on behalf of the C.B.M. in May, but again no agreement was reached <sup>(2)</sup>.

It was not long before ROCHEDIEU made a fresh approach, suggesting that a conference should be held in Brussels in mid-July to discuss the appointment of an agent who would represent the Protestant societies with the Belgian government. After consultation with the C.B.M., the B.M.S. decided against sending delegates, since the Committee had no intention of appointing an official representative in Brussels. Telegrams were sent to America and to Sweden expressing the hope that other missions would take up a similar stand <sup>(3)</sup>. Since the B.M.S. was still unable to obtain the new sites it

(1) From the reports of FORFEITT and the A. B. M. U. representatives, in B. M. S. Minutes, 18 V 09.

(2) C. B. M. Minutes, 1 VI 09.

(3) B. M. S. Minutes, 20 VII 09.

wanted in the Congo, even with the help of the Foreign Office, it was unlikely to give up its one means of pressure ; the appointment of a representative at Brussels would mean by-passing the Foreign Office altogether. The C.B.M. had in fact done this ; when GUINNESS visited Brussels he had approached the Belgian colonial authorities direct and had secured the promise of a new site at Mompona, in the Maringa <sup>(1)</sup>. There was also an American example, for the Disciples of Christ had been given a grant of land.

It was not the Foreign Office which hindered the B.M.S. from making a similar approach. ROCHEDIEU'S interview with the British Minister had had some effect ; the Foreign Office informed the B.M.S. that since the American missions were being granted land by the Belgian colonial authorities, it would be wise for the B.M.S. to apply in the same way, independently of the British Minister, since the British government had not yet recognized Belgian annexation <sup>(2)</sup>. But the B.M.S. refused to pursue negotiations with an authority that had not been recognized by the British Government ; it declared that the applications which had been made to the Congo authorities before 1908 must be considered on the basis of the rights of the British Protestant missions under the Berlin Act and the British Convention <sup>(3)</sup>. If the Foreign Office would do nothing, the Society would drop the matter for the time <sup>(4)</sup>. It would indeed have been somewhat inconsistent to support MOREL'S campaign to delay the recognition of annexation, and at the same time to negotiate for sites directly with the Belgian government, when the Foreign Office itself was refusing to do so. The Society appeared to be determined

<sup>(1)</sup> *R. B.*, June 1909.

<sup>(2)</sup> F. O. to WILSON, 18 V 09, in B. M. S. Minutes, 20 VII 09.

<sup>(3)</sup> Approved reply to the F. O. letter of 9 VI 09, in B. M. S. Minutes, 20 VII 09.

<sup>(4)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 21 IX 09.

to avoid the charge which had been brought against it in the early days of the Congo reform movement — that so long as it could carry on its mission work, it cared nothing for an improvement of the system of government in the Congo (1). Naturally its attitude was cordially approved by MOREL (2).

The C.M.S., too, was in difficulties with the Congo authorities; it wished to obtain sites on the eastern borders of the Congo territory, where Bishop TUCKER was hoping to extend its Uganda work westwards. When members of the C.M.S. Committee approached the Foreign Office privately, they found that at first it appeared to be ready to welcome pressure which would strengthen its position over the Congo question (3). The C.M.S. accordingly asked the support of the British Government for the society's application to open up new work in the Congo (4). At first the Foreign Office replied that as soon as the annexation of the Congo State by Belgium could be recognized, the C.M.S. application would be brought to the notice of the Belgian Government (5), but a month later it had changed its attitude, and was urging the C.M.S. as well as the B.M.S. to apply independently to the Belgian colonial authorities (6). Bishop TUCKER had in fact already applied to Brussels from Uganda,

(1) "The B. M. S. wants fresh sites, but it does not want the moral issue involved to be obscured by the mere question of the location of mission stations". Reply to the F. O. letter of 9 VI 09, in B. M. S. Minutes, 20 VII 09.

(2) "The B. M. S. is rightly maintaining its position that until the British Government has recognized Belgian annexation, it is not meet for a British society to open negotiations with a Government whose status its own Government does not recognize... the B. M. S. is consistently insisting that in its eyes the complete disappearance of the leopoldian regime is of far greater importance than enjoyment of its own legitimate rights under the Anglo-Congolese Convention and the Berlin Act, important as that aspect must be to the Society". *O. O., C. R. A.*, Oct. 1910.

(3) BAYLIS to Bishop TUCKER, 2 IV 09. C. M. S., Uganda, II.

(4) C. M. S. to F. O., 6 IV 09. C. M. S., Official Letters, 1909.

(5) F. O. to C. M. S., 21 IV 09. C. M. S., *ibid.*

(6) *Ibid.*, 18 V 09.

independently of the C.M.S. Committee, and was forwarding copies of his applications to the Foreign Office (1). If the work of the African evangelists from Uganda, men like Apolo KIVEBULAYA (2), was not to be wasted, the Congo border territory had to be claimed by the establishment of permanent stations. As usual, however, Bishop TUCKER's application was met by delaying tactics; certainly the C.M.S. was no more welcome on the eastern borders of the Congo territory than were the Free Church missions which entered from the west. The question of new sites for the Protestant missions at work in the Congo was becoming an urgent one; the General Conference which met in the September of 1909 passed a strong resolution on the subject (3).

There was another reason for friction between the Protestant missions and the colonial authorities. The missions objected to excessive taxation, and were supported in their complaints by the British consul (4). A long memorial on the question was sent by the legal representative of the B.M.S. to the Colonial Minister before his visit to the Congo (5). But on the other hand, there were signs that the foreign missions realised that they could fruitfully cooperate with the colonial authorities. It was clear that language created one of the greatest barriers, and the missions were making a sincere effort to improve the standard of the French they used, in spite of some objections on the part of their home supporters (6). Individuals spent two or three months in Belgium or France for language study (7), and miss-

(1) Bishop TUCKER to BAYLIS, 25 V 09. C. M. S., 1909/200.

(2) A. B. LLOYD, Apolo of the pygmy forest, London, 1923.

(3) G. C. R., 1909, p. 12.

(4) Africa No. 1, 1909.

(5) In B. M. S. Minutes, 20 VII 09.

(6) Supporters of the Swedish mission complained that its missionaries were supposed to be in Congo to evangelize, not to teach French. Svenska missionsförbundet under 75 ar., Stockholm, 1953, under the date of 1 II 11.

(7) B. M. S. Minutes, 21 XII 09. This was also true of the new missions;

ionaries urged the home committees to allow theological students preparing to work in the Congo to drop Hebrew in their last year, so that they could take up French <sup>(1)</sup>. In any case young Africans regarded a knowledge of French as their *open sesame* to well-paid posts under the government and in commerce, and Protestant missionaries realized that if they did not offer French, some of their brightest pupils would desert them in favour of schools run by the Catholic missions <sup>(2)</sup>.

Protestant missionaries were also endeavouring to cooperate in the medical programme of the Belgian colonial authorities; the government had invited them to send a number of missionaries to the Leopoldville medical institute for training, and this they were quite willing to do <sup>(3)</sup>. With some hesitation, also, the B.M.S. had advised its legal representative, ROSS PHILLIPS, to accept a place on the newly re-formed Commission for the Protection of the Natives, lest a refusal to serve should cause misunderstanding <sup>(4)</sup>. Some time later, ROSS PHILLIPS declined to undertake the duties of an acting British consul, feeling that these would be incompatible with his position as a missionary working in the territory of a foreign power <sup>(5)</sup>. So far as they could, missionaries were identifying themselves with the Congo, and not with their country of origin. As VANDERVELDE remarked of SHEPPARD, he was "no longer of England or America, but of the Kasai <sup>(6)</sup>."

Bishop Lambuth's party stopped in Belgium on the way to the Congo in the summer of 1913, and studied French for two months. T. E. REEVE, In Wembo-Nyama's land : A story of the thrilling experiences in establishing the Methodist mission among the Ateteba, Nashville, 1921, p. 122.

<sup>(1)</sup> MILLMAN, in *M. H.*, Aug. 1909.

<sup>(2)</sup> G. C. R., 1909, p. 9.

<sup>(3)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 16 II 10.

<sup>(4)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 18 V 09.

<sup>(5)</sup> ROSS PHILLIPS to CAMPBELL, acting British consul at Boma, 26 XII 10, in B. M. S. Minutes, 21 II 11.

<sup>(6)</sup> During the trial of MORRISON and SHEPPARD for libel, cf. *infra*, p. 369 ff.

But this identification remained of necessity incomplete, and RENKIN was glad that the Belgian Protestants themselves were proceeding with the idea of forming a mission of their own. He was able to answer Socialist complaints that he was treating Protestant and Catholic missions differently, by emphasizing that the difference was based on the distinction made between national and foreign missions, and was not a religious question. To the Belgian Protestant mission he had promised land and a subsidy <sup>(1)</sup>. Tentative plans for this mission were discussed in the autumn of 1909 by a group composed of an equal number of representatives from the two Belgian Protestant groups <sup>(2)</sup>. ANET applied to the B.M.S. for help in drawing up the regulations which were to govern the new society <sup>(3)</sup>, but it was some time before these were ready, and before the proposed society could find the men or the means to embark on a preliminary survey in order to discover a suitable region for evangelism <sup>(4)</sup>. Meanwhile both ROCHEDIEU for the Synod and ANET for the *Église Missionnaire* sent contributions to the B.M.S. to help to support the Belgian Henri LAMBOTTE, who had been appointed by the society to Yakusu <sup>(5)</sup>. At the 1910 missionary conference at Edinburgh the Belgian representative announced that there would soon be Belgian Protestants at work in the Congo, but it was not until 1911 that ANET himself visited the colony, to tour the district to the east of Stanleyville in search of a suitable site for a station. He was able to point to the fact that the 1911 general Protestant conference in Congo was not composed only of "English

<sup>(1)</sup> *Annales parlementaires*, 31 I 12.

<sup>(2)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 21 IX 09 ; C. B. M. Minutes, 5 X 09.

<sup>(3)</sup> B.M. S. Minutes, 17 XI 09.

<sup>(4)</sup> By 1914 the Belgian Protestants had not established their mission, and it was then impossible because of the outbreak of war. Two Belgians became regular members of the American Presbyterian mission. WHARTON, p. 93.

<sup>(5)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 16 III 10.



missionaries" but included Americans, Swedes, and also two Belgian Protestant representatives (1).

Meanwhile, the B.M.S. was still refused permission to occupy the sites which the Society had applied for in the region to the south of Stanley Falls. It had hoped to advance southward and plant stations at Babondo and Wayika, on the Lualaba, since the Itimbiri route to the north and east had been closed by the sudden refusal of land at Mundungu which had previously been granted. A reference to Mundungu in the *Missionary Herald* had caught the attention of RENKIN, who examined the magazine regularly (2), and hoping to quieten B.M.S. agitation, he himself reopened the matter and offered the Society a site of equal value. The opportunity was seized; the B.M.S. explained that the refusal of sites on the Aruwimi and the Itimbiri had led it to change its plans, and it now intended to move southwards. In 1907 it had applied to the Congo State for land at Babondo and Wayika, but had received no satisfaction; it therefore suggested that the colonial authorities should grant five hectares of land at each of these places, as equivalent to the ten which had been given and withdrawn at Mundungu. FORFEITT hopefully visited Brussels, but he found RENKIN unwilling to allow advance on the Lualaba; the Minister complained that he feared trouble should a mission be established in Moslem territory (3). The Society continued to press the question, however, and finally in May of 1911 it issued an ultimatum. Met with "persistent obstruction under various pretexts", it appealed to the British Government to assert its rights, and declared itself justified in negotiating directly with the local chiefs for land, and in occupying the sites it required without further reference to Brussels (4).

(1) Letter of ANET in *Tribune Congolaise*, 13 I 12.

(2) Report of LAWSON FORFEITT on a visit to Brussels, 12 I 11. B. M. S.

(3) RENKIN to WILSON, 25 IV 11, in B. M. S. Minutes, 16 V 11.

(4) WILSON to Sir Edward GREY, 5 V 11, in B. M. S. Minutes, 16 V 11.

This action at last brought a grudging permission from the Belgian colonial authorities for the occupation of the sites. Sir Arthur HARDINGE was told that the B.M.S. could build there at its own risk <sup>(1)</sup>, and WHITEHEAD established himself at Wayika, and placed two African evangelists at Mabondo. In neither place did he find local opposition ; this came only from Brussels <sup>(2)</sup>. The B.M.S. continued to urge that before annexation was recognized by Great Britain, Belgium should be compelled to give absolute guarantees of the rights of the missionaries under the Berlin Act to obtain land for stations <sup>(3)</sup>. It was not the only society in difficulties, for the American Presbyterians were also finding it impossible to obtain a grant of land <sup>(4)</sup>. The new missions, however, were more fortunate. Bishop SPRINGER, of the Methodist Episcopal Church, found that his fears of being unable to obtain a concession of land from the Belgian government were groundless, and he was readily given a site at Kambove, in the Katanga <sup>(5)</sup>. The Heart of Africa Mission received an equally warm welcome later. An abandoned government agricultural station at Nala was handed over to the missionaries <sup>(6)</sup>, and although STUDD had been warned before he entered the Congo that the Belgians thoroughly disliked English missionaries, and would try to turn out the mission, instead he found a friendly welcome <sup>(7)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 19 VII 11.

<sup>(2)</sup> "The men who are thwarting us are not in this district : they are in Brussels. *We* have no enemies among the officials to fight here ; it is *you* who have the fight at headquarters ". Letter of WHITEHEAD in B. M. S. Minutes, 22 XI 11.

<sup>(3)</sup> WILSON to Sir Edward GREY, 7 XI 11, in B. M. S. Minutes, 22 XI 11.

<sup>(4)</sup> *Miss.*, August 1912.

<sup>(5)</sup> *Infra*, p. 388.

<sup>(6)</sup> N. GRUBB, *Christ in Congo forests. The story of the Heart of Africa Mission*, London, 1945, p. 20.

<sup>(7)</sup> "Imagine the consternation of the assembled chiefs at this public honour paid by the highest official in the province to "these wicked English" with whom they have been warned to have nothing to do, not even to sell them food." *Ibid.*, p. 27.

Continued pressure from the Belgian government made it clear that if a single representative were appointed to speak on behalf of all the Protestant missions, and if he were to live in Brussels, relations between missions and government would become easier. Although the missions refused to negotiate on the question of the appointment of a representative before the official recognition of Belgian annexation <sup>(1)</sup>, it was obvious that Henri ANET was becoming an unofficial link between the Belgian authorities and the foreign missions. It was he who invited the missions to take part in the colonial exhibition held at Ghent in 1912 <sup>(2)</sup>, and complaints from the field were passed on to ANET so that he could lay them before the Colonial Minister <sup>(3)</sup>. It was not until after the war that a permanent representative was appointed to reside in Brussels and to speak for all the Protestant missions in their dealings with the Belgian government. Rather naturally, ANET was chosen for this office <sup>(4)</sup>, and his work was considerably facilitated by the fact that he was himself a Belgian. There was less reason to suppose that the Protestant missions were "foreign" in the sense of being hostile to the authorities, while at the same time the missions had lost none of their autonomy, nor had they agreed to a plan whereby their work in the Congo would gradually be brought to an end. The appointment of a single representative to speak for all the Congo Protestant missions was certainly one of the factors which contributed to the rapid improvement in mission-government relationships in the period after 1913.

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<sup>(1)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 19 IV 12.

<sup>(2)</sup> B. M. S. Minutes, 19 IV 12, 21 V 12, 16 VII 12.

<sup>(3)</sup> In the case of an alleged persecution of Protestants by Catholics in the cataract region in 1913, copies of letters of complaint were sent to ANET to lay before the Colonial Minister, and a cablegram was sent to the field, 16 VI 13;

"Delay complaints, consult ANET". B. M. S. Minutes, 8 VII 13.

<sup>(4)</sup> CARPENTER, p. 39.

After Belgian annexation of the Congo State, relations between the Protestant missions and the government had not been facilitated by the fact that the missions had found themselves allied with a Socialist whose views about the Congo were not in favour with the colonial authorities. The long discussions on annexation had brought the Congo into Belgian politics. In 1885 the only link between Belgium and the Congo had been a personal one, through the position of LEOPOLD II as both King of the Belgians and Sovereign of the Congo Independent State, and the deputies had made it clear that Belgium herself did not wish to embark upon a colonial policy. Gradually, however, the attitude of the Belgian politicians changed. By 1901 there was a strong right-wing group which advocated immediate annexation, although the Socialists, completely hostile to a colonial policy, opposed it and a large proportion of the right wanted delay (1). But by 1907 the Catholic party was supporting immediate annexation, and so were the Liberals, with the exception of the anti-colonial group led by LORAND. Among the Socialists, VANDERVELDE stood alone in supporting immediate annexation (2). When annexation finally won the day by a vote in the Chamber of eighty-three to fifty-four, and in the Senate of sixty-three to twenty-four, the Belgian policy towards the new colony was a matter to be thrashed out by the parties.

In this situation there was a tendency for the missions to ally themselves with the opposing parties. Catholic missions naturally favoured the Catholic ministry; the Colonial Minister RENKIN was prepared to continue to subsidize their work, and it seemed likely that they would remain in a privileged position. The Socialists, mainly agnostic and anti-clerical, were to find the exist-

(1) STENMANS, pp. 252-3.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 378.

ence of the Protestant missions useful when they attacked the policy of the government ; they could favourably compare the social and educational work of Protestant with that of Catholic missions, and demand equal subsidies for both (1). The Protestants realised that this attitude on the part of the Socialists might be useful to them, as long as the Catholic missions retained their close links with the government. A somewhat similar situation had obtained in the Congo Independent State ; certain left-wing and anti-clerical officials had been friendly towards the Protestant missionaries in the Congo, very largely because these officials were opposed to the work of the Catholic missionaries there.

It was not long before both RENKIN and VANDERVELDE departed on a Congo tour. VANDERVELDE did not even wait until the Congo had formally become a colony, unwilling to vote for annexation against his party, but left Belgium towards the end of July before the final stages of the debates. In assessing the relative value of the missions in the Congo both he and RENKIN, who followed him in the spring of 1909, made the judgements which might have been expected of them before they left. VANDERVELDE and the Protestant missions had a common ally in the person of MOREL ; he was to support their part in the anti-Congolese campaign (2), and to praise the efficiency of their educational methods in comparison with those of the Catholics (3). RENKIN,

(1) *Annales Parlementaires*, 7 II 12.

(2) " I certainly cannot share their religious convictions... but from the standpoint of humanity, my heart is in unison with theirs, and I feel a sympathetic admiration for their efforts in delivering the natives from the system to which they have been subjected for so long ". VANDERVELDE to FORFEIT, 31 X 08, in *O. O., C. R. A.* Jan. 1909.

(3) On a visit to a B.M.S. school at Bolobo, he wrote : " Nous voilà loin de l'école des Pères de Scheut, à Boma. Il n'est plus question des druides de l'ancienne Gaule et de l'histoire du jeune Tobie. Les deux dames qui dirigent l'école et leurs moniteurs noirs apprennent à lire aux enfants dans leur langue ; les livres de classe ne sont pas des laissés pour compte des écoles d'Europe, mais des manuels

on the other hand, noted that the Catholic missions produced better results, both in their evangelism and in the industrial training which they gave to the Africans (1).

MOREL had been careful to prepare the ground for VANDERVELDE's visit to the Congo. He had written round to the Protestant missionaries with whom he was in contact to stress the great importance of the tour; he had explained that to a large extent Belgian efforts to improve the conditions of administration in the Congo would depend upon it, and he had urged them to be frank in discussion with VANDERVELDE (2). At the same time he had informed VANDERVELDE of those missionaries who were best able to give him information on Congo affairs (3). The missionaries found VANDERVELDE friendly and easy to talk with (4), and he came into touch with a good many of them in the course of his visit to Leopoldville, Bolobo, Irebu, Coquilhatville, and Nouvelle Anvers, and his inland tour in the concession of the *Société Anversoise* (5). RENKIN, who visited the Kasai, travelled up the main river as far as Stanleyville, and inspected the work in progress for the Great Lakes Railway (6), found the foreign missionaries whom he met "très corrects et même aimables" but discovered that it was necessary to emphasize to the local chiefs

soigneusement adaptés à la mentalité et aux préoccupations des jeunes indigènes". E. VANDERVELDE, *Les derniers jours de l'État du Congo*, Mons-Paris, 1909, p. 92.

(1) "Mon impression, quant aux missions, se confirme. La supériorité des missions catholiques tant au point de vue de l'évangélisation que de l'instruction professionnelle des indigènes se marque nettement... Vandervelde prétend qu'ils (les missionnaires protestants) formeront bien plus d'artisans. Je voudrais bien savoir où il a vu cela". RENKIN to HELLEPUTTE, 9 VII 09. A. G. R., *Papiers Schollaert-Helleputte*, 515.

(2) MOREL to Cassie MURDOCH, 22 VI 08, to HOWELL, 29 VI 08, to STEPHENS, 30 VI 08. M. P.

(3) MOREL to VANDERVELDE, 29 VI 08. M. P.

(4) W. L. FORFEIT to WILSON, 6 X 08, B. M. S.

(5) WAUTERS, p. 376.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 375.

that the Protestant missionaries had no authority over them, and that this belonged to the magistrates alone (1). He was glad to find that so far as he could see, Catholic missions were in the ascendant (2).

In the Belgian press the Catholic-Socialist struggle was bringing out more clearly the fact of the alliance between VANDERVELDE and the Protestant missionaries. A correspondence between VERMEERSCH and VANDERVELDE appeared in the *Peuple* and other journals during the February of 1909 ; Fr. VERMEERSCH of the Society of Jesus put forward the usual accusations that Protestant missionaries were inspired by political motives (3), and MOREL joined battle in their defence. It was again alleged that Protestant missionaries were among the most ardent supporters of the Congo Reform Association simply because they met with Catholic rivalry (4), while the Socialist press gave publicity to incidents such as the destruction of a Protestant school by Catholic catechists (5).

But it was the Morrison trial (6) which brought out most clearly of all the alliance between VANDERVELDE and the Protestants. The American Presbyterians had been quick to note abuse of European authority in the Kasai ever since MORRISON'S public criticisms of the State's use of cannibal Zappo-Zap soldiers there as early as 1899, and the missionaries were regarded with the utmost suspicion by the Kasai Company. Early in

(1) RENKIN to HELLEPUTTE, 9 VII 09. A. G. R., *Papiers Schollaert-Helleputte*, 515.

(2) " J'ai visité les missions catholiques et protestantes qui se trouvaient sur ma route... les catholiques gagnent beaucoup de terrain sur les protestants, beaucoup d'indigènes protestants se font catholiques ". RENKIN to HELLEPUTTE, 11 VI 09. A. G. R., *Papiers Schollaert-Helleputte*, 515.

(3) " Il paraît que certains de leurs catéchistes prêtent un serment d'allégeance au roi d'Angleterre comme au chef spirituel de leur Église ". VERMEERSCH to VANDERVELDE, in *XX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 17 II 09.

(4) *Le Matin*, 9 VII 09.

(5) *Le Peuple*, 14 VII 09.

(6) VINSON, pp. 78-110.

1908 an article by SHEPPARD appeared in the *Kasai Herald*, a mission paper edited by MORRISON. SHEPPARD painted a picture of Bakuba life, busy and prosperous, before the coming of the State authorities ; he followed this up by a description of the state of affairs in 1908, when the towns were neglected, full of weeds and dirt, and when the people had no time to listen to the missionaries.

“ Why this change ? You have it in a few words. There are armed sentries of chartered trading companies who force the men and women to spend most of their days in the forests making rubber, and the price they receive is so meagre that they cannot live upon it.” (1)

In March MOREL forwarded to the Foreign Office a lengthy report from Luebo concerning the activities of a State officer who had come from Luluabourg to recruit forced labour for the Kasai Company (2). At the same time a correspondence began between MORRISON and the Director of the Company in the Congo (3), who had seen and objected to SHEPPARD'S article in the *Kasai Herald*. The Kasai Company was not a chartered company, he stated, and it did not employ armed sentries. This correspondence was followed up by another, between MOREL and the Director-General of the Company at Brussels (4), who was concerned to point out from the missionaries' own earlier testimony that all had not been so peaceful in the Kasai before the coming of the Company as SHEPPARD had insisted (5).

This was no real answer to the accusations, however, and the Company's next move was to threaten MOREL with a libel action. MOREL wrote immediately to MORRI-

(1) *Kasai Herald*, Jan. 1908.

(2) *O. O., C. R. A.*, May 1908.

(3) VINSON, pp. 79-83 ; *O. O., C. R. A.*, June 1908.

(4) *O. O., C. R. A.*, June 1908.

(5) *Petit Bleu*, 28, 29 VI 08.



SON ; he asked him and SHEPPARD to take down from the neighbouring chiefs and people as exact an account as they could of the events of the past two years (1). He also suggested to the American Presbyterians that they might be willing to contribute towards the cost of his defence, since this would be a heavy burden upon the Congo Reform Association, and since the accuracy of the testimony of their missionaries was involved in the case (2). The response was encouraging, but in the meantime the Kasai Company had given up any thought of an action against him (3).

It still intended to take legal proceedings, however. By the end of the year the Company was expecting to embark upon a second Stannard case, and to transfer its proposed attack from MOREL to the American missionaries. Press campaigns might have some result (4), but a judgement against the missionaries would have a more weighty moral and material effect for a Company whose stock had fallen considerably after the visit of the British consul THESIGER to the region. MOREL decided to make whatever capital he could out of the affair. It was obvious that the trial of American citizens in the Congo would concern the American government, and he saw an opportunity for the American Congo Reform Association to plead for consular jurisdiction. He therefore cabled the Association to this effect, and encouraged MORRISON to stand firm (5). The summons finally came in February ; MORRISON and SHEPPARD were to appear at Leopoldville in May on a libel charge. MOREL took

(1) " I know you will back me up, as I do you here ". MOREL to MORRISON, 29 VI 08. M. P.

(2) MOREL to WHYTE, 2 VII 08. M. P.

(3) MOREL to Motte MARTIN, 2 VII 08. M. P.

(4) " This is what is being sent to the Press, to try to convict your people of double dealing, lying, hypocrisy, malice and every abomination ". MOREL to MORRISON, 7 VII 08. M. P.

(5) MOREL to MORRISON, 8 I 09. M. P.

an extreme tone, and stated that he considered the action against the missionaries was that of the Belgian government, rather than of the Kasai Company only, and that "MORRISON stood between the persecuted Bakuba and their Belgian persecutors" (1).

After representations had been received from the American Congo Reform Association, from the Presbyterian mission board, from the whole denomination, and from interested Congressmen (2), the first efforts of the American government were directed towards obtaining a change of place and date for the trial. Leopoldville was nearly a thousand miles from the Kasai, so that it was difficult to get African witnesses there in any numbers, three months was too short a time in which to arrange an adequate defence, and the specified date came after the beginning of the dry season, a particularly difficult time for river travel to or from Luebo. Finally the date was altered, and it was arranged that the trial should be held in Leopoldville in July.

The next problem was to find a suitable lawyer to conduct the defence. The Kasai Company had secured one of the best lawyers it could find in Belgium for the prosecution, and had retained the services of the only good French lawyer at Brazzaville. HANDLEY, American consul at Boma, appealed to the Governor-General, but was told that private individuals could not be assisted by the colonial authorities, especially in the present instance :

"You know the Rev. Drs. MORRISON and SHEPPARD have not spared the administration on the occasion of their attack on the Kasai Company... It is evident that the missionaries could not ask their lawyer, a colonial officer, to associate himself with them in attacks on the administration, and on the other hand, it is necessary for the lawyer to have entire liberty of action." (3)

(1) *O. O., C. R. A.*, April 1909.

(2) *S. D.*, 1906-10, 12053/41 ff.; *Miss.*, June 1909; *Daily Chronicle*, 20 V 09.

(3) Quoted in VINSON, p. 96.

It was clear that the trial was of great importance for the Congo reform movement. Robert WHYTE was in close touch with MOREL, and it was the latter who approached VANDERVELDE about the trial (1). After a series of telegrams it was decided that VANDERVELDE himself should go to the Congo to undertake the defence of the missionaries, and incidentally that of Congo reform. Again the trial was postponed, and the date fixed finally for September. The news that VANDERVELDE himself was defending the missionaries caused a considerable stir; Robert WHYTE even found it necessary to deny a rumour that the services of the Belgian Socialist had been secured on the promise that he would receive in return the sum of four thousand pounds (2).

Although pressure for American consular jurisdiction in the Congo was unsuccessful (3), news of the trial aroused great interest in the United States, and the American Congo Reform Association did its utmost to see that it received full publicity (4). In Leopoldville the revised date of the trial almost coincided with that of the general Protestant missionary conference, so that the court was "crowded out with missionaries" (5). VANDERVELDE'S defence was impressive. He contended

(1) "If Americans accept responsibility for expenses could you put me in touch with honest young Belgian lawyer to defend MORRISON in Congo against Kasai Company at Leopoldville". Translation of telegram, MOREL to VANDERVELDE, 3/6 VII 09. M. P.

(2) *British Weekly*, 19 VIII 09.

(3) The *Missionary* of September 1909 was still asking for American consular jurisdiction in the Congo. The president of the Swiss equivalent of the Congo Reform Association wrote a pamphlet arguing that the American government was entitled to contest the competence of the Congo courts to try American subjects: H. CHRIST-SOCIN, *Les missions évangéliques et l'État du Congo. L'Affaire Morrison-Sheppard*, Geneva, 1909.

(4) "The [State] Dept. is thoroughly interested in the Morrison case, and has instructed the Consul General to employ VANDERVELDE for additional service, if need be etc. This looks good. We open our autumn campaign at once with a broadside on the missionary case". American Congo Reform Association to MOREL, received 13 IX 98. M. P.

(5) GILCHRIST to HARRIS, 23 IX 09. R. H., MSS. Brit. Emp., S. 22, G. 263.

that SHEPPARD had no malicious intent in writing the article, that the stock of the Company had fallen not because of the publication of the *Kasai Herald*, but because of that of the Thesiger report, and that the prosecution must prove the statements made in the article to be untrue <sup>(1)</sup>. The prosecution's refusal to allow the defence to bring witnesses from the Kasai to prove the truth of the statements made in the *Kasai Herald* was, he claimed, a moral condemnation of the Kasai Company, whatever the court's decision might be <sup>(2)</sup>. VANDERVELDE'S speech was far more than a defence of MORRISON and SHEPPARD; it was an impassioned appeal for reform in the Belgian Congo and it made a strong impression upon those who heard it <sup>(3)</sup>.

It was hardly surprising that after all his efforts the verdict was an acquittal for the missionaries. There was some thought of an appeal on the part of the Kasai Company, and VANDERVELDE offered his services again to MORRISON and SHEPPARD; the idea was dropped, however, for the Company probably felt that its reputation had been sufficiently damaged by the publicity which had been given to its methods at the trial. The journal of the Congo Reform Association was enthusiastic in its congratulation of VANDERVELDE, MORRISON and SHEPPARD <sup>(4)</sup>. Before he left the Congo, VANDERVELDE attended the general Protestant missionary conference, and made it clear that he was glad to see Protestant missionaries in the Congo. In his message to the gathering he expressed the hope that the prejudice in

(1) Account of the trial of MORRISON and SHEPPARD by Geraldine MACKENZIE, in *O. O., C. R. A.*, Jan. 1910.

(2) VINSON, pp. 103-4.

(3) "The American consul general said to me had never heard anything like it, and he believed it was one of the finest appeals for the natives of the Congo that had ever been made". GILCHRIST to HARRIS, 23 IX 09. R. H., MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 22, G. 263.

(4) *O. O., C. R. A.*, Oct. 1909.

the colony against English missionaries would not make them discouraged with their work (1).

The Socialists found it useful to champion the rights of the Protestant missions in the Congo two years later when, led by VANDERVELDE, they launched an attack upon the Catholic missions there, and in particular against the *ferme chapelle* system set up by the Jesuits and taken over by other Catholic missions. The charges which had been brought by the Commission of Enquiry of 1904-5 were revived; the Jesuits were accused of stealing children and holding them against the will of their parents, of using flogging and confinement in chains as disciplinary measures, and of separating husbands and wives (2). It was alleged that in the influence which they obtained over the surrounding countryside they were in effect creating a state within a state.

The Socialists therefore made a bitter attack on the government's policy of giving subsidies to the Catholic missions. A total of six hundred thousand francs was spent on subsidies in 1911 (3), and of this amount the only contribution which was made to any Protestant mission was the long-standing annual grant of two thousand five hundred francs given to the B.M.S. in recognition of the society's medical work. The Socialists contended that if Catholic missions benefitted from government resources, then Protestant missions ought also to receive state subsidies — not for their religious, but for their social work (4). The Socialist agitation was unsuccessful; in any case it was motivated less by the idea that Protestant missions should be helped than by the conviction that Catholic missions should not. The government stand was taken on the principle

(1) *Daily Telegraph*, 18 X 09.

(2) DENIS, p. 82; KEITH, pp. 156, 222.

(3) L. VERTOGEN, *La cléricatisation du Congo*, Bruxelles, 1912.

(4) *Annales parlementaires*, 31 I 12, 7 II 12.

of subsidising national, but not foreign, missions. RENKIN told the Chamber at the beginning of 1913 that the missionary society which was being formed by the Belgian Protestants would receive a grant of land and a subsidy from the government, just as the Catholic missions did (1). He was insistent that his distinction was not between Catholic and Protestant, but between Belgian and foreigner.

It was not until the 'twenties, however, that the Protestant missionaries in the Congo complained of serious discrimination against themselves (2). A great impetus was given to Catholic missionary expansion at the time by the "missionary Pope", PIUS XI (3), who realized that the Congo presented a unique opportunity for advance. Belgian missionary effort concentrated increasingly upon the Belgian colony, and it was natural that the stress which RENKIN had earlier laid upon national missions should be revived and reinforced by Belgian nationalists who were also ardent Catholics. Protestants complained of the close identification of the Catholic Church with the government in the Congo (4), and pointed to the fact that the Mill Hill missionaries were subsidized in the same manner as the Belgian Catholic missions, while Protestant Congolese were treated as foreigners (5). Administrators of course, differed in outlook, so that at various periods and in particular localities a great deal depended upon the attitude of the individual; the Protestant missionaries recognized that, apart from the question of subsidies, official instructions ordered the impartial treatment of the missions (6). By 1939 the tension had relaxed, and

(1) *Ibid.*, 31 I 12.

(2) CARPENTER, p. 62.

(3) LATOURETTE, VII, pp. 46-7.

(4) STONELAKE, p. 133.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 136.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 135.

in 1946 the Belgian government decided to give subsidies to foreign Protestant missions for their educational work, provided that they fulfilled the requirements and reached the standards laid down by the colonial authorities. The first subsidies were actually received in 1948 (1). So one of the complaints which had been made by the Protestant missionaries ever since 1908 was finally met, and Protestant missions were officially recognized as the partners of the colonial administration in its civilizing efforts in the Congo, just as the Catholic missions were from the beginning.

\* \* \*

The Belgian annexation of the Congo had been followed by a vigorous renewal of missionary effort there, both on the part of the Catholics and of the Protestants. The Protestant missionaries felt that a great opportunity was open to them when the Congo State régime came to an end, expecting that now they would have greater freedom to advance into the many unopened districts of the colony. In 1908 there were vast territories of the Congo basin where no missionary had ever been. There was more land to be occupied by Christian missionary advance within the borders of the colony than there was in any other comparable area of Africa. At the time when the Congo State became a Belgian colony, evangelism was being conducted from isolated pockets of missionary settlement scattered throughout the Congo region, mainly along the rivers, so that thickly populated areas of the interior were left untouched. On the lower river there were plenty of mission stations in 1908, but in the upper Congo it was not so much a question of filling in the gaps which had been left, as of

(1) CARPENTER, pp. 62-3.

linking up the isolated points where missionaries had settled.

This was to be the task both of the older societies and of the new missions which were soon to enter the field. The Congo controversy had aroused general interest in the region both in England and in the United States, and American missions were especially drawn to the Belgian colony, since they were not bound by national ties to any particular parts of Africa. After annexation the missionary societies concluded that there was a better hope of entering the Congo, and between 1908 and 1915 half-a-dozen new societies, English and American, came to reinforce those already at work there. Missionaries began to settle both to the north and to the west of the isolated Presbyterian mission in the Kasai, and others entered the untouched region which lay to the north and east of the main river, the district from which the B.M.S. had been excluded for so long. They reinforced the existing work in the Katanga, settling to the south and west of the Brethren mission, and also started to evangelize the Lualaba. Thus they began to link up isolated points of missionary effort, and to fill in the pattern of missionary distribution which had remained almost static since 1900.

That the Kasai was one of the first districts to be reinforced was largely due to the welcome which the American Presbyterians already established there accorded to new missions, and in particular to the energy and the foresight of MORRISON. MORRISON believed that every denomination or mission which started work in the Congo should confine itself as far as possible to one district, so that there should be no language difficulties when a missionary was transferred from one station to another. The B.M.S. with its line of stations whose language range stretched from the Kikongo of the lower river to the Kiswahili of the Falls, certainly had pro-



blems of personnel which did not face those missions which had entered the field later and had confined themselves to a more limited district. MORRISON, therefore, did not wish his own mission to try to cover too wide an area, but hoped that others would come to evangelize the neighbouring regions. It was on the invitation of the American Presbyterians that the Methodist Episcopal Church (South) entered the Kasai (1). It was already committed to missionary work in other parts of the world, but in 1910 its board of missions decided on a new venture in Africa. At the end of 1911 its pioneer missionary, Bishop Walter Russell LAMBUTH (2), arrived at Luebo to consult MORRISON, together with Professor John Wesley GILBERT, a representative of the coloured Methodist Episcopal Church. MORRISON advised the pair to travel north-eastwards, and to begin work among the Batetela tribe, which the Presbyterians had not touched (3).

A second group of missionaries which came to MORRISON for advice had been sent out by the American Mennonites. Individual Mennonites had for some time been interested in the Congo, for one had worked there for a while with the Christian and Missionary Alliance, and another with the Swedish mission. In 1907 several Mennonites had gone to East Africa to work with the Africa Inland Mission, but had felt that this society paid too much attention to educational and medical work, and did not give sufficient emphasis to direct preaching (4). The Mennonites then decided to embark on a Congo mission of their own. The preliminary party which arrived at Luebo in 1911 was directed westwards by MORRISON, to evangelize the Bachoka (5), and in

(1) A. P. C. M. Report, 1913.

(2) W. W. PINSON, Walter Russell Lambuth, Nashville, 1924.

(3) VINSON, p. 133.

(4) W. WEAVER, Thirty-five years in the Congo, Chicago, 1945, pp. 69-73.

(5) VINSON, p. 133.

1912 the mission — called the Congo Inland Mission — began its real work.

The American Presbyterians were ready to welcome and to help the new missions which came to the field just as they themselves had been assisted when they arrived. They did more than give advice. Over twenty of the African evangelists at Luebo volunteered to accompany Bishop LAMBUTH in his journey to the Bate-tela tribe (1). This gave the Bishop a great advantage which the older missions had not possessed, both on this prospecting tour, and at a later date when he returned to plant the Methodist mission, and could begin work at once with a nucleus of educated Christians. The Bate-tela mission gave evidence of the missionary outreach of the African Christians themselves, and not only of the evangelistic impulse of the west. On his first journey the band from Luebo was of considerable help to Bishop LAMBUTH; when in February 1912 the party arrived in WEMBO-NYAMA'S village, they received a great welcome from the chief, for one of the evangelists was a friend whom he had not seen for many years (2). The chief's cordiality led to a decision to plant the Methodist mission near his village, and the Bishop promised that he would return within eighteen months (3). Meanwhile he and GILBERT returned to the United States to arouse Methodist interest in the new mission, and to gather reinforcements (4).

In January 1914 Bishop LAMBUTH was back at Wembo-Nyama with three more missionaries and their wives, in order to establish his first station there. Naturally a great deal of the early success of the mission would depend on the chief; his authority did not cover a wide

(1) A. P. C. M. Report, 1913.

(2) REEVE, pp. 118-9.

(3) *The Missionary Voice*, Jan. 1913.

(4) *Miss.*, June 1912.

area, for he was chief only of the large village which bore his name, and of several small ones, and the State estimate of the people under his rule was about three thousand. WEMBO-NYAMA'S attitude to the missionaries was reminiscent of that of MUTESA to MACKAY and of MSIRI to CRAWFORD, although of course the scope of his authority was in no way comparable to theirs. He seemed unlikely to become a Christian himself, for the cost was too great, too many ingrained habits of life would have to be given up, and he refused to renounce polygamy, since the number of his wives was the sign of his rank. He was, however, very friendly towards the missionaries; he clearly realized the advantages which their settlement would bring to his village. His profuse professions of friendship for Bishop LAMBUTH <sup>(1)</sup>, as well as his constant demands for gifts, recalls MSIRI'S attitude towards CRAWFORD, although Wembo-Nyama seemed to be without MSIRI'S periodic suspicions and his unaccountable moods.

The chief was well aware that it was the missionary who could fit his people to play their part in the new pattern of society which was coming into existence as Europeans gradually penetrated every part of the Congo. It was the missionary who could teach them to read and to write, to understand the taxation system which was being imposed upon them, to replace their traditions by new customs, all essential if they were to win a place in the new order which was breaking in upon them whether they wished it or not. It was the missionary who by his superior knowledge and skill could lead them into a new way of life, and realising this, WEMBO-NYAMA was enthusiastic in urging Bishop LAMBUTH to settle near him, and he was ready to give the mission all the help he could in its early days.

(1) REEVE, p. 133.

The district of the northern and eastern tributaries was another large area which in 1908 had not been touched by Protestant evangelistic activity in the Congo. GRENFELL'S idea of pushing north towards the Sudan by way of the Aruwimi or the Itimbiri had come to nothing because of the attitude of the State authorities, and this had also prevented the B.M.S. from linking up with the C.M.S. in Uganda. The C.M.S. itself had been concerned about the eastern part of the Congo State ever since LLOYD'S journey westward from Uganda down the Congo to the West Coast. As early as 1896 APOLO KIVEBULAYA <sup>(1)</sup>, an outstanding evangelist of the Anglican Church in Uganda, had on his own initiative started work at Mboga, which at the time was nominally under the British protectorate. In 1911, however, a boundary commission placed Mboga in Belgian territory, and the C.M.S. began to negotiate with the Belgian authorities for the grant of a site there. Several Anglican missionaries had crossed the border into the Belgian Congo, and had come back with the impression that if APOLO'S efforts were followed up, the Babira there would be as ready to welcome the gospel as were the Banyoro and the Batoro <sup>(2)</sup>.

The Africa Inland Mission <sup>(3)</sup> — an interdenominational society founded by Peter Cameron SCOTT in 1895 — was also interested in the region <sup>(4)</sup>. As with KRAPP of the C.M.S. and with the B.M.S. pioneers, SCOTT'S imagination had been captured by the vision of a chain of stations stretching across the continent. Starting from Kenya, the society had begun to plant a line of posts to the north-west, towards Lake Tchad, and in 1912 two Americans, John STAUFFACHER and his wife,

<sup>(1)</sup> A. B. LLOYD, *Apolo of the pygmy forest*, London, 1923.

<sup>(2)</sup> MADDOX to BAYLIS, 9 III 09. C. M. S. 1909/104.

<sup>(3)</sup> M. S. GRIMES, *Life out of death, the story of the Africa Inland Mission*, London, 1917.

<sup>(4)</sup> STONELAKE, p. 47.

entered the Belgian Congo and began to work on the western shores of Lake Albert. When this happened, it was suggested that the C.M.S. work at Mboga should be handed over to the American missionaries, and that the society should limit itself to British territory. Although the Committee at first hesitated <sup>(1)</sup>, this course was finally decided upon <sup>(2)</sup>, so that the frontier of the Belgian colony was taken as the western boundary of the missionary work both of the C.M.S. and of the Anglican Church in Uganda <sup>(3)</sup>. This was partly because of C.M.S. staffing difficulties, but also because the Belgian government seemed much more friendly towards the Africa Inland Mission than it did towards the C.M.S. An approach made by the government of the United States <sup>(4)</sup> had been much more successful than was the Foreign Office application for Mboga. But in the end, the C.M.S. found that it was impossible to give up the work which had called forth so much heroism and loyalty. APOLO had returned to Mboga in 1911, and in 1915 a new church was built, while the Christians there were beginning to undertake missionary work among the forest pygmies in the neighbourhood. LLOYD himself always continued to look westward, for in 1923 he was still pleading for a C.M.S. advance towards the Congo from Mboga <sup>(5)</sup>.

The great northern and eastern stretch of the Congo territories was not being evangelized solely by American effort. A party of British missionaries led by G.F.B. MORRIS went out in 1913 to take part in the advance of the Africa Inland Mission from Uganda towards the Sudan through the Azande country; in September they

(1) C. M. S. Minutes, 28 XI 12. C. M. S., 1913/1.

(2) C. M. S. to F. O., 10 IV 13. C. M. S., Official letters, 1911-14/45.

(3) Memorandum by Colonel KENYON about points on which he was asked by the Group Committee to report, Aug. 1913, C. M. S.

(4) STONELAKE, p. 48.

(5) A. B. LLOYD, Apolo of the pygmy forest, London, 1923, p. 58.

planted a station at Dungu (1). Another British society — the Heart of Africa Mission — took the Uele as its field, and started to evangelize the region which lay to the north of the B.M.S. stations on the main river and to the south-west of the field taken by the Africa Inland Mission.

It was C. T. STUDD (2) who was chiefly responsible for this enterprise. His life had been an eventful one. He had played cricket for England, and his future as a professional cricketer seemed assured, when he came under the influence of the American evangelist MOODY and also under that of Wilfred GRENFELL of Labrador. A sudden decision had led him to offer himself for work with the China Inland Mission, and there had naturally been considerable publicity surrounding the venture when he and Stanley SMITH, stroke oar of the Cambridge boat, led out the "Cambridge seven" to China in 1885. Ten years later STUDD went on a tour of American universities in the early days of the Student Volunteer Movement, and there encouraged American students to go abroad as missionaries.

His next move was to India, and it was not until 1908 that STUDD turned his attention to Africa, at a time when he had already reached the age of fifty and when for the preceding fifteen years he had constantly been in poor health. He was attracted to Africa by a Liverpool poster which announced that "Cannibals want Missionaries", and although previously he had been intending to return to India, he changed his plans, and two years later set out on a prospecting tour to the African interior, with the southern Sudan as his goal. He returned to England bearing news of the unevangelized tribes in the north-eastern territory of the Belgian

(1) STONELAKE, p. 48.

(2) N. GRUBB, *C. T. Studd, cricketer and pioneer*, London, 1933; T. WALTERS, *Charles T. Studd, cricketer and missionary*, London, 1930.

Congo, and announced his intention of devoting himself to them. His appeal for volunteers marked the beginning of the Worldwide Evangelization Crusade, of which the Heart of Africa Mission was a part. The aim of the Crusade was set forward as " ...The speediest possible fulfilment of the command of Christ to evangelize the world by a definite attempt to evangelize the remaining unevangelized parts of the earth. The heart of Africa... is the object of its first operation " (1). STUDD saw the district to which he was going as the " strategic point in the great conflict between Islam and CHRIST " (2). It was largely this same conviction which had inspired GRENFELL'S attempt to enter the region, years before.

STUDD'S approach was not made by the Congo route, but from the east, for he had planned to travel inland from Mombasa, eventually crossing Lake Albert. It was quite accidental that his work was to be undertaken within the borders of the Belgian Congo. The earlier missionaries, with the exception of the Plymouth Brethren — and even they entered Katanga from the west — had all used the Congo route, and had specifically set out to evangelize the Congo basin. Of the new missions, the Methodists and the Mennonites had gone straight to the Kasai. But the Africa Inland Mission and the Heart of Africa Mission were looking at Central Africa as a whole, and were filling in the large gap which had been left between the Congo approach from the west, the Nile approach from the north, and the inland thrust from the east coast.

In October 1913 C. T. STUDD and his companion Alfred BUXTON, the pioneers of the Heart of Africa Mission, reached Niangara in the Uele and decided to apply for a concession of land there. Five days' journey to the south, they chose the site of a former government

(1) WALTERS, *ibid.*, p. 97.

(2) GRUBB, *Christ in Congo forests*, p. 14.

station at Nala for a second post, and the colonial authorities offered them the abandoned buildings. In the summer of 1915 a new party of six sailed, travelling southward by the Nile route to the Uele rather than entering the field from East Africa. By 1915 the mission had four stations — Poko and Bambili being the additional ones — and were working an area covering some hundreds of square miles, but only one language was necessary, for Lingala gave the missionaries entry into every part of the Uele province. In the summer of 1915 the first twelve converts were baptized; the large gap in the heart of Africa which had so distressed GRENFELL was gradually being filled in by Christian missionary advance.

The Uele had been touched very little by Europeans. True, a chain of Belgian posts stretched across the three hundred miles of forest from the Congo to Niangara, but European influence had not yet penetrated far beyond these occupied points. It was not unusual for the missionary to find himself in an area where a white man had not passed for five years (<sup>1</sup>). The Katanga, on the other hand, set a completely different problem, although it was a region which needed missionary reinforcement as much as the north-eastern stretch of the Belgian Congo. It was the district of the future; its rich mineral deposits were already being exploited, and a railway was being pushed northward to link the Katanga with South Africa.

Once again both American and English missions were interested in the region. The American interest in the Katanga sprang out of the existing mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church (North) in Rhodesia; the wife of one of the Methodist missionaries, John SPRINGER, had worked for two years in the Congo under

(<sup>1</sup>) GRUBB, p. 31.



Bishop TAYLOR, and this gave the SPRINGERS a special link with the region. In 1907 they decided to make a journey across the continent, travelled into northern Rhodesia and the Katanga, and then turned westward into the Kasai and came out on the west coast (1). They came to the conclusion that nowhere was evangelistic work more necessary than it was in the mineral belt of north-western Rhodesia and the Katanga. So when they returned to America, the SPRINGERS appealed to the Methodist mission board to extend the field of its operations in this direction. Once Bishop TAYLOR had tried and had failed to open up the Congo from Angola, but his failure had been partly due to the living conditions from which his missionaries had suffered. Now, argued the SPRINGERS, Methodists might well open up the Congo basin to evangelism from the south, from the healthy plateau of the Katanga which is the northern limit of the highlands extending northward from the Cape (2).

English interest in the Katanga came first of all not from a missionary society but from a British consul, for BEAK, the vice-consul in the Katanga, wrote to a friend in the Society of St John the Evangelist to suggest that the society might embark on a mission in his district. It was, he explained, in Belgian territory, but the British were for the time the predominating element in the European population, and he was hopeful that this numerical superiority would continue. He proposed that there should be a chaplain for the Englishmen, and an industrial mission for the Africans (3). The Society

(1) J. SPRINGER, *The heart of Central Africa*, New-York, 1909.

(2) J. SPRINGER's pamphlet, *The opportunity of the Methodist Episcopal Church on and near the mineral belt in the Heart of Central Africa*.

(3) "We want one or two educated tactful men, for both whites and blacks hereabouts are very critical... I am extremely anxious that the Established Church should be represented here". BEAK to HODGE, 10 VIII 08, enclosed in HODGE to Bishop MONTGOMERY, 28 IX 08. S. P. G.

of St John the Evangelist passed on BEAK's letter to the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, which in turn approached the C.M.S. and the Archbishop-elect of Capetown. The latter did not know where the Katanga was, but felt that the Anglican Church should take advantage of the opening <sup>(1)</sup>, while the C.M.S. was able to locate the Katanga, but declared that the region was too far from its own field for it to be able to do anything practical about the matter <sup>(2)</sup>.

Correspondence continued ; Bishop MONTGOMERY, secretary of the S.P.G., approached BEAK direct, and found the vice-consul most pressing in his insistence that the opportunity which offered should not be lost. He saw the Katanga, which " misfortune had placed under the Congo administration " in spite of the fact that the region " belonged more to South than to West Africa ", as an excellent mission-field for the Anglican Church. What was needed immediately was a chaplain of " character, learning and tact ", rather than " the missionary type of man " <sup>(3)</sup>. At the beginning of 1909 the European population numbered about five hundred, and was rapidly increasing with the development of the Katanga mines. By September it had trebled, while African labourers were swarming in in large numbers to live in pitifully over-crowded conditions in the mining districts. BEAK declared that the question of sending a missionary was a most urgent one <sup>(4)</sup>, for the nearest missionaries were the Plymouth Brethren at Luanza and Koni Hill, and the White Fathers near Lake Tan-

<sup>(1)</sup> Bishop of Pretoria, Archbishop-elect of Capetown, to Bishop MONTGOMERY, 2 X 08, S. P. G.

<sup>(2)</sup> C. M. S. to MONTGOMERY, 5 X 08. S. P. G.

<sup>(3)</sup> BEAK to MONTGOMERY, 6 I 09. S. P. G.

<sup>(4)</sup> " The railway construction is going ahead apace and the mines will be developed in no time. I wanted the church to anticipate the rush but she, apparently, is as slow to move as the British Government ". BEAK to HODGE, quoted in HODGE to MONTGOMERY, 10 VII 09. S. P. G.

ganyika ; if the Anglican Church did not seize her opportunity, however, she would lose it (1).

In July Bishop MONTGOMERY issued a press appeal for the funds necessary to establish an Anglican chaplain in the Katanga, asking for the sum of four hundred pounds for his support, but hoping that the amount would be doubled, so that two might go (2). The public was not enthusiastic, however, and by November the S.P.G. had received less than twenty-five pounds for the purpose (3). Finally an arrangement was made with the Universities' Mission to Central Africa whereby an Anglican priest from the diocese of Northern Rhodesia was periodically to visit Elisabethville (4). This was the only positive result which had followed from vice-consul BEAK's efforts ; like the C.M.S. to the west, the Anglican Church to the south had virtually decided that the boundaries of the Belgian Congo should mark the limit of Anglican work in Africa.

In 1910 the SPRINGERS were back in N.W. Rhodesia (5). They were interested in the whole mineral belt, not only in the part which lay within the borders of the Belgian Congo, and their first thought was merely to secure a line of transport across the southern part of the Congo territory by planting a temporary station between the Kasai and their final destination (6). This was done at Lukoshi, where they received a great welcome from the chief KAZEMBE. His enthusiasm, like

(1) " Feeling between Britishers and Belgians is running somewhat high and although it may be hoped that religion will be kept apart from politics, it would seem advisable, if possible, to send an Anglican Chaplain while the field is still clear. The district proposed for an Anglican Chaplain may at any moment be invaded by a Roman Catholic or Nonconformist mission ", BEAK to MONTGOMERY, 10 IX 09. S. P. G.

(2) *Morning Post*, 23 VII 09.

(3) S. P. G. Standing committee, 4 XI 09.

(4) Bishop of Northern Rhodesia to MONTGOMERY, 25 V 11, in S. P. G. Journal, Meeting of 20 XII 12.

(5) Cf. J. SPRINGER, *Pioneering in the Congo*, New York, 1916.

(6) SPRINGER to LEONARD, 1 VII 11. B. M. M. C.

WEMBO-NYAMA'S, came not so much from a desire for the Gospel as from an awareness of the material advantages which the European missionaries would bring with them, and of the benefit which his people would receive from the education they would offer <sup>(1)</sup>. The SPRINGERS also found the Belgian authorities in the Katanga friendly <sup>(2)</sup>; indeed, more friendly than those of the British South Africa Company <sup>(3)</sup>, and as a result they decided to start their permanent work at Kambove. The railway from the south reached Kambove in June 1913, and they had visions of it becoming the metropolis of the district, a rival of Johannesburg. The forecast proved wrong; ten years later the mining company moved its headquarters twenty miles to the south, as there was a lack of water at Kambove, and the mission followed. In 1917 the Methodists had also planted a station at Elisabethville. Thus Protestant missionaries were steadily advancing into the industrial region of the southern Katanga.

The older missions were also extending their work. GILCHRIST and PADFIELD of the Congo Balolo Mission made several prospecting journeys in the forest country between the Ikelemba and Juapa rivers, and across the Lopori-Maringa basin <sup>(4)</sup>. In 1911 the society decided to embark on a forward movement with the object of spreading the Gospel among the Ngombe, as well as in the upper Lopori, and in the Lomami <sup>(5)</sup>. The Disciples were also eager for expansion. After a special campaign to raise funds for the Congo <sup>(6)</sup>, they planted two new stations at Lotumbe and Monieka in 1910 and 1912 <sup>(7)</sup>.

<sup>(1)</sup> Helen SPRINGER to LEONARD, 31 VII 11. B. M. M. C.

<sup>(2)</sup> SPRINGER to LEONARD, 12 IX 11. B. M. M. C.

<sup>(3)</sup> *Ibid.*, 14 XII 11. B. M. M. C.

<sup>(4)</sup> *R. B.*, May, 1909.

<sup>(5)</sup> C. B. M. Minutes, 30 V 11.

<sup>(6)</sup> *M. I.*, Nov. 1908.

<sup>(7)</sup> SMITH, p. 39.

At home there was an appeal for more missionaries <sup>(1)</sup>, and a few years later a preliminary party surveyed that part of the Equator district which was bounded on the north by the C.B.M. and on the south by the American Baptists and Methodists, and was as yet untouched by Protestant missions <sup>(2)</sup>. The American Presbyterians recovered from their shortage of staff and embarked with enthusiasm on an extension of their work in 1912, planting a station at Mutoto in the Bena Lulua country, and another in the following year at Lusambo, which had been a government centre for many years. In 1915 Presbyterian missionaries settled at Bulape, in the heart of the Bakuba Kingdom, and in 1917 at Bibanga, among the Baluba <sup>(3)</sup>.

The Lualaba was yet another region quite untouched by Protestant missionaries in 1908. The B.M.S. had only extended its line of stations as far as Yakusu, although when the Society had entered the Congo ARTHINGTON had declared that "we shall soon have a steamer on the Congo... and carry the Gospel eastwards, and south and north of the river, as the way may open as far as Nyangwe <sup>(4)</sup>. It applied for two sites on the Lualaba, at Wayika and Mabondo, as early as 1907. In 1910 these had not yet been granted by the Belgian government, but MILLMAN went on a tour of the region. He realised afresh that the centre of Africa was gradually being filled in by missionary advance. As he wrote :

"Your letter did not authorize me to go farther than Wayika, so I did not go on by the second railway. There is something very exciting in the thought that within three weeks from Yakusu I could have shaken hands with Mr. CRAWFORD of the Brethren's mission on Lake

<sup>(1)</sup> S. J. COREY, *Among Central African tribes : journal of a visit to the Congo mission*. Cincinnati, 1912, p. 157.

<sup>(2)</sup> Cf. *Spying out Congoland ; the record of a 3000-mile journey of four American missionaries in the unexplored regions of Belgian Congo*, Indianapolis, 1917.

<sup>(4)</sup> BENTLEY, I, p. 59.

Moero or with some of the C. M. S. missionaries on Lake Tanganyika. I was sorely tempted." (1)

In the following year the two sites were granted to the B.M.S. and while WHITEHEAD started work at Wayika, two hundred miles up-river from Yakusu, two African evangelists were placed at the half-way station of Mabondo (2).

This was not the only attempt to evangelize the Lualaba. Much farther south on its upper waters BURTON and SALTER were the pioneers of the Congo Evangelistic Mission (3), sent out by the British Pentecostals. A station was planted at Mwanza in 1915, while later some of the Pentecostals settled among the fishing villages on the northern shores of Lake Kisale, villages ruled by the Baluba chief KIKONDJA. It had been a troubled region. Kyakapula Hill, near the Lake, had at one time been the headquarters of a group of Batetela rebels, who had looted and ill-treated the Kisale fishermen, and had carried on a profitable trade in ivory and slaves. Finally the stronghold had been captured and destroyed by the forces of the Congo State. The missionaries who came in peace to the shores of the lake found a ready welcome (4), and the Pentecostals gradually extended their work until they met the Presbyterians on the west, the Methodists on the north, and the Plymouth Brethren on the south-west (5). In this way previously isolated missions were being linked together as new societies started work.

There was a similar advance on the part of the Catholic missions; the older missions extended the fields of

(1) MILLMAN to WILSON, 28 X 10. B. M. S.

(2) *M. H.*, Jan. 1912.

(3) M. MOORHEAD, *Missionary pioneering in Congo forests, a narrative of the labours of William F. P. Burton and his companions in the native villages of the Luba-land*, Preston, 1922.

(4) E. HODGSON, *Fishing for Congo fisher folk*, London, 1934, pp. 24-5.

(5) CARPENTER, pp. 25-6.

their activity while new missions entered areas which had not previously been touched. In 1907 the Holy Ghost Fathers had returned to the Congo, this time taking the northern Katanga as their field ; their leader was Émile CALLEWAERT, who twenty years before had worked at Kwamouth and Boma before being transferred to Angola when the Holy Ghost Fathers left the territory of the Congo Independent State (1). In 1910 the Benedictines from the Abbey of St André at Bruges began work in the mineral belt of the southern Katanga, while the Belgian Capuchins went to the Ubangi to evangelize the north-western part of the colony. In the following year the Salesians started a mission in the upper Luapula in the extreme south-eastern corner, while the Dominicans went to the Uele and the north-eastern tributaries (2). The older missions also extended their work ; the Jesuits advanced into the Kwilu (3), while the Scheut Fathers went further into the Mayombe (4) and also moved into the Mongalla (5). Thus Catholic missionaries, like the Protestants, were expanding their work and filling in some of the gaps which had been left earlier.

Wherever new regions were opened, the methods of the missions were very like those of the pioneer period. The Methodists at WEMBO-NYAMA'S were unusually fortunate, since they took with them a group of Christians from Luebo, and could begin their work by forming a church with three Europeans, two African evangelists and thirteen African Christians in membership. Even so, their task was in many ways like that of the pioneers ; they needed to reduce the language to writing, to build their houses, a church, a school and a dispen-

(1) *B. C. B.*, III, cols. 113-4.

(2) F. DE MEEUS and R. STEENBERGHEM, *Les missions religieuses au Congo belge*, Brussels, 1947, p. 57.

(3) DENIS, pp. 88-93.

(4) DIEU, p. 178.

(5) *Ibid.*, pp. 198-203.

sary. Their model was naturally the Presbyterians' mission at Luebo ; in imitation they gathered together children at the station, boys destined to become evangelists, and girls who had been orphaned or who were redeemed from child marriages. A "mission village" grew up near the station <sup>(1)</sup>. Bishop LAMBUTH was convinced that "... a policy of strong centres, from which missionaries will travel periodically to outposts, will yield the largest results" <sup>(2)</sup>.

The first stage for every mission, however evangelical, was that of gathering a group of boys together into a school. This was as true for the Pentecostalists <sup>(3)</sup> and for the Heart of Africa Mission <sup>(4)</sup> as it had been for the older societies. Like their predecessors, the pioneer missionaries of the second advance movement were reduced to the poorest of living conditions <sup>(5)</sup>. Occasionally they were faced by the earlier contempt for education ; at Mabondo the B.M.S. found that boys would not attend school unless they were paid to do so <sup>(6)</sup>. This was rare, however, for often the sons of chiefs were the first to present themselves to the missionary, uninvited ; no longer did he depend upon freed slaves and orphans for his pupils. Africans had in general been forced into sufficient contact with Europeans by the gradual spread of Belgian authority, to make them fully aware of the advantages of literacy. Chiefs like WEMBO-NYAMA and KIKONDJA were quick to see how the residence of a missionary would benefit their people ; KA-

<sup>(1)</sup> REEVE, pp. 135-6, 142-3, 194.

<sup>(2)</sup> Bishop LAMBUTH to FORFEITT, 19 VI 12, in B. M. S. Minutes, 16 VII 12.

<sup>(3)</sup> HODGSON, p. 30.

<sup>(4)</sup> GRUBB, p. 33.

<sup>(5)</sup> Alfred BUXTON thus described the A. I. M. missionaries whom he and STUDD met in the summer of 1913 : " We arrived... to find them in grass-roof shanties, living in daily hardships and sicknesses, with only the barest necessities ". Quoted in GRUBB, p. 18.

At Lukoshi the SPRINGERS lived in a mud hut with a grass roof. Springer, p. 195.

<sup>(6)</sup> *M. H.*, Feb. 1913.



ZEMBE, too, offered his help freely for the early clearing and building work of the Methodist mission at Lukoshi <sup>(1)</sup>. In addition, converts were very ready to spread the teaching they had received. The Pentecostals recorded that every Christian became a preacher, and that converts came in daily from distant fishing camps, asking for baptism and for teachers to return with them <sup>(2)</sup>. This was no unusual story. Africans were admitted to church membership <sup>(3)</sup>, and the local churches themselves sent out African evangelists. Gradually the first stage of missionary work was merging into the second, and from their concentration upon central stations missionaries were beginning to develop outpost work.

In 1918 there were still areas of the Belgian Congo not yet effectively occupied by Protestant missionary advance — the Kivu, the Ubangi, parts of the Kwango, the northern Sankuru, and in addition the mandated territory of Ruanda-Urundi, formerly part of German East Africa. Into these regions came yet more societies, American, British and Scandinavian, so that by 1939 the number of Protestant missions in the Congo had more than doubled <sup>(4)</sup>. In 1952 forty-four different societies were at work there <sup>(5)</sup>. Reinforcements had not only been needed for the vast unopened areas of the interior, but also for the urban centres which had developed very quickly as the pattern of life in the Congo began to change. The Methodists had already gone to work in the industrial regions of the Katanga, while the Salvation

<sup>(1)</sup> SPRINGER to LEONARD, 12 IX 11. B. M. M. C.

<sup>(2)</sup> HODGSON, pp. 32-3.

<sup>(3)</sup> The Mennonites required " ... that before being admitted into church membership there must be evidence of genuine conversion, the catechism to be finished and a satisfactory examination to be passed showing that there is a clear saving knowledge of the plan of salvation, also a forbidding of the use of all strong drink". Congo Inland Mission field-committee minutes, 23 I 15.

<sup>(4)</sup> CARPENTER, p. 26.

<sup>(5)</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.

Army went to join the Baptists in Leopoldville. The Protestant missions have not yet, however, adapted their missionary strategy to keep pace with the movement of Africans from the villages into the cities and towns <sup>(1)</sup>.

By 1914 Catholic missionary enterprise in the Congo was only in the early stages of its development. Franciscans, Lazarists, Assumptionists and many other groups came to join in the work, and the territory was parcelled out into twenty-eight Apostolic Vicariates <sup>(2)</sup>. The number of baptized Catholics in the colony rose from about seventy thousand in 1912 to well over five hundred thousand in 1927 <sup>(3)</sup> and then to nearly three million in 1945 <sup>(4)</sup>. Protestant missionaries were also reaping a large harvest; between 1924 and 1950 the number of baptized Protestants rose from sixty thousand <sup>(5)</sup> to well over five hundred thousand <sup>(6)</sup>. In the three decades after 1914 the increase in the number of Christians in the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi was among the most impressive of any in Africa, or indeed in the world <sup>(7)</sup>.

Pioneer methods of work were similar in any region which had been more or less by-passed by European advance. But as European influence extended into the remotest villages, mission work gradually began to change in character and to take on new forms. Missions cooperated in the social welfare programme of the Belgian colonial authorities. Educational standards began to rise among the Protestants, the *École de Pasteurs et d'Instituteurs* at Kimpese, the *Institut Chrétien Congo-*

(1) *Ibid.*, p. 65.

(2) DE MEEUS and STEENBERGHEN, pp. 57-8.

(3) LATOURETTE, VII, p. 238.

(4) DE MEEUS and STEENBERGHEN, p. 90.

(5) LATOURETTE, VII, p. 239.

(6) CARPENTER, p. 86.

(7) LATOURETTE, VII, p. 239.

*Jais* at Bolenge and the *Institut Springer* at Mulungwishi <sup>(1)</sup> took their place at the head of an educational ladder which still had the village school under the teacher-evangelist as its vital lowest rung. In 1954 the Catholic University of Lovanium was opened. Until very recently all educational work in the colony had a religious basis and was in the hands of the missions. Medical work developed on similar lines, and both the larger Protestant institutions — Yakusu, Sona Bata, Kimpese <sup>(2)</sup> — and the rural dispensaries took their place in the colony's medical service, as did the Catholic *Aide Médicale aux Missions*, and *Fomulac*, the *Fondation Médicale de l'Université de Louvain au Congo* <sup>(3)</sup>.

Missionaries had gone to the Congo knowing that they would be fully successful only when they could withdraw from the country and leave Christianity there no weaker by their departure. Their first efforts towards this goal can be seen in the training given to the future African evangelists right from the earliest stages of the missionary enterprise. But Christianity was not only to be spread by Africans; the African laity had to be led by African bishops, priests and pastors. From the 'twenties onwards the tendency of African Christians to break off into separatist African sects under African "prophets" <sup>(4)</sup> indicated the urgency of the problem but also the need to advance with prudence. A stability which could only be expected from the few was necessary for leadership, and disappointments were frequent. However, in 1950 there were over three hundred ordained Protestant pastors in the Congo, although not one of them had had full theological training equal to that which a European or an American would have recei-

(1) CARPENTER, pp. 56-8.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 48.

(3) DE MEEUS and STEENBERGHEN, pp. 161-3.

(4) LATOURETTE, VII, p. 242.

ved <sup>(1)</sup>. The Catholic missionaries were slower because their standards were more exacting ; by 1947 nearly two hundred Africans had been raised to the priesthood <sup>(2)</sup>, and had received a training comparable with that given to Catholic priests in any part of the world. Some of the Protestant missions made early experiments in self-government ; the Christian and Missionary Alliance took the lead and granted full autonomy to its African churches in 1931, when the foreign missionaries became members of the local congregations and advisers to the African Christians who were elected to all offices in the churches <sup>(3)</sup>. Most societies were not ready to move so quickly, while the Congo Protestant Council long remained an all-missionary group without any African members <sup>(4)</sup>. A beginning was made in 1956, when it was decided that Africans should be welcomed as full voting members of the C.P.C. It is becoming increasingly obvious that Western paternalism is giving and must give place to partnership, in preparation for the day when Congolese Christians will have grown to maturity. The uncertainties of the political situation in Africa are bound to give a new urgency to pressure towards the goal of which the pioneers had sometimes dreamed — a truly indigenous Christianity.

Seventy years earlier when the pioneers had found themselves in a polygamous society divided by tribal warfare, decimated by the slave trade, a prey to disease, ignorance and fear, indigenous Christianity had seemed a Utopian dream. The Portuguese missionaries had tried to establish Christianity in the Congo and had failed ; the Church had faded away with the decline of the political influence of Portugal. In the nineteenth century as

<sup>(1)</sup> CARPENTER, p. 79.

<sup>(2)</sup> DE MEEUS and STEENBERGHEN, p. 101.

<sup>(3)</sup> STONELAKE, p. 83.

<sup>(4)</sup> CARPENTER, p. 42.

in the sixteenth religious and secular advance went together. Christian missionaries travelled into the Congo interior side by side with the emissaries of LEOPOLD II, and the establishment of the Christian mission coincided with the foundation of the Congo Independent State. European secular pressure had a great effect upon the welcome given to Christianity by the Africans ; advancement in the new western way of life which Europeans were imposing upon the Congo came by way of education, and so, since schools and missionaries were inseparable, by way of baptism. But the missionaries realized that only a truly indigenous Christianity, a stable Church firmly rooted in African soil, would withstand the discovery that western civilization could be had without Christianity. In the twentieth century the urbanization and industrialization of the Congo was to force the pace in a way which the missionaries did not themselves always welcome.

It is not always easy to recognize that one's children are growing into adolescence, and the effort to increase the responsibility placed in African hands in preparation for the day when the missionaries would leave the country, was something very different from the paternalism of earlier years. In the beginning the missionary had been a leader whose authority extended to the secular sphere as well as the religious ; he had often enough taken the place of chief or witch-doctor for the Africans who sought his protection in the period when tribal society was breaking up under the impact of European influence. The missionary had become a power in society, responsible for the direction of a mission village or *chrétienté*, arbiter and judge to the surrounding countryside, respected because he was a European and could represent the African point of view to the European officials of the Congo Independent State. The missionary was still in charge when Christianity began to

move out from Christian centres into tribal society with an evangelistic network based upon the dispersion of African teachers in the villages. It was the same when the methods of the pioneers were gradually adapted to suit the changing conditions of life in the Congo, when the educational and medical work, in the beginning the handmaid of evangelism, began to grow and develop independently of the immediate results in conversions, and cooperation with the government forced up the standards. It was still the European missionary who was in charge of the college or hospital. African professional qualifications began to rise rapidly, however, and a beginning was made towards the establishment of an African clergy. Thus African Christianity was no longer in its infancy.

Similar problems had faced both Protestant and Catholic missionaries in the early establishment of mission villages and *chrétientés*, in the evangelistic outreach into tribal society, in the later development of educational and medical work, and in the training of African Christians for pastoral responsibility. But except for their earlier start, the Protestant missionaries in the Congo had all along faced special difficulties which had not been met by the Catholics, for they were regarded as foreigners standing apart from the Belgian development of the Congo. There had been cooperation between missions and government in the early years, for the geographical and linguistic pioneering of the missions had been of great service to the Congo State, while before 1885 LEOPOLD II had been glad to draw what profit he could from the presence of English missionaries in the Congo. After the foundation of the Independent State, however, he had been anxious to impress upon it as Belgian a flavour as possible; thus he had encouraged Belgian Catholic missionaries to undertake the evangelization of the Congo, he had provided them

with material aid and had given them a semi-official position.

During the period of the anti-Congolese campaign the difficulties of the Protestant missionaries greatly increased, for they came to be regarded not only as foreigners, but as the enemies of the State. At first they had been divided amongst themselves. Some of the Protestant missionaries had seen the Congo as it was before LEOPOLD'S rule, had supported the King's enterprise in the period of his early struggles, and were grateful for the comparative peace and security which had followed the establishment of the Congo Independent State. Other younger missionaries had known nothing but the "rubber troubles", and regarded the leopoldian régime as an insufferable tyranny imposed upon an African society which would have been far better off left in isolation. A sharp conflict over the policy of public criticism of the State régime had given way to full support for the Congo Reform Association; without the presence and support of English and American missionaries in the Congo, the anti-Congolese campaign could not have taken the form it did. The English-speaking missionaries had played their part in the establishment of the Congo Independent State, and through the agitation for Congo reform they were not without influence upon the annexation of the State by Belgium.

We have seen that after Belgian annexation there was a great increase in the number of Protestant societies at work in the Congo, while their missionaries spread out into all parts of the colony. However, the Belgian Protestant mission which had started work there was very small, and all the others continued to suffer from the distinction made between national and foreign missions. The new impulse given to the Catholic missionary enterprise in the 'twenties had its effect in the Congo; Belgian Catholics made great efforts to evange-

lize the colony, and numerically the Protestants were left far behind. It was not until after the 1948 regulations offered the English-speaking missions educational and medical subsidies on conditions which included a higher standard of French, a closer acquaintance with Belgium herself and an increased understanding of Belgian policy in the Congo, that their work was fully integrated into the colony's social, educational and medical programme.

The term "Ba-Ingelisa" as applied to Congolese Protestants may have died out earlier <sup>(1)</sup>, but it was not until 1948 with State inspection of Protestant schools and State recognition of their certificates that Congolese Protestants ceased to suffer from the social disadvantages which had previously been theirs. An improvement in the standard of the French spoken by the English and American missionaries in the Belgian Congo was not only an advantage from the point of view of the teaching of French enforced in their schools. Previously there had been no common language which could be used at a colony-wide conference of Protestant missionaries and Protestant Congolese. English had sufficed for the Congo Protestant Council <sup>(2)</sup>, but French was the only language which could be used at a meeting of African Protestant delegates from all over the Congo. It is clear that such meetings must take place if Congolese Protestants are to share in that measure of unity achieved by the English-speaking missionaries in the Congo Protestant Council, and if they are to develop more fully the ideal of the "Church of Christ in Congo", which at present is a common name applied to the Protestant churches in the Congo rather than a reality

<sup>(1)</sup> It was still in use in 1937. STONELAKE, p. 84.

<sup>(2)</sup> The 1956 decision to admit African members to the C. P. C. meant that French would be the language used at C. P. C. meetings in future; much of the business would be translated into English, however, for the benefit of the senior missionaries.



expressed by any colony-wide fellowship of Congolese Protestants.

Catholic missionaries in the Congo were conscious that they were extending the boundaries of the universal Church. They were insistent that the Church in the Congo must put on African dress, its pastors were to be Africans, with African priests ordained and African Bishops consecrated as soon as suitable candidates presented themselves, but it was never to be autonomous, and Congolese Catholics would always continue to accept the jurisdiction of the universal Church. At first the Protestant missionary societies had been content to form local churches after the Free Church pattern, linked together only by their attachment to their respective missions. But with the rapid growth of urbanization so that African Christians of all denominations were thrown together, and under the stimulus of the Ecumenical Movement, the ideal before the Protestant missionaries developed into that of an autonomous Congolese Church, in communion with its mother-confessions but in no sense dependent upon them.

In 1914, a few years after the Edinburgh Conference, this ideal had barely begun to take shape. African Christianity was in its infancy. The Protestant missions were ceasing to be as important a factor in the European impact upon the Congo as they had been in their earlier days. But gradually they became aware that missionary movements are judged by their success in planting the Church. Viewed from this angle, the Protestant missions in the Congo suffered from a double disadvantage, from the centrifugal tendencies of the Free Churches, and from the fact that English, the mother-tongue of the missionaries, could never become the common language of African Protestants in a French-speaking colony. The Congo Protestant Council, however, has achieved a considerable measure of success in overcoming the

first, while the future development of the "Church of Christ in Congo" from an ideal into a reality will be greatly helped by the increasing ability of the Congolese Protestants and the English-speaking missionaries to use French as a common tongue for the purposes of colony-wide conferences. After thirty years of missionary effort in the Congo the Protestant missionaries were coming to a dim realization that without the progressive immolation of the "mission" into the growing body of the indigenous Church they would finally have failed; after fifty years more it seems that further and faster development in this direction is still an urgent necessity.

## SOMMAIRE.

Le premier chapitre de cette étude décrit l'œuvre missionnaire protestante au Congo entre 1878 et 1885. Au milieu du dix-neuvième siècle, il restait très peu de traces du christianisme qu'avaient introduit dans le Bas-Congo les Portugais du quinzième siècle. En 1877 STANLEY arriva à Boma ; dès lors il était évident que le Congo allait fournir une route vers l'Afrique centrale. Les missionnaires protestants anglais, à la fin du dix-neuvième siècle, s'intéressaient surtout à l'Afrique centrale. Ils voyaient dans le Congo une route vers les Grands Lacs, où on avait l'espoir de rencontrer d'autres missionnaires protestants dont le point de départ était la côte orientale. C'était dans ce but qu'ils essayaient d'arriver au Stanley Pool et sur le Haut-Congo aussi vite que possible. Les premiers missionnaires de la *Baptist Missionary Society* et de *Livingstone Inland Mission* arrivèrent dans le Bas-Congo en même temps que Stanley et les premiers représentants du roi LÉOPOLD II ; en général ils voyaient STANLEY et l'Association Internationale du Congo d'un œil favorable, tandis qu'ils n'aimaient pas le travail de DE BRAZZA ni les revendications portugaises. Leur attitude influença l'opinion publique en Angleterre avant la Conférence de Berlin. La fin du chapitre envisage l'intérêt de la Conférence de Berlin au point de vue des missions protestantes au Congo.

Le deuxième chapitre décrit l'expansion missionnaire entre 1885 et 1900. Le missionnaire baptiste anglais George GRENFELL fit plusieurs voyages d'exploration afin de pouvoir dresser une carte du Haut-Congo, de l'Uele,

du Kasai et du Kwango. La question arabe et l'expédition de STANLEY pour secourir EMIN PACHA éveillèrent l'intérêt des missionnaires pour les régions du Nord et de l'Est du Congo ; la *Baptist Missionary Society* ne cessa pas de faire avancer la ligne de ses stations missionnaires dans le Haut-Congo. D'autres missions sont également venues pour soutenir le travail d'évangélisation au Congo, notamment la *Christian and Missionary Alliance*, les baptistes américains, les protestants suédois, et la mission de l'évêque TAYLOR. Les presbytériens américains et la mission des frères WESTCOTT établirent leurs stations dans le Kasai. Au Katanga s'établit la mission des *Plymouth Brethren* ; dans le bassin de la Lopori-Maringa la *Congo Balolo Mission*. En même temps, avec l'encouragement du roi LÉOPOLD II, les missions catholiques belges arrivaient au Congo.

Le troisième chapitre décrit les méthodes employées par les missionnaires entre 1885 et 1908. On commença par créer des centres chrétiens au milieu du pays païen, quelquefois avec un noyau d'esclaves rachetés. Cette façon de séparer les chrétiens des autres Africains fut au début la seule possible, mais il fut bientôt nécessaire d'essayer de faire pénétrer le christianisme dans la société africaine même. Alors on envoya des évangélistes indigènes dans les villages. Les missionnaires ajoutaient à leur travail d'évangélisation une œuvre d'enseignement et d'aide médicale. On envisageait dès le début la création d'un clergé africain. Peu à peu les diverses missions protestantes établirent entre elles une certaine unité.

Le quatrième chapitre traite la question de l'influence des missionnaires protestants au Congo sur la campagne anti congolaise en Angleterre et aux États-Unis. Dès 1890 certains missionnaires protestants manifestèrent leur inquiétude devant le régime économique de l'État Indépendant du Congo, et il y eut des critiques publiques de la part des missionnaires américains et suédois à la

fin du dix-neuvième siècle. Cependant quand E. D. MOREL commença sa campagne en Angleterre vers 1902, il trouva les missions protestantes, surtout la *Baptist Missionary Society*, sans enthousiasme pour s'unir avec lui. Les missionnaires s'intéressèrent au voyage du consul britannique Roger CASEMENT en 1903, et à la Commission d'Enquête de 1904-05. Finalement ils se sont presque tous décidés à soutenir la campagne de MOREL jusqu'à l'annexion du Congo par la Belgique en 1908.

Le dernier chapitre décrit le nouvel essor des missionnaires protestants pendant les premières années du régime colonial belge. Il y eut certaines difficultés au début ; le Ministre des Colonies aurait voulu voir des protestants belges prendre la place des missionnaires étrangers, américains, suédois et anglais. Mais, par contre, plusieurs nouvelles missions, américaines et anglaises, s'étaient établies au Congo belge ; elles tentaient d'établir des postes dans les vastes régions qui n'avaient pas été touchées par l'évangélisation jusqu'en 1908. Les protestants belges envoyèrent également des missionnaires au Congo. La conclusion du chapitre montre les liens entre les efforts des missions protestantes sous l'État Indépendant du Congo et la situation actuelle du protestantisme au Congo belge.

28 février 1958.

## SAMENVATTING.

Het eerste hoofdstuk dezer studie behandelt het protestants missiewerk in Congo tussen 1878 en 1885. In het midden der negentiende eeuw bleven slechts weinig sporen over van het kristianisme dat de Portugezen der vijftiende eeuw in Neder-Congo hadden ingevoerd. In 1877 kwam STANLEY te Boma toe; het bleek toen duidelijk dat Congo een weg zou ter beschikking stellen naar Centraal Afrika. Tegen het einde der negentiende eeuw stelden de Engelse protestantse missionarissen vooral belang in Centraal Afrika. In Congo zagen zij een weg naar de grote meren, waar men hopen kon andere protestantse missionarissen te ontmoeten, vertrokken van de oostelijke kust. Met dit doel trachtten zij zo vlug mogelijk de Stanley Pool en de Boven-Congo te bereiken. De eerste missionarissen van de *Baptist Missionary Society* en de *Livingstone Inland Mission* kwamen in Neder-Congo toe, op het zelfde oogenblik als STANLEY en de eerste vertegenwoordigers van Leopold II; in 't algemeen waren zij STANLEY en de Association Internationale du Congo gunstig gestemd, terwijl zij afwijzend stonden tegenover het werk van DE BRAZZA en de Portugese eisen. Hun houding beïnvloedde de openbare mening in Engeland vóór de Conferentie van Berlijn. Het slot van het hoofdstuk behandelt het belang dezer conferentie voor de Protestantse Missies in Congo.

Het tweede hoofdstuk beschrijft de uitbreiding van het missiewerk tussen 1885 en 1900. De baptistische Engelse missionaris George GRENFELL ondernam verschillende ontdekkingsreizen met het doel Boven-Congo, Uele, Kassai en Kwango in kaart te brengen. Door de

Arabische kwestie en de tocht van STANLEY om EMIN PACHA ter hulp te komen, werd de belangstelling der missionarissen voor de noordelijke en oostelijke streken van Congo gewekt ; voortdurende verlegde de *Baptist Missionary Society* de lijn harer missiesteunpunten hoger in Boven-Congo. Nog andere missies kwamen het evangelisatiewerk in Congo steunen, meer bepaald de *Christian and Missionary Alliance*, de Amerikaanse Baptisten, de Zweedse Protestanten, en de missie van bisschop TAYLOR. De Amerikaanse Presbyterianen en de missie der gebroeders WESTCOTT richtten hun steunpunten op in Kasaï, de missie der *Plymouth Brethren*, in Katanga en de *Congo Balolo Mission*, in het stroomgebied der Lopori-Maringa. Terzelfdertijd kwamen, met de steun van koning LEOPOLD II, de katholieke missies in Congo toe.

Het derde hoofdstuk beschrijft de methodes gebruikt door de missionarissen tussen 1885 en 1908. Men begon met het oprichten van christelijke centra in heidens gebied, soms met een kern van vrijgekochte slaven. Deze methode de christenen te scheiden van de andere Afrikanen was in het begin de enig mogelijke, maar het werd spoedig noodzakelijk te trachten het christianisme in de Afrikaanse gemeenschap zelf te doen doordringen. Men stuurde toen inlandse evangelisten naar de dorpen. Het evangelisatiewerk der missionarissen ging gepaard met onderwijs en medische bijstand. Van in het begin was het de bedoeling een inlandse clerus op te leiden. Stilaan bereikten de verschillende protestantse missies een zekere eenheid.

Het vierde hoofdstuk behandelt het vraagstuk van de invloed der protestantse missionarissen in Congo op de anti-Congolese campagne in Engeland en de Verenigde Staten. Reeds in 1890 gaven zekere protestantse missionarissen hun onrust te kennen over de economische toestanden in de Onafhankelijke Congo-

staat, en tegen het einde der negentiende eeuw werd door Amerikaanse en Zweedse missionarissen in het openbaar kritiek uitgeoefend. Toch vond E. D. MOREL, toen hij rond 1902 in Engeland zijn campagne begon, de protestantse missies, en allerminst de *Baptist Missionary Society*, niet geneigd zich bij hem te voegen. De missionarissen stelden belang in de reis van de Britse consul Roger CASEMENT in 1903, en in de Onderzoekscommissie van 1904-05. Tenslotte beslisten zij ongeveer allen de campagne van MOREL te ondersteunen, tot bij de aanhechting van Congo door België in 1908.

Het laatste hoofdstuk beschrijft de nieuwe vlucht die de protestantse missies namen gedurende de eerste jaren van het Belgisch koloniaal regime. Aanvankelijk stelden zich enkele moeilijkheden; de Minister van Koloniën had graag Belgische protestanten de plaats zien innemen der buitenlandse missionarissen van Amerikaanse, Zweedse en Engelse nationaliteit. Anderzijds hadden nog verschillende Engelse en Amerikaanse missies in belgisch Congo zich gevestigd. Zij poogden posten op te richten in de uitgestrekte gebieden die tot in 1908 nog niet geëvangéliseerd waren. Ook de Belgische protestanten stuurden missionarissen naar Congo. Het besluit van het hoofdstuk toont het belang aan der inspanning van de protestantse missionarissen in de Onafhankelijke Congostaat voor de hedendaagse toestand van het protestantisme in belgisch Congo.

8 februari 1958.



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